Reg Prescott

@ Ophiolite I've numbered the sections of your post for convenience. (0) Firstly, I was quite clear in my previous post, I believe, that I wanted Phi for All to provide examples (examples, mind you, not example); not you or anyone else. It was, after all, he who made the accusation. (1) I've never used the word "conspiracy", nor do I believe it is implied by my use of the word "rally". To rally together in order to help a friend, as far as I can see at least, holds no connotations of conspiracy; an altogether more sinister proposition. You're manipulating words, I'm afraid; one thing you accused me of earlier. One might even be forgiven for thinking that you're now attempting to add mental illness to my litany of sins. So, no, your putative example of my making stuff up fails. Furthermore, it seems to me quite irrelevant to Phi's original accusation which has nothing to do with inventing motives, as far I can see. (2) What's so difficult about saying I don't know enough to answer a question? Nothing! I have done so. If you want links, just ask. Meanwhile, your comments regarding competence are just plain silly. At times, other members will introduce a sub-topic the OP knows little or nothing about. When it happens to me, I say so. Surely members cannot be expected to be competent in all domains? If I'm to hang for lack of omnicompetence we'll all hang together. All of this, of course, has nothing to do with my "making stuff up". Someone playing your own logical fallacy game might refer to this as a red herring. (3) Asking about things I don't know enough of? I've done this too. Links available upon request. Once more, this is irrelevant to the charges of my making stuff up. Another red herring. (4) Now, I've no doubt there is such a thing as a logical fallacy, but with respect to some threads and some members here, it seems to me the logical fallacy thing is better described as a tactic, a game, if you will. It's a tactic that could potentially be adopted against any post. What happens in reality is that certain members play the game against posters whose content they find objectionable (Creationism or whatever) in an effort to belittle and discredit, and refrain from playing it against anyone they consider a friend. It could nonetheless be played against anyone -- as you've been doing to me and I'm doing against you right now. Just my humble analysis, and I don't expect anyone to admit as much. Ask yourselves late at night tonight, though, when you're alone. On the other hand, it may just be another symptom of my mental illness. Readers may judge for themselves. By the way, inasmuch as this also has nothing to do with my making stuff up, chalk up another red herring. That makes three. (5) re insults. A quick glance at your post# 46 in my "Popper, Confirmation..." thread yields the following. I am apparently: "supercilious" "arrogant" "a passive-aggressive ******* " (this one is left to the imagination) I'm inclined to think most of us would feel insulted if addressed in this way. Once again readers will have to judge for themselves. Meanwhile, Ophiolite, I challenge you to produce one insulting term I've used against you. Just one. I'm fairly certain you won't find any. And never mind the spiel about "insulting your intelligence". It's lame and I think you know it. Zapatos said : "When you find yourself in a position where most people you are talking to think you are in the wrong, you may want to at least consider the possibility that you are indeed wrong." Respectfully, sir. I do. Finally, to all: I don't like this at all. I don't want this. I simply want to learn from, and perhaps contribute to, the community. But for as long as I'm allowed to speak, I will challenge all attempts to besmirch my character. Colin

@ Phi for All In your post #43 of this thread you -- wrongly -- accused me of "making stuff up". My immediate response was: "Since you mentioned it, can you give us a few examples of stuff that I've "made up"? On a site like this, aren't members expected to support their claims?" (post 44) You failed to offer any support for your accusation in your next post (48), so I brought the matter to your attention again (post 51). You evaded the issue again (post 52), focussing instead on the pain that my ignorance causes you. I raised the matter for a third time (post 53) and you have evaded it yet again. During the meantime, quite predictably, the usual jackals that I'm not even addressing took a nip here and a bite there, while hammering away at their respective +1 and -1 rep points, as if justice can be determined through sheer force of numbers. I'm addressing you, Phi. Your conduct is unconscionable. I now request for a fourth time that you either support your accusation, or retract it with an apology. I submit to all the reason Phi for All has dodged his responsibility is very simple: I don't make stuff up, at least not in any sense that implies wrongdoing. My foibles are many. Like all the rest of you, I get confused on a regular basis, I'm often wrong, I screw up; but I am not a fabricator of facts. Those who know me well regard me as a very honest man, sometimes too honest for my own good. If attempting to clear my name results in the termination of my membership here, so be it. My conscience, at least, will rest easy. Ophiolite, another member who has insulted me on numerous occasions, chooses to characterize it, in yet another attempt at belittlement, as "crying" and "playing the martyr", among other things. He can call it what he likes; nonetheless I will not allow my character to be impugned. Here are some of your options, Phi: (i) Continue to evade your responsibility (ii) Construct a paper tiger. Build a case that I do make stuff up, but you'll only succeed by trivializing the idea of making stuff up. For example, in the sense that my posts are, by and large, generated through my own thought processes, and not through copying and pasting, say, then I do indeed make stuff up. But then so does everyone else. (iii) Silence me (iv) Do the right thing I'd also point out this is not the first time I've been falsely accused by a moderator, and objected. A similar incident, though less egregious than the present one, occurred only a few days ago. The moderator in that instance (hypervalent_iodine) also lacked the integrity to admit his mistake, choosing silence instead. See posts 216 & 222 in the thread entitled "Is Religion Being Picked On" for details. Those in charge take note. Is this really the kind of site you want?

