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OK, I read the article. And I am not impressed. In fact I find it a pretty naive article. Only one sentence in the introduction made it already clear where the authors stand: In philosophy, this position is known as epiphenomenalism. But alas, this position has debunked already a few times: it is self-refuting. Epiphenomenalism is the theory that something is effected by some (causal) conditions, but that itself plays no causal role. But this means that the authors could have written this article without any consciousness at all! But then how do they know about consciousness then? So consciousness has impact (so much that there are libraries written about it, including this article), or it has not. If it hasn't we are left clueless why the authors wrote this article. Later in the article they (consciously!) declare themselves as epiphenomenalists: Another point is that epiphenomenalism is a dualistic stance: There obviously is something caused by material phenomena, but has no causal impact on anything else. But in the material world this is never true: the law of causality says that every event has a cause, and that every event causes something (otherwise it would be impossible to detect). This also means that any attack on free will based on the ideas that (a) consciousness exists; and (b) that it has no causal impact whatsoever, is based on dualism. In a monistic view consciousness is part of the material world and therefore can play a causal role. The authors obvious struggle with this problem, even if you have to read more or less between the lines. Here is a subtle example: 'Antecedent' fits in a normal causal framework. So what they say is that consciousness is caused by brain processes. This fits perfectly to their epiphenomenalist position. However when they say that processes are accompanied by subjective experience, they take a more careful stance. I deny the first formulation, because it implies dualism, but agree with the latter. However we must define accompanied more precisely: and here I would say that certain types of brain processes are consciousness. The authors take the rainbow as a perfect parallel to their view on consciousness. The rainbow is an optical phenomenon that is caused by the refraction (not scattering! ) of sunlight in raindrops. But the optical phenomenon has no causal impact back on the light or the raindrops. But it is not true that a rainbow has no impact at all! When there is a rainbow I walk to the window (or outside when it is not raining anymore where I am) to see it better: it is a beautiful phenomenon! Imagine we build a rainbow detector: it is based on the analysis of forms (must be a part of a circle, has a certain broadness) and colour distribution. When the device detects one it signifies me. So it is not based on measurements of raindrop sizes and locations and calculations about the position of the sun etc, but on image analysis. Now my sons play a trick on me: they hold a picture of a rainbow in front of the detector, and yes, I run outside, for nothing. The point is that we can create devices that react on the optical phenomenon, not on the physics on which the phenomenon is based. And this, is my position: that the brain is such a system that 'creates rainbows', and also reacts on its own rainbows. Of course there is plain physics under all the neuron firing in my brain, just as there is for the signaling of my rainbow detector: but the brain works successfully, because neural configurations mean something for the brain itself. This is the basis of consciousness: we, our brains, are heavily loaded with meanings. And this is also why the authors are wrong that consciousness is no top-down process. If certain neurological configurations would not represent 'mental rainbows', they would not have the effect if they weren't. Take the following computer program: counter = 1 loop counter = counter + 1 if counter > 1000000 then shutdown computer end loop; How would you explain that the computer soon turns itself off? By analysing its physical structure? Or by the program it runs? I am convinced that there is a completely naturalistic explanation for consciousness. However, we will need soft concepts as representations and meanings (rainbows, so to speak) to understand it. Douglas Hofstadter has written a beautiful and playful book about it: Gödel, Escher Bach. (It is never too late to read it): One final note: the authors see no problem with free will, even that they defend that consciousness has no influence on the brain. But I think they are just flying over the problem. Or does it convince you? This all they have to say about it in the main article.

Well, yes, nearly. It was Gilbert Ryle's expression for an absurd idea: that the soul somehow inhabits the brain, that it is the place where all sense data arrive, and where all our conscious actions are initiated. Consciousness is the 'spirit in the material world' (another phrase of Ryle). It is a view of what we are, Cartesian dualism. The only point I am making that I do not have the machine experience. But it is true, I also feel I am somewhere behind my eyes, between the ears. What question? If we normally have free will? Well, it might be an empirical question, but not in the way that many suppose here. If somebody acts free or not is by looking if he was forced to his actions, or if he has a heavy psychological dependence on somebody else, or misses some of the preconditions needed for free will (to be able to evaluate reasons for actions and have a realistic picture of the environment). But definitely not by looking into the brain and discover that there is no soul in it. But yes, then I am using my definition of free will, and not the absurd notion that we can decide what to do uncaused by lower level level brain processes.

At least not according André Maeder, University of Geneva: Interesting. Let's wait and see.

