Pembroke

You say here "Why is choosing to do things you find enjoyable NOT a rational decision?" I said: "what I am saying is that the enjoyment I feel of a thing is not a rational decision " Those are different. What you said implies that one already finds something enjoyable and then subsequently chooses to do it or not, whereas what I said is that one does not choose whether one feels enjoyment of a thing in the first place. So no, they are not the same, and that is what you have quoted me saying above. I don't get why this is so hard for you to understand either. The quote of me in bold I still stand by. The first example you gave of a person choosing to enjoy a thing: "Except when one goes to a movie one has been excited to see." You said that I used the words "may not", and the context I used those words in was to say that a person may not feel any excitement to see a movie. That is the case for me now, I actually don't enjoy watching movies in general and I don't feel any excitement towards the prospect of watching any of them. I can't choose to feel excited about it, because that feeling does not occur to me at the prospect of watching any movie. I said that even if I was excited to watch one which I'm not), then it could happen that I watched a movie and felt disappointed in it. While I don't have that current experience in a movie, I have a memory in my youth of feeling excited for Halloween to go with my family to a pumpkin patch and when we went on the outing I felt strangely empty about the experience and frankly disappointed. I was young then and I did not engage in a process of consideration of all the reasons I did not like the pumpkin patch, I simply had a reaction of disappointment to it. I think this is applicable to all of your examples, that one simply reacts to these stimuli with approbation or disapprobation, one does not choose beforehand to enjoy or not enjoy, one feels that way as a result of the experience. You used the example of a good Comic con (something you enjoy). That is very well that you enjoy it, I'm not in any way discounting your feelings, but just because I do not have an equivalent of Comic Con, does not mean that I can rationally choose to materialize something that I react with a feeling of approbation towards. I am driven to respond on this site, for example, but honestly I get a feeling of anxiety at the thought of it, rather than a feeling of enjoyment... and that is how my experiences are. I don't really want to personalize this conversation because I think it works on the level of ideas, but I can use myself for the sake of concrete examples.

It wasn't an impression so much as a direct quote, you see. No I don't see that in the quote you provided there. I still think that enjoyment I feel is a reaction in a moment to the experience and not a decision. First, one may not experience anticipation or excitement to see a movie in the first place. Even if one did, one could watch it and feel a disappointment in the movie, which wouldn't be rationally chosen but a reaction to the experience of watching it itself. One could stand before a mirror and smile but not truly feel happy, and hope to have a good day but experience a bad one. The same for the rest, the actual quality of the experience is a reaction that a person experiences and not one which is chosen. The same for negative experiences. I don't see you have proven anything, you are merely trying to say that one can choose to feel a given way from an experience, but that isn't true or by any means given.

I wouldn't say that choosing to do things you find enjoyable isn't a rational decision, my appologies if I gave that impression. What I'm saying is that one doesn't rationally choose to gain enjoyment from a thing or not, it is an experience which arises from the interaction with the thing. But is this analogy pointing to something like, even if the experiences are negative, they are sill analogous to the fullness and in some way worthwhile? If it is the latter then I don't see it.

If I reiterate what I mean, would you then provide a response to it? When I used the word instinct, I meant that, when engaging in a given activity, I will either feel enjoyment or some other positive emotion or else I will feel discomfort or some other negative emotion, I might also feel ambivalent or neutral towards the experience. When I say that enjoyment is based on instinct, what I am saying is that the enjoyment I feel of a thing is not a rational decision, it is a reaction which takes place in me. It would be similar for seeing something as beautiful, it either strikes someone that way or it does not.

