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I think you get yourself in a kind of logical problem here. There are two kinds of explanations: the 'virtus dormitiva' way; and the reductive way. In the first way, the working of a sleeping powder is explained by saying that it contains 'sleeping-force'; in the second way a phenomenon is explained by lower level phenomena that have nothing in common with the phenomenon to be explained. To give an example: life can be explained by assigning all organisms vis vitalis ('élan vital', or 'living force'). Or it can be explained by a lot of chemical reactions working together, reactions that are not alive themselves. You obviously choose the 'virtus dormitiva' way: you explain our consciousness by stating it has conscious constituents. Dennett explains it by processes in the brain that itself are not conscious. If they were, nothing would be explained. So you have a choice: to give up explaining; or accepting that some complex processes constitute subjective experiences. That comment is completely wrong: Dennett argues a chapter of about (I have the book as ebook) 45 pages against several conceptions of qualia. Dennett really takes every bull by the horns.

Slowly I have only one answer to you: read Consciousness Explained, of Daniel Dennett. The answer is not just 'emergence'. Dennett gives a pretty good theory how consciousness emerges from brain processes. In the end I think it will boil down to this: we see that consciousness has to do with the complexity of the brain. A researcher, believing that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, discovers what kind of complex structures reveals this consciousness. Another researcher, believing that consciousness is an emergent property of some structures in the universe, discovers what kind of structures leads to consciousness. The structures they describe will be the same. For me this means that the assumption of consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe is as superfluous as is the assumption that it needs a God to keep everything running. We just have to accept that complex structures can give rise to consciousness, that this is a fundamental fact of the universe. Empirically both kind of theories cannot be distinguished: using Ockhams rasor tells us to ignore superfluous assumptions.

We have to be very precise here. As qualia play no causal role, they have no existence on their own. It is a mistake to see them as some additional entities to the process that runs on the brain. So I would say we also have no qualia. It is just another word for being conscious. I think that if an AI program reports inner states in the same way we do, she has consciousness. I see no reason why not (have you seen the movie 'Her'? It is fun, and something to think about. Or Ex Machina?) I've read Penrose's Shadows of the Mind. I did not find it very convincing. He is misusing Gödel's incompleteness theorem (Hofstadter shows in GEB that such kind of arguments are invalid). I've even once had a small chat with Penrose, and he very honestly admitted that his theory is far from complete. In my own words: it is very speculative. Exactly. I think we learn from physics that combining General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics leads to infinities, but that this problem only plays a role in extreme circumstances, like black holes and the Big Bang. So why we would need a quantum theory of gravity to understand consciousness is totally incomprehensible for me. I think theories of consciousness based on QM, or the possibilities left open by QM can never provide a theory of consciousness, simply because in QM we 'cannot look behind the scenes'. What we observer are quantum events: e.g. the measurement of a particle. There is no way to look behind what we observe (an obvious tautology, but tautologies are per definition true...). We even know that that there are no local hidden variables.

There are different meanings of the word 'ego' of course. What I mean is the feeling that something of 'me' is the same though all the years, from my earliest childhood till now. It is the basis if thinking that this is a 'thing', a mind which is the unchanging subject of all experience and activity, and that according to many people survives death. This means it has an existence of its own, independent of the brain. That is the illusion of the ego: there is no such a thing. That does not mean that there is no consciousness. "The light is on, but there is nobody at home". Just to mention: this is also the classical Buddhist view: the soul has no independent existence of its own. Well, as I described above I see this as different concepts. We assign consciousness to the ego, 'that what is conscious', but that is just a (strong) habit. We are aware of things we see, that we hear, of our thoughts and feelings etc. The ego is so to speak a narrative of the brain, without any independent existence. I don't know, you keep saying that. It's ok if my arguments do not convince you, but I hope at least that you understand them. But again: did you read about David Chalmers, with his 'easy problems' and 'the hard problem'? I recently saw him in 'Through the Wormhole' and he argued for a view that seems very similar to yours: that consciousness is somehow a fundamental attribute of existence. Yes, qualia (singular: quale) is the technical term. However, I think you use it wrongly when you say we experience qualia: qualia are the experience. We experience that something is red: that experience is the 'red quale'. However, I think you get in trouble if you want to answer the question: what is the causal role of qualia? Would an objective observer see the difference when somebody is missing qualia? If they play no causal role in the universe, do they exist then? Dennett heavily criticises the concept of qualia in Consciousness Explained. The chapter's title is Qualia Disqualified. As quote above the text he has following quote: Thrown into a causal gap, a quale will simply fall through it. This does not mean we do not experience the world around and in us. It means that it can be explained by brain processes.

