Eise

Don't expect too much from me... Ethics never was a main topic for me. I would say, as any sensible person, just the risk of giving capital punishment to an innocent should be reason enough to refrain from it. And AFAIK deterrence seldom works. So I think incarceration might be the best solution, in the first place simply because we put somebody away who has proven to be dangerous, in the second place we, i.e. society must attach consequences to people who do not want to play by the rules. However, if a society does not take the chance to rehabilitate the offender, it is not much use. Just putting somebody in jail, specially when it is overfilled, you create offenders and possibly more radical ones too. In this respect, it seems to me that there is a huge difference between prisons here in Europe, and in the USA. Most of the times rehabilitation is the aim. Therefore we might take some risks, letting out somebody who will still act criminally (which hurts extremely when its is murder on innocent people), but I think a lot more crimes are committed by ex-inmates who were radicalised by their life in prison. To get a glimpse of the difference between the USA and Scandinavia, there is a short series about 'the Norden'. This is the episode about prisons (the others are just as interesting): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfEsz812Q1I To get back at capital punishment: there are also examples of murderers who felt much remorse about their killing, and ended up meeting the family of the victim, or became meditators, even meditation teachers to their fellow inmates. These are pretty extreme examples of course, but just killing a criminal, or putting him/her in jail purely as punishment I find useless, and not something a civilised society should do. Punishment yes, but for the betterment of offender and society. A loose-loose is the last we want, no?

Then the world is absurd. See a ball and feathers falling in vacuum:

Wow, 'sphere of existence'... Where can I find that sphere? I did not say that daydreaming or its interpretations do not exist. I said that their existence is different from that of physical objects, because when there were no humans (or other similar conscious entities), there would not be daydreaming.

Janus is right, it was an argument from Galileo against the Aristotelian view on falling objects. In Aristotelian physics, an object twice as heavy as another, falls twice as fast. Galileo's argument works against that viewpoint, but not against Newton's, in which all objects fall with the same velocity (or better acceleration), independent on their mass, and therefore independent on their weight in the same gravitation field. So you are physically and historically wrong. Just to add, Galileo is the first person known, who said that all objects fall the same way, independent of their mass.

Sigh. Are you intentionally misunderstanding me? What when there is no Queen of Britain? Then there are no balancing policies of her either. They do not depend on me, or you, but definitely on HM Elizabeth. Electrons on the other hand, would continue to exist even if no human would be there to detect them. So different kind of things exist in different ways. That is my whole point. There is no general EXISTENCE, except if you use such wavy definitions that I used as a reaction on Alex Mercer's post . Existence is not an attribute, as being white, or being rich, etc.

I fully agree, but you are not reacting on what I actually said. And you have not refuted anything, you have just contradicted some view without a single argument. Just look at it this way: if something, principally, cannot play a role in our lives, can you then say it exists? And then I am not looking at historical accidents. E.g. a photon produced by a star in a galaxy billions light years away, arriving at one of its planets surely does not play a role in our lives. But photons definitely effect our lives very much (how else could you read this?). So photons exist, even if we happen not to observe them because they do not reach us. Your view seems exactly what I warned about: to reduce the meaning of 'existence' to one category (physical existence in this case). But I mentioned many more. If we take your view, 'existence' meaning 'existing independently', then a whole lot of 'things' we normally see as existing, wouldn't: holes, shadows, juridical laws, laws of nature, institutions, thoughts, feelings. None of these exist independently. If I were Descartes, I would say, yes, namely the mind. But I am not. ('Res extensa' i.e. everything that takes place in space vs 'res cogitans', the mind). I just reacted to Studiot's question, which was about time. But surely you are right that much what applies to time, also applies to space. A possible answer to your question could be 'mathematical truths'. But that, as said, is a complete new topic in itself. I do not want to go there now.

Sure, for many 'things' existence means 'existing in time'. But there are a few exceptions, which I think I mentioned already: mathematical truths, laws of nature to name just two. And as said, time itself.

Sorry, I am too lazy to look up the exact place where you made the link. But I think only for some categories existence and time are related. Surely for physical processes, but it becomes difficult when you think about laws of nature, and then that which I left out: mathematics. And then think about time itself. There you could get in a definitional loop. (And if this does not fit to your link, then please refer to it, or say it again, maybe a little bit different after my exposé.)

