Pembroke

This is the part of what you said that I understood, but I think it may have larger consequences than you seem to be acknowledging. I may be wrong on that, we can discuss it if you like. I also agree that our unconscious impulses can be controlled. I usually use the word activated, but that's not really important. I also agree that it is absurd to think of our unconsciousness and us as separate. But the problem I have is this. If our conscious thoughts arise from the unconsciousness already decided by those processes, then the programming which we do isn't completely in conscious control. (I don't say that it is not within our control.) The desire or impulse to actually change our minds has to already be activated on an unconscious level. I do think that this can happen, for example if we encounter influences in the environment, or if our unconscious mind is already contemplative so that, in consideration it doubles back on itself (self-consciousness) thus making a decision, but the heart of the problem I am indicating is this: When people generally consider free will on the level of consciousness, they are relating it to our conscious operations, which includes things like conscious perception, and listening to reasoned arguments, etc. but there is not guarantee that those things will influence an unconscious process. Through studies in psychology, certain triggers are discovered which, on average, activates the behaviour of most or many people in a certain way, and so we could say that our wills can be influenced through those triggers, but it is less certain that we can be influenced through perception of things we think are rational, or through the arguments of rational people. I think that latter claim (about rational arguments) holds up to observation, haven't you in the past seen people ignoring rational arguments and wondered why? I see that you've lost your existential angst through reason. I mean, I can't debate with you on your own experience, I think that would be absurd because you know your experience better than I have. If it was reasoning with yourself, I think that is possible as I said above... I just think that such self-reasoning might not be infallible for all people, simply because we don't really understand the process of it. If someone reasons with themselves, comes to a rational conclusion, and the mind does not ultimately follow it, there could be some deeper reason that the individual isn't fully conscious of but which continues to activate the impulses of the mind. And I think that is one of the "problems" of our free will originating in unconscious mental processes rather than entirely in the conscious mind as it is generally conceived. By saying it is a problem, I am not saying that we can or should therefore ignore the truth, by a problem I only mean that the way people generally have conceived of influencing their behaviour is likely to be flawed or incomplete. I think that what I said directly above about angst can be applied to the rest of the things like phobias and eating habits and so on. If I would give a personal example, I used to bite my nails, and it seemed like by an act of pure conscious will I decided to stop doing that and haven't since, but I am still unsure that such conscious decisions are the whole story of why we do things we do.

I didn't say that we are different from the unconscious processes in our brains. I outlined a distinction between a conception of intention as arising from a conscious decision on the one hand, and an unconscious process which does the calculation (in a metaphorical sense) and outputs the decision to our conscious mind. In regards to the second part, I do think there is an issue which arises if what we consider to be our conscious will is in reality formed on this latent level, which is that we cannot be sure of the decisions which arise to us, or in a conscious control of that decision-making process. You put the issue on the level of wanting (something like desire), but the wanting (on whatever level, conscious or unconscious) does not necessarily make the thing desired or sought after good for us. The further problem is this: if (and I think they are) our natural reactions (or affective responses) are determined by unconscious processes, there can be no guarantee that we will choose what is good over what we know (even consciously) to be bad. An example, if one knows that continuously eating things which are high in fats or sugars and not exercising will result in ill health, if the impulse which causes us to ultimately make the choice operates on an unconscious level, there may arise a disconnect between our knowledge and the effective ability to choose something different. The essence of that example can be related to a number of different instances. For example, one might garner information from evolutionary psychology that human intelligence has evolved for the purpose of effectively navigating the world so that we can sustain organic selves and reproduce, but nonetheless engage in activity which leads finally to the decay of the organism without reproduction because one wishes to enjoy some pleasure. One coud potentially engineer a sort of environment using ideas from behaviourist operant conditioning (to be extremely simplistic) which leads such people towards self-sustaining and reproductive behaviour, but doing so would be engaging with people on the level of unconscious processes rather than consciousness which is the level which people generally consider free will. To be clear, I understood what you were saying and on one level I can agree with it, the only reason I take issue with it is because when you say there is no conflict with free will, I think you are redefining what people generally think of as free will when you place the will on the level of unconscious processes rather than in consciousness, which is how people generally conceive of free will. **Edit: I just want to add something here to clarify, as a sort of problem that hopefully we can try to work through together (anyone here): Let's say I felt a sense of ennui, existential angst, or something like that. If I wanted to feel satisfied with the world as it is - perhaps I had listened to some scientist speaking who said that asking if there is a meaning to life in an objective sense is a meaningless question, so all there is are natural processes. Say I would then understand or believe that, but the sense of ennui or existential angst continues. On a conscious level, I want (referring to what Bender said above) to accept this fact and simply act in life according to it, but though I do not understand the feeling, the sense of ennui or angst continues to rise to my consciousness. Is there not then a conflict between free will as it is generally understood (the ability to decide our fate) and the process in our brain which causes us to react, and potentially even act (let's say, for example, I further engage in activity to assuage the feeling of ennui or angst, despite knowing consciously they are meaningless, futile, or potentially harmful)?