Of course we are conscious. Consciousness in itself is not an illusion. But many aspects of it can be, like unconditional free will, a continuous stream of consciousness in the exactly the same time as 'world time', the ego. Did you look at my link of the 'hard problem'? I think we know what you are talking about. I think there is no sharp threshold of animals that are conscious or not. Evolutionary I think consciousness goes hand in hand with the capability to steer behaviour by observing the environment. A bee that informs her colleagues that 50 meters from the beehive, in NE-direction is a field of clover might have consciousness, even if it is very limited. Let me turn around your 'I cannot imagine' argument: I cannot imagine how an animal can picture its environment, evaluate possible actions with their outcome against its own interests, without being conscious. There is a level in the brain at which it makes symbolic interactions, with representations of itself, its environment and its interests. But we know that symbolic manipulations can exist in rigid, logical, and physical hardware. So consciousness might be the necessary consequence of being such a system.

Well, I think QM shows how we can still do science, even if we have lost perfect predictability: it predicts chance distributions. But as long as some event has a cause, we can still do science. Or it has no cause, and then we are left with randomness. I do not see how randomness can explain mental phenomena. I also do not understand why you mention 'unpredictability' here. Should that be an element of awareness? At most it is an element of creativity. But if I conscious avoid to collide with another car, I think I am fully aware, and very predictable. Somehow you intermingle creativity, awareness and free will. Sure, they are somehow interdependent, but they are not the same. I think, as you do, that awareness is the most difficult problem to understand. If we do understand it, I think the explanation of creativity follows directly. The 'problem' of free will I consider as being solved already. It is a pseudo problem, caused by a wrong understanding of what free will really is. If the mind somehow causes our behaviour, then it is accessible to science. But I think your definition just goes too far. If one really observes, in one self, what free will is, what empirically is given what free will is, we do not have that much: On on side, I do not know where my exact motivations come from. In some situations, where my choice is between equal alternatives, it is often impossible to say why I chose the alternative I did. On the other side, I perfectly know that what will happen next depends on my choice. My decisions matter. And if nobody forces me to do something I normally would never do, it was a free choice. Everything else people associate with free will, like consciousness always preceding actions, or that we 'could have done otherwise' in a categorical sense (and therefore contradicts determinism), is metaphysical humbug that doesn't follow from my honest experience. I agree. But maybe the problem is not science, but the concepts we are using to think about consciousness. And that is why the problem of consciousness is not just a scientific problem, but also a philosophical problem. Daniel Dennett, who had the courage to give his book the title 'Consciousness explained', is a philosopher. But one who uses all of cognitive science to show how his theory works. I think you should read the book. Due to the discussions we have here, I am now rereading it, and really, it is worth the time. But the most difficult in the book is to get rid of some (cherished?) illusions. I think that if we have explained how every behaviour arises, we will not feel the need for a separate theory about consciousness. I think that when all the 'easy problems' are solved, nobody will still see a 'hard problem'.