It seems to me you do not realise that the mathematics, in other sciences than mathematics itself, are abstract descriptions of something empirical. Physics is not plain mathematics: it is mathematical models of matter, fields, energy etc. I agree with you that mathematics taken for itself cannot be conscious. But that doesn't mean that what is described by mathematics cannot be conscious. Yes, of course. But that was not what I meant. I drew a parallel between consciousness and life. I can use the same argumentation for life, as you do with consciousness: Mathematics is not alive, and because everything can be described by mathematical laws of nature, it cannot be the sole reason for life. Or an even worse example: Mathematics cannot fall. Laws of falling bodies are mathematical. So it cannot be the sole reason for falling bodies. That is just BS. It is blind dogmatism.

Sorry for the late reaction, I was a away a few days. My objection was against the the 'machine' part. I do not experience myself as a machine: I have no direct access to my machine-layer of the brain. Because of science I know I have a brain, and know basic principles of its functioning. But I do not have access to this functioning of my own brain. I cannot decide to let neuron 1,435,460,822 fire at will. I think my own experience in this is that 'I' am somewhere behind my eyes, and between the ears¹. And I know I can move as I want, but I have really no idea how I do this. Well, it is more than that: I try to show what this different definition of free will is. I try to show that it does not conflict with determinism and that it fits to my experience about what free will is. It does not fit to an ideological view of what free will is: the possibility to 'could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances', and that it is not caused by previous conditions. We are so to speak totally bathed in this ideological view on free will that we think we have such experience, where I am convinced that we have not. Part of this change of view is what it means to have been able to do otherwise, therefore was my vegetarian restaurant example. In the vegetarian restaurant I could not have done otherwise, i.e. I could not choose for a beef burger. In a 'mixed' restaurant I could have chosen the beef burger. But I took the tofu-dish. But I could have chosen otherwise. This is a relevant meaning of 'could have done otherwise' that is still relevant in a determined universe. It means the choice depends on me. But 'me' is not a homunculus in the brain. It is me as a whole. Does that help in understanding my previous reaction to you? ¹ A small funny anecdote: for about a year the company where I work replaced the telephone system with Skype. We could choose what kind of end-device we would use: an IP-telephone connected to the PC, or different kind of headsets. I chose a headset (so I can use the phone handsfree), but only with one earphone in it. I didn't want to hear the voice of some colleagues as if they would come from the middle of my head. It would place them in my head, where normally only my thoughts reside... Greetings from the Borg. What you describe is fatalism, not determinism. Fatalism does not follow from determinism. Fatalism means that what will happen is fixed, and nothing you can do will change it. But that is simply not true: what you do matters even if determinism is true. It will make the future different from what it would have been if you did something else. And what you will do depends on you inner mental activities, even if these are determined. So mathematics is also not able to produce life, don't you think? Aren't we, and all other organisms alive?

No, we don't. Simply because we do not experience the machine. Or do you have direct insight of the inner workings of your brain? The only illusion of free will is that of libertarian free will: that under exactly the same circumstances, including my brain states, I could have done otherwise. It is a category mistake because you are using the categorical meaning of 'could have been otherwise'. But there is also the hypothetical reading, as Parfit shows. Don't you see the difference? In the case of free will it means that there was nothing outside me that forced me to a decision. The brain cannot force me: I am my brain. But of course, because the brain is determined, we are too. So, as Parfit says, there is a way that I could have been struck by the lightning, because I was very close. If I know during a thunderstorm that I could get being hit by lightning, I try to get at a safe place. If then the lightning strikes, at the place where I was standing, it is perfectly valid to say 'I would have been struck if I did not decide to find shelter'. So what I do depends on me. But there is no me inside me. Say I am in a vegetarian restaurant. I can choose between 5 dishes. E.g. I choose the tofu-burger with salad. When I look back afterwards, I can justifiably say that I could have chosen some of the other dishes. Why? Because they were on the menu card, and nobody forced you to take the tofu-burger. But being in this vegetarian restaurant I could not have chosen a beef burger, simply because it is not on the menu card. So there is a very relevant meaning of 'could have' completely independent of the question if I am determined. This is the 'could have' that is relevant for free will. For me the experience of free will is that I can act according my ideas. If something is obstructing me from acting as I want, I am not free. If I get the tofu-burger because I wanted it, it was a free action. If somebody points a gun at me and says that I should take the dish with the Brussels sprouts, then I am not acting according my ideas, and then it is not a free action. It has nothing to do with determinism.

