Reg Prescott

Now we're entering the realm of absurdity, I'm afraid. I spent many a long frustrating hour in another thread arguing -- alone! -- against a bloodthirsty pack who either explicitly asserted or implicitly endorsed one particular wolf's (patently absurd -- as your remarks above make clear) claims to the effect that science has nothing to do with truth (It's merely concerned with producing models that are empirically adequate, on their account). Doubtless there are scientists whose only concern is generating empirically adequate models (most notably in quantum physics) with nary a care if their theories are true or not, but to advance this claim on behalf of all scientists in all times, places and disciplines is manifestly preposterous. Take a look for yourself (see post # 66 for a summary of the objectionable claims) http://www.scienceforums.net/topic/91338-scientific-testing-split-from-goal-of-science/page-1 Also, ydoaPs, you misrepresent me: I am not defending Popper's views. What I am doing is exposing deep confusions on issues such as evidence, the aims of science, the Scientific Method, etc., etc. Time and time again one member asserts in no uncertain terms what these things are -- as if there exists universal consensus on these matters and he could not possibly be wrong -- only to be flatly contradicted in another time and place by another member. John Cuthber did precisely this with his claim -- "Science has a very clear agenda- finding out what is supported by evidence" (see post 1 above). I'm pointing out that not everyone agrees; the agenda of science is anything but "clear". Popper and his followers claim the exact opposite: what distinguishes good science is amenability to falsification, not verification. On this account, if it's not falsifiable, it's not scientific. (Swansont, for one, apparently adds his personal imprimatur to the Popperian agenda with the following comments from post# 35 of the "Is Religion Being Picked On?" thread : "That's the problem, though. *Everything* is evidence for a supreme being. It's not a falsifiable proposition. Makes for weak prediction, too, except in very vague terms. Which is why it's not unfair to exclude it. It sucks at doing that job." The God theory, then, insofar as it lends itself only to verification but not falsification, "sucks") And you, ydoaPs, have just provided us with yet another example. Why not first tell the hooligans in that thread I linked above that your considered opinion is that science has a great deal to do with truth (see red highlights), and then get back to me. Three things to say about that: 1. The lexicographer is an empirical scientist who reports on how words are used. It is not his duty to provide a philosophical explication of terms such as evidence. You're putting the cart before the horse, I'm afraid. 2. Bizarre or not, that's the claim. And Popper, with his doctrine of falsification as the mark of good science (contra your earlier remarks about verification being so), has been hugely influential among scientists. I'm afraid you'll have to live with the fact that not everyone agrees with your characterization of the agenda of science. Here's your claim again to remind you (see post 1 above) : Science has a very clear agenda- finding out what is supported by evidence. You did say "supported by evidence", right? Not "falsified by evidence". 3. Well, bully for you. I'll pray for enlightenment.

I'm not arguing anything. I'm asking John to clear up what appears to be a problem for his claims. (was it evidence or not?) Several problems actually. He hasn't addressed any of them yet. Re your final remark. Please point out where I've been irrational. If you can't, why the insinuation of irrationality on my part?

This seems like another non sequitur, John. Theories of God are not examined in a judicial court. Neither are theories of science. Why the double standard? And which "point" exactly are you referring to? I don't believe the validity of any of the points I've raised depends on the existence of God being provable in a courtroom. Why not address them one by one?

Jagella, getting back to your opening post... I'm not a Creationist. I'm not religious at all, and not even particularly sympathetic to their agenda. I would say this though: There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that their views ARE treated unfairly by the scientific community and her devotees. Kudos to yourself, Jagella, for drawing attention to the issue. I'm a United fan myself. But if in order to secure victory against City, United must resort to unscrupulous tactics, I'll boo them off the park every time. It's disheartening to see over and over again, on Internet forums such as this one and elsewhere, Creationist critiques of evolutionary theory routinely dismissed, often without any analysis, as "not good science". We're never told exactly what the criteria for "good science" are, alas, otherwise these pesky Creationists, you, me, Peter, Paul, and Mary might ascertain these things for ourselves objectively without having to appeal to the soi disant "good science" guru for arbitration. We're not told what the criteria are for good reason: several centuries of attempts to demarcate good science from non-science, pseudoscience, metaphysics, bad science, or whatever have not succeeded. There is no universally agreed upon set of criteria for what constitutes good science. I also suspect that if precisely the same critiques -- irreducible complexity, say -- were leveled by Stephen Jay Gould rather than some fellah from the Discovery Institute, no doubt some in the science community would challenge the critiques, but no one would tell SJG he's not doing good science. Here's a link to a very relevant essay, “Science at the Bar—Causes for Concern”, by Larry Laudan that you and others might enjoy, Jagella, if you're not already familiar with it. http://faculty.washington.edu/lynnhank/Laudan.pdf