Hi KipIngram, I think I have good grounds to state that QM processes are not relevant for consciousness. The number of QM events involved in a simple signal process in the neurons and between the synapses is too big, and temperature is too high for individual QM states to play a role. See e.g. Max Tegmark, The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes: Of course I cannot be 100% sure that QM does not play a role, but it just does not make sense to me. It shifts the explanation of awareness, creativity and free will to a domain where QM states we cannot observe anything. The wave function itself is not an observable. The only thing we can observe in QM is the single event, not what happens immediately before. There is no way that a 'willed' QM event can be distinguished from the 'default quantum noise'. So how could the brain can do that? Also I think that free will must not be explained by some new kind of process in the brain. As free will for me means 'being able to do what you want' no reference to special mechanisms in the brain is necessary. To distinguish free actions from coerced actions we only have to know what a person wants, and what he in fact does. Same for creativity: the 'classical chaos' in the brain is already big enough that randomness because of neural mechanism are more than enough to explain why new ideas can arise. QM randomness would also not be distinguishable from the classical chaos in the brain. So for me it is much too early to throw away the idea that the mind is an emergent phenomenon of the brain. Introducing consciousness as physically fundamental is like introducing God because we do not understand how the universe, and we in it, have arisen.

Yes. But the correlations found do not agree with the premise of the existence of local causes. That means if you want to see consciousness as a quantum phenomenon that consciousness is not just local. Do you want to go that far? (Some people do: accidentally I yesterday saw an episode of 'Through the Wormhole', named 'Is there life after Death'. Stuart Hameroff defends such a kind of theory. Maybe something for you? Hmmm. But we have other examples of emergence. E.g. electrons, protons and neutrons have no colour. However their composites (atoms and molecules) have. Electrons, protons and neutrons do not evolve, but organisms built from them do. Electrons, protons and neutrons do not plan the future: but we, built from them do. Can you give me a reason why that would be impossible, except 'I cannot imagine'? Well I am not saying free will is an illusion. Only a certain definition, namely as uncaused will, it makes no sense. And I don't think you really sense that. What you sense is that you do not know where your thoughts, feelings, motivations etc arise. But that does not mean that they originate from some non-physical domain. Hofstadter would say: you do not have access to the level where your brain 'calculates': you are not aware of your neurons firing. What I think you do sense, is what I said before: that I am able to act according to my wishes and beliefs, and that makes free will. Creativity is the unexpected popping up of new ideas. But that does not mean that they do not have a causal foreplay on levels where your mind has no access to. I do not think this will show ever. We already know that consciousness only arises in animals with brains of a certain complexity. I also think that consciousness exists in different gradations: it is not that insects are not aware at all, and only primates, or even just humans, have consciousness. But this means that your 'conscious atoms' can only express themselves as conscious when they are organised in certain complex structures. If we have discovered exactly what kind of structures these are, the need for postulating 'conscious atoms' will drop away, just as the angels moving celestial bodies dropped away by celestial mechanics. An "I cannot imagine how these celestial bodies are moving without angels pushing them" will not do.

Well, that is a very unusual way of defining free will. What you name free will I would call creativity. And that is not the same as free will at all. I would define free will as follows: A person is said to have free will if he is able to act according his own motivations. This definition covers the daily use of the concept of free will, and does not contradict determinism. (Just to add, one can make several amendments to this definition to make it more precise, but I think for most discussions this suffices.) And also, for new things to happen, we just need new situations that did not occur before. That is also not in contradiction with determinism. I understand your reasoning, but I do not agree. In the first place because of the above: free will just is not doing something unpredictable. In the second place while EPR shows there are no local causes determining the outcome of a single quantum event. In the third place it is not clear at all that the brain functions as a 'quantum-event amplifier'. And even if it turns out to be, how does the brain know which events to amplify to new ideas or actions, and which not? Further, I would like to mention one point again: you lay stronger constraints on an explanation of consciousness, than you do for other phenomena. Or do you think something is still missing in e.g. the theory of electromagnetics. "Yes, I know, but what is really causing the charges?". We know what charges are, because we have a full blown theory about them. If we have a theory that explains what kind of structures are conscious, we have explained consciousness. I think this is more or less the point that MonDie makes here.