Do you mean humans (as in through generations of accumulated knowledge) or individuals by the end of their lives? I'm also curious if you have any reason for thinking so. To expand on what I'm getting at for the sake of clarity (hopefully). In the past, value was not conceived subjectively, people thought in moral absolutes. But we have come (most of us) to locate value in the subject who gives it to things. The problem which I am trying to illustrate is that these applying of value depends on an instinct (rather than the rational function of reason), we have to already value things, instinctively. But in the absence of that instinct (whether it be towards life, towards morals) there are not arguments (at least that I can see, but I am open to hearing arguments from others) which can convince us to see the world in such a way that we don't already. I would be willing to follow this line of reasoning with others, which is what I'm trying to do by posting here. I do not revel in the above described situation. I think that it is also true for morals though, but I think the question of whether to keep living is more central. I am not the first by any means to go over this issue. It is the subject of the work by Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (Sisyphus being a figure akin to the one I'm describing, whose existence consists of rolling a boulder up a hill which subsequently rolls back down only to roll it up again and repeat for all eternity). That work by Camus is focused on whether suicide is philosophically justified.

Yes, I agree that it's subjective. But I think that's the issue, because our experience of a thing (positive or negative) depends on an instinct, not on a reason. So a given individual might not be able to choose the reaction they have to things. What I am wondering is whether, if the instincts of a given human being predispose them to have negative reactions to stimuli (subjectively), is the life worth living which is experienced in that negative light?

What I am getting at is this: If meaning is not inherent in things - which seems to be the consensus, then it depends on an individual giving a meaning to the thing. But if an individual is unable to believe in a meaning then the process is impossible. Likewise for value. Enjoyment of things is dependent on an instinct (one does not choose to feel enjoyment for a particular thing, it is an experience which arises in the individual). Because these things are based on instincts (whether one is instinctually able to believe or to feel enjoyment) then they are not bound by reason. They are in a sense irrational aspects of the human. I wanted to explore whether life is still worth living for this individual. Is there something about life itself that makes it worth living, or is it some aspect of the experience. I'm wondering when you asked "Is there anything else you feel needs to be stripped from this individual before you can decide if they should live?" if you are somehow angry about this, as if I am committing some kind of injustice by asking. I am not stripping any individual of these things. If I must be honest this individual is myself, and I haven't stripped myself of anything that was not already missing. Can you elaborate on why you think it doesn't matter? If the experience is to be negative (even hypothetically), why would the individual wish to continue surviving to experience it?

Okay, I will accept that you say, but somehow the issue I am pointing out still stands, don't you agree? If we then accept that the issue must be subjective, because the subject must decide whether to take his/her life, then on those grounds, there isn't really an argument against it, as is attempted by the OP of this thread. The reason I added the word enjoyable, for example, was because I wondered whether someone thought that a life which is not enjoyable could still be worth living (for that individual). I think that my discussion with Phi for All might be coming towards the issue that I was trying to get at. The problem I am having with the line of reasoning that you're giving is that it has to be supposed that someone would want to know or experience what comes next whatever it is. Phi for All has pointed out that I am setting up an argument which is designed to fail, but rather than that being a criticism of what I'm doing it's kind of the point. I know that may sound strange, but it is because I am trying to probe the limits of subjectivism (value is generally held as subjective in our age, whereas in previous ages it was not held as subjective) and there are consequences of this. For example moral nihilism.

I am willing to follow your line of reasoning, but I suppose we will have to iron out either where I don't understand or else where a certain conclusion must rest (at least insofar as together we have reached a stand-still). I don't know what you are asking when you ask "wouldn't this have to be the way everyone feels about their worth?". Is it then fallacious or somehow misguided to ask, "If a given subject does not feel that life has intrinsic worth, is there reason for that subject to feel that it does?" Though you didn't say so, I do still think that this line of questioning is relevant to the thread, because if an individual does not experience their life as inherently meaningful enjoyable, or valuable, what would be a reason to keep living (ie. an argument against suicide for this individual)? The question of suicide is dependent on having a life to take. Is that what you're saying? If so, I will agree to that, but I don't think that the question of whether one should commit suicide is completely encaspulated by that fact. The original post of yours I am particularly referring to runs as follows: "It’s preferable to prevent an immediate prospect of death in favour of a less certain future, even if that future seems unavoidable (which it isn’t)." One problem I have with the comment is that you don't give an explanation as to why it is "preferable", but it also relies on the ability of someone to experience a future which makes life somehow desirable or worthwhile, which isn't a given. I don't only mean that someone may live an entirely tragic life, which is a possibility, but that someone could experience anything that happens as undesirable. The reason I am putting this in this particular thread is because, in particularly the latter case (that all is experienced as undesireable) is there still an argument against suicide? That is also why I felt that the issue of the intrinsic worth of life is relevant, rather than extrinsic (some event or else some meaning which is given to it by experiencing subjects).