On the subject of evidence, readers might like to consider, for example, the argument from design. Design -- or apparent design, if you prefer -- in nature is regarded these days, by those of a more scientific persuasion at least, as evidence supporting the theory of natural selection. But for centuries prior to Darwin the very same observation (design) was seen as powerful evidence for the existence of a designer -- yes, by scientists too! So what are we to say about all this: (i) The appearance of design in nature still constitutes evidence for the Designer (God) theory, but the same observations now confirm the natural selection theory to an even higher degree. In that case, why is John Cuthber telling us there is NO evidence for God (see posts 15, 20) or (ii) The appearance of design in nature never did constitute evidence for the God theory. It was only taken to be evidence by proponents of the theory. In that case, how can we be sure the putative evidence supporting the theory of natural selection is not in precisely the same boat? i.e. we take it to be evidence but it is, in fact, no such thing.

I'd like to add the following to my previous post: Here's another quote from the link I posted above: "He [Popper], instead, argued that Einstein’s theory was distinguished from those of Marx, Freud, and Adler by its openness to criticism. This provides the key to Popper’s solution to the problem of demarcation." Well, well, well! If openness to criticism is what distinguishes science from the rabble, I'm wondering why I was just assigned another "-1" bad reputation point by a disgruntled reader, giving me a grand total of 26, when all I've done in these forums since joining a few weeks ago is present reasoned arguments, never being abusive to anyone. What also is overlooked by the rabid button pushers is that I'm not even criticizing science; what I criticize is the exaggerated, unjustified, empty, or just plain untrue claims made on behalf of science by her overzealous and ill-informed supporters. Would you rather we try our best to characterize science nicely? Or accurately? If you feel my arguments are flawed, give the reputation button a much needed break and refute them - with reason. Please!

Without meaning to be argumentative, John, I'd say all your claims above might most charitably be described as dubious. (I've numbered them for convenience) (1) The definitions are clear enough? This is news to me. Please share these definitions with us so that those poor beleaguered souls who've spent decades trying to explicate the concept of "evidence" in science, and meeting very little success, might finally rest. It seems to me that "evidence" in science is simply that which people commonly regarded as being involved in the scientific enterprise call evidence. (2) Well, that's one opinion. It's not the opinion of Karl Popper and his followers, though, who renounce inductive confirmation (evidence) altogether; after all, on their account, every Tom Dick and Harry (the Marxist, the Freudian, the Christian, the Muslim, the fan of fortune telling, the alien nut...) with a theory to hawk boasts a mountain of supporting evidence. Have a look at this summary: http://schriftman.wordpress.com/2010/10/22/what-is-science-what-is-pseudoscience-karl-poppers-solution/ "Popper’s emphasis on criticism stems from his rejection of the most straightforward criterion of demarcation, according to which scientific claims are special because they are confirmed by observational evidence and because they explain observations. Kasser explains Popper’s view that pseudosciences, such as astrology, are chock full of appeals to observational evidence. Hence, Popper thought, observation is cheap. It is essentially interpretation of experience in terms of one’s theory. The pseudoscientist finds confirming evidence everywhere (for example, in the many case studies of Freud and Adler). Furthermore, apparent counterevidence can be turned aside or even turned into confirming evidence by a clever pseudoscientist. Freud and Adler had ready explanations for any observational result. For Popper, no evidence falsifies a pseudoscientific claim and almost everything confirms it. As a result, Popper came to see the two standard virtues of scientific theories as explanatory power and confirmation by a large number of instances as closer to being vices than virtues. Fitting the data well is, thus, not the mark of a scientific theory." (3) I don't have a particle accelerator in my basement. Or a Hubble telescope on the roof. How about you? The moral of the story here, boys and girls, is a familiar one. Ask ten people, including scientists themselves, what constitutes scientific evidence and you're likely to get ten different answers. Same goes for the agenda of science, the Scientific Method, and so on, and so forth. Each one is convinced there is a simple (it's clear!) answer to the question. he has it (of course!), and presumably anyone who has a different answer is just plain wrong (duh!). A bit like religion if you think about it.