But my point is that EPR experiments show that there is no room for hidden local causes. QM has only randomness on offer, and my will is simply not just randomness. Of course not! You are mixing two different discourses: on one side there is the discourse about reasons, motivations, aims, etc. On the other side is the discourse of laws of nature, of energy, of conservation laws, of causes, etc. In the first discourse talking about free will, or coercion, makes sense: in the second it does not. In the second, talking about determinism and randomness makes sense, in the first it doesn't. The problem of free will and determinism is a pseudo problem, that under the correct understanding just evaporates. There is a relevant way in which e.g. a chess computer has a choice: it can move a pawn from E2 to E4, but also E3, but it cannot move to A5. This is true, even if the choice is determined. The same with us: we are determined, but there is relevant meaning of having a choice: if you are in MacDonalds you cannot choose a coq d'orange. But you can choose between a big Mac or a Cheeseburger. That you are a determined system does not change the fact that you choose. So there is a relevant meaning of free will in a determined world: that what will happen next, depends on your choice (opposed to e.g. that what you do depends on the choice of somebody else). Again, you must be aware of the difference between determinism and fatalism. Your choice might be determined, but what will happen depends on your choice. In fatalism, what happens, happens independently of your choices. We are determined, and therefore free will can arise. In a world of randomness this would be impossible. There is some kind of illusion of free will: that it has no causal foreplay. But that my choices have impact is an empirical fact. The idea that we have some kind of absolute free will is a metaphysical idea, that is not supported by any evidence. It was probably just a theological idea, as a solution to the problem of the theodicy. Tell me about these restrictions: give me some empirical evidence that you are restricted by the laws of physics (not the obvious kinds of course, e.g. that you cannot fly, or run faster than light). GEB is not tedious at all! It is fun! But it can be demanding, if you really go through it. But you can try this short cut. But you should really read GEB. It definitely change my view, and gave me a deeper insight of how consciousness can arise in a formal system. Just to say "It is emergence" definitely falls short. But the theories that cognitive science came up with can be subsumed under the label 'emergence'. The real problem for you is that you say "I cannot imagine how a complex mechanism like our brain can be conscious". Now that is not very solid. You step in one stroke from "I cannot imagine it" to "cognitive science is bankrupt". Understanding the brain might be a slightly more difficult problem than the movement of planets and other dead bodies. No. We are machines. Very, very complicated electrical-chemical-biological machines. "Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots." That is the way I do it too. Another way is to use 'raw format': see what happens if you press the button just above the button for 'Bold'. Sometimes my postings get completely messed up, and the only way I can save them is by using the 'raw mode'. There you can use tags, as many other, more primitive forums software, e.g. use the tag

You can try the sandbox.