No, you fixed nothing. Slowly I am thinking you are not seriously interested in the subject. Your cursory one-liners don't show you are trying to think. Right. And? Still thinking that one needs Godlike capabilities to have at least some control? You can control your own actions. The better you plan them, the better your strategy may work out. But of course life can suck. But again, you seem still to think that control per definition means complete control. Stop thinking in absolutes. A choice that does not lead to an action? With your choice you cause your behaviour: with your behaviour you exert at least some control over your environment. Again, if you would not exert this control ('I go the supermarket when my fridge is empty'. You have control over what is in your fridge. If you do not exert this control you will be dead soon (unless you go to a restaurant, where your decision also has some control over the situation: if you order the beef menu you do get it. Or do you never get what you order in restaurants?))

Yes, it is. In my opinion the western view on free will is still heavily loaded with Christian theology: that we have a soul, which can freely decide what to do, unconditioned by a causal history. Without such a soul, it is difficult to justify that souls could be damned to eternal suffering in hell. It makes us absolutely responsible. From a naturalistic point of view this makes of course no sense. The inheritance of of this view however is that we think that because we have no soul we have no free will either. Still we have the experience of free will: that what we do in certain situations depends on what I will do, and what I will do I can consider. Do I take the schnitzel or the cordon blue? Of course this is all determined by brain processes, but in such situations I cannot just refrain from choosing. To say it a bit awkward: I still have to process the decision with my brain. And given who I am and the circumstance I will come to a decision (usually...). The point I am trying to make, is that I cannot be overruled by my brain processes, because I am my brain: I am not a soul that is forced by my brain. The element of free will is that I am not forced to choose something by some form of coercion. In daily life, I mostly know very well if I do something out of free choice, or was forced by somebody else. My slogan-way of saying this is: we cannot be what we want; but we can do what we want. Yes, of course. If the conditions are exactly the same, including my brain state. That is an error in what 'could be otherwise' means. I think somebody else explained that much better than I can so here it is: Derek Parfit - On what matters. In this way we are perfectly justified to say that I could have done otherwise - namely when I would have decided otherwise. If there was nothing in the situation that forced me to decide what I wanted to decide, then the decision was free. I could have decided otherwise, but in the above sense. Parfit again: So even if we are completely determined, it still makes sense to think about our decision.

Of course. But without control over the environment free will is impossible. So control over the environment is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. So idf somebody can prove that we have no control over our environment at all, free will simply does not exist. Right. There is no 'you' inside your brain. 'You' is just a function of the software running on the brain, its hardware. But we are surely not completely determined by our genes. Our upbringing, culture, books we read, and thoughts we have have all have influence on my actions. We are not dedicated computers that can only do the one thing for what is was designed. Our hardware allows a giant multiplicity of programs that are also rewritten every moment, partially based on internal functions only (e.g. when I change my plans for the future). One of the chimeras about free will that it should be completely unconditioned. It is not. Such a kind of free will could only be chaotic, has nothing to do with what I am. Really? How do you know? You have an overview of all possible physical mechanisms? Do you so precise what consciousness is, that you can exclude that is implemented on any high complex system?

The self-image is the image of the own interests, motivations, reasons, beliefs etc the system has. A self-driving car does not have these. So I think what I essentially I am saying that consciousness is a necessary condition for free will.

This does not touch on the fact that organisms have control over their environment, and that was all what I am saying. I was talking about control of the system over the environment, not some control over the system. It does. Is there a 'you' somewhere in the brain, controlling its functions? When not, does that mean you do not exist? For free will the same: there is no free will in the brain; free will can exist in the control the brain exerts on its environment. Yes. But given dimreepr's position, only the God of the universe has unlimited control. He wouldn't even be content with a car that can at least drive with warp 10. Oh, no, that is a limitation too. I thought my list of conditions for free will's existence was a bit longer than just having a self-image. A single cell organism has no wishes, beliefs or a picture of its environment and its possible futures. With a little bit of precaution, yes. The more an organism has the capabilities listed above, the better it is potentially able to have free will. Of course I am not sure where we can draw a line, even if we can draw a line, but given your examples, I would say yes. This tastes after dimreepr's 'absolute control'. The point is that every organism has some control over its environment. Stronger, every negative feedback system has control of some part of its environment.

No. I am just arguing here against the idea that we have no control. I try to show that there is no contradiction between exerting control and determinism. For free will a system must have some additional futures: the capability to picture its environment, to evaluate different possible futures against its own interests, how these possible futures might arise dependent on its own actions, have a self image. I other words, I think it is only possible to exert free will when a system is conscious.