I suppose the terrible twins have taken quite a flogging. Any unsatiated masochists out there might enjoy "The Twin Earth Chronicles" where you'll find Putnam's original article ("The Meaning of Meaning") as well as reactions -- positive and negative -- to the implications of the thought experiment from a panoply of philosophical bigwigs, Yes, I don't think anyone doubts both Johns are conscious; just that the content of their respective conscious states may not be the same. I should add for clarity that it may well be the case, given the strictures of the Twin Earth scenario, that both Johns' mental states are determined entirely by the physical plumbing; just not by the physical plumbing inside their heads. The environment plays a role too. If we've staggered off topic a little, there are several celebrated philosophical arguments which challenge the putative reducibility of consciousness to physics. The worry is that all attempts at reducing consciousness to physics seem to leave something out. Thomas Nagel's "What's it like to be a Bat" and Frank Jackson's "What Mary Didn't Know" (often known as the Knowledge Argument) are two seminal essays that spring to mind. What follows below is copied from Wiki: The thought experiment was originally proposed by Frank Jackson as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in theneurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous systemthe contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’. [...] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? [4] In other words, Jackson's Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color. The question that Jackson raises is: once she experiences color, does she learn anything new? Ontologically, the following argument is contained in the thought experiment: Premise: Any and every piece of physical knowledge in regard to human color vision has been obtained (by the test subject, Mary) prior to her release from the black-and-white room. She has all the physical knowledge on the subject. Premise: Upon leaving the room and witnessing color first-hand, she obtains new knowledge. Conclusion: There was some knowledge about human color vision she did not have prior to her release. Therefore, not all knowledge is physical knowledge.

I don't think -- and I'm fairly sure Hilary Putnam doesn't either -- that it's remotely likely two people could have physically identical brains. It's a thought experiment purporting to illustrate a conceptual point, viz., the mind (i.e., psychological states or intentional states or mental states or conscious states or whatever you want to call them) is not entirely determined by what's inside the skull. Supposing we grant you neurophysiological omniscience, Andrew, and present you with the severed heads of our hapless heroes, John and Twohn, for examination,you would not be able to tell which one was having thoughts/memories of water (H20) and which was having thoughts/memories of twater (XYZ) immediately prior to decapitation. Would you?

Ok His memories are not copies. I have never mentioned copying. What I have said is: What's inside John and Twohn's heads is physically identical. John and Twohn, however, do not share a common history. Their respective memories, thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. about what they both call water have been caused in a different manner. John's community has had no contact with XYZ; Twohn's community has had no contact with H20. When John desires (what he calls) water, it appears that what he desires -- even though he doesn't know it -- is H20 and not XYZ. Conversely, when Twohn desires (what he calls) water, it appears that what he desires -- even though he doesn't know it -- is XYZ and not H20 By hypothesis, the two of them are physically identical. But the question is: are they psychologically identical? Are their respective desires the same psychological state or different psychological states?