Hi KipIngram Sorry it took so long for me to get back, but during the week I am so occupied by my work... About EPR: I do not quite understand what you are saying, and how it is an counter argument against mine: that EPR experiment show that there is no underlying, local mechanism in QM, so that QM does not leave room for being influenced by a mind, so to speak under the threshold of QM. No, that is not true. What you are doing here is taking a mind, or soul for granted. But if you see that we are what the brain does, then this makes no sense. Something cannot be coerced by itself. You can be coerced by somebody else: by threatening you, or literally forcing you to do things. But that has nothing to do with determinism. Determinism is not the same as coercion. Determinism is only saying that from certain start conditions only one set of end conditions follow. But that is the course of things, not coercion. Laws of nature force nothing: they just describe how nature flows. What my brain does is really a choice: a choice between possible consequences of several actions I can imagine to do in a certain situation. But such an 'evaluation machine' can be determined. Every chess computer is an evaluation machine in a very limited universe. Why do you think so? Can this feeling not be explained just as well by the immense complexity of the brain? And I think even a chess computer may surprise you by doing a fully unexpected move. Then you haven't read any book that really tries to explain consciousness as emergence. It is much more than just saying 'emergence', like other say 'soul' or 'God'. Really, Read GEB and Dennett's 'Consciousness Explained'. Of course it is a choice! Evaluation of several possibilities, and choosing one, is a choice. This is exactly the evolutionary advantage of consciousness: not to react automatically on some chemical gradient or light source, but have a picture of the environment, about its own position in this environment, to recognise its own interests, its possibilities for actions, evaluating the consequences and then choosing the best option. We see an increase in this capability in animals with increasing brain complexity. So why invoke something else than this (neural) complexity? So you are looking at the wrong place for consciousness if you think it should follow from our laws of physics. You do not become a good chess player by analysing the physical structure of the chess computer that always beats you. Or another example: you do not understand evolution by studying elementary particles. Elementary particles do not evolve in the Darwinian sense. Yet Darwinian evolution exists. Evolution is also an emergent property of complex material structures, called life. You are doing it again... If you use the word 'just' like this, everybody knows that you are leaving something out, namely the most important. You are just a portion of chemical: how can you be conscious? If awareness is somehow fundamental to the universe, why is it that we only see awareness in higher animals? It must have to do something with complexity! If we would have found out what, do you think somebody will still say 'oh but this only works because matter is conscious', or 'and so we have an antenna for the soul-entity; but we do not know still what this soul-entity is'. In Newton's days one could wonder who started to move the planets, or how gravity works (Angels pushing, looking that they push exactly according to the inverse square law...). Yep. But in both case you still have to explain why we have awareness, and e.g. a stone hasn't. And of course it is not just 'sufficient complex', but complex in a certain way. If science understands under what conditions complex structures are aware, then we will have understood awareness. Exactly. Nothing in the simple rules of 'Life' suggests that such complex structures can arise from them: they have even build Turing machines with it. They even replicated 'Life' with 'Life'!

Would a mind exist, when it never was connected to the senses (which would include no dialogues with other people too...)? We are the software of the brain, and without any input there would be no useful program running on the brain.

Hmm. I am a bit disappointed by your reaction. You wrote extensively about free will, I reacted on it, and now you simply drop the topic. Of course the topics of consciousness and free will are related. For both you claim that the traditional scientific attitude is bankrupt. And for both you propose solutions with QM, that have a strong odour of dualism. And besides, my last posting was not just about free will... Let me know when you are not interested anymore. But I think my arguments have earned a reaction.

QM predicts probabilities. EPR experiments show that underneath the determined probability distribution do not lie local causes. And that is exactly what you seem to suggest: that QM-events allow room for the will to interfere with nature. Well, we might get in a discussion about terms, but if I compare the different words with their opposites, I have following picture: free actions vs coerced actions determinism vs randomness freedom vs oppression Free will for me means being able to act freely (first bullet). If my choice were completely uninfluenced, then my actions would have nothing to do with the circumstances I am in, and also with who I am: my character, the things I learned in my life, my self-knowledge. That kind of free will is a chimera. Well I think I have written that pretty clearly. Of course we need determinism to act freely. In the first place, we cannot know any outcome of our actions, i.e. choose certain outcomes, if the result of my actions would be random. I need, so to speak, a reliable nature; that in similar circumstances occur similar outcomes. In the second place, the only way I can even be made responsible for my actions is when I determined my actions (I really like the word in this context... Somebody who is sure in his actions is said to be very determined). Now you are suggesting that there must be something (mind, soul), that sits in the control room, using the controls, getting information via the senses, but not subject of causality. But now you have only moved the problem to some subentity. No. Determinism and fatalism are two very different things. Fatalism means that I have no influence: things take their course independently of what I want. In determinism however, my motives, beliefs, feelings etc are causal factors. And to these factors belong also moral considerations. So there is no contradiction between moral behaviour and determinism at all. And of course you have choices: there is a relevant sense in which you have a choice when you are given a menu card in the restaurant, where e.g. a prisoner just has to eat what he gets. And if nobody forces you to pick something you do not want, you have a free choice. You just state this argument as if it is obvious. But it is not at all. Nothing would change, except that we might become a little bit less harsh in our verdicts, because we know there is nothing like ultimate responsibility, absolute free will, and the Evil (with capital 'E'). No! Exactly the opposite. Because I am conscious of my behaviour, the choices I make, the ideas and feelings these are based on, I must conclude that others are self aware too. I can even talk about the ideas and feelings with others. Obviously they have them too. In other words: philosophical zombies do not exist. Entities that behave exactly as we do, which includes talking about their inner feelings, thoughts, doubts, etc, but are not conscious are a pure philosophical fantasy. Therefore I know: certain complex processes can lead to self awareness. If we have found the conditions that such processes arise, we will have understood consciousness. If you think we don't, then you are applying harder constraints on explanations of consciousness than any other science does on its explanations.

