Eise

Oh, sorry for the collateral damage: I only wanted to blow Randolpin's mind. Maybe it did, because he did not return to this thread...

Well, even in a deterministic world, the future is not certain. The world, and we are just too complicated to make real life predictions. But it is important that causality 'runs through us': our motivations, intentions and believes, are part of the causal fabric of the universe. Even if they are implemented in material structures, like brains. So there is no difference to ask for: the future is uncertain anyway.

Reality is the way it is, because otherwise it would be different.

That is very vague again. Please be more precise, and use technical terms correctly. I already said that there is no causal relationship between two entangled particles, so how should I be able to that? Instead of understanding and dealing with my arguments, you ask a question of which you should already know that it is a meaningless question for me. Then can you tell me where the error in Bell's theorem is, and why the experiments show that local hidden variables are ruled out? What is 'governed by spacetime'? Bell's theorem, together with the proven correctness of the predictions of QM, indeed prove that local (meaning local in space) variables cannot explain the outcome of Bell-like experiments. If they are local in some other, mathematically defined space, is a complete other story. And still another story is if this mathematically defined space is somehow physically real, or even more fundamental, then spacetime in which we live. I don't think it is very useful to link to a bunch of articles that you do not even understand yourself. Even if it turns out that 't Hooft and co are up to something, I do not think that they can make their theory operational in a way that would help to support your viewpoint: I assume that such a theory will not be able to predict where at the screen in the two-split experiment the next photon will be measured. I wonder what the scientific status of a theory is that at one side says that the world is determined, but does not allow experimental verification for that fact.

Itoero, I explicitly accentuated 'local' here: But your answer only contains 'hidden variables'. So it is not much help. My idea is the following (maybe its yours too): on this 2 dimensional surface with the same informational content as our normal 3 dimensional space, 2 detectors of entangled particles might be 'local', i.e. at the same 'place'. (So one must not equate this 2 dimensional surface with just a spacial surface somehow wrapped around the detectors). This would fit the fact that 2 entangled particles are described by one state function, and not by 2 independent ones, as in the case of two non-entangled particles. But this is very speculative from my side. So it would be nice if a real physicist chimes in here and can answer above question! I don't know what 'real space' means. At least when we talk about Bell-like experiments, when we talk about the impossibility of local hidden variables, this 'local' definitely relates to our normal 3 dimensional space. To repeat: I never ruled out the possible existence of non-local variables. But nowhere did you even accept that the non-existence of local hidden variables (in our normal 3-d space!) is empirically proven. No, there is no causal relationship between the 2 measurements of 2 entangled particles. In the first place, Bob has no way of knowing that the particle he measures is entangled, unless he compares them with Alice's measurements. Just having his own measurements he cannot find out anything about the question if Alice did measure anything at all. So causally, for Bob nothing changes because of Alice's measurement. Secondly, because the correlation between Alice's and Bob's measurement is faster than light (I even assume it is instantaneous), the events of Alice's measurement and Bob's measurement are not in each other's light cone. This means that, according to special relativity, there can be an inertial frame in which Bob's measurement takes place before Alice's measurement, and there can be another inertial frame in which Alice's measurement takes place before Bob's measurement. So causality is not preserved. However special relativity preserves causality. A causes B is true for every possible inertial frame. So there can be no causal relationship between Alice's and Bob's measurements.

Is there a contradiction between the holographic principle and the non-existence of local hidden variables?

Yep. Exactly the point.

Really wondering why a thanks for an interesting article gives me a -1... Didn't you like the article, Itoero? Bell's theorem showed that it is possible to empirically decide that there are no local hidden variables. Yes, why would Mordred have done this? Maybe because it is essential to understand Bell-like situations? Because it gives the valid description of what happens? You only show you understand really nothing of QM, that you can't reconcile QM with your religion that everything must have a precise cause. And so QM must be false. Look for the word 'precise' above, and then show us why it logically follows that nothing is caused, not even the universe?

Thanks for the article you linked, Mordred. Very enlightening.

