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It is not illogical. The only thing is that if you try to picture what happens with objects and movements as you know them from daily life, you fail. It is not logical to think about light as a wave, spread out over a certain area, but then is only measured at one point. But that is only because you think about classical waves. The mathematics of QM is consistent, so why call it illogical? Well, it is a scientific fact that QM makes predictions that do not allow for local hidden variables. Until now these predictions are confirmed. This is a stronger statement than 'we are not able to detect potential local hidden variables'; it says 'we have proven there are none'. Well, you can tell them that indeterminism does not help. If people think that their free will lies in the disconnectedness of their action actions and thoughts, or the random character of their thoughts, they clearly have not thought deep enough.

We can't know what. I propose you open a thread in the QT forum under physics to see why is this. I am not a professional physicist. No, of course this is not proven. It is only proven that the statistical distribution is always the same. I also propose to discuss this in the QT forum. I think you have some real problems understanding (or accepting...) QT. No!! Why doesn't this go into your head? If QT predicts that the chance of a photon arriving is close to 100% in a certain area, then why do you say simply it can arrive anywhere. And in the double split experiment, a photon simply does not arrive at the dark stripes: QT predicts a statistical chance of zero. So what is this with an 'event can be present everywhere'? No. Bohm's theory, while conceptually possible, can impossibly be empirically proven: we cannot observe the complete universe, adding up the influence of all particles in the universe. Relativity already makes this impossible. And you forget: it is proven there are no local causes. That's great, at least something we agree upon. But then, still, why are you interested in knowing if people believe in determinism or not?

I more or less reacted on this in my previous posting. You seem to think that a bit of indeterminism means 'no determinism at all'. A photon arriving at a screen in a double split experiment is determined to arrive at certain places: but not exactly at which place. Take many billions of photons, and on repeated doing the experiment, you will always get the same interference pattern. No idea what you are talking about. You did not mention 'correlation' before. Not quite. It is also based on the experimental proof that local causes are ruled out. Non-local causes are, well, spooky. And I do not see that even with spooky, non-local, causes an experiment can be done that proves that there are non-local causes. I have no idea what such an experiment would look like. That is what Einstein thought. He turned out to be wrong. So is your interest in if we are determinists or not really fed by thoughts about free will?

So a tiny bit of indeterminism on the level of events involving tiny particles precludes the existence of order and matter in the universe? QM's predictions are empirically proven to be be very precise, but its predictions have statistical character: where QM can predict how millions of particles behave, it cannot predict single events exactly. QM explains atomic spectra very precisely, it explains chemical bonding of atoms, it explains interference patterns of all kind of particles, including light, it explains how light diffracts through lenses etc etc. Isn't that order? But it does not exactly predict when the beta decay of a nucleus occurs, nor the exact place a single photon will arrive, or the excited atom will return to its ground state. Concerning the brain: there are estimations that, with the number and kinds of particles involved, we do not need exact predictions of single particle events even in the case of synapses. That means, that for all practical purposes, we can consider the brain as determined. Of course. I gave my (short version) definition. There is no contradiction between this definition and determinism. Only when people add non-empirical assumptions to this definition (e.g. not caused by 'outside' factors) , they conclude that determinism and free will are incompatible.

You mean we are (for all practical purposes) determined. If one defines free will as 'being able to do what you want', where is the problem? Did you understand my 'slogan'? Just read it again, and see if there rally is a problem with determinism. Or even better: prove that there is a contradiction between determinism and free will as I defined it. Do not smuggle in another meaning of free will. Exactly what I wrote to robinpike: you smuggled in something I did not say. I did not say anything about outside factors. I said, that free will means that I can do what I want. Full stop. Think about it.

In my opinion when indeterminism would be true, it would mean we have no (or less) free will. I really hope that I am determining my actions. If there would be no causal relationship between my thoughts, plans, desires etc on one side, and my actions on the other,, there would not be a way to be free at all. No. But one can answer the question if a meaningful concept of free will fits to determinism. So in the end, still, I don't know why the OP thinks it is an important question (at least important enough to ask here for people's opinions if they are determinist or not.