'Existence' is a word with 9 letters. And if you want to know about the concept behind the word, I think I showed that it depends on the context: existence of what? If you want a general definition you would get something like 'something exists if it can play a role in somebody's life'. And here you see something else: 'existence' is the substantivation of the verb 'to exist'. So the existence of what are you interested in? To give again another example: space and time. One could call them the 'stage' on which causal processes occur (Pity that Markus is away now, he surely had to say something about it from the viewpoint of general relativity...). But they themselves do not exist in the same way as physical objects or processes exist in space and time. Space does not punch a ball, neither does time. Asking for THE general, meaning of EXISTENCE, leads to nothing other than all kind of philosophical apories, getting people confused. And if you insist on one meaning, it will lead to some bad metaphysics.

Yes, pity isn't it? Because the context in which somebody declares the existence of something is essential. 'Things' (the quotes are there to do a warm-up for what is coming...) exist in totally different ways, depending on the kind of 'things' we are talking about. So let's try a few examples, with my comments. Existence of a ball This would fall under what I would call physical existence. It means that a ball can exist independently from its immediate surroundings, and can play a role in causal relationships. It can be moved by another physical object, and it's movement can move other objects Existence of rain Rain is an example of a process. One could defend, a bit exaggerated, that if the above description of 'existence' is the only correct one, then rain does not exist: what exists are water drops (physical objects), falling down from clouds. But I think this comparison shows at least a difference with the previous one: without some physically existing things, processes cannot exist. Existence of a hole Holes cannot exist independently. E.g. if you have a cannon ball, you can completely remove all its surroundings, and it is still a cannon ball (fire it up to the sky with more than escape velocity, and it will further exist in vacuum). Remove the complete surroundings of a hole, and there is no hole anymore. 'Holes' are more or less a byproduct of what we conceive as normal. Say we have a golf ball, rolling over the lawn. The hole in which it drops is on one side very real: in the end, dropping is a physical process. But physically it is better described as the absence of supporting ground, as it is around the hole. Having the hole under the ball, the ball van continue its natural movement, which is following gravity. Existence of the one Ring One could say it has narrative existence. In cases of stories, e.g. one can even reach some kind of objective existence in these stories. One can answer questions about an imaginary object, and the answer can be right or wrong. "Does the one Ring of Sauron has a jewel in it?" If you read the Lord of the Rings, you know it hasn't. Does the Ring exist? Well, not physically, in our physical world. But it definitely exists in the context of the story. Existence of rules and laws Does there exist a law that you should drive on the right side of the road? In many countries (sorry Studiot ;-)), yes. But such 'human laws' exist in the sense that people made it, and act accordingly (and might be fined if they do not). Existence of laws of nature That is pity enough a very tough one. It is clear (otherwise science would not be possible) that there exist (!) regularities in nature. However the laws of nature are our formulations of these regularities. And we can be wrong about these formulations. But one could say they exist, at least in the sense that scientists discuss about them, technicians apply them, and describe at least partially the observations and experiments we have done. Existence of other cultural phenomena Does science exist? Science, from the viewpoint of 'existence', is a meaningful conglomerate of all the above. I think we could make this list longer and longer (I left out mathematics, that would become a topic in itself). But moral of the story is: there is no general concept of 'existence'. But in our daily life, using the concept, it often is pretty clear what we mean, and is not problematic at all. Seeing the concept 'existence' as something having a well defined meaning, leads to all kind of philosophical diseases. I think I have said nothing revolutionary in this post, but a lot of the confusion in such kinds of 'fundamental questions' arise because the seemingly simple structure of language put a spell on our way of thinking: in this case 'one word - one concept'). Philosophy is a way to free us from these kind of spells. Just having a philosophical opinion (or better an opinion about a philosophical subject) doesn't help a bit in reaching intellectual clarity. Psst... I think it is your Avatar...

That would be the same as arguing physics is BS, because there are so many crackpot theories (see our Speculations section). One should look what professional, academic philosophers have to say about 'existence', not at philosophical 'hip shots' of people who are not knowledgeable about what philosophy has to say about the topic.