I do not quite agree. For the hard sciences you are completely correct. But I think it does not apply for the social sciences or literature. (Of course you can say these are not really sciences, but then we get into another discussion...) We can investigate mental states: we can look for correlations with other states, we can theorise about what kind of structures are needed that mental states actually can arise (e.g. as in cognitive science), we can investigate intelligence, its different forms and qualities etc etc. So in my opinion one cannot conclude from working with measurable and testable phenomena to 'materialistic method'. But one thing of course is sure: we must at least be able to observe phenomena. Here it is important that the manifesto discusses science, not scientists. What scientists believe in their private time is not the issue. Formally you are right. But the more science is able to explain phenomena that were supposed to be 'immaterial', the less people will believe them to be not a possible object of scientific research. Also, even if people say they believe in God, very often they do not have the naive picture of God as a man with a big beard in the sky, or a person who caused the Flood, or somebody who helped the people of Israel to find their way back, or had a son on earth etc etc. Even stronger, people involved in science tend to be more atheistic, or have a very abstract concept of God. So it is a quite modern view that science has nothing to say about God: it has reduced God to a more and more abstract or vague Something. To be short: I don't buy into NOMA. That is the short version of my critique... Thanks for the moving, you are completely correct. But please not to trash. I did so my best to write a nice critique on this manifesto, I would prefer that it it does not disappear into trash...

Because nearly everything what he says about physics is BS, so this must be BS too. I agree this is not a very formal argument, but in practical life it is very valuable. No, of course not. QM is the most fundamental theory in physics. Stapp seems to equate physicalism with what I would call materialism: reduction to matter in the sense of classical (pre QM) physics. Stapp belongs to those physicists who seem to shy away from the consequences of their discipline for our human self image, and try still to find some 'magic' in nature, that should explain the human factor. Others are Penrose and Josephson. Who says that we need a dimension beyond physics and biology to understand consciousness? As I said before, we do not need another ontological order to explain consciousness. Read, e.g. 'Consciousness explained', by Daniel Dennett.

The manifesto you link below is pretty clear that modern physics' materialism is not the same as it once was. That is a reason not to use the concept 'materialism' anymore, but use 'physicalism' instead: the idea that all processes in the world are in the end based on physical processes. But 'based' on physical processes does not mean that every phenomenon can directly be derived from the physical processes. To give an example: evolution in biology is real process. But it is about organisms, not about elementary particles. Organisms are not a study object of physics. And one can study evolution without referencing the physical make up of organisms. But no doubt all organisms are built up of the same particles that dead matter exists of. That it is nonsense. To mention a few points (the numbers refer to the numbers in the manifesto): This is partially true, partially false. The falsity is that there is no logical connection between physicalism and studying other phenomena, like evolution, the mind, society etc. These phenomena can be studied independently of knowledge what the basic building blocks of reality are, as explained above. A game of chess is exactly the same if it is played with wooden pieces on a board, with plastic, via the internet on a virtual chess board, or just in memory (as very good chess players can). Physics has just nothing to say about chess: you never will become a good chess player by studying elementary particles. But no doubt, all of these different physical forms of chess are implemented in physical reality. True is that humanity became blind for other values than those that can be realised via technology. We enjoy our capabilities to travel anywhere in the world, hearing music at every possible place and time etc etc. The hard sciences are just the most successful, and we can enjoy the fruits of them without understanding them. If you are rich enough. So psychologically and sociologically seen there is a connection between physicalism and materialism as a life attitude. But is, again, not a logical, necessary connection. For many scientists their work is a spiritual endeavour. Surely I consider my interest in physics and astronomy as spiritual. This is an old fashioned way, and probably minority view, of seeing the measurement problem. Of course mental events affect the physical world! But not by being of an other ontological order (a soul?), but by being implemented in physical substance. But it is true that if we really want to understand these effects, we must have an idea what mental events are. And we cannot understand mental events with physics. Mental events have a certain independence of their material substrate, in the sense that my thinking of moving a pawn from E2 to E4 might be a very different neurological constellation of that of somebody else moving his pawn in the same way. But surely, both events are implemented in a physical reality, the brain. Parapsychology has until now found no proof of such phenomena at all. So probably these phenomena only exist for uncritical observers. Under scientific scrutiny nothing is found. NDEs can also be explained by phenomena that occur in a brain under the stress of oxygen deprivation. The claim that there is empirical proof is empty: no such proof is found under supervision of critical researchers. It is only 'proven' by 'researchers' that want to make their case. No cognitive scientist agrees with this. Nah, enough is enough. I could go on. Just this last point (OK, it is ad hominem...): Surely, there are good reasons to criticise vulgar reductionism (we are nothing but a clump of wet matter), and our concentration on materialistic values, but this manifesto is intellectual rubbish.

