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And three things are worth more or less mentioning in a science forum: In Pisa, I did not find any souvenir that somehow refers to Galileo throwing weights from the Leaning Tower. 😢 If in Newton's time such fine fabrics as nowadays used in flags would have existed, the question if light is particles or waves would have decided immediate against him: (My own picture of a patch of light seen through the Italian flag) I've been reading Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time, by Peter Galison. It is a great book, showing how Poincaré and Einstein were in very close contact with the practical problems of timekeeping. Poincaré was even in charge in France for establishing good world-wide synchronised timekeeping for commercial and practical purposes, and especially for creating better maps. Einstein on the other hand, in his work at the patent office, had to evaluate many proposals for precise timekeeping devices, and for synchronising them. I think I agree with the linked review that Einstein would also have come with SR without his work at the patent office, but obviously the whole topic 'was in the air'. However, what I find convincing is the style of Einstein's On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies: it contains nearly no references to other authors or scientific articles: this was the usual style of patent requests, because of course these requests should show itself as original as possible. The book also explains quite well why Poincaré could not make the final step of completely abandoning the idea of the æther. Poincaré was a kind of conservative, in the good sense, i.e. he saw science as a gradual changing discipline, keeping all ideas that had proved to work so well for many years (Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's electromagnetism), where Einstein was more or less a rebel, prepared to throw useless ideas overboard. The only other criticism I have on the book is its detailedness about all the expeditions in South America, negotiations between companies, governments etc about establishing coordinated time. A shorter overview would have done just as well. But for everybody interested in the history of science, and how it is embedded in wider culture, it is a must-read.

That is a pretty useless example of very bad philosophy. you state that only facts matter in life you state that only numerically quantifiable observations count as facts And that without even one simple argument. This reduces your viewpoint to an irrational (and none quantifiable and non-factual) mental jerk.

Yes. And I think compatibilism accounts for both views. Your talents, chances you have in your life, cultures in which you grow up determine who you are. But that has no impact on the compatibilist conception of free will: because that is about what you want (determined by all kind of external and internal factors), and the possibility to act according it.

I think I must agree with Markus to disagree. The only last possibility I see is to replace the word 'change', when not applied to the flow of time, with another one: maybe 'to vary' will do? Y varies dependent on the variation of x. And the observation that in a few English dictionaries, I always see a reference to time in the 'change'-lemmas.

Formally you are right. However the practical difference between solipsism and realism evaporates by the observation that also a solipsist is confronted with the fact that his influence on his virtual world is just as limited as that of the realist. Just because the sun exists in 'his imagination' only, he cannot 'think it away'. Same for the experience of his body, and the need for food. He has to see that his body is also just a projection of his mind, which must regularly be fed by projections of food. And as he shares this experience with all these other 'virtual' people doing exactly the same, he could just as well be a realist. The only step in the direction of solipsism I see, is the idea that we cannot observe the world as it is in itself, but this is more or less common sense for modern scientists. We create the models, sure, but they have to be tested against factual observations of 'reality'. For a solipsist however this would already be funny: why can't he have a full grasp of reality, when reality is just a product of is mind? So I think that only under a 'methodological hammer' solipsism makes sense, or better, as you say, is not unfalsifiable. But except on this methodological playground, solipsism is an empty idea. And @Markus Hanke: thanks for your explanations about Theravadin Thai Forest tradition, and your path. Interesting enough, I also made my first steps in Zen when I was in Ireland (Galway). I lived a year there (1998-1999). Since then I go into retreats at least once a year (except this year, due to COVID-19), since 2005 with Reb Anderson, who was ordained by Suzuki.

Exactly. You have to imagine going from top to bottom, to get a change in colour. Yep, time does not just equal change. In my view however, they are strongly related: you can see it in two opposite ways: change is always change in time. That means time is some (local?) background dimension time is the highest abstraction of change But certainly time and change are not the same. I can see it: by letting my gaze/attention/imagination move from top to bottom...

It is an obsession with correct language. It would not be the first time that metaphoric thinking leads to absurd conclusions. I think you will find a reference to time in every meaning in a dictionary. Why do you understand me if I would talk about a universe where nothing changes. Do you think then automatically about a universe that is uniformly filled with a continuous substance, or completely empty? If I say to you 'Imagine a universe where nothing changes', would you then ask for clarification 'you mean no change in space or no change in time?' Wouldn't people wonder when somebody says 'the difference between a TV set and a picture, is that at a TV the picture is changing continuously', and then you react 'but a picture changes too. if you go from left to right, its colour changes'. They would think you are a nerd, weirdo, or the like.

But no one has been saying this...? Well, at least I interpreted your remark so: In the literal sense, yes, because you put something in that implies time: 'from to to bottom'. that is a movement. Where (nearly) everybody fully understands what you mean, it is metaphorical speech. less metaphorically formulated, I would say 'if you move from top to bottom, at a certain moment you will see that the colour changes from black to white'. And statically I would say 'the top half is black, the bottom half is white'. Nothing changes, the knob looks what it looks like, and that's it.

I had never heard of it. Could one say, in a few single words, it is Buddhism 'back to the roots'? Pity Ireland is a bit far away to be there at the ceremony. And who knows where we are with COVID-19. Same for me. Just to add (not for you, you already know that for sure), there is of course also a lot of suffering that does not start with bodily pain, but raises from our false understanding of what and who we are. I would nearly say, no need for that. It will only increase confusion, and create a lot of 'fake problems', similar to 'How many angels can dance on a pinpoint'.

Dennett wrote two books about free will: Elbow Room (1984) and Freedom Revolves (2003), many articles, gave many talks, interviews, and discussions (e.g. with Sam Harris). So I do not think his criterion for free will is 'hasty'. Quite the opposite: he is one of the deepest thinkers about that subject. Even that I learned most from Peter Bieri, Das Handwerk der Freiheit, but yeah, that is German, and it is not translated in English. Ah, 'graded' is not really a problem, quite the opposite. 'Free will' is a bit of a wide concept, one reason that I sometimes go to the preciser formulation, that some actions are free (i.e. 'not coerced'), and when a person is able to act freely, one can say she has free will. Here you go again! What does 'really free' mean? Why would you be interested in this mirage? Oh yeah. And I think that what you call a 'working definition' is in fact the definition of free will. Or a bit more precise: I think you would call my definition a 'working definition'. The error you probably make is similar to find a purely physical explanation of what a book is. It is definitely not a 'working definition', because meaning of the text is involved in what a real book is. I do not quite understand your remark between brackets, but I fully agree with your main sentence. E.g. better not publish a book that is printed with the same colour as the paper. That is a physical criterion for real books. Isn't that a contradiction to your point 1)? Maybe you are, but I think as long as you are prepared to enter a serious discussion, as you do, this doesn't bother me at all. Just be aware of the special rules for posting in the philosophy forum. (Ups, they do not exist. Yet?)

Well, at least cladking has shown us extensively one example of bad philosophy. Ill informed about what science and philosophy are, or better, what scientists and philosophers do, cladking vents his ideas about them. To look back one the criteria I proposed earlier in this thread: Nope Hardly Nope Nope. Done.

Can you explain this more. I don't get what you are trying to say.

No, of course not. I said: Maybe I should have written that activities exist in time, and therefore a 'change of x' exists in time. So your example of the electrostatic objects does not work. Yes, because only observers that exist in time can say 'if you change x, then y changes according f(x)'. Otherwise, an observer would just see an object, a static form. I think the subtle point here is that one must take care to distinguish between what we observe, and how we speak about it. I might be wrong, but I have the impression that you and Markus discuss what we observe, and I talk about how we speak about an observation.

As long as you just look at a teacup, or a graph of a function, I fully agree with you. I would say, yes, you do it, and time is the parametrisation you use. In my opinion, if somebody says that 'y changes as function of the change of x', she is saying 'if you change x from a to b, then y changes according f(a) to f(b)'. But a change of x is an activity of an observer, and observers exist in time. And concerning your points with MigL: of course change can occur without observers. But observing a change means either a passive observer sees things changing (you are sitting quietly at a veranda, and you see the streets changing from dry to wet (a very common experience in Ireland...)) or you look at an non-changing object, but you let wander your gaze from one place of the object to another, and e.g. see how the colour 'changes' dependent on the place of the object where you look. But the latter also means a change in time. But the change is in the observer, not in the object. The object is static.

You can read: o Yes o No Two trees are explicitly mentioned: the tree of life, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. 'Accepted as true' is not the same as 'true'. Therefore no science should stick to axioms, and philosophy neither. Taking them temporary for granted is ok, but one should always be prepared to drop these 'axioms'. I slowly get the impression you have no idea how science and philosophy work.

Buckyballs. (C60, i.e. a kind of soccer ball with 60 C atoms). And even more: But the experiments are difficult, because even the tiniest disturbance would destroy the superposition.

It makes a difference if we see them as physical things, or as processes. That's all.

I never used the 'none-physical'. I said 'physical thing'. Consciousness, selves, and free will are highly complex processes. And just because one water molecule can not make an eddy, you must not look for anything corresponding to consciousness, selves, and free will at levels where they clearly do not exist.

I don't think Schrödinger was very interested in cats. He wanted to show to what absurdities the Copenhagen interpretation leads, if you assume that it is consciousness that collapses the wave function. But be aware that quantum experimenters get bigger and bigger objects in superposition. Just not in a simple "Schrödinger's cat way".

But I do hope you can accept that quantum particles can be in two states at the same time, because that is fundamental to quantum physics

AFAIK Schrödinger only used his cat for demonstrating the absurdity of quantum physics. 'Absurd' in the meaning, 'we cannot grasp it with our daily notions'. Today most physicists assume that any interaction with the superposition of 'the radioactive atom has decayed' and 'the radioactive atom has not decayed', is like a measurement. So consciousness is not needed.

I took this from a 'status update' of @koti. I looked at the 37th minute. I noticed something important: Susskind mentions in one breath: the illusion of consciousness the illusion of free will the illusion of self Let me say it this way: if you look to the world on physical level, where there are no selves and no consciousness, there is also no free will. Susskind probably just made a list of examples of human categories, but I would say it is a complete package. You can't get consciousness and selves without free will. So if somebody asks: Are we free? --> Yes, we are, because with 'we' you implied the existence of selves Does free will exist? --> 'Depends': if you take the existence of consciousness and selves for granted, then 'yes', if you mean 'exists' in the same way as physical objects exist, no. The whole confusion is because people mix these two kinds of discourse: we will never find the 'selficle' at LHC, there is no reason to suppose the 'self' is a physical thing, and therefore we will also not find anything physical corresponding to free will; on the other hand, if you suppose consciousness and selves are somehow real, then free will (or coercion...) are real. Do not mixup these discourses! I think this is an error many of you make. @joigus: any progress in reading Dennett?

I interpreted a text, not what somebody once might really have meant, said or written down. Eh? I claimed it was the New International Version. I got it from www.biblegateway.com, where it obviously is the default. I agree, except maybe with that 'it is fundamental'. But that also means axioms have no fixed place in science and philosophy. Honest observations and reflection can lead you anywhere, and axioms would work out as a dogmas, blocking ways to real understanding. Axioms surely can have a place in theory development: assume something to be true, and find out where the theory leads you too. (Maybe to nonsense, so then your axiom was wrong, or your theory is wrong, or both).

I fully agree! A function y = f(x) is static. I thought that is what I am saying all the time. But as soon as you say 'y changes as function of the change of x', I think you are implying time. What you are in fact doing is looking at y(t) = f(x(t)). This triggered the whole discussion: So, no, I would say, as soon as you use 'change' you are implying time.

Yep, that is not what philosophers mean with 'qualia'. Those philosopher who think qualia are really something, would say that pain is already a quale. It is more or less 'the experienced'. An object can be red, but only the 'observed redness' is a quale. Where I fully agree with your citation 'Pain is inevitable, suffering is optional'. But I would prefer to explain that without using 'qualia'. I thought so. My robe is black . May I ask you in which tradition? I think I understand what you mean, but having pain seems to me 'meant' to be unpleasant. In the end, the organism in pain should try to do everything to remove the cause of the pain. Now often, you cannot remove the cause of the pain, so then the question arises how to cope with it. In that we have a choice, exactly in line with what you say: Just another thing, I realise reading your post again: Red things are objects, but the experiencing of redness, the 'quale' so to speak, is essentially subjective. I think with pain it is similar, but just the opposite what you say here. Pain is the (per definition subjective) 'quale', the object is some process in your body, sometimes clear (burned your finger), sometimes not (headache). Where your observation of redness can trigger some further reactions, be it value propositions, feelings ('Who is afraid of red, yellow and blue'), or actions (stop your car for the traffic light), so it is also not done with a 'pain-quale'. So my interpretation is that the separation of 'not-identifying' lies between the 'quale' and the reaction on it.