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Yes. No.

It is mathematically proven that the predictions of QM are inconsistent with theories with local variables. It is empirically proven that QM's predictions are correct. You behave like a creationist who cannot accept scientifically proven facts. So you did not learn anything. Your opinion is against established science.

Of course. But you have no argument anymore that for typical QM processes every event is locally caused. If you still think so, you are denying established, empirically proven science. Repeating the arguments you already have given will not help.

Well, what do you think of the reactions in that thread? No physicist supported your view, I think on good grounds. Do you still hold to the view that the world is determined, with local causes?

This is misuse of the word 'logic'. Logic has nothing to with how people experience the world. It is about how truth of propositions are related. One can study this independent of what proposition you think are really true. 1. If the world is a disc, one cannot travel around the world. 2. The world is a disc. Conclusion: One cannot travel around the world. This is a logical valid reference. Only proposition 2 happens to be wrong. But the argument is correct.

But there is empirical proof! Why do you repeat this over and over again? QM's predictions violate the Bell inequalities. QM's predictions turn out to be correct. Bell's theorem says that no theory based on local (hidden) variables can reproduce QM's predictions. So it is proven there are no local hidden variables. You behave as a trisector who does not understand the difference between 'nobody has found a method to trisect an angle' and 'there is mathematical proof that trisection of an angel is impossible'. Your argument 'absence of evidence is not evidence for absence' is not valid: there is evidence for absence! Again: repeating the same argument over and over again does not make it more true. According to QM there is enough order to explain the order of the universe. The 'uncaused' events average out to a for nearly all practical, daily purposes determined universe. Why do you think did it took so long in our history of science that this statistical behaviour of matter was discovered? Because we do not notice it in our daily life

You can think that, but no such influences are found. So at this moment you only express a belief, not grounded in any science. Eh, yes? And what? Just translate correctly 'characteristic time' with 'half life', and it really is mainstream science. Note the use of the word 'spontaneously', which in this context means, 'having no cause'. Same as above: there is no empirical proof of such a cause, or causes. There are only strong arguments for the opposite. Do not forget: QT works. And really, as Strange already noticed: you think there must be causes, because you believe determinism must be true (begging the question). But until now you have not given any convincing argument, except misinterpretations of Bell-like experiments. Pure formally, you might be right. But it is a mathematical fact that that QM violates Bell's inequality. And all empirical experiments point to the fact that QM's predictions are correct. Of course you have heard about the 'loopholes'. But they are closed more and more. See e.g. here. In the light of the empirical evidence, you are inconsistent here. Or you believe that QM is wrong. Given above. This is vague as vague can be. Unless you come with a mathematical description, that can be tested empirically, you have nothing more than your belief that determinism must be true.

Of course, that is possible. But I would say that non-locality is just as 'spooky' as uncaused events. No, no, that does not work. If decaying particles were just 'leaking energy' continuously, all decays of a certain kind (e.g. muons) would take just as long. We would not have a halflife, but an exact lifetime, the same for all muons. But we know that is not the case. But of course a decaying muon is not an example of non-locality. You made this error already our discussion in the philosophy section. QM events are caused, but not exactly. A bit of indeterminism does not drop all relations with properties of the environment, it does so only a tiny bit. Why do you think it is difficult to realise Bell experiments? You do not seem to understand the character of Bell's theorem. In Bell-like experiments, it is not so that we cannot measure precise enough. Bell's theorem states that no local variable theory can reproduce the predictions of QM. So what we must do is setup situations in which QM predicts something that does not fit Bell's inequality. These experiments have been done, and QM's predictions are right. That proves that local variables (hidden or not) do not play a role. I am wondering what exactly your viewpoint is: is causality in your view 'saved' by non-local causes, or by hidden local variables? You use both in your arguments.

OK. And? Sources?

I think that you forget people can do something, without explicitly knowing what, or how they are doing it. This is obviously true for speech (children can speak without knowing grammar explicitly, same for people who never were at school). So you do not necessary need formal logic to make valid arguments. Also, you should distinguish between the chronological order of discovery and, well, logical dependency: one can do logic without doing math, but doing math without logical argumentation is of course impossible. Same for physics and math. Edit: see that Ophiolite made a similar point already.

Randolpin, you have a strange idea about what logic is. Logic tells us e.g. what valid arguments are, when propositions are contradicting each other, etc. What logic definitely isn't is a source of truth about empirical reality. The example you gave here are definitely not examples of logic. Logic tells us e.g. when you know on other grounds some true propositions, what follows from these. So except tautologies (A is the case or A is not the case) which are always true, logic produces no truths on its own. But it tells us how the truth of propositions depends on the truth of others. So it is an absolutely necessary tool in science, and even more in mathematics.