That's a question only you can answer. Now, you can sigh all you like, despair at my ignorance, celebrate your own enlightenment, and seek refuge in sarcasm if it makes you feel better. I'd still like you to support your allegation about me "making stuff up", though. Do that now, please.

Now, I don't want to be impolite to anyone, but Phi, I feel compelled to respond as you're not only attempting to discredit me, but your own response is simply nonsensical. Let's examine it: (1) You didn't even ask a question! Here's what you said again: It's truly amazing how you can glean all that from people disagreeing with your ideas, showing you exactly why they disagree with your ideas, and asking you to maintain the same rigor in your replies instead of guessing and making stuff up. (2) I did not "attack" anything! I responded with an offer. An offer cannot possibly constitute an attack. Here are examples of offers: Would you like me to open the window? Can I offer you some whisky? Would you like me to compile a list? Here's an example of an attack: Your claim that President Smith is a good man is untrue, and here's why... An offer is not even a candidate for an attack. An offer is not in the attacking business. Your strawman accusation, therefore, is incoherent. (3) Yes, like you asserting that I "make stuff up". I explicitly asked you to provide examples to support your allegation. You didn't. Why not examine your own rigor and critical skills before advancing nonsensical, incoherent, and untrue slurs on mine.

Once again I find myself in the same unenviable predicament that my investigation of evidence led to in another thread; to paraphrase : "We'll tell you what is, and what is not, evidence, thank you very much." I have my own qualms regarding the debating technique of certain other members; qualms that I can easily make explicit if anyone cares about such things (which, given my brief time here, I somewhat doubt). Unfortunately it seems that the final word on these matters -- whose arguments are good and whose aren't -- lies in the hands of the very people that I am debating against. You do see a problem, don't you?

Would you like me to compile a list of some of the things I've been called on this site? If so, say the word and I'll get to work immediately. Meanwhile, perhaps you can work on compiling a list of insults I've hurled at other members. Your list will be shorter than mine. Edit : P.S. Since you mentioned it, can you give us a few examples of stuff that I've "made up"? On a site like this, aren't members expected to support their claims?

If no one feels offended or angry or threatened by evobulgarevo -- a masquerade that some unoffendable members seem determined to uphold -- I'm wondering how to explain his ever-growing and prodigious pile of -1 you're-a-bad-boy rep points, which, although hasn't yet attained the dizzying heights of my own, is beginning to cause me some concern over the possibility of being usurped from the diabolical throne. Just a few words to the rotten new kid on the block then... I had to go through exactly the same song-and-terpsichore when I first joined the site a couple of months ago, evo. A significant number of our members ARE -- and never mind their denials to the contrary -- manically suspicious of anyone who speaks a different dialect from their own, and thus embark on a mission to insult, belittle and hopefully silence the upstart dissident. Ten of them will rally together against one, accuse you of evading their questions when you may simply lack the time or competence to address them all, attempt to snow you and dazzle you with technicalities, predictably and formulaically point out putative logical fallacies in your posts (and on this site, by and large, you can read "strawman" as "you're wrong, asshole"), on occasion censor your counterarguments (happened to me recently in another thread), misrepresent -- sometimes grossly -- your own comments, simply assert without support what is the case, or what they take to be the case, and blithely dismiss any evidence you might adduce, when no one, as I've been examining in a thread of my own, seems able to articulate exactly what evidence is -- all we've learned so far is that if scientists say it's evidence then it IS evidence, and vice versa. Evidence by legislative fiat! The good news is, evo, that, to some degree at least, it does get better with time if you make clear that you're sincere about productive discussion, and are not here just to cause trouble. Certain members who were initially hostile to me seem to have warmed somewhat. Some were perfect gentlemen and gentlewomen from the beginning, bless 'em. Others, meanwhile, seem incurably belligerent to anyone, like myself and yourself, not content to simply toe the party line, sing songs of praise, and rehearse the same hoary and often dubious (in my opinion) mantras of the orthodox scientific community. All my attempts at detente remain futile in some quarters; all I can do is ignore those who seem committed to regarding me with contempt no matter what I say or do, and focus on those with whom I can enjoy enlightening dialog within a cordial atmosphere of mutual respect. Erm, welcome!