I think it has to do with the 'hear-say' mechanism. Einstein felt very bad under Prussian discipline at school in Germany. He was pretty unconventional already in his youth. In this time his parents left for Italy, but poor Albert stayed behind in a guest family. I do not remember by heart, but I think his uncomfortness led him to emigrate to Switzerland (Aargau) where he finished school with great grades. Also at the technical University in Zürich, he was pretty unconventional: he did not visit lectures, and learnt on his own, partially with notes made by companions. I would say he did work pretty on his own (but not in complete isolation!). His revolutionary take on special relativity came as a complete surprise for the outer world (only one friend knew what he was working on). With general relativity he needed the help because of the math ("Hey I have a great idea, but I have some trouble with the math...."). Marcel Grossmann introduced him to the math of curved spaces, and much later he sought also support from David Hilbert. This nearly costed him his primary on general relativity, because Hilbert also started to work on it. They were ready at nearly the same time, but Hilbert gave all the credits to Einstein. But Einstein definitely knew what was going in the world of physics, and was completely uptodate in all the important disciplines. Contrary to crackpots who say 'I have a great idea, but I need help for the math...' Sounds similar, but there is a world of difference. Might be a reason too, but it would be extreme: in Switzerland, grades go from 1 to 6, 6 being the best. In Germany, it is the opposite. But with nearly only 1's in Switzerland one would never get at a University, as Einstein in fact did.

Sorry, that is not what I meant. I meant he gave up on the road of cognitive science explaining consciousness. Yes, I am such an opponent. Free will is not free will by 'breaking through the stream of determinism', but by causing actions based on our mental state (intentions, beliefs, ...). So even if QM effects play a role in my brain, it would only be a disturbing one, possibly breaking the causal chain from my motivation to my action. Yes. In order to be free, determinism must be true, or at least there must be sufficient determinism. But this is not an example of free will at all. Free actions are actions that are not overruled by the actions of others. The best examples of free actions are where I want something (motivation) and can actually do it (action). Bad examples are where I do not care what action will come out, and you gave such a kind of example. A quantum amplifier would mean that my free actions are random actions. That is definitely not what free will is.