I am a bit in a dangerous area here, because I am not a physicist. But I think the established interpretation is this: particles are correlated with all particles in their light cones, or better all particles they ever interacted with. But if a particle is entangled with trillions of other particles, there is no way that you can see this. But please, raise your question in the QT forum, where more professional physicists are around. That's a hard one. But you can say this of any experiment. I can only say that Bell's theorem is generally accepted, and given that the predictions of QM in EPR-like experiments turn out to be correct, there cannot be local causes. If you doubt this fact, please also open a thread in the QT forum. Late Night edit: Maybe you can chime in here?

It is not illogical. The only thing is that if you try to picture what happens with objects and movements as you know them from daily life, you fail. It is not logical to think about light as a wave, spread out over a certain area, but then is only measured at one point. But that is only because you think about classical waves. The mathematics of QM is consistent, so why call it illogical? Well, it is a scientific fact that QM makes predictions that do not allow for local hidden variables. Until now these predictions are confirmed. This is a stronger statement than 'we are not able to detect potential local hidden variables'; it says 'we have proven there are none'. Well, you can tell them that indeterminism does not help. If people think that their free will lies in the disconnectedness of their action actions and thoughts, or the random character of their thoughts, they clearly have not thought deep enough.

We can't know what. I propose you open a thread in the QT forum under physics to see why is this. I am not a professional physicist. No, of course this is not proven. It is only proven that the statistical distribution is always the same. I also propose to discuss this in the QT forum. I think you have some real problems understanding (or accepting...) QT. No!! Why doesn't this go into your head? If QT predicts that the chance of a photon arriving is close to 100% in a certain area, then why do you say simply it can arrive anywhere. And in the double split experiment, a photon simply does not arrive at the dark stripes: QT predicts a statistical chance of zero. So what is this with an 'event can be present everywhere'? No. Bohm's theory, while conceptually possible, can impossibly be empirically proven: we cannot observe the complete universe, adding up the influence of all particles in the universe. Relativity already makes this impossible. And you forget: it is proven there are no local causes. That's great, at least something we agree upon. But then, still, why are you interested in knowing if people believe in determinism or not?

I more or less reacted on this in my previous posting. You seem to think that a bit of indeterminism means 'no determinism at all'. A photon arriving at a screen in a double split experiment is determined to arrive at certain places: but not exactly at which place. Take many billions of photons, and on repeated doing the experiment, you will always get the same interference pattern. No idea what you are talking about. You did not mention 'correlation' before. Not quite. It is also based on the experimental proof that local causes are ruled out. Non-local causes are, well, spooky. And I do not see that even with spooky, non-local, causes an experiment can be done that proves that there are non-local causes. I have no idea what such an experiment would look like. That is what Einstein thought. He turned out to be wrong. So is your interest in if we are determinists or not really fed by thoughts about free will?

So a tiny bit of indeterminism on the level of events involving tiny particles precludes the existence of order and matter in the universe? QM's predictions are empirically proven to be be very precise, but its predictions have statistical character: where QM can predict how millions of particles behave, it cannot predict single events exactly. QM explains atomic spectra very precisely, it explains chemical bonding of atoms, it explains interference patterns of all kind of particles, including light, it explains how light diffracts through lenses etc etc. Isn't that order? But it does not exactly predict when the beta decay of a nucleus occurs, nor the exact place a single photon will arrive, or the excited atom will return to its ground state. Concerning the brain: there are estimations that, with the number and kinds of particles involved, we do not need exact predictions of single particle events even in the case of synapses. That means, that for all practical purposes, we can consider the brain as determined. Of course. I gave my (short version) definition. There is no contradiction between this definition and determinism. Only when people add non-empirical assumptions to this definition (e.g. not caused by 'outside' factors) , they conclude that determinism and free will are incompatible.

You mean we are (for all practical purposes) determined. If one defines free will as 'being able to do what you want', where is the problem? Did you understand my 'slogan'? Just read it again, and see if there rally is a problem with determinism. Or even better: prove that there is a contradiction between determinism and free will as I defined it. Do not smuggle in another meaning of free will. Exactly what I wrote to robinpike: you smuggled in something I did not say. I did not say anything about outside factors. I said, that free will means that I can do what I want. Full stop. Think about it.

In my opinion when indeterminism would be true, it would mean we have no (or less) free will. I really hope that I am determining my actions. If there would be no causal relationship between my thoughts, plans, desires etc on one side, and my actions on the other,, there would not be a way to be free at all. No. But one can answer the question if a meaningful concept of free will fits to determinism. So in the end, still, I don't know why the OP thinks it is an important question (at least important enough to ask here for people's opinions if they are determinist or not.