Q : How do you get a philosopher off your porch? Ans : Pay for the pizza.

I've just one comment to make regarding all the above: “There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination. —Daniel Dennett

Phew! And thanks! The issues you raise are indeed fascinating. How did Newton come by his laws? And how are these laws to be construed: are they empirical discoveries? are they stipulational definitions (i.e. Newton isn't discovering the law, but laying down the law). For example, it seems implausible, to say the least, that Newton came upon his third law by leaning against walls and doors to see if every action force has an equal and opposite reaction force. And is there any difference between an empirical hypothesis/law and an analytic truth (i.e. a definition, such as all bachelors are unmarried men)? Quine, for one, notoriously says no. As I mentioned in my previous post, Nagel's 1961 treatment of the whole issue is magnificent, and I'll be happy to point you to other sources if you'd like to read more on it. These waters are deep! But intriguing. Best regards

There are some fascinating issues to be addressed here, although I'm afraid it may take us away from Georgief's original question (for philosophical analysis of your question about Newton's laws, G, the locus classicus, I believe, is Ernest Nagel's 1961 masterpiece "The Structure of Science" -- a superb read!), and I wouldn't want to derail his/her thread. Just a few brief comments, then, on Swansont's excellent questions... Q1: One answer might be: "No, muons don't follow Newtonian gravity on the grounds that there is no such thing as Newtonian gravity." Similarly, one might respond to a question on whether Dalton's atoms (or unicorns) are affected by such-and-such with: No, on the grounds that Dalton's atoms don't exist; according to our current understanding there is nothing in nature possessing the properties that Dalton attributed to his atoms. Newtonian gravity, according to my layman's understanding (so please be gentle -- I'm not a physicist), is construed, among other things, as an attractive force which acts instantaneously over any distance, apparently with no expenditure of energy, against a backdrop of absolute space and absolute time. Is this correct? If so, I don't think anyone believes in Newtonian gravity these days, do they? Swansont, you stated above "Relativity reduces to Newtonian gravity except in extreme cases". Some might object to this being asserted as an uncontroversial fact; I don't think it is. Questions of reduction in science are complex, require heavy-duty analysis from the philosophy of language, and quickly transcend my own limited competence. There is a concern, though, over so-called incommensurability, and whether Dalton's atomic theory, say, and whatever the current theory is, are both theories about the same thing (atoms), or two theories about different things (which share the name "atom"). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to theories of gravity. Frege-Russell inspired descriptivist theories of reference seem to support the latter conclusion; reference of terms is secured via a description, and inasmuch as nothing satisfies Dalton's description of the atom, it does not refer; there is no such thing as Dalton's atom (or Newtonian gravity). Those wishing to defend inter-theory continuity, on the other hand, can appeal to the Kripke-Putnam inspired causal theory of reference whereby continuity of reference is purportedly secured by means other than a description. I'll reproduce a passage from Larry Laudan at the bottom of this post for everyone's consideration, with apologies once again to Geordief if he/she doesn't want LL cluttering his/her thread. Q2: Not being a physicist (as you well know - pokety-poke), I'm not competent to answer that, nor am I particularly inclined to play "Let's Watch the Non-Physicist Butcher the Physics ". If we can remain at a non-technical level, perhaps we can still enjoy an enlightening discussion of the philosophical issues involved here. Q3: We could talk all day! -- perhaps somewhere else though. I'd just say here, however, as I've said in other places with respect to related concepts such as evidence and the so-called Scientific Method, anyone who thunks there's a simple answer to this question should probably thunk again. Now, as promised, here's Laudan... QUOTE "There is a deep reason why the convergent realist is wrong about these matters [cumulationist or retentionist construals of science]. It has to do, in part, with the role of ontological frameworks in science and with the nature of limiting case relations. As scientists use the term 'limiting case', T1 can be a limiting case of T2 only if (a) all the variables (observable and theoretical) assigned a value in T1 are assigned a value by T2 and (b) the values assigned to every variable of T1 are the same as, or very close to, the values T2 assigns to the corresponding