Quantum effects are caused by something. But not precisely. QM's laws of nature have probabilistic character, i.e. they predict probability distributions. I think that nature behaves probabilistically, because that is what physics says, based on sound theories and experiments. You on the other hand, stand outside physics, picking up a few things you do not understand, and then proclaim that the physicists have it completely wrong. In the end, historically they immediately accepted the absurd notion that QM laws are probabilistic without hesitation. (Oh, shit, where are the irony tags?)

No, your English is not bad at all. But your thinking is: - you think you understand Bell's theorem, but you don't - you do not accept empirical proven aspects of nature (a hurray for the one who sees the small pun in this one...) - you use no rigid definitions of your terms ('theory'), which leads to your chaotic thinking - you do not backup your claims with references to physics sources - you stick to your dogmatic thinking, without giving valid arguments - you suffer from 'black or white thinking': 'not completely determined' does not mean 'totally random'

What has randomness to do with free will? So not only you do not understand physics, you neither understand much of philosophy. How true... Sweet dreams. In short: you say you understand Bell's theorem better than all the physically reliable articles about it. I hope you are going to study physics. I already see the description of the Nobel Price Committee: 'Against the mainstream, Itoero proved that Bell's theorem did not exclude local causes, and that there is a hidden mechanism exactly predicting single quantum events'. It also showed why technology based on quantum entanglement that always seemed to work, in fact does not'.

So this means a particle is completely defined by its interactions?

I know what you mean, but in my opinion you go, methodologically seen, too far. What you can see is that the period of the clock has become longer: compared with a clock in rest in your inertial frame it is slower. So in fact you are comparing two processes. And of course because all processes slow down (compared with your local clock), one can say time has slowed down. But one cannot say that the slower time causes processes to slow down.

I think I agree: definitions must be circular in the end (per definition ). I said the same elsewhere. And it is impossible to define time without referring to change, and one has a hard task defining what change is without referring to time. But the operational definition of time is always attached to a 'standard changer'. And one refers to the duration of other processes by comparing them with the standard changer. And as you can use different kinds of changes to define a standard duration, it seems to me that time is the abstract notion, which we can only access by referring to change. I know, but in my opinion it is not enough. Where e.g. an electrical current can have effects, we can use these effects to measure the current. So we measure by means of causal effects of the current. This is definitely not the case with time. The cause of the moving pendulum is gravity and inertia, not time. We cannot remove time, and then the clock stops. I do not think so. In the first place, it is a consistent use of language: space is to time, what length is to duration. Or if you want: space is to length, what time is to duration. We can use lengths and durations to make operational definitions of space and time. But not the other way round.

This is pretty useless, don't you think? "What is a photon?" "It is what a photomultipier measures." Would you be satisfied by such an answer? There is no way you can know it. And what is the meaning of 'time is occurring'? I would say that events occur. In my opinion it is impossible to say what time is, or even measure it, in the absence of events. Again, you can't know. All clocks or based on cycles or ticks: we only know that until now we can treat time as continuous. The comparison is not quite apt: a ruler measures length, or distance, as you say. But the time-equivalent of length is duration, not time: a fixed time interval between two ticks. The equivalent of time is space. And I have really no idea what space would be when there were no distances and lengths at all. Yes. This makes time's existence something different from physical things, or better events, that can cause something. I somehow agree that time exists, but it exists not in the same way as physical objects and events. (Yes, that would be materialistic.) Well, Einstein explicitly referred to clocks and rods in his 'On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies'. I think he did because without reference to concrete clocks and rods, by using operational definitions, he could clarify what he meant. He had to go back to the most basic points of what it means to measure time and space. Comparison with standard durations and lengths is such an operational definition.

So for you there is no difference between totally random, meaning 'event can happen any time and anywhere' on one side, and statistical 'event can happen according a certain limited chance distribution in time an space.' The interference pattern of light (or any other quantum particle) in a two slit experiment is exactly predicted by QM. So where particles arrive is totally random? Of course you don't think so. But it is your Newtonian notion that every event must have a cause that convinces you there must also be causes for quantum events. QM explains the build-up of atoms and molecules, explains phenomena like superfluidity and superconductivity, it is the basis of electronics by describing and predicting the behaviour of semiconductors etc etc, without caring about the question if there is a hidden reality under the chance processes. But if we do the experiments as in Bell-testing experiments, it turns out that a hidden reality with local causes is excluded. And that is an empirically proven, scientific fact. Yes, and this: How do you reconcile these? Didn't Swansont describe here how nature behaves? We do not 'really know' what is going on on the quantum level, but we know how nature at least does not behave in Bell-like experiments: it does not behave according to local causes. Do you thinks Swansont's statements are inconsistent?

This is a physicist saying. I would say, follow the link of the quotation (bent arrow on the right of the quotation), and join in in the discussion there.

AbstractDreamer, I think you just repeat the same phenomenon one metaphysical level deeper. If the local function is also indeterminate, then you have gained nothing. I even think that you must think classically here: by doing so, you see that our classical concepts do not work anymore, i.e. our classical concept that causes must be local and determinate. Of course you know that metaphysics is not physics. My 2 cents.

So you propose: everything is determined but we cannot describe it, i.e. formulate it as a theory How can you find out if some event is determined, when there is no regularity in its occurrences? Or which kind of regularity cannot be described with a theory. (BTW, you are using the word theory again: what does it mean now? Idea? Notion? A set of related laws of nature? An opinion?) You should react on my mentioning of probabilistic causation. QM makes predictions. But not exact predictions for every single event. This is an empirical rule. And there is a cause for it: the energy levels in the carbon-14 nucleus. The structure of the carbon-14 nucleus is so that on average a nucleus decays in 5730 years. The logic that people think that they can apply Newtonian logic in the realm of QM, makes people think that QM events must be determined exactly.

Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem): Well, how you normally do it: finding no regularities, no absolute repetitions, etc etc. Let's assume it passes all statistical tests. Now, is this random generator totally random? Say, the possible range of values is between 1 and 100. Can I predict that its value lies between 0 and 1? Does random then mean that the value is not determined at all? Maybe you find some interesting ideas here: Probabilistic Causation. Because QM: - gives definite and unambiguous statistical predictions - these predictions are correct The question of completeness is a different one. And that is what we are discussing here.

Well, it is necessary, because Bell's theorem only excludes the possibility of local variables. Again and again, you want to be less precise than necessary for a clarifying discussion. No, I only put in the word 'pseudo' because it is not possible to make a real random generator with a perfectly deterministic machine. And you missed what I really asked: Can you criticise that it is not a good random generator on the ground that it only produces values between 0 and 1? Because there are no 'inner workings' of electrons and photons, and because Bell's theorem excludes that there are such that are responsible for the exact attributes a single particle has. If you would understand QM, you would see that this is correct. The problem you have is that you just can't believe that QM defies our daily understanding of the world. We are not capable of understanding how an object can have particle attributes and wave attributes at the same time. The problem is not mathematics or logic: QM is mathematically and logically sound. But we cannot picture exactly what is going on. But that is what you are doing: you apply your daily, intuitive understanding of the behaviour of macro objects to quantum objects: So this applies perfectly to you. Me too: they light my way. Greene is pointing to the many worlds interpretation of QM. (In the end with 'hidden reality' he means the multiverse, not a reality under the events we measure.) The Schrödinger wave function is deterministic: the problem is however that we can only measure single events. And about these the wave function says nothing, except their chances to occur. It does not predict exactly what we will measure. The many worlds interpretation assumes that all events that are possible according to the wave function occur but in different universes: the universe, together with its observer, split in so many universes as there are possible outcomes of a quantum measurement. That is a bit extreme theory, but it is consistent with the mathematical formalism of QM. As said before, you can accept that there are non-local variables. But then you get Bohm's implicate order, in which events depend on momentary events at other places in the universe, possibly lightyears away. I am not aware of any other theories that are consistent with QM, and are strictly deterministic. So this is it: either you accept the many worlds theory or Bohm's implicate order; or you accept that quantum events are not completely determined.