Hi Markus, This is regrettable for us. I will miss your expert knowledge on relativity, your honesty, and your nearly endless friendly reactions, even on the most weird ideas that are posted here. This friendliness is already a clear sign that you are on the right track. I also like very much that you showed us all that there is no contradiction between the spiritual path you are going, and a scientific world view. And not to forget, your openness on your autism, and your setting straight some misunderstandings about being on the autistic spectrum from your own experience. Somehow I nearly feel like I found a kind of friend, possibly I am not the only one that feels that way. I take it as a sign that you are progressing on your path, you are not the first Buddhist I encounter (in real life and on the internet) that gives me such a feeling. So it is an empirical statement . I like the idea of sending you a 'post card' So here is mine: I've been camping here on my own for nearly 2 weeks (in 1991, but went there a few other times), on the Great Blasket Island at the end of the Dingle peninsula; between the two unroofed houses a bit right from the centre of the picture. I wish you all the best, and hope very much get further on your path. A deep 'gasho' for you from me. I hope we will meet again, here, or even once in real life. Who knows? Eise

Thank you for your welcome. But I do not know yet if I am 'back'. It is just that, due to corona measures, I am now working at home (since October), and for some reason it is tiring me more than working in the office. Then additionally to my work, posting meaningful postings here is just another task, instead of fun. So no promise when I chime in again. But be aware! I am still reading the forum nearly every day. And because this was such a clearly real philosophical theme, I had to write my little exposé. No, not necessarily. And as a a heuristic principle, not a methodological one, it is not the 'way to truth'. And it is also not very precise: how does one count assumptions, or entities involved in your scientific theories. Ockhams razor is helpful, but not decisive for the soundness of a scientific theory. I think one should not use Ockhams razor outside a scientific context. (Weren't you an engineer?) So I cannot subscript to your position: You do not compare scientific theories here. And different ways to tackle a practical scientific target, are perfectly fine. Classical mechanics is a great example. It doesn't matter for the outcome if you use the laws of Newton directly, or use the Lagrangian, or whatever. In the end, it is already proven that they are empirically, even mathematically, equivalent. So in the end, both approaches are belong to the same theory. Just pick the method that leads you to the conclusion in the easiest way. That sounds nicer, yes. I also hope it means exactly the same. You can always correct my English, in the end, it is not my mother tongue. And speaking the noblest of English on my dying bed sounds a a nice idea!

I think it is important too see what Ockham's razor is: it is a heuristic principle, not a criterion for truth. A fine modern translation would be that if you have two theories that explain exactly the same empirical phenomena, then the one which less assumptions is the better one. As an example: the Lorentz transformations were already derived by... eh... Lorentz, and later again by Poincaré, and again later by Einstein. But Einstein's version comes away with only 2 assumptions (relativity and the invariance of the speed of light). But there is an ambiguity in the different formulations of Ockham's razor. If you take the one mostly attributed to Ockham: "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity" it is about what we assume about reality. If we can explain phenomena without using God, angels, the luminiferious aether, or a preferred frame of reference, then they should not play any role in our theories. On the other side, we have such vague formulations, like "Plurality must never be posited without necessity". We could also apply, as I did above, on the number of assumptions of your theory. An example where both versions come in conflict is the multiverse. On one side, it posits the existence of many (infinite?) separate universes which is against "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity"; on the other side it may have less assumptions, because we do not have to explain why the laws of nature are as we find them in our universe. And then there is Einstein's formulation, something like "A scientific theory must be as simple as possible, but not simpler.". So as a heuristic principle, I would translate it as: if you want to explain a phenomenon, then start with the simplest possible hypothesis; if it doesn't work out, take a more complicated hypothesis, etc. So it is a way of selecting theories you want to probe first. But in all cases, experiment and observation decide if you are right or not. If a complicated theory works empirically, and simpler ones don't, the complicated theory is preferred.

Wait what? We don't know the same thing in case of determinism, if everything was pre-determined by origin of the universe. Than we could not have done otherwise, unless we determined that origin as well (by our free will) and that's the origination problem! How is compatibilism empirical, while libertarianism is not? If it was, science could prove free will exists, but it currently cannot! If I have a choice between A and B (say I take the bus or a taxi) these are clearly two options. Now I choose A. Then I am justified to say that 'I could have done B'. Say option C is not open (e.g. by train, because the nearest railway station is even further than the destination where I want to go to). So it is in exactly the same way that I can say 'I could not have done C'. To say it a bit more technically: modal sentences can make just as much sense in a determined world as in a not (completely) determined world, and they have a truth value, just as any other empirical sentence. 'I could have done C' is false, 'I could have done B' is true. I've seen that PBS video. Predictability has nothing to do with free will. Get that 'ultimate' out of your head. Nobody needs 'ultimate responsibility'. It is a chimera, just as libertarian free will. Yep it sounds absurd, that's one of reasons - why i think free will doesn't exist. Metaphorical speech eh??? But we know empirically - we didn't choose our preferences. How is that metaphorical, if premise is based on true empirical observation? And is true - that we didn't choose our preferences. If i do something, because of my preferences (i didn't choose) how is that free will? You don't take 'orders' from your 'origin'. That is metaphorical speech. Yeah, but sounds to me incomplete. How do i do that? How do i choose out of nothing? You choose according to who you are, what is your character, your knowledge, your motivations, wishes, visions; and according to what you observe, anticipated possible reactions of others etc etc.