No, I haven't edited it out. See post # 27

Andrew... 1. You said: "what specifically [don't I understand in your post]?" Well, for example, your comment about memories being measurable. I can't understand that. 2. You said : "if xyz is not water chemically, then there is the measurable difference, therefore twohn would be incorrect in calling it water. that could mean that the process involved in creating the copy is not perfect. just because he calls it water doesn't make it water. water is h20, if he's drinking h2s [is this a typo? Do you mean XYZ? I think we could avoid much confusion by inserting XYZ here] and calling it water he's wrong." Well, presumably your twin - Twandrew - on Twin Earth just posted the following: if H20 is not water chemically, then there is the measurable difference, therefore John would be incorrect in calling it water. that could mean that the process involved in creating the copy is not perfect. just because he calls it water doesn't make it water. water is XYZ, if he's drinking h2s [??] and calling it water he's wrong What makes you think you occupy a privileged position on these matters? John thoughts are about his water, i.e., what he calls water (= H20); Twohn's thought are about his water, i.e., what he calls water (= XYZ) Let's suppose that here on Earth, by some fluke the Swahili language also has the word "water" but it refers in Swahili to what we in English call a lion. And I hope we can all agree that water (H20) and lion (with big teeth) are not the same thing. Now, when a Swahili warrior, Kintuba, points to a big, hulking, menacing creature with sharp teeth and cries out "Water!", should we conclude: (i) Kintuba is wrong. (on the grounds that a lion is not water), or (ii) Kintuba is not wrong. His use of the term water is perfectly standard in his linguistic community. And, of course, he's not speaking English. In light of this, review your previous comment once again : "water is h20, if he's drinking h2s and calling it water he's wrong" Compare : Water is H20. If Kintuba is being mauled by a lion and calling it water, he's wrong" 3. You said : "what is meant by superficially indistinguishable? it either is water or it isn't. this isn't a question of perception; water is defined by its physical and chemical properties. as i said above, you're ignoring another possible option: that the process creating these copies is imperfect leading the twin to think that something that isn't water is water." Superficially indistinguishable means indistinguishable without resort to the kind of chemical analysis which only became available after 1600. As for "copying", I can't understand this either. I never mentioned copying. Copying is no part of the thought experiment, at least as far as I can see. Edit P.S. I'm reminded of humorous encounters between speakers of British English and American English.... Nigel: "I'm hungry. Would you be so good as to pick up some chips for me on your way home, old chap?" Chuck : "Sure thing, man" (30 minutes later Chuck arrives home armed with a tube of Pringles) Nigel: "Good God in boots, you barbarian! These aren't chips!!!" Well, who's right and who's wrong?

Sorry, Andrew, I don't understand everything you said above, but I'll try to address the first sentence. You said: "wouldn't "twohn" pick up a glass of "xyz" as you put it and go "ah, water, just as i remember" and not "ah xyz...?" and he wouldn't be wrong in saying this because..." Yes, that's quite correct. But remember when Twohn says water he's -- without knowing it -- talking about XYZ, not H20; he's referring to his water, not ours. Just to remind ourselves, both John and Twohn (who both call themselves John, of course) both use the word water, and neither of them knows the chemical composition of their respective waters -- no one on either planet does (this is the year 1600, remember). From our vantage point, we can see that the substance John calls water is chemically distinguished from that which Twohn calls water; the former is H20 and the latter XYZ. Neither John is wrong when he thinks or talks about his respective water. That's not the question. The question is: Are they entertaining the same thought? Presumably not all psychological states are the same -- a thought/belief/desire about dogs is distinguished from one about kangaroos -- and, presumably, would be instantiated differently too in the brain. Now, with regards water (H20) and twater (XYZ) there are two routes you might take, which I outlined above. You might hold either: (i) Water and twater are different kinds of things. Twohn may use the word water, and his water may be superficially indistinguishable from our water, but it ain't water. (and vice versa: our water isn't the real McCoy to him, even if he doesn't know it), or (ii) H20 and XYZ are both water (anyone's water) -- they're not simply called water, but they are water. If we follow the former path, as Hilary Putnam does, then we have a case where physical identity does not entail mental identity, i.e., what's inside the head is physically identical, but the two Johns (John and Twohn) are in a different psychological state. And the point of all this is that there would then be more to psychological states (i.e. mental states, i.e. consciousness, if you'll allow that latter term to include intentional states which have a propositional content), contra John Cuthber who claims above that "there's nothing to consciousness than a complex arrangement of molecules doing what physics tells them to."