Yes, it is deterministic, but at the cost of loss of any locality. Local events have causes by all particles in the universe, independent of distance. That is a high price. And practically, a difference with statistical predictions cannot be made, because it is impossible to know the causal influence of all the particles in the universe. So with Bohm you are theoretically right, but practically not. Do not forget: Bohm and Copenhagen are empirically equivalent. OK, the methodological hammer: you cannot prove there is a cause, especially because Bohm and Copenhagen are empirically equivalent. If you think about causal determinism, then of course. But it is much of a tautology. In causal determinism per definition every event has a cause. But before you can state that everything has a cause, you have to prove it. But even with Bohm you are not able to empirically prove it, because it is methodologically impossible. Ah, you are a well known QM-physicist! Can you explain to the specialist here why QM is incomplete? Einstein thought so too, so you are in good company. Pity enough, the practical experiment based on his EPR idea showed he was not right. Yes. But that is not what I think free will is. To give my idea in one single slogan: we are free to do what we want, but not to want what we want. So there is no conflict with determinism. Look up compatibilism if you want to know more. For all practical purposes, I consider people as determined, and most people have free will. But again you are unclear in your question. There are two interpretations of your question: 1. Are people determined? 2. Do you believe people are determined? So I assume you wanted to know if people here in the forum are determinists, i.e.believe that determinism is true. I still don't know if another question resonates in the background: if people are hard-determinists, i.e believe that we have no free will because the world is determined, and determinism and free will contradict each other. The first thing in philosophy is to learn to ask meaningful and clear questions.

Yes. All kinds of Bell type experiments. Of course they are not absolutely defined. But it makes sense to agree on exact definitions, so that we know what we are trying to say each other. And thereby it is not a bad practice to use definitions that are as close as possible to the daily use. Causality uses to be described as the law of cause and effect. When there are no causes, or we do not know them, or are not interested in, one better uses event. If you want to philosophise without being precise you are lost from the beginning. No. Determinism is the position that everything is determined, whatever way. Causal determinism is the form of determinism that comes along with physics, or one can say is a naturalistic form of determinism. Another question is if the world is determined. The most usual interpretation of QM says it isn't. Still another question is if that matters for daily life. E.g. in the free will discussion, a majority of philosophers assumes that for all practical purposes we are determined, but that this fact does not oppose a correct definition of free will, i.e. most philosophers are compatibilists. Even more philosophers agree that fatalism and determinism are not the same and that the first does not follow from the second. So in the end, I do not understand why you started this thread.

Of course. But experimental proof that some events cannot be (locally) caused, is knowing that there are no such causes. You mean events without a cause. But it is in the meaning of the word 'effect' that it is an effect of something: a cause. So nobody calls quantum effects indeterministic effects. No. Determinism is the belief that there is only one way the world unfolds. This belief is older than just causal determinism, e.g. in certain religions. So it can be divine providence. And as I said, an effect always has a cause. But some events are not caused. Your word 'seemingly' says everything. I only wanted to say that determinism implies the possibility of prediction. But not a certainty.

You cannot just believe or not believe in determinism, and then declare yourself determinist or indeterminist, like it is some kind of religion. It is a fact that the individual events as we measure them in QM cannot be predicted. We even know that there are no local causes determining what we will measure. So there is not not left much room for determinism in QM, except Bohm. In chaos theory events are determined, and can in principle be predicted, however we quickly loose practical predictability, because we should know the beginning conditions in a precision we are not capable of. Further I have no idea what an indeterministic effect is: this is a contradiction in terms, like a married bachelor. And then the concepts of 'determinism' and 'causation' have strong connections, but one does not necessary follow from the other. Too be short: your thinking is an utter chaos.

Hi AC, It is not often done so explicitly as in your example, but some philosophers tried it rigidly (e.g. Spinoza, or Wittgenstein in his Tractatus. I would not take Kant as example, even if his work is impressive). Most philosophers do not argue so exact, in my opinion mostly because philosophical concepts are not that clear. A lot of philosophy is just trying to get such clarifications, and some philosophical problems 'evaporate' by providing rigid definitions. But there are modern day philosophers who at least partially build up such logical arguments. But never so rigidly as is mathematics.

If definitions are circular, then none of them is primitive. Physicists take, I assume, those as basic axioms that are most easily and/or exact measurable in a laboratory. But if one is really only interested in the theoretical framework of physics, then the only thing one must make sure of is that from the axioms the whole can be built up. There is no a priori reason to take e.g. force as the most fundamental concept, instead of energy or mass (or even acceleration). The only thing that counts is that you can derive the other concepts from them.

Very true. But once I was nearly killed for saying something like that... Hamed.Begloo, a circular definition is not a paradox. Every definition has to be circular. Of course you can define something in terms that everybody thinks are inherently clear, and then it seems as if you have a non-circular definition. But if you want to build up a rigorous conceptual system, then, as Swansont says, you have to take some definitions as axioms. The only way to get out this circle is to refer to something you can do, e.g. an experiment, or an observation, and so leave the domain of language. With the empirical meaning of your basic concepts, you give empirical meaning to the whole conceptual building that is derived from these basic concepts.