Bold by me. Why is normal responsibility not enough? Why should it be 'ultimate'. We are also not 'ultimate free'. That is exactly my point: we cannot, formulated a bit more absurdly 'want what we want'. But surely we can do what we want, and that is more or less all what free will is. Really, a concept of free will that requires we should be able to want what we want is a theoretical and a practical absurdity. I think this has to do with the Christian background of our culture: that God, as our perfect creator does no evil, so it must come from humans alone. I.e. by being able to what they want, they are ultimate responsible. (When it was not 'ultimate' He would also be a bit responsible' for our evil deeds.) This is bad theology, and even worse philosophy.

That is wrong already. Assuming you mean that 'objects you drop from a tower, without pushing them in any direction', due to the earth's rotation, objects will not fall exactly straight. The top of a (high) tower has a higher speed then the surface of the earth. So an object will follow a curve, closing in to a straight line more and more during its fall. In your citation there is no mentioning of forces, only of movements. The example I gave above might be measurable, but I think that the rest of the movements does not contribute big enough to the deviation of a straight line to be measured.

Well, you cannot say from such a distance that they are the same birds. I looked at the video. But at 6:44 the helicopter is going downwards, and at 7:41/7:42 it is going up again. And yes, a small group of birds is flying along, in both cases from left to right at about the same height. But there are a lot of birds that do that, e.g. cormorants. I see them a lot in front of my house, and if they just want to move from one location on the water to another, they always fly about 15 cm above the water surface. That the landscape is the same is obvious: their telescope is standing on a tripod. On the other side, Audio/video/photo material on itself is never proof of anything. You have to trust the people that they exactly did what they show you. And in times of deep fakes this is more true than ever. What I missed was that they would do a simple calculation: with the distances and heights they measured, one could estimate the size of the earth (assuming it is a sphere).

Yes, it is obvious that you are very confused. So why did you do so long as if you understand what 'base' means here? Let's try to explain it 'my way'. You must distinguish between the designator and the designated. E.g. when I ask you what a chair is, you could say 'it is a piece of furniture, that is designed to sit on'. You would feel pretty fooled if I would answer 'no, it is a word of 5 letters'. (I should have written then 'chair', between single quotes, to make clear that I meant the designator, not the designated. But hey, I wanted to fool you.) On the other side the same designated can be designated in another language, e.g. in Dutch as 'stoel'. Science usually does not change when you change the language. It is the same with numeric bases: on one side there are the numbers, at the other side there are their representations. Mathematics, and therefore all sciences using mathematics, are of course independent of the number base you use to express the numbers. Here a list of 'objects' and some translations: Chair Stoel translation in Dutch 666 29A translation in hexadecimal 666 1232 translation in octal 666 1010011010 translation in binary 666/18 = 37 29A/12 = 25 translation in hexadecimal 666/18 = 37 1232/22 = 45 translation in octal 666/18 = 37 1010011010/10010 = 100101 translation in binary So in the second column, we have only translations. The maths stays exactly the same, just a the physical characteristics of a chair are exactly the same as een stoel. We just have to keep an eye on which language we use, and be consistent. As an example: if we would think that '1232/22 = 45' is written in decimal, it would be wrong: in decimal 1232/22 = 56. But those are just symbols. You should always be aware of what they mean. You meant tan( #$@ ) = @ (assuming the last symbol in your 'language' stands for '0' ).

Yes, indeed, very sad.

If it would be so easy to observe the effects of gravitational waves, why do you think this 'discovery' would not already be done earlier? The first (indirect!) proof of gravitational waves was with binary neutron stars: very, very heavy bodies compared to Jupiter, showing that their orbit is slowing down, but in an extremely slow pace. We already have explanations for the structure of Saturn's rings: orbit resonances with the many moons of Saturn.