variable when certain initial and boundary conditions -consistent with T2 *** (see below) - are specified. This seems to require that T1 can be a limiting case of T2 only if all the entities postulated by T1 occur in the ontology of T2. Whenever there is a change of ontology accompanying a theory transition such that T2 (when conjoined with suitable initial and boundary conditions) fails to capture T1's ontology, then T1 cannot be a limiting case of T2. Even where the ontologies of T1 and T2 overlap appropriately (i.e., where T2's ontology embraces all of T1's), T1 is a limiting case of T2 only if all the laws of T1 can be derived from T2, given appropriate limiting conditions. It is important to stress that both these conditions (among others) must be satisfied before one theory can be a limiting case of another. Where 'closet positivists' might be content with capturing only the formal mathematical relations or only the observable consequences of T1 within a successor, T2, any genuine realist must insist that T1's underlying ontology is preserved in T2's, for it is that ontology above all which he alleges to be approximately true." "Too often, philosophers (and physicists) infer the existence of a limiting case relation between T1 and T2 on substantially less than this. For instance, many writers have claimed one theory to be a limiting case of another when only some, but not all, of the laws of the former are 'derivable' from the latter. In other cases, one theory has been said to be a limiting case of a successor when the mathematical laws of the former find homologies in the latter but where the former's ontology is not fully extractable from the latter's." "Consider one prominent example which has often been misdescribed, namely, the transition from the classical aether theory to relativistic and quantum mechanics. It can, of course, be shown that some 'laws' of classical mechanics are limiting cases of relativistic mechanics. But there are other laws and general assertions made by the classical theory (e.g., claims about the density and fine structure of the aether, general laws about the character of the interaction between aether and matter, models and mechanisms detailing the compressibility of the aether) which could not conceivably be limiting cases of modem mechanics. The reason is a simple one: a theory cannot assign values to a variable which does not occur in that theory's language (or, more colloquially, it cannot assign properties to entities whose existence it does not countenance). Classical aether physics contained a number of postulated mechanisms for dealing inter alia with the transmission of light through the aether. Such mechanisms could not possibly appear in a successor theory like the special theory of relativity which denies the very existence of an aetherial medium and which accomplishes the explanatory tasks performed by the aether via very different mechanisms." *** above {This matter of limiting conditions consistent with the 'reducing' theory is curious. Some of the best-known expositions of limiting case relations depend (as Krajewski has observed) upon showing an earlier theory to be a limiting case of a later theory only by adopting limiting assumptions explicitly denied by the later theory. For instance, several standard textbook discussions present (a portion of) classical mechanics as a limiting case of special relativity, provided c approaches infinity. But special relativity is committed to the claim that c is a constant. Is there not something suspicious about a 'derivation' of T1 from a T2 which essentially involves an assumption inconsistent with T2? If T2 is correct, then it forbids the adoption of a premise commonly used to derive T1 as a limiting case. (It should be noted that most such proofs can be re-formulated unobjectionably, e.g., in the relativity case, by letting v --> 0 rather than c --> ∞.) } UNQUOTE

Yes, it does. It works very well in day-to-day situations.... for medium-sized durable objects like, say, us. It doesn't work so well in day-to-day situations for, say, muons. Aren't we being a little anthropocentric here? If your claim is that Newton produced an extremely useful rule of thumb for us, you'll hear no argument. But I thought we were discussing a law here? Also, both yourself and Swansont are failing to distinguish between getting something right, and producing something that works. Plolemaic cosmology -- with a static Earth and spinning heavens -- works perfectly well if you want to navigate around the world. I don't think we'd want to say Plolemy got it right (or almost right), though, would we?

No. One's epistemic context is irrelevant to the question of whether one is right or wrong. You may have the best reasons in the world for believing X, but if X is not true, you're wrong. We can all agree Newton and his contemporaries had good reasons for thinking he had "got it right". Nonetheless he was wrong.

