Kraft

Seems interesting, I'd like more information about this, and references if possible.

http://www.johnkyrk.com/meiosis.html It has an animation of the process. During the first round of meiosis, the homologous chromosomes form tetrads, and in this they can exchange genetic matierial leading to recombinant chromosomes and variation. Also, when aligning on the metaphase plane the side which the maternal vs. paternal chromosome go on is random. So, with 23 chromosomes there are 2^23 possible arrangements. You get 4 different sperm in the end. In egg formation only 1 gamete is procuded in the end rather than 4, but it is very similar.

Meiosis in the production of the gametes themselves causes variation. With cross-over and independant assortment in meiosis the DNA of the egg or sperm is never quite identical.

With the debate of active v. passive euthanasia, this is an interesting read Rachels: Euthanasia Hope it hasn't been linked already.

Hi, I'm Kraft. Comes from my initials and a part of my university diet. 2nd year biochem student, but I like philosophy a lot more. Linked here from infidelguy.com came to be entertained by WILLOWTREE's debate, and decided to register.

Sorry for the lateness of this reply, school's got me stressing out. The reason that the potential personhood argument fails is that a fundamental change occurs in development after which person is achieved. Take it like this, the fertilized ovum is a blueprint, the mother through her diet provides the raw materials and her uterus the environment for 'assembly' of the foetus. If the full child was a building, I don't consider the blueprints and empty lot a building, but when the structure of the building is set I would (i.e. personhood). As for the potential to reoffend, that is used to keep them in jail, not to make the conviction. If you were to talk about potential to offend by itself, nearly everyone has potential for harm. Physics - potential energy is different than the potential for energy, I don't see it as being comparable. For personhood a fundamental change is required that a shift from kinetic to potential energy doesn't equate to. Definition of a person - ok, me. Well what makes me a person? I could say it is my genetic code, but then what of a person with down's or Turner's syndrome, they do not fit this definition, are they persons? Biologically, I could go by physiology, but then what would happen if an amputation occurred or artificial replacement used. I am left with the definition I earlier mentioned - a biological entity with the present capacity for sentience and volition. This is not exclusive to humans, while the data AFAIK is inconclusive so far it is possible that dolphins, octopi, etc., could be persons. In this definition sentience and volition are cited, from that the principle of autonomy is derived and the rest follows. Respect for all life - I'm unsure how you can function at all if you hold this. That a plant, animal, bacterial are valued equally with your own life. You'll have to explain it further or your justification of your actions if you do hold this. Personal gain - I'm just stating what I believe to be right. I agree with Callipygous here. Honestly, emotionally I do not like the prospect of abortion, but that is separate from my values. Message #228 1. Covered earlier in definition of personhood. 2. That's the post conventional stage of development link Later.

I'm unsure how it 'says nothing', I gave a reasonable criteria for when personhood is reached. So, you believe the issue is that of the potential persons, not of when personhood begins? What is a human being/person to you? Your respect for life argument, how far does that go? (only human life gets special treatment?) Once you answer that, I'll expand on the issue. As for the core motivation: respect, honesty and consistency. If you mean 'motivation' for not covering the potential persons argument in more detail, I just don't think it's the main issue.

AFAIK, in medicine deontological ethics is used at the hands on levels, while hedonistic utilitarian is used at macro level. You missed the principle of impossibility and fidelity/best action in deontology. That one can not be obligated to do what is impossible in the circumstances, and that anyone with an obligation has a duty to fulfil it to the best of their abilities. The singular or Kantian form isn't normally applied in medicine. In the pluralistic version, the one you stated, the principles are guiding, not absolute (prima facie). This does lead to a balancing of rights/duties and although the same framework used different balancings are possible. In consequentialism, one must have data to support whatever 'good' is to be maximized. Also, an act (each situation on its own) or rule approach must be chosen (general rules which will max good). Physical well-being rather than happiness would likely be the good to be maximized in medicine.

Ok, I'll try to give my views. It's going to be in deontological pluralistic ethics, which deals with balancing the duties/rights of people. I will refer to Canadian standards as that is where I'm located. Also I can find references if people require them. Social issues such as the right to have children have been ignored in this argument, but competing rights of society are applicable. The main issue with abortion is the personhood of the foetus. A person is a biological entity that has present capacity for sentient thought and volition (constructed persons don't enter this debate). If the foetus is a person then the foetus has rights and its right to life becomes a major issue (equality and justice). At conceptions the foetus is a 'potential person', potential people have potential rights. A non-person can no be murdered, only killed. Thus ethically and legally, a non-person can be killed (think of all the micro organisms you kill daily). Now, how would one determine if the child is a person or not? Well, the structure for sentient thought and volition would need to be in place (i.e. central nervous system development). Through dissections of developing foetuses, the time frame when the CNS is developed adequately is ~18-22 weeks. This is why the CMA has a guideline prohibiting abortions after 20 weeks, and physicians are told they are dealing with 2 patients after that point. Ethically this is a gradational approach, and this makes abortion in the time period before structural development acceptable. Strictly speaking in Canada a foetus does not become a person until it 'proceeds alive from the body of its mother', so there is actually no legal limit on timeframe, only a guideline. Taking this gradational approach to personhood, after the ~20 weeks, there are 2 persons. It does not logically matter that the foetus is inside the mother, or that it is dependant on her; personhood is independant of location, and dependance does not invalidate personhood. One must balance their competing rights. The mother definitely has the right to self determination, but does that overrule the rights of the foetus? If the argument of the mother is her quality of life, against the foetus' right to life, right to life would hold greater force and take precedence. However, in cases where the life of the mother is endangered by pregnancy, the competing rights to life enter the picture. The principle of impossibility enters the picture if, unless aborted the mother will die. If in this case both foetus and mother will die if pregnancy continues, abortion would be appropriate. In case of competing rights to life, my personal view on this is in favour of the mother, but is could be balanced and argued differently. At the current time advances in artificial uteruses may make it possible that the foetus can be aborted from the mother, but continue development inside the artificial unit. When this procedure has been more fully realized, the competing right to life of the foetus may not need be balanced as transfer would be an option (this would be impossible in many less developed nations, I know). So, there you have it. Abortion should be allowed and available up to a certain stage in development, after which one must balance the rights of the foetus against the rights of the mother.