Funny: Daniel Dennett's first book about free will 'Elbow Room' has as subtitle 'The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting'. In this book he defends his compatibilist version of free will. The libertarian version of free will is simply not empirical: we do not know that we 'could have done otherwise' (in the literal meaning), we do not know the physical causes of our feelings and thoughts simply because we are a 'higher level phenomenon' of the brain: we cannot access our neural level ("Gosh, my neuron LQ225-ZH-5,768,231,234" is firing again and again! I must be hungry."). The idea of libertarian free will is purely ideological, and so I do not see why it would be 'worth wanting'. However, we do have an empirical concept of free will: the experience that when we want to act according my preferences and beliefs, I often can. I am thirsty, so I want to take a glass of water, and low and behold, I can act according to this preference! Only when somebody else blocks my way to the glass, e.g. locks the door to the kitchen intentionally to avoid I can take a glass of water, I am not free: I am standing before the kitchen door involuntary. Simply said, my actions are free if I can do what I want. (Yes, without these 'metaphysical things' like flying in the air, as you rightly remark). No. This is metaphorical speech. Nature caused me to exist as I am. So can it force me to do what I want to do? Doesn't that sound a bit absurd? Is a kind of free will that is like the Baron von Münchhausen pulling himself and his horse out of the quicksand by pulling himself at his hair a kind of 'free will worth wanting'? I think I only agree fully with Nr 1. I agree with Nr 2. except that you should not use the word 'freely', because that is exactly what we want to define. Nr 3 is nonsensical for me. What could free will be without external factors? The only thing I expect from a concept of free will is that I can 'move around through the external factors according my preferences'. Nr 4 is 'my personal enemy': ultimate responsibility is the empty companion of libertarian free will, which is just as empty. And then not just for what I do, but even for what I am! So, no. And with that the rest of your (or Kane's) argument fails. Responsibility does not mean being responsible for what I am: I must be responsible for what I do. And that means I can give the grounds for my actions (i.e. I can response, when others ask me for why I did something). No, not at all. Our praxis bears weight, because that is our concept of free will is at home in our daily concepts. If I lock you into a room, you very well know that you are not free to act according your preferences. But I forced that upon you: but there is no such force between you and your preferences and beliefs, these are elements that are you, that make up you. I do not base my concept of free will on responsibility: but it is a very good touchstone. Really, the whole basis of my concept of free will is that we can act according our preferences and beliefs, that we can act on what I recognise as my own grounds.

Sorry, that again does not touch my argument. In my concept of free will, we need (sufficient) determinism, so how can there be a contradiction? This is what happens in most discussions between me and 'free-will deniers': I propose a definition of free will that necessarily needs determinism, and as reaction I get "But we are determined, so we have no free will". Do you see that that does not make much sense? Remember my definition: Your argument does not work if you take this definition of free will. Nowhere do I imply that your actions are not determined. You seem to be (psychologically) so much attached to your idea that for 'genuine' free will, you should be able to act completely independent of the history of the universe, your personal history, and the preferences you therefore have. But my definition does not contain such 'spooky free will'. It seems to me that you just repeat the way how you see that we do not have free will. You however oversee thereby that your arguments do not apply, because they only show that we are determined. But my definition is not touched by that. As long as you do not show that my definition is wrong, you can defend the fact that we are determined with more and more arguments, but I can only yawn: yes, we are determined, but that does not deny we have free will in any sensible (=naturalistic) way.

With due respect for the difficulties you have to formulate your points, couldn't you boil it down to the essential argument in your above posting? Just a few points that caught my attention By the capability of (at least human) animals to anticipate the future, dependent on how they think it will develop dependent on what actions they could do. And that is not a contradiction with the brain being determined. I fully agree that physics only give us causal determination (I don't know why you are using 'pre-determined'. What does this 'pre' mean for you?). And determinism is a condition of free will being possible. I also agree with your evaluation that randomness cannot be a fundamental condition of free will: too much randomness makes free will impossible: our observations, thoughts and feelings would be completely unconnected.

I have no idea what different perspectives of objects in the same FOR have to do with relativity which is about how observers in different FOR measure time and space. And I remember you have serious problems already with perspective... "Analogies are like cars: if you take them too far, they break down." (Don't remember where I saw that, but it applies very well here). Please test your ideas at the examples of time dilation/length contraction of muons. Can you explain these with your ideas? And did you look up the 'paradox of the pole in the barn'? If you work this through, you would realise how essential the relativity of simultaneity is, and that your diagrams do not suffice to account for that. Therefore you should understand the message of Janus' diagrams, which show the different time readings. One of the best understandable explanations I found in Chapter 2.3 Paradoxes in David J. Griffith, Revolutions in Twentieth-Century Physics. I think it is a very useful introduction for laypeople in modern physics, if your are not afraid for a bit of mathematics. But a little understanding of simple algebra is enough (which also is enough to have a basic understanding of special relativity).