Yes, it is deterministic, but at the cost of loss of any locality. Local events have causes by all particles in the universe, independent of distance. That is a high price. And practically, a difference with statistical predictions cannot be made, because it is impossible to know the causal influence of all the particles in the universe. So with Bohm you are theoretically right, but practically not. Do not forget: Bohm and Copenhagen are empirically equivalent. OK, the methodological hammer: you cannot prove there is a cause, especially because Bohm and Copenhagen are empirically equivalent. If you think about causal determinism, then of course. But it is much of a tautology. In causal determinism per definition every event has a cause. But before you can state that everything has a cause, you have to prove it. But even with Bohm you are not able to empirically prove it, because it is methodologically impossible. Ah, you are a well known QM-physicist! Can you explain to the specialist here why QM is incomplete? Einstein thought so too, so you are in good company. Pity enough, the practical experiment based on his EPR idea showed he was not right. Yes. But that is not what I think free will is. To give my idea in one single slogan: we are free to do what we want, but not to want what we want. So there is no conflict with determinism. Look up compatibilism if you want to know more. For all practical purposes, I consider people as determined, and most people have free will. But again you are unclear in your question. There are two interpretations of your question: 1. Are people determined? 2. Do you believe people are determined? So I assume you wanted to know if people here in the forum are determinists, i.e.believe that determinism is true. I still don't know if another question resonates in the background: if people are hard-determinists, i.e believe that we have no free will because the world is determined, and determinism and free will contradict each other. The first thing in philosophy is to learn to ask meaningful and clear questions.

Yes. All kinds of Bell type experiments. Of course they are not absolutely defined. But it makes sense to agree on exact definitions, so that we know what we are trying to say each other. And thereby it is not a bad practice to use definitions that are as close as possible to the daily use. Causality uses to be described as the law of cause and effect. When there are no causes, or we do not know them, or are not interested in, one better uses event. If you want to philosophise without being precise you are lost from the beginning. No. Determinism is the position that everything is determined, whatever way. Causal determinism is the form of determinism that comes along with physics, or one can say is a naturalistic form of determinism. Another question is if the world is determined. The most usual interpretation of QM says it isn't. Still another question is if that matters for daily life. E.g. in the free will discussion, a majority of philosophers assumes that for all practical purposes we are determined, but that this fact does not oppose a correct definition of free will, i.e. most philosophers are compatibilists. Even more philosophers agree that fatalism and determinism are not the same and that the first does not follow from the second. So in the end, I do not understand why you started this thread.

Of course. But experimental proof that some events cannot be (locally) caused, is knowing that there are no such causes. You mean events without a cause. But it is in the meaning of the word 'effect' that it is an effect of something: a cause. So nobody calls quantum effects indeterministic effects. No. Determinism is the belief that there is only one way the world unfolds. This belief is older than just causal determinism, e.g. in certain religions. So it can be divine providence. And as I said, an effect always has a cause. But some events are not caused. Your word 'seemingly' says everything. I only wanted to say that determinism implies the possibility of prediction. But not a certainty.

You cannot just believe or not believe in determinism, and then declare yourself determinist or indeterminist, like it is some kind of religion. It is a fact that the individual events as we measure them in QM cannot be predicted. We even know that there are no local causes determining what we will measure. So there is not not left much room for determinism in QM, except Bohm. In chaos theory events are determined, and can in principle be predicted, however we quickly loose practical predictability, because we should know the beginning conditions in a precision we are not capable of. Further I have no idea what an indeterministic effect is: this is a contradiction in terms, like a married bachelor. And then the concepts of 'determinism' and 'causation' have strong connections, but one does not necessary follow from the other. Too be short: your thinking is an utter chaos.

Hi AC, It is not often done so explicitly as in your example, but some philosophers tried it rigidly (e.g. Spinoza, or Wittgenstein in his Tractatus. I would not take Kant as example, even if his work is impressive). Most philosophers do not argue so exact, in my opinion mostly because philosophical concepts are not that clear. A lot of philosophy is just trying to get such clarifications, and some philosophical problems 'evaporate' by providing rigid definitions. But there are modern day philosophers who at least partially build up such logical arguments. But never so rigidly as is mathematics.

If definitions are circular, then none of them is primitive. Physicists take, I assume, those as basic axioms that are most easily and/or exact measurable in a laboratory. But if one is really only interested in the theoretical framework of physics, then the only thing one must make sure of is that from the axioms the whole can be built up. There is no a priori reason to take e.g. force as the most fundamental concept, instead of energy or mass (or even acceleration). The only thing that counts is that you can derive the other concepts from them.

Very true. But once I was nearly killed for saying something like that... Hamed.Begloo, a circular definition is not a paradox. Every definition has to be circular. Of course you can define something in terms that everybody thinks are inherently clear, and then it seems as if you have a non-circular definition. But if you want to build up a rigorous conceptual system, then, as Swansont says, you have to take some definitions as axioms. The only way to get out this circle is to refer to something you can do, e.g. an experiment, or an observation, and so leave the domain of language. With the empirical meaning of your basic concepts, you give empirical meaning to the whole conceptual building that is derived from these basic concepts.

Hmmm... Seems a bit complicated, indeed. The conclusion of the argument is 'there is more than one being'. So denying this would be: There is only one, or zero beings The sentences 'Some are logicians. Some are not logicians.' are not quite unambiguous, so let's rewrite them: There exists at least one being who is a logician. There exists at least one being who is not a logician. No let's split our denial in two: There exists no being. Well both sentences say there is a being so 'There exists no being' is false. Now: There exists exactly one being. Assume this being is a logician. Then the second sentence says there exist a person who is not a logician. Well one person cannot be a logician and not a logician at the same time so this is a contradiction. Of course the same the other way round. So the denial: There is only one, or zero beings is wrong, and therefore the conclusion is correct, which makes the original logical argument valid. I consider pure logic not as philosophy: it is however an essential tool for philosophers. They should be able make sound arguments, and recognise wrong logical derivations. Mathematics I consider as applied logic: to the field of mathematical objects, like numbers, transformations, forms, etc etc. Where in other sciences one can operate at least temporally with concepts that are not rigidly defined, where the logic might be hidden for the moment, mathematics must rigidly comply to logic. If a logical argument to some mathematical statement cannot be found, it cannot be considered true. But in physics one can formulate an empirical law that exactly fits the observable data, but one has no idea how this empirical law can be derived from known physical laws. Examples that come to my mind are Balmer's formula, and Planck's formula. It was only later that Planck could derive his law for black body radiation later from more fundamental principles, but for many years could not believe these principles were true.

That is a very good question, indeed.

I am wondering if you understand special relativity, where we of course also have time dilation. I think if you understand time dilation in special relativity, then you would not ask such a question. An easy analogy is the length of a line segment in 2-D space. Its projection on the X-axis can be longer or shorter dependent on its orientation in the plane: if it is parallel to the X-axis its projection is as long as the line segment itself; if it is perpendicular to the X-axis its length is 0. But you would not ask what the physical cause of the shortening of the projection is, would you? Same with special relativity, except that the coordinate system is that of spacetime: dependent on the 'orientation' of the events in spacetime, which in this case means dependent on the relative velocity of observers, different lengths and time differences are measured. But there is no physical cause for these differences: it is a question of perspective. Same with general relativity: dependent on the masses around, spacetime is bent differently, and so observers at different places (and different velocities) have different perspectives on events happening, including time (which of course includes frequency), and lengths. But for an observer at the same place, with the same velocity, a clock just normally ticks as usual. Physically, nothing changes. But other observers, because of their different perspective, see the events differently. So asking for some kind of mechanism that slows down processes, is just the wrong question. There is no mechanism at all, so not for atomic clocks either.

This? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlTVIMOix3I

Thanks for clarifying that there is a gliding scale from '100% sure that not ...', 'no idea at all', 'pretty sure that ....', 'nearly sure that ...', 'it is proven that ...' You do as if 'nearly sure...' is the same as 'do not know at all'. If we would use that criterion, we should rewrite a lot of books about antiquity. Historians have methods to recognise forgeries, or better, to filter probable true descriptions of historical events. Christians would not be very glad with what historians have to say about Jesus. Of course one of the reasons why these discussions are so endless, is that the historical base of Jesus' existence is small. But the other one is the emotional resistance that there could be a historical basis for Christianity's development. But modern day Christianity has not much to do with the portrait that historians have of Jesus: an apocalyptic preacher, spreading the message that the end of days was coming very soon, possibly in his own life time. Paul had to bend his theology pretty hard, when some of the people in his churches were worried about people that already died before the final days: were their souls saved or not? Thanks, forgot that one.