I see progress. But it is slow, but in my opinion this can be explained by the complexity of the subject; and by the emotional barriers that it might be possible to understand ourselves as what we are: wet information processing machines. Please, re-read GEB; and read Consciousness Explained by Daniel Dennett. (This is a few months of work, I know...). I would say this is just not true. There are some great ideas around. I would be happy to discuss above mentioned books with you. I would say that you give up the naturalist agenda too early. Consciousness seems to be the most complicated issue to tackle in science, and therefore a solution seems to be far away. But maybe we just need another perspective. To give up explaining, and postulate conscious agents as fundamental, is too much the move of an 'old universe creationist'. If it is just proposed as that, and nothing more then you are right. But in my opinion this is just a very high level abstract of the idea. I think there is a long way to go from Hoffman's conscious agents, to explaining human consciousness. And it might be (good that we are in the speculation forum) that if a research programme would be based on it, in the end the consciousness agent is thrown out as a superfluous assumption of the theory. Newton believed in God as a creator of the universe. But his mechanics was a great stepping stone in forgetting God as just a superfluous hypothesis. You are doing it again... No, no. That will not ever happen. But it is not necessary. It must only be possible to implement a functionality, in complexity more or less equivalent to neural structures in the brain. Does evolution pop out nicely out of mainstream physical theory? Or chess programs? Sorry to repeat my self so often: read GEB again. If we will understand consciousness one day, it will not be directly derived from physical theory. But conscious entities will be implemented in physical structures. I think Hoffman is much farther away from 'prime time'. In fact, it seems to me, he has given up.

Just forgot to mention it again: Every nerve cell is still a nerve cell, and each signal just a chemically transported potential difference. You should get rid of this kind of emotional pictures if you want to understand consciousness, it is a blockade to look into the processing character of consciousness. Maybe you should do this to get rid of it: every time you think of AI in terms of 'it is just ...' , build the same sentence but then with brain equivalents. And then do not forget we are conscious, even if we are 'just ...'.

It is not just a pattern of course. It is a very complicated process, with many levels, where higher levels can have influence on the lower levels. Really, re-read GEB, you probably would get a lot out of it. Why 'suddenly'? Wouldn't consciousness exist in gradations? And why are you looking at just at the smallest components, and 'view them as mechanisms only'? Seems the precise recipe never to understand consciousness. This is basically the 'Chinese room' argument. See also the arguments against it. You can read it online, taken from 'The mind's I', including a critique of Hofstadter. Maybe. Maybe not. Maybe we should just get used that some complicated processes are conscious processes, independently from how they are realised, in nerve cells or flip-flops.

Philosophy does not just describe stuff. It is an academic subject. During my study at university AbnormallyHonest's stuff never was a topic. For good reasons. Very good reasons... Philosophy is not the trash bin of science.

No, it is not philosophy. AbnormallyHonest makes empirical claims; philosophy does not. But because he presents no logical or empirical evidence, and he contradicts science, these are just wild speculations.

A nerve cell neither.

No, definitely not. But one can distillate a kind of 'core-Buddhism' which fits pretty well to a scientific outlook. E.g. the teaching of 'no-soul'. It doesn't literary say that a soul does not exist, but it says a soul does not exist independently: it is build up from the 5 Skandhas, and when we die the soul dissolves. One way of understanding Buddhism is that it is a kind of humanism. And just as humanism usually does not contradict science, so neither does this 'core-Buddhism'. However: one must be clear that it is the 'believer' (or 'practitioner') who brews this 'core-Buddhism'. Many traditional Buddhists do not accept such a stripped-of Buddhism. But there is a rather strong movement in Europe and America known as 'Secular Buddhism'. See also here. I am practising Zen meditation. I see this as a helpful method not just to know that the Ego has no independent existence (based on scientific and philosophical arguments (many of the modern philosophical arguments can already be found in Buddhist texts)), but also to feel that way. In other words: Buddhist practice (not all its teachings!) might fit to a modern scientific world view. It gives hints how to get on par with a universe that is deaf to your needs, which might have created you, but will also destroy you in the end. It might be a way to have peace with the radical contingency of life.

These sources were already discussed in this thread. Your link is to a Christian website (the one you give later too). If you want to cite sources, then better do this of a critical, historical source. Where I agree with you that Jesus is mentioned in some secular sources, I would never point to a page that begins with: 'The' New Testament does not exist. It is a collection of writings of different sources, some only about 10 years after Jesus' death (some letters of Paul), until more than 70 years after his death. Critical historical investigation has shown that the gospels are inconsistent, partially wrong, and therefore not accurate at all. If you want to build a case, please use sources that are based on the best of historical science.