Eise

A nerve cell neither.

No, definitely not. But one can distillate a kind of 'core-Buddhism' which fits pretty well to a scientific outlook. E.g. the teaching of 'no-soul'. It doesn't literary say that a soul does not exist, but it says a soul does not exist independently: it is build up from the 5 Skandhas, and when we die the soul dissolves. One way of understanding Buddhism is that it is a kind of humanism. And just as humanism usually does not contradict science, so neither does this 'core-Buddhism'. However: one must be clear that it is the 'believer' (or 'practitioner') who brews this 'core-Buddhism'. Many traditional Buddhists do not accept such a stripped-of Buddhism. But there is a rather strong movement in Europe and America known as 'Secular Buddhism'. See also here. I am practising Zen meditation. I see this as a helpful method not just to know that the Ego has no independent existence (based on scientific and philosophical arguments (many of the modern philosophical arguments can already be found in Buddhist texts)), but also to feel that way. In other words: Buddhist practice (not all its teachings!) might fit to a modern scientific world view. It gives hints how to get on par with a universe that is deaf to your needs, which might have created you, but will also destroy you in the end. It might be a way to have peace with the radical contingency of life.

These sources were already discussed in this thread. Your link is to a Christian website (the one you give later too). If you want to cite sources, then better do this of a critical, historical source. Where I agree with you that Jesus is mentioned in some secular sources, I would never point to a page that begins with: 'The' New Testament does not exist. It is a collection of writings of different sources, some only about 10 years after Jesus' death (some letters of Paul), until more than 70 years after his death. Critical historical investigation has shown that the gospels are inconsistent, partially wrong, and therefore not accurate at all. If you want to build a case, please use sources that are based on the best of historical science.

This Luc Montagnier, in the words of PZ Meyers: I have two other Nobel price winnners for you: Linus Pauling and Brian Josephson.

I said: Scientific speculations are at least not in contradiction with most of established science. And then you ask if I agree with: A speculation that is in contradiction with some of established science is not a scientific speculation. Ehhh? Didn't you understand what I wrote? Let's take the Bohr example: Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom was in contradiction with established theories about electromagnetism. Bohr's model explained the spectrum of hydrogen numerically precisely. So at one side it contradicted established science, on the other side it could explain something that physics until then couldn't. There obviously is a tension here: Bohr himself of course knew that he proposed something that couldn't be the last word. But Bohr's atom model was not in contradiction with the whole body of physics. Another important point is that established science can mean (at least) two things: scientific facts and scientific theories. Scientific theories can always be amended again. e.g. when we try to apply a theory in a domain where it does not lead to acceptable empirical predictions. But scientific facts cannot be denied. It is empirically measured that clocks slow down by high velocities, so there is no point to deny it, and yell 'relativity is wrong!'. It is an empirical fact that in a homeopathic solution of C100 there is no single molecule of the original substance in it. So if a speculation is in contradiction with scientific facts, then forget it. If your speculation is against established theories, then be sure you explain more facts than present theories do. Don't get me wrong: I have nothing (in principle) against wild speculations. It seems there are also people who collect stamps. But I have something against people who think scientists should all listen to their ideas, and get angry that their ideas are suppressed. In case of e.g. climate change I heavily have something against people who take their speculations as truths, and act upon them. I think I gave a kind of difference, but this is not dictionary-ripe. A hypothesis can be tested in the immediate future. A speculation's empirical confirmation lies in an unknown future. (Multiverse? String Theory?).

I have never heard of 'pseudo-speculations'. Something that looks like a speculation, but isn't one? 'I think Molly is home' might be speculation. Is it a pseudo-speculation because in fact I know she is home, because I just called her with my cell phone? But maybe it is useful to talk about a scientific speculation, and speculations in general. Or maybe founded speculations (we are not only speculating in science, but also in daily life), and wild speculations. Scientific speculations, are at least not in contradiction with most of established science, and ideally increases the domain of explained facts. If (empirical) tests are imminent, then we could better use the word 'hypotheses'.

True. One of the shallowest arguments is 'I cannot imagine how this is possible, so I postulate a simple answer': Universal Consciousness! (Never forget the capitals). As Strange already said above: this is quantum woo. You obviously explain something you do not understand, with something else you do not understand. Now that is shallow thinking.