Can you please expand on that question? I'm not sure what you're asking. I'm also not sure how religion came into the discussion.

Okay, I would like to know more about why you think that so I can get a better understanding. Do you have any comments about the examples I gave in my original post in this thread? I'm also wondering if you think it that evidence could possibly found through studies in psychology?

Well, I suppose if one were certain about the thing, it might be a difference how we conceptualize certain questions about what people are doing and about the universe in general. It would have a bearing on the answer of, to what degree are my thoughts and my actions (and other people's) related to the natural world? I don't really believe in a "meaning of life" in a transcendant sense. What I generally think of meaning in terms of relations and context. I think that free will being an illusion (and the will having a sort of pre-conscious/natural basis) would affect how I look at history for example, and maybe what is possible, or how humans work (questions concerning psychology I guess). When I think philosophically I am asking things more like "what is?". Sorry if this doesn't answer what you're looking for. You can rephrase it if you're thinking of something else.

Hey, I'm just wondering, was this part to me? Because I don't think I'm conflating the meaning of life with free will, I just think that free will is relevant when considering the meaning of life. You said: But what I was trying to get at is, if we don't possess free will (which I tried to keep open as a question), then to what degree are we truly giving life a meaning. What I mean by the latter is, if we don't have free will, in what sense is the thing giving truly us and not rather some natural process which is something like our precondition? I'm not sure that I understand your response, sorry. I wasn't implying that we do something like deconstruct meaning when I said we could ask what is going on. What I meant by asking what is going on (which I admit is itself a vague sort of phrasing) is that we study the natural world history as a natural process rather than a consciously intentioned process (meaning that historical actors and even institutions aren't necessarily comprehended by the agents who put them into practice). Regarding treating the construction of meaning as an illusion, I am wondering if you have any responses specifically to what I said about it? It just seemed to me that if what I was saying is true, then conscious agency is an illusion.

I recently watched a debate with Richard Dawkins where he said that asking Why things exist is not a meaningful question if what we mean is their purpose. If anyone can set me right on this I would greatly appreciate it. My interest in this question is, in a manner, existential. As I understand it, asking, "What is the meaning or purpose of this?" need not be to seek a conscious intelligence (a god) which imbues things with a reason. As far as I can see, purpose is a human construct, related to intention. I suppose my next question is, "Why do I, as a human, intend things?" It seems that I am speaking about the conscious perception of chosen intention (in terms of agency) — I am not sure if it is relevant to ask if, for example, a dog has the same kind of agency when it chooses to eat. I then begin to wonder, to what extent do I make choices? If I chose to write the letter x: x (so), to what extent is that action and intention active in me? Just before I wrote the sentence which led to x, the idea sprung into my mind, but from where did it spring, because before I was aware of the intention, I had no such intention. What I am trying to get at is that, when we say that purpose (in this sense of intending things by our actions) is a human construct, it seems that we are saying that purpose is something that humans give to things. As dimreepr said: but what I was trying to indicate above (in my discussion about writing x) is that it does not seem clear to what extent our intentions are consciously chosen. To re-iterate with another example: Let's say I thought, I will get up from my chair right now and jump once. Then I think, I will not spontaneously above this thought, because I have agency. What I am still left wondering is, from where does that re-thinking of my agency arise, because the consciousness of the notion in me was not present before its arising from a pre-conscious place. If I am to any degree on to something, what I then wonder is whether the whole question of meaning and purpose cannot be reformulated. If intention does not arise from a point of consciousness in me, then it arises from some natural functioning of my brain, which in turn arose from a long natural process which pre-dates the human species. We could do one of two things: reorient the question about purpose to simply ask what is going on (both externally to and intentially within the human) or else remove the category of purpose from human action except as something like a convenient metaphor or an illusion. Any thoughts on this? Am I misguided in some way which isn't readily apparent to me?