I don't think that I'm ignoring other subjects. I would be happy to talk about it. I can create another thread, but I don't think this is off topic because I think it is relevant to whether the arguments against suicide are truly good arguments. Why I think it doesn't matter in this case what other subjects feel about life (that it has intrinsic value) is because if a given subject does not feel that it has intrinsic worth, how would it be relevant to them if others think it does, unless it is some objective quality which is universally applicable (particularly to their own situation)? In other words, even if I made another topic about the intrinsic worth of life, to follow the reasoning I am on in this subject, I would need to refer back to the notion of suicide, because the question would be whether it is worth it to continue living under any conditions. I don't think your reiteration answered this issue. We can talk about how our lives affect those around us, sure, but it doesn't necessarily have bearing about whether a particular subject would find their lives worth living. And then you said that value and worth people define for themselves, but if someone defines value in such a way that life does not fit their definition, life could still appear not worth living. This is relevant to the subject of this thread because it could have specific bearing on whether an individual choses to continue living, and whether arguments directed against that act are relevant or effective. I did downvote your comments because I found them unhelpful. The replies I made to others should clarify why I disagree with you, but to reiterate it I don't think that the question of suicide (writ large as a philosophical issue, rather than in certain particular cases or as psychological issues) is dependent on conditions which may subsequently improve, but on whether life is intrinsically worth living. If you feel that my downvoting is in some way unfair or ill intended, I will take them away because I don't see the system as particularly helpful, since the feeling that I or any others have about a given statement is irrelevant to whether it is true or not (and I think the voting system represents the former rather than the latter).

Well I don't necessarily agree with your conclusion of my line of reasoning because if the value of life is subjective and a subject does not see a value in it then by that standard the life does not have value. If one follows that line of reasoning one is also saying that life does not have intrinsic worth, which was my question originally. We might never know how many lives we affect, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it matters if we affect lives at all, or at least that isn't here proven.

I have a few questions regarding this if you're up for continuing the conversation. First, If someone was, for example, enslaved, would you still consider the positives able to be seen and up to the individual to choose to see them and therefore think it worth living? Second, if someone did not see them, either because they chose not to or for some reason was unable to, would life still be worth living and if so why?

The problem I have with this response is that it's a hypothetical. There isn't always something around the corner, because we can point to lives that turned out disasterously. I would accept an argument that we don't know, but then the question I am concerned with is if all turns out poorly at the final moment, was the life still worth living and if so for what reason? You said that one should write a different story for oneself, but you cannot be suggesting that "anything is possible"? because there are limits to possibility. What I am wondering with my entrance into this thread is if someone experienced a completely negative life (either because of explicit experiences or their interpretation or feeling about all experiences) is life still worth living regardless?

I suppose then I would still ask about the second part of the original statement you responded to: What if the continued existence of the person would cause a significant degree of distress (this is presumably what you mean by the harm of their suicide), for example of they would act chronically depressed and speak negatively about life, become a financial burden or homeless, etc.? If you're up for it, could you elaborate on one of the questions I asked DrP, namely: Could you also elaborate reasons on why would would do things for the world, particularly if one had adverse experiences from the world and other people? What if it matters to a person and therefore causes distress to the individual? Also to be clear, though I said this in my original post in this thread, the reason that I am considering this is because I would like to contemplate whether life is innately good or whether it is good for something else (eg. experiences one has of the world).

I hope you don't mind me pressing this because I am curious about whether life is innately worth living or if it's only worth living under certain conditions. You need only respond if you feel up for it. You said that one does not know what is around the corner, but should we think that, in a hypothetical scenario where nothing could would come around the corner, is that life then not worth living, or is it worth living regardless of endless drudgery if that was the case, and if so for what reason? In a second scenario, even if someone did not have explicitly adverse experiences but simply had a distaste for everything in life, regardless of what would come, would life be worth living and if so for what reason? Could you also elaborate reasons on why would would do things for the world, particularly if one had adverse experiences from the world and other people?

But this is based off the premise that every person contemplating suicide would be doing so because of a temporary or solveable problem, which does not need to be the case. Some people might just find little point in existence in its entirely or not really hold anything to be good or worth living for. Is there then a rational reason for them to live? What if an individual does not have a spouse, friends, or children? Also, what if the continued existence of the person would cause a significant degree of distress (this is presumably what you mean by the harm of their suicide), for example of they would act chronically depressed and speak negatively about life, become a financial burden or homeless, etc.? The reason I am posing this and the above is because I am contemplating whether there is an innate reason to live. By that I mean, if all conditions were considered undesirable to the subject under consideration, would it still be worth it rationally for them to continue living and if so why?

You're right that those are both common opinions. Though my opinion hasn't been asked for, I generally consider history (among other things) as a trove of data to be considered which often possesses both character and conditions not currently at hand but have a degree of veracity which elevates their use for contemplation above imagined possibilities.

I definitely think an explanation of why cultural norms change either within a certain territory over time or from territory to territory is beyond my ability to discern with any certainty. I'm less sure that such changes necessitate the conclusion that any divergent norms are therefore equally valid. It would be easier to contemplate changes within an individual over time, perhaps because we may have personal experience and insights into that. I know that I once held the notion of unvarying kindness in high regard whereas I don't really believe that to be a well grounded position any more. I believe that shift to have occured as a result of contemplation. I'm not sure if that is analogous to the situation for a broader culture. While I'm not sure that an objective notion of good and bad can be reached for certain, I think I differ from some others in this thread because I don't think pursuing the question wholly futile. A few problems I have is in defining the words morality, or even good and bad (are these as yet empty categories which would then be filled in, or do these already have meaning). When you follow the dictionary definitions (I'm using oxford) you ultimately have the definitions using terms that were used to define previous terms, making the reason circular. The closest definition to good that I can see, and that bears some weight is under Noun, definition 2: Benefit or advantage to someone or something. because the first definition (under noun: That which is morally right; righteousness.) ultimately leads (by using the dictionary) to the circle where the word Good must be defined, and if it is defined as moral, then it begs the question of what moral is, and so on... What is beneficial or advantageous seems at least slightly more clear cut, because we know things about human biology. We could say it is beneficial to have those things which sustain us and even make us more healthy, skillful and so on... and that I wouldn't think depended solely upon opinion. It might vary from person to person or situation to situation. For example if someone was cripple they wouldn't benefit from the practice of running or jogging whereas someone with healthy legs would, but in principle both would benefit from exercise. Also if one was tired one would benefit from rest, and so forth.

Not to butt in on the conversation you were having, but I'm curious why you think that evidence of objective morality would have to be backed by examples from cultures over history? It seems to me that a culture not following a moral position does not mean that the given moral position isn't necessarily the correct one. It could equally be evidence that the culture operated in folly. I'm not necessarily making an argument for an objective morality, my position is more complicated than that, I'm just curious about your reasoning that a true morality would necessarily have to have been followed in the past.

It could be one reason. To be upfront, I did come to that idea from reading evolutionary theories of religion, so it's not really my idea solely. I can't point to a particular source because I read a number of theories as well as theories of consciousness and so on. Particularly in regards to religious beliefs, which provide narratives which speak to existential conundrums. There could be additional factors as well, like a need for an established and unquestioned morality perhaps which allows a common language and community. And if the resultant behaviour is not evolutionarily effective it dies out (like Stylites in Late Antiquity, and so on)?

