I think of it as the timid, bashing a strawman. Part of this arises from viewing philosophy as a unitary academic field rather than an array of subjects that range from austere metascience* and ontology to more worldly ethics and political philosophy. And linguistic philosophy, too. Every field can benefit from a meta-discipline that steps outside of the field and considers it's methods, scope, aspirations, symbolic systems, and epistemic stance. As others note here, many fine scientists have engaged in meta reflections, whether they called it that or not. And I can think of very few physicists who have never engaged in a little epistemology as regards the inferences they can make from many indirect sorts of observations.
*(when I use the term "metascience, " I'm trying to show the contours of something a little more than metaphysics -- it's all that is "meta," which includes epistemology and, in fields like cosmology, some ontology as well)