Eise

@mistermack: You made up your mind, I made up mine.

What do we really know of Luke? Next to nothing. But historians assume that the author of the gospel of Luke and Acts are the same. No. It is taking the text 'as is'. The strategy of mythicists with text fragments very often is: It cannot be true, so it is a falsification the author did not mean what he wrote And then again Flavius mentions the execution of James: You know that different versions of the Testimonium Flavianum have been found? Some of them are shorter, and missing the obvious insertion by Christian scribes. You are preoccupied by 'your own book'. Surely you think the same of me, so let's end this fruitless discussion. Textual analysis shows that the author very probably is the same. See my link above.

Sigh... Here we go again. You do know the difference between the articles 'a' and 'the' I hope. Further, James was also called 'the brother of Christ' in Flavius Josephus Antiquities of the Jews. And I hope you know 'Cephas' is the disciple Peter. Expectations? Whose? Yours? Carrier's? The Pauline epistles are letters to churches he grounded, and meant to react on all kind of problems and theological questions that arose there. He was spreading his variation of believe what was Jesus' aim: not just reinstate the laws of Jews to them, but to prepare for the apocalypse also for the gentiles. This point was probably that which Paul quarreled about with Peter and James. I do not assume 'your book' is a scholarly work based on classical text analysis, put in the historical context in that time. Basically, you are just saying "I don't like it, so it is not true". I am not a Christian, but assuming he existed, makes a much better understanding of the development of early Christianity: the change in character of the gospels the later they are written, the bending of the story of Jesus' birth to fit the prophecies in the old Testament, the mentioning of John the baptist (also mentioned in non-Christian sources), and the mentioning of Jesus (or 'Christ') in a few non-Christian sources (including his crucifixion). So instead of taking the texts as they come to us, compare them, set them in historical context, you base your opinion on a psychological 'analysis' of Paul's character? There go many suppositions in such a stance. Above I wrote what the epistles of Paul were meant for. You find out by reading the texts, and analysing them in their context.

Yes, I was one of the participants, arguing strongly that Jesus more probably existed than not. I am missing reference here to the fact that Paul mentions meeting Peter and Jesus' brother James (in a letter that is considered genuine), and that James is also mentioned by a few (two, if I correctly remember) historians in the Roman age. There is also the strange fact that according to one gospel Jesus was simply born in Nazareth, but in Luke there is the complicated history where Joseph and Maria had to go from Nazareth to Bethlehem, obvious bending history to get it in sync with the prediction that said the Messiah would be born in Bethlehem. Such a bending would not be necessary if the story was a myth from the beginning. Most classical historians agree that the evidence hints at a real existence of Jesus. But 'hints' does not mean 'proves'. Read e.g. Bart Ehrman, Did Jesus really exist?. But the picture of who Jesus really was, is very different from how he is pictured by (modern) Christianity. He seems to have been an apocalyptic preacher, expecting to see the 'youngest day' (the Apocalypse) on Earth (not in heaven!) in his own lifetime, or at least very soon. I will not repeat every argument here, there are many posts of me in that thread.

I hope you see that you exactly make my point: as I said earlier that it makes no difference if a traffic jam consists of horse cards, diesel or gas cars, for a computer it makes no functional (or logical) difference if it implemented in a completely different way. I happen to work, as most of us, with computers that are transistor based, not gear based, but to write my programs I do not need any knowledge of the computer's physical principles. So another way of seeing this, is that emergent properties have some independence of its physical substrate. No question, a physical substrate is absolutely necessary, but there are many cases where different kinds of substrates can do the job. I do not exactly get your example of day and night. Not knowing the cause of a phenomenon does not mean it is emergent. It is essential that the emergent phenomena arise from their components, mostly many of them (molecules for the Gas Laws, neurons for mental phenomena, vehicles for traffic jams, etc). Definitely.

Yes, you may. Your introduction from this other 'natural kind', D2O makes your world view more precise. None, if you ask it in this way. But I would say, based on the regularities we see (perihelion precession e.g.), we know there must be at least some mathematical explanation. It is 'just' a theoretical insight that differential geometry does the trick.