Geordief, you are quite correct. Newton did indeed get it wrong, assuming we take a law to be that which holds in all times and all places. Otherwise we end up having to countenance absurdities like "It's a law that it never snows... erm, as long as you stay in Singapore." Another member posted above: "Based on what was known at the time he got it right", implying the law was true in the 17th or 18th century, but no longer true, which really doesn't make much sense at all. It was not true then, and it's not true now. Generally I find scientists very reluctant to concede that their forebears were wrong, preferring circumlocutions like "... he was almost right". Newton was a genius; he needs no defense. There's no disgrace in being wrong. Let's not be coy, I say.

Agreed! The term is notoriously ambiguous. Do we mean (i) what's out there, i.e. reality (shudder!), or (ii) our statements or reports of what's supposed to be out there. Granting a realist attitude on these matters, I think we can say the statement must be either true or false, regardless of whether we can know which. Put another way, one of the statements -- "all even numbers greater than or equal to 4 are the sum of two primes" and "not all even numbers greater than or equal to 4 are the sum of two primes" -- is a fact. I think you'll find, though, that certain contemporary antirealists such as Michael Dummett, for example, opt for a third conclusion: insofar as it defies verification the Goldbach conjecture is neither true nor false, but indeterminate. In other words, there is no fact of the matter, counterintuitive though this probably strikes most of us. I might, of course, be misreading him. (He's hard to understand ) We see parallels here with orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretations of quantum physics, and the abhorrence thereof aroused in realists such as Einstein. Does the photon pass through the right slit or the left slit? Einstein the realist insists it must be one or the other, even if we don't or can't know which one. On the other hand, Bohr, with his positivist-inspired antirealist leanings, tells us the answer is indeterminate; the question is ill formed. To emphasize, on Bohr's account, it's not just our knowledge that hangs in limbo, but reality itself. Once again, there is no fact of the matter... ... assuming I'm not confused again

Congrats, ydoaPs! This thread addresses a very important issue. In many posts throughout the site, I've noticed a rather (philosophically) naive view to the effect that, while theories may come and go, facts are somehow untainted; facts are simply given to us; we bring nothing to the encounter; facts are pristine, so to speak, and thus quite immutable and separate from theory. To encapsulate this view: "We might draw different conclusions from them but we can all agree on the facts". Your comments on the theory-ladenness of observation (i.e. facts) belie this untenable (I believe) view. Is it a duck or is it a rabbit? I look forward to watching this thread progress.

Great idea for a thread, ydoaPs! I thoroughly enjoyed your reading your lengthy and well considered remarks in your "sister" thread, and look forward to watching it develop. I've had the pleasure of discussing certain topics with ajb since joining the site, and almost responded to his quote above myself, wondering if he's prepared to accept (what I take as) the counterintuitive implications of his own philosophy. I hope you won't mind me adding a few remarks here. Firstly, in a recent thread of my own, I was quite fascinated to discover the prevalence of antirealist sentiment among our members. The contributing members were almost all physicists, as far as I can tell, a domain where the kind of verificationist ontology, influenced by positivist philosophy, and by extension, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, does indeed hold sway. Those members, however, seemed committed to the view that all of science is like that; a claim I find implausible, but quite willing to be proven wrong. I'd be very surprised if, say, geologists or evolutionary biologists, endorse the same philosophy, viz., that the only reality is that of the observational consequences of their models, and that quarks et al (assuming they are unobservable) are therefore not real, or else the question of their reality is moot.. Surely few, if any, geologists hold that unobservable theoretical entities such as tectonic plates (if they indeed are considered to be such entities) should be denied bona fide ontological standing. Secondly, I'd like to put the question to ajb: Your philosophy seems to imply there are no verification-transcendent truths. That is to say, only that which can be verified or measured can be considered real, and statements regarding that which is unmeasurable or unverifiable are indeterminate -- they have no truth value. If we can't know about something, or at least garner certain evidence to bear upon it one way or the other, then it's not real. Take a standard philosophers' example such as the question of what Napoleon ate for breakfast before getting his hands dirty (one of them anyway) at Waterloo. Presumably this question transcends any possible means of verification or measurement. Would you then hold, ajb, as I believe your philosophy implies, that the question has no answer?

