Well, I took sometime rereading the thread and rethinking about my approach. I think that in refuting the OP approach we all, @iNow, @studiot, @Eise and even @TheVat agree in that some "free will" does exist although some limitation is always present because some conditions are always present prior to any possible event we consider. I'm not really sure why are we discussing so much. Seems we are trying to reach a good agreement in how that kind of "free will" could be defined.
My approach was to call it "conditioned will" stating that the called "free will" (as defined in dictionaries) actually would not exist. What I tried to mean is that a total "free will" would not exist and seems we all also agree in that, am I wrong here? Only some "degree of freedom" exist sometimes for us to make decisions.
I don't find contradictions in my approach but please feel free to mention if there is any. May be naming it "conditioned will" could lead to some confusion but as for now I cannot think in a better name for it. Is there any?
What I don't understand is just about the "compatibilists" approach of both concepts of "free will" and "determinism" being compatible presented by @Eise. For me they both cannot coexist simultaneously.
Now, @studiot claimed for a good example of the kind of free will we are all talking about and I posted the video of the dogs playing with a balloon in a beach. For me the dogs at the beach have made a choice with a high degree of freedom in their decision. There's nothing forcing the dogs to play with the balloon, isn't it? They are doing it just because they wanted to do it. I don't understand why @studiot finds it not a good example to treat.
As for @Eise question:
Everything in the universe obeys the physics' laws but we can intervene in it making changes like sending a space probe to mars so there must be some degree of freedom in the universe's "mechanics" for that be possible. I don't get what you don't understand about this.