You can only see if a phenomenon is emergent, when you can explain it from simpler constituents. My hunge with the Schrödinger equation is that it is not emergent, given that physicists already do not not agree if it is just a calculation algorithm, or is ontic. The Schrödinger equation already 'lies deeper' then our direct experience. E.g. we cannot observe its phase. We can only observe that it describes our observations statistically correctly. Well, since we know it we can derive the Gas Laws from statistical mechanics, we know they are emergent. (But, btw, I understand swansont's doubts that it is a good example of emergency, because the effects of more or less bouncing particles in a bottle can be linked to the macroscopic pretty directly; I like my example of the traffic jam better). Do you mean 'light' and 'darkness', or your seeing of them. (Hopefully Koti is not around... ) I nowhere implied that! Of course, my expectation is that we live in 'natural world' through and through. If somebody would not accept natural explanations, he is simply enforced to introduce new metaphysical entities, like souls, or God. So yes, I am interested in neurology, to a certain level, but for certain questions we do not have to know much about it. That's fine. It surely will pop again when some newbie starts a new thread, saying 'We are determined so we have no free will!'. Then the great free will defender will do his work again (if he is not too stressed at that moment...). No, you did not understand me me correctly. I only said it is possible to describe phenomena at a higher level than its composite parts, not that our understanding of the phenomena incredibly increases when we know how they are rooted in more fundamental parts. The other way round: there are things we, as humans, simply cannot understand at its fundamental level. I do not need quantum physics when I write programs for my databases, but the workings of computers is only understandable from quantum theoretical technology (PNP layers, and so). (Here you see an interesting example 'the other way round'. First there were the 'quantum discoveries', then the question 'what could you do with it', build a transistor, put millions of them together, et voila, a computer!).

Trying to challenge me? I think we can talk about emergence when following condition applies: The phenomena can be described without knowing or needing from what they exactly emerge. A few examples: the gas laws of Boyle and Gay-Lussac: without knowing that gas is made of flying around particles these laws cna be fixed empirically (but not explained, of course, then we have to get to statistical mechanics, assuming smallest particles bouncing around) One of my favourite examples: traffic jams. These can be mathematically described without knowing if we are talking about horse cards, diesel or gas cars And yes, of course, free will. The problem of free will and determinism can be decided without reference to the brain, neurons and neurotransmitters. Just take determinism for granted, and ask if in a determined world free will is possible. That simply means that neurologists have nothing to add, if you take determinism for granted. The exact details are of no importance. About time as an emergent phenomenon I have nothing to say: ask Carlo Rovelli, or Lee Smolin... It is of course highly speculative. But a fact is that all our established theories can work very well without knowing if time is emergent or not. Wow, 4 weeks later. Sorry....

Sorry for neglecting the forum for such a long time. It is a stressful time (corona (homeoffice) and stress at work), and I seldom have the peace to do more 'thinking' for this forum. Here an observation about this topic: I wonder if it is really so astonishing that math is so effective describing the world around us. In my opinion we need only two aspects of nature to more or less guarantee that we can use math to describe it: regularities in natural phenomena, to begin with simple phenomena like the yearly rising of the Nile, sun sets etc. I cannot imagine a regularity that cannot described mathematically. If somebody can, please give an example. the existence of 'natural kinds', like water molecules. Simply said, if you acquired knowledge about one water molecule, you know it is valid for all water molecules. Life would would be impossible without these. So just add the smallest bit of anthropic reasoning (if above aspects of nature would not be the case, no observers could exist) and your are done. No?

What Studiot is aiming at, is that a space-time diagram is not a plot, but a map. However, you cannot put time into a drawn map. So it makes sense to use time multiplied by a velocity to get a distance. 'c' is used because we already know from relativity the importance of 'space-time distance', which is similar to the normal 3-D distance in space, but not the same: instead of the 'space version' of Pythagoras (s2 = x2 + y2 + z2 ) we have s2 = x2 + y2 + z2 - (ct)2, or in just one space dimension s2 = x2 - (ct)2, which means that distances are distorted compared to a normal map of Euclidian space. Still, it can be use to create a mechanical device that transforms distances in space.time correctly (see e.g. the space-time globe).

Just too late to edit it. Read: There is no 'given time of the universe' in a block universe.