Hi KipIngram, First a compliment for the way you show your ways of thought. The quality of your posting is high above many of the postings made in the philosophy forum. You ask for people if they can bring something new. Reading all your thoughts, I am not sure I can, but I give it a few tries. As a take-off, I would take that you know you are conscious. As you were born from humans, grew up, live and communicate with humans, I hope you agree that this is a sufficient basis to state that all humans are conscious. A second point is that we are animals: we descended from other animals, those from simpler organisms, even from organisms that do not have nervous systems. The fact that changes in our central nervous system (drugs, concussion) change our consciousness, is a basis for supposing that consciousness is related to brain processes, so we can safely assume that organisms without nervous systems are not conscious. So where would the spirit enter organisms in the historical evolution? I think the question makes no sense at all. Therefore I think we can safely assume that consciousness is a function of nervous systems above certain complexity. This of course is not a theory of consciousness: but for me it is enough to see this as an empirical fact: that complex nervous systems can give rise to consciousness. The next question is then if completely different systems, like complex electronic devices (aka computers, but we might need some completely different kinds of hardware as we have now) principally could have consciousness. Elsewhere I described what I think are necessary attributes of of a system to call it conscious: being able to observe the environment, react on it in ways that show that the system evaluates possible courses of actions, and is able to reflect on reasons for its actions, and communicate them, and understand reasons of other systems (organic or not). You say the hardware of a computer is a machine, and nothing more. That is of course not true. It is a very special machine. And it is this specialty in which it differs from machines with other specialties, like cars or pumps. One should always be aware of expressions like '... is nothing more than...', or '... is just...'. You can be sure when hearing or thinking such a thought, that exactly that attribute that is important is cut off. You should put a trigger on those words, something like 'over-generalisation alarm!'. A steam engine is nothing more than iron, coal and water. But you cannot ride a train with a heap of iron, a heap of coal and a tank with water. And the essence of the train is not that it is steam engine: it could also be a diesel engine. Different material components, but does the same: it pulls a train. So I would say: we are complex electro-chemical engines, so complex that consciousness can arise. (So we are not just electro-chemical engines, we are very complex ones.) There is no reason beforehand to exclude the possibility that a system built on other underlying principles could be conscious too. But it must at least share some of the complex structures that we are. In this thread you are referring to Gödel, Escher, Bach. I think you really should reread it. The essence of the book is not what you write there: that is just a global formulation of Gödel's incompleteness theorem. I see the main point of GEB in the hypotheses that consciousness can arise in systems that are built up of different layers of complexity built on each other, and where the higher levels can change the system on lower levels (see strange loop). I think you can get a quick overview of Hofstadter's thinking if you read one of the final chapters of GEB, called 'speculations', if I remember it correctly. All this is of course not consciousness explained. But one should ask what one expects from such an explanation. I think that if we would know the necessary conditions for a system to be consciousness, we understand consciousness. A philosopher like Daniel Dennett even thinks that we know what these conditions are. So if you are ready with GEB, go on with Dennett, 'Consciousness Explained'. Hope I gave you a few new thoughts... Happy to investigate further, but I will not have always so much time...

I think you do not quite understand the scientific 'mind set'. New entities are only hypothesised when there is something that cannot be explained by existing scientific means, when we know that existing explanations fall short. To give an example: dark matter. We know we cannot explain the movements of galaxies as we see them, or the gravity lensing effect. So there is an obvious hole in our explanations. There might be more than one hypotheses that can explain what we observe, but dark matter is surely one of them. For consciousness this is not clear at all. Quite the opposite, neurology is progressing fast, and there also no compelling philosophical reasons to assume something like you propose here. Only when we are sure that known mechanisms cannot explain consciousness, we must look farther. But we do not know that yet, because we know we do not know all mechanisms. A lot is already known of course, but you should ask a biologist and/or neurologist. But there is no reason at all to suppose that the causal chains are somewhere incomplete. Therefore the interesting question here is why it feels that 'I' move my hand. If you carefully observe and reflect on how you move your hand, you will even discover that you even do not know how you do it. You just do it.

This is plainly false. You obviously never read the gospels. Get informed. Then you can go on, e.g. reading a few books of Bart Ehrman

That's why I took the one paragraph that is contradicting all science I know of. . NOBODY EXPECTS THE SPANISH INQUISITION! (Sorry this had to be... )

You do realise you are asking a question to somebody who wasn't on this forum for 4 years?