All and sundry are having a ball pointing out (what they take to be) Jagella's strawmen and logical fallacies. But when I respond to another member's strawman attack (comparing a friend of mine to a witch burner! - how nice and how unstrawlike is that?), my post is removed, with no mod explanation as far as I can see, and the following warning is issued: SillyBilly, you have been asked before to lay off the evolution/creationism line. We're not going to keep reminding you. (post 216) To which I reply: I don't recall being "asked before". Perhaps there has been a mistake. Can you please show me where I've been asked before? @ John Cuthber, who said (post 215) : "Heretic! It's right there in the Bible that she must do that" (responding to the post of mine that was removed). Answer : My friend isn't even Christian, John. Jumping to conclusions is a logical fallacy. Now, firmly on topic, please note: Is religion being picked on? Yes!

The point, I suppose, John, is that people tend not to think their own beliefs are crazy. One man's reductio ad absurdum is another man's confirmation.

@ Phi For All A couple of thoughts on your post above: (1). Certainly you raise a good a point that we should distinguish between what we might call (i) epistemic reasons for belief, and (ii) non-epistemic reasons for belief. Perhaps the latter might be identified with practical reasons for belief. I'd say it's also uncontroversial that scientists, by and large, are concerned only with the former. With the religious, I think you'll find both kinds, or a combination thereof. A close friend of mine, for example, believes in God largely because, given certain unfortunate circumstances in her own life, belief in God is helpful to her. She candidly admits as much too. This kind of reason for belief is clearly of the non-epistemic variety. It's simply not true, however, to suggest that large numbers of religious believers do not invoke epistemic reasons to support their beliefs. Now you might not find their reasons compelling, but they are nonetheless appealing to rational argument and not emotion. (2). The loquacious pooch example seems inappropriate to me. A demonstration of said mongrel's Gallic verbosity would constitute proof of your claim. What's relevant to our present discussion, I believe, is the question of epistemic warrant -- evidence, if you like; i.e., that which can support a claim in the absence of a conclusive demonstration -- not proof. There is no proof of either general scientific theories or the existence of God. Barring a demonstration (i.e. proof), the only evidence I would have for your dog's French fluency is your own testimony; evidence that certainly wouldn't persuade me given the implausibility of the claim, and I daresay would not convince very many religious believers either. In short then, no, I would not take it on faith that your dog speaks French, and I don't imagine many religious people are of such a woeful degree of gullibility that they would either. But once again, this is easily tested: ask them! We might also wonder what the point of the comparison is: that belief in God is as ridiculous as belief in a French-speaking dog on the grounds that one stranger says so? If so, I'd say it's insulting in the extreme. If not, we must ask: what is the point of the comparison? (3). As for your comment: "... [religion] seems very much more liable to feelings of persecution and ridicule..." I respectfully disagree. Speaking merely as an outsider peering through the window, with no particular allegiance to either clan, I find the scientific community to be every bit as conservative, biased, tribalistic, defensive, and hostile to criticism (watch how many -1 rep points I earn for this post) as the religious can be. This is, of course, my personal opinion. Others will doubtless demur. When one is part of a group, one tends not to see oneself as outsiders do. Edit P.S. - The obvious exception to all I've said in (1) above is evolutionary theory. Certain scientists and science followers not only get emotional at any hint that the theory might be flawed, but positively livid. It's clearly a matter of great importance to them that the theory be more or less true. And wanting something to be true is surely not conducive to epistemic objectivity.

Ignoring the ad hominen, and with apologies for not finding obvious what you apparently did, let's now take "reason" to mean rational thought. What exactly is your claim: All belief in God is supported by nothing more than appeals to emotion? There are no religious apologists who defend their beliefs with rational argument? (Clearly false) Some religious apologists do not defend their beliefs with rational argument? (Trivially true and entirely uncontroversial) Or what?

Now I'm really confused. Can you explain a little more, Moth? The point I was trying to make in the Allegory of the Laura is that it's at once futile and inconsistent for any science apologist to dismiss the putative evidence adduced by the religious as not up to standard if no such evidence (i.e. that which purportedly supports supernatural causes) can be "up to standard".

That's correct. But it misses the point, I believe, that the man who came up with it (Schrödinger) was attempting to highlight the craziness of the opposition's ideas, viz., the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum physics; not his own ideas. The cat thought experiment was presented as a reductio ad absurdum. In other words, Schrödinger was effectively saying: "You guys are crazy; not me".