Yes, for the simple reason that the space-time distance between two events is the same for all observers. However, there are many combinations of x, y, z, and t that give the same space-time distance. What the values of the coordinates are depends on the movement of the observer relative the train. So asking what the length of the train is without knowing how the observer moves relative to the train, is impossible. BTW, that you did not know about this space-time distance, tells me you do not understand what is meant with the 'block universe'. And if you have a wrong picture of it, your conclusions will be wrong too. Otherwise you would also not say something like this: There is no 'given time of the universe' is a block universe.

What I am about to say was probably already said in several variations, but you did not get it yet. So here my try: You cannot simply imagine the 'block' universe as a simple extension of a 3-dimensional block: just add another dimension and voila. The block universe is not a block with just 4 space dimensions instead of 3. Time stands in relation with the space dimensions, but in another way. This is especially true for Pythagoras theorem. So the metric of the block universe is not: s2 = x2 + y2 + z2 + t2 (Invalid!) When this were the case you would be probably right. But you are then just extending the Euclidian metric with one dimension. Instead you must use the Minkowski metric, in which 'Pythagoras' is: s2 = x2 + y2 + z2 - ct2 This is the so called 'space-time' distance, and it is a distance all observers agree upon: all observers in the block universe agree on its value. Now a god-like high-dimensional alien creature, looking at our block universe would take that as the distance between two events (e.g. the train's passing of a point, first event is the passing of the locomotive, second event is the passing of the last wagon). However when an observer in the block universe prays to the alien, and asks 'how long is that train really in my 3 dimensional space?', the alien must first ask (or look) how the observer is moving in respect to the train. Only then he can answer the question. But the answer will be different for another observer. This is also true for an observer that is in the same inertial frame of reference as the train. There are conventional reasons to take the length of the train as the length measured in the frame of reference of the train, but these are not physical reasons.

I think one should not see philosophy too much as a separate subject, but looking in a special way to a subject. When a physicist is trying to find a particle at CERN he is doing physics. When a physicist is trying to find a new theory he is doing physics. Both activities are about physical reality. However, when it e.g. turns out that a conceptual framework does not work anymore (e.g. rise of quantum theory in the 1920s), when there are questions about the validity of certain methods, or about a demarcation criterion for science (e.g. string theory, multiverse) then one is doing philosophy. And one does not necessarily need a philosophical education for that: the interest in conceptual clarity and the intellectual capacity to do so, are enough. Latter should not be a real problem for physicists. First of course is really a question of what one is interested in. It's not everybody's thing. So not philosophers should push scientists to philosophical questions, so to speak from another discipline; the need for doing philosophy should arise in themselves because e.g. methodological or conceptual problems. Philosophers might be helpful in methodological and conceptual discussion, they are well trained in such discussions.

It has an easy answer: consciousness has no influence for a given setting of the experiment. Consciousness might decide what kind of experiment you are doing (e.g. a 'which way' experiment, or a 'phase' experiment), but once chosen the experimental setup, consciousness has no influence whatsoever. The only 'real problem' I see is the problem of QM at large: the measurement problem. (± collapse of the wave function). Right. Physics present basically 2 options: classical determinism or quantum probability. Both do not work together with the idea of libertarian free will. Whatever free will 'really is', that your actions are random does not belong to any reasonable concept of free will. So QM is no help here. But one can define free will pretty clearly. One of the reasons however that these discussions are so difficult is that people often refuse to stick to a single definition. Above I mentioned one kind, libertarian free will, but there are other definitions. Just to clarify Incompatibilism: determinism and free will are incompatible a. Hard determinism: determinism is true. therefore we have no free will b. Libertarian free will: determinism cannot be completely true, because we have a direct experience of free will Compatibilism: there is no contradiction between determinism and free will a. Conceptual compatibilism: mind, motivations, beliefs, actions, etc are a complete different way to look at our human world than looking with a physical (chemical, biological, neurological) eye to humans. Both are valid in their domains, and you shouldn't mix them up. b. 'Hard compatibilism' (I never found a real name for this): Determinism is a necessary condition for free will. This means for 'real free will' that the world must be 'sufficient determinism'; with other words too much randomness will make our character and with that our actions to chaos. 1b is inconsistent (we would need non-physical causes: what would those be? The soul?) 2a might hide an inconsistency. But 1a and 2b seem consistent to me. But both must be explained in much more detail before one can start a fruitful discussion. But predictability has nothing to do with free will. Free will means just that I am able to act according my motivations and beliefs (to the latter belong justified true beliefs, i.e. knowledge). You mean "Where does that leave libertarian free will?" Yep, nowhere. But there is no contradiction with the compatibilist concept of free will. And btw, I think libertarian free will would be worse than wrong from a none-dualistic viewpoint.