Shall I put it in a disclaimer? Everytime I say something like 'All the empirical evidence' you may add 'I am aware of' in your mind. Also when I say sentences like 'A is B' you may think that I really mean 'I think that A = B'. OK? And otherwise I am totally curious if you know of empirical evidence consciousness can exist with being implemented in 'chemical and physical changes'.

All the empirical evidence shows in the opposite direction: that consciousness is a function of the processes in the brain. Philosophy contradicting empirical evidence is very poor philosophy, and in fact worthless.

I agree with this summary. I never disputed your descriptions of how our brains work, and I indeed argue that these inner workings are irrelevant. Any system that has the same capabilities as we have (reflect on future developments, on the effects of its own possible actions on these, on reasons it has, being able to explicate these reasons to other systems with the same capabilities etc etc, on the long term) can be assigned to act freely or not, independent of our knowledge of its inner workings. Just to add: it makes no sense to apply the category free/not free action to systems that do not have afore mentioned capabilities. A planet is not forced in its orbit by the gravity of it central star. (One could also say that a planet wants to be in its orbit, because the presence of its central star. That makes no sense too.) Causal laws are in fact no laws. Laws of nature are not enforced, like human laws. They are descriptions of how natural objects happen to behave. This also applies to the workings of neurons and the brain. But if the system behaves in the way I described above, then this 'spherical cow' expresses very complex behaviour (verbal and non-verbal). But such complex behaviour hardly justifies to call it a 'spherical cow'. Surely, one day neurologists might find out what the difference between free and coerced actions is. But the differences will be in how different subsystems of the brain react on each other and on sense inputs, and not in a conscious 'captain system' in the brain. Every process will be determined all the same.

Well, we have executive function/oversight. The 'apparatus' that gives us this capability is the brain. But it is a category error to require that this is some subsystem in the brain, and that this subsystem controls the brain. This is exactly the point I was making all the time. iNow presupposes that 'real free will' needs such a conscious entity in the brain. It is just a modern version of dualism. That is why it called 'soul' or 'magic'. All the facts iNow presented are arguments against dualism, but not against free will. But if you already have a naturalist view point, I think one does not need neurologists to 'discover' that dualism is not true.

No, you did not. But you did very poor in reacting on the position of others. Well, it is not fair if people do not agree with you that you are not even interested in understanding their viewpoint and countering their arguments. Nearly always your only reaction on my postings was giving your viewpoint in slightly other words again: not countering my arguments. I do not think that. So you really did not understand one word of what I have been arguing for. No doubt we can be lured. But that is not the point. Our standpoints are influenced by external factors. Many, maybe even most of them, are unconscious. But if I can do what I want, recognise what I did as not coerced, then it was a free action. If I afterwards recognise that I was manipulated, I will say it was not of free will. So I can be mistaken. But that does not suffice to say we have no free will at all. Many of my daily choices are not not influenced in this way at all. Of course, I like coffee, and if I was not born in a culture where drinking coffee is a normal daily ritual, I wouldn't do it. My will is of course a product of my genes, of my cultural, biological and personal history. But the possibility for this will to express itself in actions is the point where we can decide if these actions were free or coerced. This is the place where the concept of free will can be applied. Definitely not in the brain itself. So forget about the biochemistry. It has nothing to do with it. And I think you should come with a better example. I would react exactly as you describe: but consciously and on good grounds. You behave like what I call 'a scientist on Sundays'. During his work, the scientist works very precisely, and does not jump to conclusions he knows that are not fully supported by his (empirical or logical) evidence. But on Sundays he is free, via unsupported extrapolations, to extend his scientific findings to the universe and everything. At this moment he becomes deaf to rational arguments and does not behave better than any believer. He has become a devotee of scientism. Just to add: I am not anti-science, not at all. If you think that, then it is clear again that you haven't understood what I am arguing for.