No. So what?

This is a category error. Look at the menu card in the restaurant: there are the choices. What you choose if of course determined by your brain, but that does not mean you do not choose. The brain is exactly that: a mechanism that is able to evaluate possible paths the futures can take, dependent on how you act. Some of these choices can be completely driven by some unconscious processes (I have no idea why I hat Brussels sprouts; I do not exactly know if I would like, a schnitzel or a cordon bleu now. So I just pick one.), others are complete conscious ("Ups, I have only $20, so I can't choose the beef menu..."). No, I still would not like them. But I would eat them.

Right. Stop here. Here is where you really have control. Limited, but you have. As I said before, life is all about control. If organisms would not somehow control their environment they would die. The least they have to do is keep the bad chemicals outside, and let the good chemicals in. You do not need control over your brain. Your brain is a way of having control. It makes no sense to dig deeper: Just as you find no 'you' in your brain, you will not find a control centre there. It is the mechanism that makes 'you' possible. But the 'you' is the whole mechanism, and you can only assign control to the system as a whole. So it makes no sense to seek for a source of free will in the brain, just as there is no 'you' point in the brain that dictates how the chemical reactions run. That does not mean that you do not exist! If you act freely, it means you can realise what your brain is coming up with. If you want to write a contribution to this thread, you can do it. If you do not want to do it, you can leave it. But writing this I am writing to you, not to some subsystem of your brain. If you deny free will on basis of neurology, then you consistently must also deny your existence, because there is no 'you' in the brain. And when there is no you, there is nobody to apply the category free/not-free to. Who is the 'you' that is free or not? But if you take your existence as granted, then you get it together with free will, for free. Your car can also drive only 120 mph, so it is limited. Therefore it doesn't matter that it can drive at all. I am free to react on your posting, or let it be. I am not free to jump to the moon. I am also not able to let me like Brussels sprouts. So free will is limited. But it matters. So therefore do not plant the seed? As I said, if you give up giving up the little control you have over your life, you will die.

Now you have shown very clearly to all of us that you are just making things up. I gave the pass, Swansont made the goal. The wave function of light can collapse when it interacts with matter. But nothing the like happens when light bends in a gravity field. It just follows its straight path, a geodesic, in spacetime. I am wondering what you think about the state of your physics knowledge, sticking to your 'refraction is scattering' where several physicists here already told you x times that they are not the same. Especially when you start with such a question: Every photon travels at c, and its energy is not infinite, but dependent on its frequency alone. Somebody missing such fundamental knowledge of physics tries to convince seasoned physicists that refraction is a form of scattering???

There is a kind of control that certainly exists: thermostats controlling the temperature, Google software controlling the driving of a car, animals walking to a river to drink, humans planning their next vacation, or building the LHC. What I am saying all the time is that in this concept of control, we can distinguish between free actions and forced actions (against your will). What you are talking about when denying free will is control of consciousness over the brain. But I, just as you, see consciousness as a (very complex) function of the brain, with a lot of unconscious, causal pre- and post-processing. The examples of research you give support that view. I fully agree. But I do not agree that this is saying anything about free will. 'Free will' is an attribute that can be applied to the interactions of an organism with its environment. When an organism can act according its own wishes an beliefs, it is free, otherwise it is not. So denying that consciousness has no control over any brain process has simply nothing to do with the question if an action is free or forced. So I can split my question in two points: Do you agree that we have at least some control over our lives? (You in fact already said this: 'in large part you do control your life') That this control has nothing to do with control of our consciousness over our brains, but only with the control of us over our environment? So your life does not change when you stop controlling it? Try. Let us know when you are close to starvation.

Explain how gravitational lensing is scattering.

Yes, I understand that you see it like this. You very eloquently showed us why you think so in your posting I cited above. But again: you did not answer my question. Don't you see the question, or are are you intentionally evading it? What is 'truly free'? Acting otherwise then you want, independent of your wishes and beliefs, independent of what you are? But that is a chimera! I suggest you go to the restaurant and do not choose a dish from the menu card.