Not according to any definition I've ever heard. I don't imagine there's a single religious person out there who believes in God or gods for no reason. This is just silly, not to mention condescending. Easily tested though: let's just ask them. Hand up all those who believe in God for no reason? Dictionary.com yields, among others, the following definitions: 2. belief that is not based on proof:He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact. 3. belief in God or in the doctrines or teachings of religion:the firm faith of the Pilgrims. Belief without proof is very different from belief without reason. It might be salutary to point out that scientific theories of a universal nature (i.e. pretty much all of them) are not proven either, but widely believed nonetheless. Now I'm not trying to defend religion or attack science. I'm just trying to be fair. As far as I can see Jagella is a man of integrity trying to do the very same. He should be applauded for his efforts by all those who value justice. Instead, by and large, he gets abused. Go figure! You're doing well, Jagella. Take heart in the fact that you have at least one admirer here.

Today's thrilling episode, ladies and gentlemen, will consist of a sample quote to consider, a definition, three questions for you, dear reader, a travel advisory, and an allegory. Something for all the family. a Quote ---------- "Your evidence is no good. Let us know when you find some actual evidence for God and we might take you seriously." - anon Questions 1 & 2 : Have you ever seen a comment like this on this website? Have you ever made a comment like this yourself? a Definition --------------- Methodological Naturalism (MN) : The principle that science should not invoke the supernatural. Only naturalistic explanations are legitimate; appeal must not be made to divine agency, no matter what is observed. This is a principle to guide the conduct of scientific investigation; it has nothing whatsoever to say about the EXISTENCE of putative supernatural entities such as God. Q3 : Are you a methodological naturalist? a Travel Advisory ---------------------- Earlier this year I had the pleasure of doing a little travelling in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A warning, though, regarding cash for anyone out there planning a trip to the Central Asian republics: US dollars and euros are the most widely accepted currencies, but bring only the the most recent edition banknotes in pristine condition, or as close to as possible. Don't even bend them! The moneychangers, and even the banks there, are notoriously picky. Any banknote not meeting their lofty standards is likely to be tossed unceremoniously straight back at you. A Story : "Bishkek Blues" ------------------------------- It's Laura's first day in Bishkek, and she needs Kyrgyzstani som. Fortunately there are several moneychangers close to her hotel, so she sets off armed with a wad of American greenbacks. "Honest Bob's" is the first moneychanger's she walks into, where she explains that she'd like to convert USD to KGS. Before even reaching into her purse, however, she's told: "Sorry, miss. We don't accept American dollars here. Euros, Sterling, and Rubles are fine. If dollars is all you've got, try Finicky Frank's next door." Slightly disappointed, Laura nonetheless thanks the polite young man and heads next door as advised, noticing as she leaves, a sign on the wall announcing, "USD Not Accepted". Next door Frank himself greets her, confirms that he does indeed accept American currency, and asks to see the banknotes. Laura hands over five one-hundred dollar bills for examination. "Your money's no good. Come back when you've got some decent dollars." Decent dollars? What could Frank possibly mean, wonders Laura. Frank explains: "Your banknotes are both old and crumpled. We have high standards here. We can't accept rubbish like this. If you come back with latest edition American banknotes in good condition perhaps we can do business. Just like that old geezer over there is doing right now." Laura, although none too impressed with Frank's attitude, observes that there is indeed an "old geezer" at the counter being issued local currency in exchange for his well-looked-after and youthful greenbacks. Frank at least is a man of his word, even if his manners leave something to be desired. The third moneychanger's Laura walks into is MN Enterprises. Once again, Laura explains she'd like to exchange US dollars for local som. The clerk asks to see the bills. After a cursory examination, he shakes his head and frowns: "Your money's no good. Come back when you've got some decent dollars." Our hapless heroine will come to learn that this is a familiar tune indeed throughout the Central Asian republics! A dejected Laura stuffs her unwanted cash back in her purse, and as she walks towards the door, a sign on the wall catches her eye, "USD Not Accepted". Laura raises an eyebrow... "Why did he ask to see my banknotes, as if there was a chance they might be accepted, when it was a foregone conclusion that they would not be?" "Why is he asking me to come back when I've got some decent dollars, as if the fault lies with me for bringing dollar bills that fail to meet certain standards, when dollars of any kind must be rejected as a consequence of his own store's policy?"