I do not think that I use them so differently. The simplest definition of free will is that you can do what you want. If people say, no we can't, because we are determined, I say that they use another, pretty absurd definition of free will: that you can want what you want. It is only when some kind of neurologists and misguided philosophers uncritically take over this absurd definition, and 'go metaphysical' with it, that we get into a free will problem. And then this problem is e.g. 'solved' by saying that free will is just an illusion. As I said earlier, I think the whole confusion is historically a remnant of Christian theology: that we have souls, that freely, uncaused themselves, can interfere with the causal universe. This is an absurd idea, of course, but most of us still feel this way. That is an illusion, but it doesn't touch the simple definition of free will, to be able to do what you want. Now this definition is a bit simple, and therefore I proposed a bit more technical one: A person is said to have free will if he is able to act according his own motivations. This stresses the point that the difference between a free and a non-free action is not that the first one would be determined, and the secondly 'free'. Of course not: both are determined. But the correct opposition is that between a free action, and a coerced action. An even more technical definition is the following: A person is said to have free will if he recognises his action as in agreement with his own motivations. This implies that we might be wrong: we might be manipulated, and it could turn out that somebody manipulated me. But grosso modo, this is not the case in daily life. And also, we should not make the error to apply this on the inner workings of the brain. Persons are free or not. You do not find persons in the brain. You find a person in his talking, his actions, thoughts, feelings, etc. The concepts of free or coerced do not apply at the physical level. One does not understand an article by studying the chemical components of the ink with which it is printed.

No, no, no. Stop fantasying what I think. Really, you still have not understood what I am arguing for. Nowhere I said, or even implied, that I am responsible for what my neurons are doing. I have the feeling I have said it already a hundred times: my critique on your position against free will and control, is that you apply these concepts it on the wrong level: on subsystems of the brain, or even on chemical reactions. And now you do as if I make this error. I repeat it: every time you see me using the words 'free will' and 'control' you fill in your own meaning of the words, and so my position seems absurd to you. But my critique on your viewpoint is that your use of these words is wrong. And I do not just say it: I gave arguments for it. So please first get a good rest of your trip, then reread my postings, and then point your arguments against my position, and not the straw man you create again and again by mixing my viewpoint with yours.

Yep. The complete set, not just some subset in the brain.

Uniqueness has nothing to do with it. E.g. suppose 90% of the people like beer. Does that mean I am not free when I want to drink a beer, and can actually do it? If dogs have free will is an interesting question. If you simply apply my definition, then I would say yes. Of course much less pronounced than we, but still. If you can force a dog to do something he normally would not do, e.g you force him in a very small dog kennel, threatening to beat him with a stick, then obviously you artificially restrict the capability to act according his own motivations. However, there is also another viewpoint, which is reflected in your question ('since they aren't self aware'). Suppose this is really the case, they are not self aware. Then an important difference between humans and dogs is that humans have, at least in principle, the capability to act out of reasons they are aware of. The Dutch reclaimed land from the sea, because they found they had not enough land for agriculture. This of course is a long planning process, and the exact way how to realise this highly depends on the reasons you have. But a dog does not has this capability (we assume here: no self-awareness). To say it another way: the dog acts for a reason (trees grow tall also for a reason), but they do not act because they are aware of this reason. So, I don't know where I exactly stand: I have had two dogs myself, and I am inclined to say that they have a bit of free will. But definitely less than we do. Now I think I can predict what iNow and you will say: we can be completely wrong about our reasons. We can be manipulated, and everything is a rationalisation in hindsight. I simply do not believe that. You can set up situation where this is true, but I perfectly well know why I fetched a bottle of red wine from my cellar: because my son made lasagne, and I know I love to drink red wine with lasagne. So I acted from a reason, and I know the reason beforehand. I do not understand: you say he is forced to eat other stuff. So it means his free will is partially and intentionally restricted. People too often do not want to do what rationally seen would be the best.

But you argue against a concept of free will that stems from theology and metaphysics. You argue as an incompatibilist: that free will and determinism do not go together. On good grounds you defend that we are determined, and that consciousness is a function of the brain, and that it is clear that consciousness is not in charge of brain processes. Until here I agree with you. But this is only an argument against free will if one believes that free will implies that consciousness should be in control of neural processes. I do not defend that. Yes, here is the root of our disagreement. But by calling it a red herring, you just sweep it from the table, without giving any argument. I gave an argument: that my concept of free will is rooted in our daily use of the concept of free will. Somebody acted out of free will when he acted according to his own motivations. I am acting of free will when I am allowed to choose the cauliflower, and am not forced to eat Brussels sprouts. Bold and italics by me. Please refer to a posting where I suggest such a thing. This is your consistent misreading of what I write. Every time you see me using the words 'free will' you seem to fill in your concept of free will, but that is simply not what I mean with it. OK, at least you see the difference. But to dismiss my viewpoint by calling my idea of free will a 'red herring', or your use of 'spherical cow' is not really arguing against my points. If somebody does not know how a thermostat works, it is also a 'spherical cow' for him. Somehow this device controls the temperature in the room. Now if he learns how it works, that it is a simple deterministic mechanism, doesn't it control the temperature anymore? Of course, some of the magic is gone, but the thermostat still controls the temperature. (Just replace it with a copper cable: temperature will arise above what you want). You in fact are just sweeping my arguments from the table without looking at them. They just do not fit your ideas, and so they are wrong. Not worth looking at it. Really? For you there is no difference between being forced to eat Brussels sprouts, and freely choosing the vegetable you like, cauliflower? Of course, I was not always friendly. But seeing how you consistently misread me, and you do not react on my arguments, it is a logical reaction. Nowhere I said that you believe in magic, a soul or whatever. But you supposed I did.

According your definition of free will. What makes you an authority of what the correct definition of free will is? I gave an alternative concept, rooted in the daily use of the concept of free will. You are taking for granted a definition that is rooted in theology and metaphysics. Then it is an easy task to show that free will does not exist. Oh, come on, don't be so agitated. The model of free will you are using supposes that consciousness is a subsystem in the brain, and that actions originate from this consciousness. You show that this is not the case, and voila!, there is no free will. But you deny the existence of a straw man: there is no place in the brain where everything 'comes together' (of course you know that). Free will (and control) apply only to the system, i.e. the person, as a whole. I argued this several times, but you never took up this argument. I don't know why. Just a minor illustration: Gerhard Roth is a German neurobiologist who for a long time defended more or less the same position as you do. But recently he changed to a compatibilist viewpoint. I cannot deny his knowledge of neurology. It obviously became clear to him that he applied the concept of free will on the wrong entity. I am sure he did not find processes in the brain that do not precede consciousness. To be short: as long as you not honestly flesh out what your definitions of 'control' and 'free will' are, and show why they are more valid than mine, your viewpoint is build on quicksand. That is just saying that people are not always rational, not that they don't have free will. It seems I hear an echo again: of your idea that if people really are free they must be perfect rational, and omnipotent. Not every action of us is free, not every evaluation of future scenarios is perfect. But saying that our free will is severely limited, does not mean that we have no free will at all.

I thought this thread was about free will, not about 'sense of self'. You are implying again a philosophical standpoint on what free will is supposed to be. At the same time you say you do not like to discuss with philosophers. And I have no idea what you mean with 'my own logic'. - I showed that the concept of control only applies to the system as a whole. You happily neglect this completely. - I use a more realistic concept of free will, rooted in the daily use of this concept. And not the theologically and ideologically concept you are using. Again you show that you are a bad reader. You haven't even started to understand my logic. Of course. But the question was about the relevance of the discussion, not about the correctness of my standpoint. Again you show that you are a bad reader. It seems you can only run your own train, and do not even see those of others. Right. Then why would you go to dive into this bag, to argue that the bag did not decide? What makes you think that for free will to exist a 'self' must be in control of the brain's internal processes? Yes. You are looking for the homunculus in the brain. And you think it is a neurological discovery that such a homunculus does not exist. You are applying the ideas of control and free will on the wrong level, when you start to look into the brain. Nowhere you countered my arguments. (Nowhere you showed you have even understood, yes, even read them.) I leave the rest The discussion here is not about the sense of self, but about free will and consciousness. I perfectly understand iNow's postings. I nowhere deny any scientific fact he presents. But I gave arguments why he applies his concepts of 'control' and 'free will' wrongly. Instead of countering my arguments he keeps using them in his way, as if they are not philosophically problematic at all. He takes a philosophical standpoint, but does as if his way of approaching the topic is scientific. To exaggerate: he defends that the earth is round, and therefore we have no free will. Does anybody deny that the earth is round? No. Is it relevant for the topic of free will? Of course not. Do I deny that neurological processes run as iNow descibes them? No. Ist it relevant for the topic of free will? No. The second point is not as easily to see, but I gave arguments. I am still waiting to hear any conterarguments.

Oh, come on, be serious. Not at all of course. A person is said to have free will if he is able to act according his own motivations. A thermostat has no motivations, is not a person. These are higher order phenomena, that cannot be implemented in such a simple negative feedback system. I already said: having control is a necessary condition of having free will (but not a sufficient condition!). Please follow the discussion.