Thanks for you very reasonable post. You make very clear where you are standing, and why. But... you did not answer my question! This is what I asked: Why do you think that on the topic of free will, that this is not the relevant concept of control? It is essential that you see that we have two different concepts of control here. The first one is the one I was citing from you: This is what I described as the control an organism has over its environment, or as the control a thermostat has over the temperature in its environment. However, in your above posting, you shift your position from the relation between the organism and its environment to the relation between consciousness and our bodily processes. What I am saying is that the latter relation is not relevant for the question of free will. The idea of free will only applies to the relation between the organism and its environment. Obviously, you do agree that we have much control over our lives ('... large part...'). There where we really have such control, i.e. we can act according to our wishes and beliefs, we are acting freely; there where we are obstructed to do what we want we are not free. It is the organism as a whole that can act free or not. It needs some basic capabilities, that we human animals obviously have, and maybe some higher non-human animals as well: the capability to observe its surroundings, anticipate possible futures, and the causal role it plays itself in the possible actualising of a future (in other words, it needs also a self-image). Do you see how far this is of the Libet-kind of experiments (like the one Harris is doing in the video in the 'inner peace' thread): to do something for no reason at all? That these kind of experiments have nothing to do with the relation between the organism and its environment?

iNow, you remember writing this, don't you? Why do you think that on the topic of free will, that this is not the relevant concept of control?

Time is very real for us. As long as you have memories of the past and hopes, expectations, and curiosity about the future time is real for you as it is for me. The idea of 'control' is very confusing. If you mean 'absolute control', in the sense that somebody (or something) has control without previous conditions, then you are completely right. But then I also have no idea what our acting would be based on: you would have no character, you would not even be a person. But there are less unrealistic concepts of control. Take a thermostat as example. It controls the temperature. But it is of course a (simple) mechanical system, based on negative feedback. Now organisms are also systems that express control. Not absolute control, but they can change their environment so that it fits to their survival. Higher animals have the capability to anticipate the future, and act based on their expectations of what possibly might happen and what their capabilities to act are, and so to have influence on the environment they live in. So animals have control over their environment. Not absolute control, but still control. However, it is a category error to assume that they therefore should have a centre of control in themselves. It is as if you are saying that a thermostat has no control over the temperature of the environment because it cannot change its own settings: but that is a ridiculous expectation. So if we speak of control, we should look at the influence of the organism as a whole on its surroundings, and not for some magical control centre in the organism. And free will is based on this kind of control, not on the existence of such a magical control centre. Our actions are free when we can express our control, without being obstructed by somebody else. Harris however sticks to just denying that a magical control centre exists. He is right, such a centre does not exist. But it has nothing to do with the question if we free will or not.

In fact Harris anticipates your argument, by telling about psychological experiments where people give reasons for their choices, but the researchers know it is something else (having a cold or war glass in the hand is an example gives): so the reasons we give are confabulations, rationalisations afterwards. The example of the cities however is a very banal one. In this 'experiment' you are asked to choose something where there are no good reasons to pick one city above another. It is the same with the famous Libet experiments: people are asked to flex their wrist at some moment for no reason at all. The point about free will however is a different one: that we can do what we want without any obstruction from somebody else. Harris sees free will as physically unconditioned free will. But that is a chimera. What free will is in daily life, is that e.g. I want to go to my work, and nobody is opposing me to avoid I get in my car and drive to the company where I work, and here I am. If somebody asks why I am driving my car, I have a very good reason: I want to go to my work. Of course you can ask further, why I want to go to my work, and after a few 'why-levels' I certainly come to the point where I have to say "Because I am who I am". But that has nothing to do with free will: free will does not mean 'to be who I want to be', but 'to act according to what I want to do'. So what Harris is doing is defining free will as something that a priori cannot exist (at least if you have a naturalist world view), and then deny that it exists. Fact is that Harris in his pamphlet 'Free will' argues against free will, but then, when he is arguing why this does not mean that we have to give up on morality, or our penal system, he argues exactly as compatibilists do when they defend free will. So as an antidote to Harris, here is Dennett: At 3:25 he defines free will: the capacity to see probable futures that seem to gonna happen, in time to take steps that something else will happen instead. At the end Dennett says a few words about the consequences, e.g. that we have to let go the concept of ultimate responsibility, of sin (which clearly shows where such ideas come from...). And if you think about something you think now morally wrong, it can contribute to your inner peace. Feeling regret, but knowing that you were determined, you might not be too hard with your self. You can think 'I should have done otherwise', meaning: 'next time I come in such a situation I will do otherwise'. In facts Buddhism (at least as I know it) encourages such a stance, to your self and to others. And to make the circle round: Harris is a strong promoter of (Buddhist) spirituality. See his book Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion. So in their practical consequences, Dennett and Harris might be very close to each other. But Dennett (and I), do not like his rhetoric. We should never forget that we should take as much responsibility for our actions as we can. In my opinion, saying we have no free will does not contribute to such a position.

Beautiful example of gravity waves: