Silber5

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism 1. A deterministic ToE would come close to proving Determinism, but it might still be, that there actually is an underlying reality to it with some indeterminism or that the universe was only deterministic during some time period. 2. We may observe unpredictability, as in quantum physics, but that doesn't require actual indeterminism, deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics exist. Determinism and Indeterminism are philosophical metaphysical ideas, none of them can be disproved by observation.

We can't ever tell determinism and indeterminism apart with certainty anyway. The closest thing we could get to with regards to telling both apart, would be to arrive at a deterministic ToE without something like the quantum uncertainty principle. It seems to me science should remain prepared that some behavior that had been thought indeterministic turns out to be deterministic; and be prepared, as well, that some behavior so far thought to be deterministic may actually turn out to be influenced by randomness factors. I only require that this model I presented is thinkable and without inherent logical flaws. A relativistic world example of the kind asked for by my question would refute my idea - nothing circular about it.

A deterministic world seems possible to me just like an indeterministic one. I'd accept both (just not at the same time for the same world ;-) ) as valid for a counterexample to my claim. To be able to clarify my question further, I'd need to know what else you consider unclear. For now, I'll just quote myself from my original post. Let the world be implemented by a pseudo-code basic program run on a Turing machine: 10 set world to initial state 20 calculate new state from applying modification function on current state 30 replace current state with new state 40 GOTO 20 Can anyone imagine (and give an example of) a world wherein the above could be disproved by interntal intelligent observers ? (Example is not required to include math, if it's clear enough without it. And don't worry: I don't plan to start nit-picking on whether a proposed world could support intelligent obvservers. ) From an outside perspective, to talk about the temporal evolution of such world, we'd read the appropriate memory area of the Turing machine once, each time that line 20 is about to be executed, to talk about the temporal evolution of the world. (Alternatively the program could be modified to output each state of the world, which would be the same for all practical purposes, as far as I can tell.) Quoting my previous post in response: *possibly as a seperate thread

SR and LET aren't as relevant to my argument as it seems. I'm essentially only asking the question whether there's any case, where the following could be disproved by intelligent internal observers. "Every possible world has an initial total present state* and there are laws which may change this state." (*Including, possibly, "records" of the past and/or even the future as part of the total present state.) I did make claims the inconsistency of relativity of simultaneity. While I'm true to that, it admit that it may not be obvious whether this follows from the answer my argument is asking for or whether it doesn't. So I suggest, for sake of the clarity of this thread, that the be effectively ignored by considering them my personal (not necessarily justified) opinion. (I'd move on to a philosophical forum first, for some discussion, before potentially returning here with such claim.) It might be reasonable, to have this thread closed and I'll make another one wherein I limit myself to discussing the answer to my question** - this is up to the mods and precise moderation guidelines. (**Rather than making claims about whether it's true or false. And in which new thread I'd refrain from claiming consequences for relativity.)

Interesting. What matters to my argument is whether both can be distinguished by an internal intelligent observer, whether one can be disproved without disproving the other. Here comes my argument ... as promised, just one day late, in a form which I think is concise and sufficiently detailed. I'm telling about it in advance, that it's not relevant to a position which assumes as fully secured, that the world(the universe or multiverse, whichever applies) doesn't have a state. And it's possibly less relevant, to a position which assumes as fully secured, that the world is static – that the state of the world can't possibly change. Also, I recognize that a physical theory is incomplete from it's mathematical description alone, at least so until we've got a ToE which could be recognized as such from it's mathematical formulation alone (by a person with appropiate expert knowledge). Consequently, for people who are only comfortable with abstract thought when limited to mathematics, this argument is possibly not a good read. Central statement of my argument: The common scientific understanding of the concept „relativity of simultaneity“ is flawed, insofar as: Relativity of simultaneity is considered to be mutually exclusive with absolute simultaneity, but absolute simultaneity cannot be empirically disproved. Every possible world(our universe or multiverse, and all other logically valid worlds) which is mathematically described by a relativistic physical theory is compatible with absolute simultaneity for all intelligent internal observers or groups thereof. Details: Relativity of simultaneity and absolute simultaneity contradict each other in their normal scientific interpretation. Therefore they can't both apply to a single world. Consequently, it's a valid question to ask which of both ideas applies (and to which possible worlds). Let there be the set of all possible worlds which are mathematically described by one* of all possible relativistic physical theories, this is „set Rel“. ( * or by a number thereof, which is essentially the same) Let there also be the set of all possible worlds which are described by one* of all possible physical theories with absolute simultaneity, this is „set absS“. There are five mutually exclusive possibilities for the relationship between both sets, as illustrated: See attachment: Or take the google drive link to the image: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7wut-d6RqxJUVVzaWxJV1lsOEE/view On Option A: A is eliminated, because superluminal transmission of information is incompatible with relativistic theories, but it can be compatible with some theory with absolute simultaneity. On Option B: B is eliminated, too, because of the special theory of relativity and the equivalent lorentz ether theory example. On Option C: C is eliminated on the same ground as option A. On Option D: D is the option I suggest to be the only empirically significant one. On Option E: E seems like the option which the relativistist desires. If we accept A, B and C as eliminated, then all that is required to disprove my argument, is to show that there's at least one logically valid example wherin a relativistic physical theory's (mathematically described) world can be proved incompatible with absolute simultaneity for an internal observer or group thereof. However, a sound qualitative description of such case would be valid as well. Before an example is possibly proposed, I'd like to note: I imagine it's obvious, that for a supposedly relativistic world to reinterpreted as a world with absolute simultaneity, multiple possibilities for the absolute temporal order of events may exist. I don't see any problem following for my argument. The relativistic description might simply be incomplete.

I'm aware of the Lorentz Ether Theory which makes the same mathematical predictions like Special Theory of Relativity. But of course, LET and STR are less complete than general theory of relativity. You're right about Option B: relativity of simultaneity and absolute simultaneity actually are mutually exclusive in their common interpretations. So far, I've posted a wall of text in my first post, which contains my argument implicitly, spread all over the article. Then, I made the TLDR version, where I tried to cram my argument into a very compact form, resulting in oversimplification that may make the argument appear invalid. (see above paragraph) I'll endeavor to deliver, within a day or two, a final formulation of my central argument against relativity of simultaneity that is concise and sufficiently detailed.

The concepts of "relativity of simultaneity" and of "absolute simultaneity" are certainly important to science and so is the relation between them. Regarding existence of an aether, yes, certain kinds of ether have been disproved, but to say all have been disproved, that's highly reliant on your definition of ether. Un-falsifiability of a theory is bad, yes. And attempts to falsify one theory should be discriminated from proposing an alternate theory.

I'm condensing my argument here, to make it easier to see what it's about. (after which I'm going to reply to specific replies) The argument is about the concepts/ideas „relativity of simultaneity“ and „absolute simultaneity“ and their relationship. I'm not proposing any physical theory. The argument isn't even about which of the concepts applies to our actual world, though there may follow certain consequences for our world. Let the set „relativity of simultaneity“ be the set of all possible worlds to which relativity of simultaneity applies. Let the set “absolute simultaneity” be the set of all possible worlds to which absolute simultaneity applies. Then consider the illustration: See attached image or use link https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7wut-d6RqxJU0piTXZOeTVZWnM/view Option A tells, that absolute simultaneity and relativity are effectively the same thing. I believe we can agree upon dismissing it. Option B tells, that absolute simultaneity and relativity of simultaneity are necessarily mutually exclusive. I dismiss it, by considering special theory of relativity and the mathematically equal lorentz ether theory; the former has relativity of simultaneity while the latter has absolute simultaneity, yet they describe the same world. (So their must be a possible intersection between relativity of simultaneity and absolute simultaneity.) Option C tells, that wherever absolute simultaneity may apply, relativity of simultaneity applies, too. I dismiss it, because it seems impossible. Consider a world with absolute simultaneity and with instantaneous(FTL) communication, it's just not compatible with relativity of simultaneity. Option D tells the opposite of C. It's the standpoint I suggest to be the only valid one: Wherever relativity of simultaneity applies, there actually is an underlying absolute simultaneity. Then relativity of simultaneity just means "conventionality of simultaneity" or "undetectability of simultaneity" or something similar. Option E If you agree with my assessment on options A, B and C, then to prove me wrong, all you'd have to do is show that Option D can possibly be wrong. Show a possible world where "relativity of simultaneity" applies exclusively, that is, absolute simultaneity does not possibly apply to it.

I'm not making any predictions. To illustrate what my article is about, consider a theory that logically contradicts itself - to dismiss such theory, there's no need to postulate an alternative one which explains experimental evidence better than the contradictory one. I'm not exactly saying relativity was logically contradictory, but what I am saying is, that there's no good reason to believe in "relativity of simultaneity". It's a bit comparable including a postulate in an existing theory, that "a transcendent, unfathomable pink elephant god upholds the functioning of all laws of nature." There would be no good reason to believe in such postulate, yet the postulate it wouldn't invalidate the theory. You do know, that this "the speed of light is still the same in all frames of reference" is an axiom, a presupposition, of the special theory of relativity ? Just as an example, Lorentz Poincare Ether theory makes the same predictions as the special theory of relativity, yet it takes absolute simultaneity for granted.

I claim that relativity of simultaneity, as presently understood, is most likely inconsistent as a very concept. On the Nature of Time and Simultaneity Author(s): Benjamin Palan Abstract What is time ? Which properties are emergent and which are intrinsic ? Time is discussed, with special emphasis on properly discriminating the hypothetical outside perspective from the time of a world itself. This leads to a single, relatively simple model of time which is thought to encompass all others. Applying it to simultaneity, a conjecture is made which could turn out to be of great importance to proper definition and discrimination of relativity of simultaneity and of absolute simultaneity. The author was unable to disprove the conjecture, but found strong indications pointing to it's truth. Introduction Considerable effort has gone from the scientific community into the investigation of time. Change or flow of time, arrow of time, past, present and future, causality, relativity of simultaneity and absolute simultaneity, cyclic time and circular time, perception of time, loops and time travel, beginning of time and end of time are among the investigated properties. Most of them could be either weakly emergent or fundamental. A valid first question about time is »Can there be change ?«, if answered negatively, a lot or even everything about time is defined away. This is not the method employed. Instead, change is at least taken as a valid possibility. Previous attempts to describe time and relate it to the world, however, very often gave insufficient care to distinguish the model that attempts to explain time or defines »how a world might be generated« versus the temporal properties attributable to the world itself or to it’s behavior, including those seen by an inside observer. Quasi-presentistic model of time I am presenting a very simple model of time, yet with proper discrimination of the above, it can explain all the possible temporal behavior of any world I could think of, including well-defined time travel. The name ›quasi-presentistic model of time‹ is found to be appropriate: »The world has an initial state. Optionally there may be laws which modify the world’s state.« Elaborating on this, if the world was result of a pseudo-code BASIC program, this would look like the following: 10 set world to initial state 20 calculate new state from applying modification function on current state 30 replace current state with new state 40 GOTO 20 The above pseudo-code basic program is for clarity and the natural sciences community. Philosophically strictly, I’d have to amend the validity by noting that it should modify the current state, instead of replacing it. The difference between modifying and replacing is based on proper discrimination between identity and equality. Modifying may retain (some elements’) identity, while replacing cannot. So the valid pseudo-code BASIC program for philosophy purposes is: 10 set world to initial state 20 read world state into modification function, save output 30 apply modifications to current world 40 GOTO 20 Emergent and fundamental properties of time in the quasi-presentistic model Temporal properties of a world: • Time doesn't exist necessarily, a world may be static. • If a world changes at all, it’s appropriate to speak about past and future from an outside perspective, but there do not necessarily exist past or future for the world itself. • The world’s arrow of time is weakly emergent. There is nothing, in principle, that would stop the modification law from reversing the world’s arrow of time’s once a certain state is reached. A necessary condition is only, that the past exists in the world or that it can be reconstructed from the current state. This is necessary, at least, if we want an observer's present to move backwards along the same past which it originally went through. • Discriminate this arrow of time of the world from what might be called the ›arrow of time of the model’s generation of the world‹. • If the world does possess an existing past, then it is weakly emergent – in such case the world has at least one additional quasi-temporal dimension where the past is recorded. • The future may exist, too, in similar sense. Alternatively it could be deterministically determined, yet without existing. An indeterministic future is another option. Indeterminism that deterministically converges to certain events is possible – as with cyclic big bangs and big crunches. All of this is weakly emergent from the world and it’s behavior. • Flow of time with the meaning of paces, speed or rate may weakly emerge locally. • Pace of change in regards to a world as a whole is thought to be inconsistent. Apparent pace emerges from an intelligent observers perception. • Physical causality in the world is weakly emergent, dependent on it's definition. • Time travel into the past could weakly emerge in a world from the presented model, too. This includes changing the past, branching and time lines, observers caught in loops or combinations thereof. • A world may even be so chaotic as to have no recognizable arrows of time, at all. Examples how quasi-presentistic time explains common scientifically considered universes with time: • A typical non-branching growing block universe: Appears 3-space to the inside intelligent observer, but is 4-space. The world’s past exists and is weakly emergent, as it’s a result of the modification function’s recording of 3-space slices in the 4-space. • A Minkowski 4-dimensional space-time universe: Future and past are, if anything, weakly emergent, as they actually form one block. Set initial state to the 4D Minkowski space-time. If there is no change, then the modification laws do nothing. • All »time doesn’t exist« universes: It’s a static steady-state universe, it's eternalistic. Initialize to it’s state. Empty modification function. • Deterministic circular time with 3-space, future, past and arrow of time exist: Is there any change ? If not, treat like static universe above. Otherwise it can be explained, too, but this may depend a lot on the chosen definitions of, for example, regarding an observer. • Deterministic circular time with 3-space, with arrow of time, future and past don’t exist: Initialize to a state of the loop. Modification functions is such, that the state of the world repeats itself from an outside perspective examination of it’s behavior. Introduction to the controversy of simultaneity Consider a logical truth table for the Special Theory of Relativity and the experimentally equivalent Lorentz Ether Theory with it’s underlying absolute simultaneity: • STR and LET might both be false. Not very relevant. • It’s impossible to empirically determine just one theory to be true, without depending on other theories, because STR and LET make the same predictions on all experiments. • Both can’t be true, since they contradict each other. With continued neglect of other theories, the axiomatic difference between STR and LET with their experimental equivalence about the world they describe leads to conclude: A world described only by the STR is necessarily compatible with absolute simultaneity. But also to: A world described only by LET is necessarily compatible with relativity of simultaneity. If we prefer STR as the true theory, then the world described by STR is still necessarily compatible with absolute simultaneity. Or should we prefer LET as the true theory, then the world described by it still necessarily compatible with relativity of simultaneity. The above consideration probably doesn’t directly lead to anything too significant. The conjecture Benjamin Palan’s conjecture (assuming no one made it before): »Every possible world can be ascribed to an underlying reality of quasi-presentistic time.« A special case of the conjecture applicable to the simultaneity problem is given further below. One very important property of time which was consciously omitted in the chapter discussing my model of time is that of simultaneity. The model can explain highly chaotic worlds with time flowing in reverse, arrows of time changing directions, even with no definable arrows of time, with backwards-causation or time travel in various definitions. The property of simultaneity, however, is simple: There is always just one state of the world, the present one. There is absolute simultaneity and it’s as intrinsic and basic a property as it can get. The special case of the conjecture for simultaneity: »Every possible world described by a theory with relativity of simultaneity can be ascribed to an underlying reality of quasi-presentistic time.« The reverse, that every possible world with absolute simultaneity could reasonably be ascribed to a world with relativity of simultaneity, seems obviously false to me. With truth of the conjecture, this gives: Let A be the set of all worlds with absolute simultaneity. Let B be the set of all worlds with relativity of simultaneity. B is a strict subset of A. Then relativity of simultaneity would have no added explanative authority over the quasi-presentistic model. Can the conjecture be disproved ? If it must be considered true, then ›relativity of simultaneity‹, as a result of being entirely encompassed by absolute simultaneity, would stand revealed as mere ›undetectability of simultaneity‹ on it's absolutely simultaneous basis. Almost-proof of the conjecture The quasi-presentistic model of time can be thought of as running on a Turing machine. The machine makes calculations and outputs the state of the world and then another state of the world to replace the old one and another etc. . Turing machines operation is a good example of the most simple time that admits change. It runs absolutely simultaneous with itself – there's always a single present state of the machine at which the machine could be stopped and that particular state analyzed. A Turing machine can compute everything that modern computers can compute, including future quantum computers. It can compute everything that is algorithmically computable at all. Defense of relativity So how what's possibly left to save relativity of simultaneity ? Maybe it could possess a property that allows it to act as a hypercomputer. This would be the case, if it could solve the Turing machine halting problem, for example. An explanation or justification would be required, however, why or how this is property should be exclusive to relativity of simultaneity. Why couldn't a universe of quasi-presentistic time be allowed to be calculated by a Turing machine which has access to oracle machines as well ? It appears to the author, that about the only defense of relativity would involve denying that change could possibly occur to the world. This can conserve Einstein's theories while effectively admitting defeat on simultaneity – A ›static steady-state‹ , ›eternalistic‹ or ›fixed block‹ universe is the ultimate example of absolute simultaneity. END OF ARTICLE Disproof approaches anticipated to fail: Mingling temporal properties pertaining to the model of time itself with temporal properties of a resulting world. Hiding away information about a world in a different appertaining model of time. Showing that the presented model has multiple solutions for a single description of a world, it's a feature. Improper use of infinity. Generally unthoughtful arguments, such as: Propose an eternalistic universe with observers who experience time and expect my model to give the explanation how they experience time actual without change. Not giving any argument at all: “We must just accept relativity of simultaneity as a fundamental feature of the world. We merely can’t properly understand it with our natural, limited conception of time.” This would effectively mean to try to turn the discussion into a religious conflict of belief on the transcendence of relativity, rather than an application of science. While any one discipline of mathematics, philosophy and physics may be enough to disprove it, it is somewhat of an interdisciplinary topic. So I posted (or am still posting right now) this in one forum each, of the mentioned disciplines, including here. Author’s additional opinion: Publication of my idea on appropriate internet forums like this one should suffice to snowball annihilation of what I would call Einstein’s insane ideology. That my conjecture is true is obvious to me. I also expect my model of time to become the ultimate or “encompassing” one, yet it’s quite simple .. ok, enough high-handedness – but maybe it motivates disproof attempts … and I also hope for a productive discussion and please make sure to mention all special assumption you make on potential disproofs. *space for extra stuff, without the need to modify my original post*

Hello, my name is Benjamin and I'm from Germany. I'm currrently highly mentally busy thinking about certain science/philosophy stuff, so much, that I recently got my own age wrong by year . No need to worry about me, however