You're welcome. Therefore my reactions. But before I start, until now I never declared what my position is: I only defended that Davy asked reasonable questions and also had reasonable arguments. So, here we go: I have no idea what 'true nature' of anything means. For me it is the believer in the 'true nature' of anything, who should tell me what the method is by which she can declare this is a justified claim. I am pretty sure that most philosophers would shoot holes in such a justification. So my answer would be the same as in the Zen koan 'Does a dog has Buddha nature?'. I agree only with the first part of your sentence: the minimum one can say about scientific theories is that they are useful. I think one could say that science also aims for truth, but surely not in the sense of 'The Truth', but for a simpler concept of truth: that they can predict observable phenomena. 'Reality' cannot be an aim, that is a category error. Theories are 'language entities', not the reality they describe. See my answer on 1. We simply cannot know. So, no. Here we agree, as long a we do not fall for the illusion of 'absolute certainty'. In limited contexts we can have absolute certainty, but not if we start talking about the 'true nature of things', or the 'Truth about the Universe'. No, see my reaction at 4. True propositions are surely possible, 'reality' only as far as it appears to us. It is impossible to determine that we found it. It presupposes that we can look' behind the scenes'. We can't. Ah, well. It is because of what you wrote before: These are all more or less practical results. And that is not trivial for me. The use humanity makes of technology has given us very much, no question. But it also gave us a lot of problems, and some of them might kill us all (but that would be another discussion). See it as an ambiguity in my position about science: on one side we are on the brink of destroying ourselves because we do not make reasonable use of the results of science; on another side, science is warning us about this fact, and shows us possible ways out; and on still another side, as I said before, I love the insights science gives us about the world we live in.

Don't get me wrong, I am highly interested in physics and astronomy, why else would I have taken them as subsidiary subjects in my study? A difference between you and me is that I like the deep insights that physics deliver (I think my notorious winner is Noether's theorem, but there is more of course), less the results. Technology, the immediate child of science, has also given a lot of problems, for which we should not close our eyes. In Einstein's words: Davy's question, and why I chimed in, aims, as I said several times, on the selfunderstanding of physics. He wanted to discuss that with physicists here.

He doesn't in this case, at least not literally. Philosophy could give rise to valid results (like the 'scientific method') on one side, and spout nonsense on the other. He obviously sees Davy's point as philosophical nonsense. I am just wondering a little that he accepts people who studied physics as authorities in the area of physics, but people who have studied philosophy not as authorities on philosophy. Surely that does not mean that my opinions are always better (truer?) than other's, including not-philosophers, but it means that I very well know what is done in philosophy, and what is qualitative good philosophy, and what isn't.

Self claimed? Must I send you a copy of my certificate from the university of Utrecht, the Netherlands? (Subsidary subjects, btw, physics, astronomy and mathematics). I'll stop here. You are simply not interested in a substantive discussion.

I am wondering why you do not answer dimreepr's questions. You are just, rather aggressively, refusing to answer them. You are just one step away from saying 'I am right because this is the way I think'. That cannot become a fruitful discussion. I am especially surprised about [1]: you could just have copy/pasted this 'old argument' from the article, and we would know at least what you are talking about. Ah you know the truth! I havn't yet had time to read the whole article, as even in lockdown, I do have other interests and things to do. Yes, you are right, I don't believe the arguments put forward are valid and find far more logic in the reasons put by Krauss and others. My aim, as you put it is simply to express my lay person's opinion, that the practical nature of science, and the theoretical physics aspect, has crossed over into regions that were once the sole domain of philoosphy. Why do you see that as sneering at philosophers? Yes, I have been provocative, and I make no apologies for that, as the same can be said for others here that have taken the opposite stance. I will attempt to read the whole article later today or tomorrow, but I'm pretty sure it won't change my mind, just as I'm pretty sure if I scrounged the Internet and dug up all the arguments and more reputable people agreeing with Krauss, won't change your PoV either. You see: you do not exchange arguments. You share your gut feelings. And I do not expect you to change you PoV: I want an exchange of arguments. Your position "the practical nature of science, and the theoretical physics aspect, has crossed over into regions that were once the sole domain of philoosphy" is a perfectly sensible viewpoint, and we can discuss that. (Even if I think that the metaphorical language you use leaves much room for interpretation, and it would be interesting to flesh that out). That has nothing to with your sneers and 'bon-mots', and these help nothing in an exchange of arguments. Yes, I know the word, And it introduces an ambiguity that you obviously did not notice. This is what you said: Possible readings: science has historically grown from philosophy Being foundational to science, science is (logically/conceptually/..) dependent on philosophical premises. I know you adhere to 1, therefore I assume this would be the correct reading. However, the word 'still' makes it to a pretty open door. When it yesterday was true that Caesar crossed the Tiber, then it still is true today. That is normal with historical facts. And because it is an open door, interpretation 2 seems a more viable interpretation. E.g. you could mean that the scientific method is a product of philosophy, and therefore philosophy is still the foundation of science. What is it? 1 or 2? Or maybe even both? Nope, it is not dishonest. Nobody suggested that different opinions about the relation between science and 'reality' has something to do with scientists being wrong ('mavericks') and those that are correct. They don't. But you can't blame somebody with a philosophical background, like Davy, to be interested in this tension, and asking scientists here what their take is. Throwing your truths at him does not help much. I think something like sarcasm and provocation. dimreepr also noted that you are defending your scientismic (somebody who adheres to some form of scientism) views with a nearly religious zeal. As long as they are also unknowledgable about philosophy that won't help. e.g., I reacted on your Weinberg citation, but I have not seen that you reacted on it. Are you just going to use the argument of authority? First, I used this video snippet already several times, but against 'physics-crackpots', especially when they say something like 'I can't accept it' about QM. And it is really very humorous. But! You nearly see how Feynman is wrestling with the correct formulation: first he says 'this is how nature works'. Then later on he says 'we looked at it, and this is what it looks like'. So first he sounds like a realist, but then he takes a more careful stance, as e.g. in his magnetism video (that if I remember correctly you also have linked in at least on posting).

Well, at least it was not my intention to suggest something like that. Of course. I am also not continuously thinking about the basics of relational databases. Only when somebody asks me. (Did you know relational databases can meta-describe themselves? No Gödelian problems.) I have nothing against people doing their work. It is just that I like them a bit more when they also reflect on what they are doing. I stand corrected. It is true, when thinking about physics I (as possibly many others) are thinking about the 'front lines'. With dimreepr I ask: which argument? I assume you think the argument is not valid: so why not? And why don't you really read the whole article? (Or my posting). Are you überhaupt interested in the topic? Or is your only aim to present sneers to philosophers? With foundation I assume you mean 'historically grown out of philosophy'? I have some problems with your word 'still' in the last sentence. Now I think you have not understand one single word of what I am saying. I'll tell you, the physics community will never speak with one voice. Not while there are 'mavericks' but simply because they are coming to different conclusions. And that is because they are philosophical questions. And if they are good thinkers, they will give nuanced answers, that possibly do not conform to answers of other good thinkers. Some might even say "I don't know", but have much more insight than the simple-minded who just shoots from the hip, or even refuse to think about it. Sorry for calling your god for what he simply is: a (very?) good physicist, with no understanding of philosophy. Please read the article you linked yourself. If you think that a philosopher (I at least am one by education) is not capable to see that Krauss is a lousy philosopher, then you cannot be helped. No. Only 1m 14s. I think I am saying the same, just in another way. I just wanted to point out that because of that philosophy is not useless: some of the best physicists are also good philosophers, when they are concerned with the basic problems of their discipline. (But not all...)