I think what you say there is true. I was also thinking of habituation. On that issue I still have uncertainties though which I'm not sure can be cleared up by reasoning alone. Take an example of someone who knows it is good to do lots of regular exercise but simultaneously feels laziness. It's true that the laziness can be the result of prior habits, but the thing I am wondering is what is the impetus which would cause the person to switch from the habit to the other more successful behaviour? To clarify the issue I can return to my personal example of biting my nails when I was young. For a long time I thought it was not good to bite my nails, It was unsanitary and ugly, etc. but the knowledge of those things did not cause me to stop right away. I remember when I did stop, because it seemed to me odd at the top, that just one day it was as if my mind just decided it would not do so and then I did not and have not since. What I wonder is, what was the impetus which caused my mind to suddenly click that particular day. I had not been deeply concerned on preceding days about the issue, it seemed to have come out of nowhere and it seems to have been permanent. Was my brain simply in a build up from past knowledge that took years to finally ferment, or something else? I think the same issue could be considered in a number of cases. --------------------------------------------------- To bring this whole topic more closely in line with the subject (The meaning of life), I also wonder about whether our unconscious brain-processes might interpret (using that word lightly, more analogously than literally) otherwise than through reason? That problem seems strange to ask because to some it might seem self-evidently the case that it does. The reason I bring it up is that, our brains might have reason to latch on to a belief that seems irrational when considered in the light of reason and truth. Many people (in this thread and otherwise, including particular many scientists) do not believe that there is a transcendent meaning to life. For some of them we can give meaning to life, or purpose is understood on biological terms to sustain the organism and reproduce, and so on. There are problems which may arise in the above cases. Certain people might be unable to give a meaning to life because their mind does not simply believe in that meaning which is arbitrary insofar as it originates in a desire, an affect, or a momentary reflection which could be subject to change at later periods of time. Some people might continue to wonder why they bother with a process of perpetual reproduction when that reproduction itself seems without purpose. I'm sure that those who hold the latter view (the biological one) could conclude something like, the ability to ask ourselves the question why? evolved because it enabled humans to consider cause and effect and so achieve a complex understanding of the world and its mechanisms and maximize their effectivity. The desire to ask why? about life in a larger sense is a secondary effect of applying something that was naturally selected for other purposes to something it is not fit for. If such questioning interferes with reproduction it will be selected out of the gene pool. What could then happen is that some people might latch on to irrational beliefs which are then successful because they operate on the level of energy conservation (energy which might have been used in such questioning) as well as something like safety-nets which keep them from ultimate despair. If something like that is the case then they might be latched onto those irrational views out of a sort of personal necessity, rather than purely habit. Just a thought, the analysis of which I think is more in line with understanding the brain in terms of unconscious processes rather than on the level of conscious will.

Sure, descriptively I have no problem with thinking of it that way. Why the brain would favour irrational choices seems more difficult to grasp. It might have to be considered on a case by case basis. The reason I think this is potentially important (the entire subject of the discussion I mean) is because if the brain does operate this way, then when considering that old philosophical injuction "Know Thyself" would imply knowing something about brain functions so that we can understand the 'irrational' side of our behaviour, so as hopefully to better guide it.

Interesting. I'm sure you're right about the depression part.

If the income is unconditional, can I choose not to work?

As regards the first part, that was the subject of my initial post. When a thought, impulse, reaction, or affect arises in the consciousness, we were not consciously aware or consciously anticipating what that thought, impulse, reaction, or affect was. If we were consciously aware or in anticipation, that conscious awareness itself have to already have had to arisen from a point of unconsciousness. An analogous situation is one of memories. You most likely have many memories about your past, but at any given moment you are not conscious of them, but when one arises in the consciousness it has been activated to arise. If this is the case, I still think it is possible that certain people ignore rational arguments because the processes taking place in their brain is for whatever reason rejecting it. Why processes would do that is beyond the scope of what I can glean from pure reason. But psychological studies are being conducted all the time which show the reasons for people's reactions. In fact many psychological studies would indicate that what I'm saying isn't that far fetched. The fact that people are influenced for example by things that are not fully conscious of (for example the prestigue of speakers, or group pressures) show that there is a strong influence of unconscious forces. The final remark, whether people want unconscious forces to blame out of comfort is neither here nor there, some people might wish it, some might not. But the purpose of this discussion is to come to a conclusion of what is the case and not necessarily to take comfort of it. I mean, some physicists or evolutionary biologists might take comfort in knowing that the doctrines of Christianity are not true, does that make their studies therefore unfounded?