No. It must be: he probably existed, but we cannot be 100% sure. I think you are confusing history with physics. What does count for historical evidence? In the Christ case: - mentioning by Paul that he met Jesus' brother, James - mentioning by Josephus of James, whose brother was called 'Christ' - mentioning of John the baptist by Josephus - mentioning of John the baptist by in a few gospels Oh, of course, they were all Christian forgeries... And then Paul grounding churches based on an apocalyptic theology, that pretty well fits some points the oldest gospels agree upon about what Jesus preached.

Well, not an impressive number. Otherwise there would not be any discussion at all. Of several hypothesis, historians must choose the explanation that fits best to the material we have. And we do not have much material, if we filter out all inconsistencies, additions with obvious Christian theological purposes, etc etc. But still, the simplest explanation is that Christianity goes back to a preacher called Jesus at the beginning of the first century. But of course, the simplest explanation might not be the correct one. Thanks. But I won't say much more either. I've made my contributions, and what happens now is mostly just repetition of arguments that were already given. At what Forum did you already discuss this topic?

Hmmm... Let's see what you really said: So your question starts with a statement (not a question!): "Probably that phrase by Paul is disputed". I reacted on that. For me you were displaying mistrust, and I did not found it necessary to answer your question anymore. It sounds to me you already have made your mind up: "If it is written somewhere, then it is a falsification, an insertion by later Christians. If we cannot be sure, it is wrong". Then you are asking something that, if you were really following the discussion, should have known yourself, or could have looking up with Google: search for "Paul meets James", and you are done: Galatians 1:18-20. Then you come with a similar suggestion ("the Josephus section is disputed"), and cite a web page that is critical of Doherty's position. Your reference to 'last part of the page' is unclear as unclear can be. I found nothing there that supports what you are saying. And in the light of you referring to this text, and asking where Paul mentions that he met James, the brother of the Lord, your complete posting does not make much sense: in this text it is mentioned where Paul has written that he met James. So obviously you do not really read, and just throw in a few opinions. If I my judgement of you is wrong, then my apologies. But then: better avoid that people get such impressions, by writing better, more contentful postings.

Yes, on good grounds. You are over-generalising. Do you know of one 'fact' accepted by historians, based on visions written down by some person in antiquity? Of course one leaves out such things. Obviously you have not read the epistles of Paul. He is concerned mainly with the building up of his churches everywhere in the Mediterranean, and solving the social and theological problems arising there. And therefore he had to write letters. And some of them have survived. If he would have been interested in making a chronicle of Jesus, he would have written more about Jesus life, don't you think? Right, we cannot be sure. But taken all hints together, the by far simplest explanation is to assume that an apocalyptic preacher called Jesus stands at the beginning of the religion that is called Christianity.

By mythicists, yes, of course. But not by most historians. You mean this, from your page? No historian takes Paul visions of a resurrected Jesus seriously as proof or hint that Jesus existed, so that reference is useless. Paul's interest was mainly theological and political. Why should he write about Jesus, if there were enough people around him knowing the events in Jesus' life? And now you are supposing motives of Paul you don't know about! Just read the epistles, then you can see with what Paul was mostly concerned. Yes, Paul believed in Jesus, an he took his existence for granted.

Well, Paul mentions that he met James, brother of Jesus (in one of the epistles whose authenticity is not disputed). That is pretty close. Especially because Josephus in his Antiquities of the Jews also mentions James, and that he had a brother Jesus who was called Christ. This phrase is found in several independent versions of Josephus' texts, even those without the obvious Christian insertions. For historians of antiquity, this is more or less a smoking gun. If you do not accept this, you will have to deny a lot of more persons who are supposed to be historical. Mythicists of course have a great strategy here: if a text seems to hint to the existence of Jesus, then it is a later Christian insertion.

From Wikipedia: Bold by me. Further: But I have spent already more than enough time in this.