Now it would be nice if you would comment on the arguments in that link. Or on my old posting I linked to. Then we could get a real discussion, instead of making sneering remarks to each other. Just to note: one of the most important viewpoints in this article is the answer on the OP question I began with: philosophy and physics have different topics. And, as I hope you also really read the article yourself: Albert really is a philosopher and a physicist. So it would be worth to read his criticism on Krauss, who is 'just' a good physicist. Just to be clear: I do not approve of the cynical remarks of Davy ('seemingly crazy' as just one example). But I think he laid his finger on a sore point: physicists do not speak with one voice in this matter, sometimes even a single physicist spouts contradicting views. I don't know if somebody noticed in a previous posting of mine in this thread: in the 'Magnetism' video of Feynman makes very good points about such 'what is' questions. On the other side, in his QED series, he states clearly: 'This is how nature really works'. If he would have been consistent, he should have said something like 'this description really works'. From your Weinberg quote: To answer the question: in first order, no, of course not. Different topics, y'know. Physicists study nature, and try to develop theories that in the end describe physical observations. However, in second order, sure they can profit from philosophy. Not just by knocking on the doors of the philosophy department and ask for help, but by reflecting on the basics of their methods. Is there no heavy discussion among physicists if the idea of the multiverse is still science? Is there no heavy discussion among physicists if it useful to spend so much resources on string theory, because it has not made one single empirically testable prediction? These are not discussions about how nature 'really works' or 'correctly described' or how you want to name it. These are philosophical discussions. I can only add, that from my experience, one can profit having some philosophical background when discussing such topics. Not because one finds ready answers in philosophy, but because it gives a mindset to improve the quality of the discussion. I do not plead that physicists should simply hear on what philosophers have to say; I plead to name some activities of physicists for what they really are: philosophy. Eise says 'might be'. This is a very ill quantified statement. A Philosopher's statement (no offence intended) I think you misunderstood my point. The sentence is an introduction to a simple thought experiment, which is described in the sentence thereafter.

The one with no bias throweth the first stone. You do not know about philosophy, but you recognise the chaff? Sorry, but now you stretched your neck too much. This is hubris, beecee. If philosophy or semantics is not your thing, all right. But be honest about it: because you are more interested in physics and cosmology, not all arguments that modern philosophers bring are worthless. Funny... no philosopher between them, only people with an 'astro-physical' background. Yes, back to the topic! My answer to dimreepr, if you remember, was that they have different topics. Did you read the link to my posting? If you read it, we can go on.

Yes. And please, no funny meant bon mots anymore. I think it is a word, but I am not a native English speaker... And yes, many people have their philosophical phases, in which they reflect on their basic assumptions. I don't see any pedantry here. (Except maybe someone who thinks he contributes to a discussion by dropping (the same) bon mots again and again). And philosophy (and most of the sciences) are impossible if we do not clearly define our concepts. 'Beliefs' can be true or false. Knowledge is true as per definition. So you correctly use 'belief' here: You said that we that 'we still do not know the true nature of gravity'. Which implicitly means we might one day. But how will we recognise we did? Therefore I introduced my example of the electron, of which we seem to know very much (Dirac equation, QED), of which Feynman proudly tells us that the anomalous magnetic dipole moment of the electron can be calculated until an unprecedented precision, and in the same lecture says 'this is how nature really works'. So, if there is nothing to discover about the electron anymore, do we know its true nature? I ask you, because you seem to adhere to the idea that we can know the true nature of (at least certain) things. I expect arguments (this is the philosophy forum!), not just be mentioned pedantic or a semantic ant fucker (OK, last two words are mine, but I assume you know what I mean.) There certainly exists a spectrum of opinions on what exactly science 'delivers': knowledge, models of reality, descriptions of reality, truths, insight, just calculation tools, etc. It is clear as day that different views about it also exist under physicists. Or even worse, some people might even speak with more than one voice, not noting that these voices are contradicting each other. And then such a irritant philosopher comes along and points them at that...

You said: That what you call 'philosophy of how to build an atom bomb' is just a higher level description of how an atomic bomb works. It explains the basic physical principles of the atomic bomb. It is definitely not philosophy.