John's memories are of water (= H2O). John has never encountered XYZ. His memories have been caused by encounters with H20. John knows nothing of XYZ. Twohn's memories are of twater (= XYZ). Twohn has never encountered H2O. His memories have been caused by encounters with XYZ. Twohn knows nothing of H20. Agreed? What's between their ears is physically identical - by hypothesis. That part's easy. Now, if you wish to claim water (H20) and twater (XYZ) are the same thing, then you're right; their memories and knowledge are identical. Not only their physical states are identical, but their mental/conscious states are too. Their thoughts are the same. They're both thinking about (or remembering) water, albeit two varieties of water, if you like. (At this point you might want to reflect on fool's gold vs gold - same thing or not? If not, what makes them different? Their chemical structure?) If, on the other hand, you hold that water and twater are different things, then their memories and knowledge are not identical. Their physical states are identical, but their mental/conscious states are not. Their thoughts are different. They're thinking/remembering different things. You said : "but that's not the point. The question is, when they are created and identical, is the copy conscious?" I answered the latter part already: Yes! The copy is conscious! But I think my earlier reflections are very much to the point. Your claim, once again, is that :"there's nothing to consciousness than a complex arrangement of molecules doing what physics tells them to." If the latter of my two options above is appropriate (i.e. XYZ is not water. The Twin Earthlings may call it "water", but it's not.) then there is more to consciousness than "a complex arrangement of...." If the latter of my two options above is appropriate then "a complex arrangement of..." is insufficient to uniquely determine any given conscious intentional state. John and Twohn are physically identical, and they're both conscious, but the content of their conscious intentional states differs. P.S. I should add, finally, that I can claim no expertise in these matters, and I hope I haven't don't too much violence to Prof Putnam's marvellous adventures of the imagination. If in doubt, go to the primary sources.

I can think of two fairly weighty objections that could be raised here: 1. "there's nothing to consciousness than a complex arrangement of molecules doing what physics tells them to" is a claim that consciousness is reducible to physical states, and thereby incurs all the objections associated with reductive physicalism. For example, we'd have to ask next whether you mean each type of conscious state reduces to a physical state, or whether only each token does. If it's the former then each type of conscious state, pain say, reduces to (i.e., is identical with) a physical/neuronal state of the human brain. What, then, do we say of other animals, or extraterrestrials, or even so-called artificial intelligence? Given that their brains -- if they even have one -- are constituted differently, it seems we must conclude they do not, indeed cannot experience pain. If it's the latter, and pain is instantiated differently in your brain and mine (and perhaps even in your own brain at different times), and in animals and supercomputers, then what makes all these states pain? Given that they are not physically identical, in what sense are they the same state? At this point you're probably wanting to scream "They all hurt!!", but that won't do; that's what we're trying to reduce, remember? 2. With regards the physical duplicate of yourself, this brings us to the fascinating Twin Earth thought experiments of Hilary Putnam. Imagine a far off planet which is identical with our own Earth, molecule for molecule (as they like to say), with only one difference: their 'water' although superficially indistinguishable from our own water (H2O), actually has a quite different, and very complex, chemical composition, which we'll call XYZ for short. We both use the word water, of course, but our term refers to H2O, while theirs refers to XYZ. On Twin Earth, there is, of course, a duplicate John Cuthber, who also calls himself John Cuthber, but we'd better call him Twohn Cuthber to avoid confusion. And to thicken the plot even more, let's place ourselves in the year 1600, say, before the chemical composition of water was known. On a particularly hot summer's day here on Earth John thinks, "A drink of water would be nice right now." Meanwhile, on Twin Earth, Twohn, who is equally thirsty, yearns, "A drink of water would be nice right now." Now, by hypothesis, John and Twohn are physically identical. The question we ask next is : But are they also mentally identical? It would appear that their respective thoughts are about different things: John's is about water (H2O); Twohn's is about twater (XYZ). We might say their thoughts have the same narrow content, but not the same wide content. Now, if you buy this argument, we're forced to conclude that the mind isn't (entirely) in the head! Environmental factors are partially constitutive of mental states. Two people can be physically identical but not mentally so. Would John's duplicate be conscious? No doubt. Would he have the same conscious states as our John? Apparently not. And so it would appear that the claim there's nothing to consciousness than a complex arrangement of molecules doing what physics tells them to is no longer sustainable, assuming that consciousness in this context includes intentional states (i.e., those mental states with a content), and not merely the raw feels of phenomenal consciousness.

Interesting post again, Peter, but John Searle (one of my fave dudes), for one, would disagree, and suggest that the above -- often repeated -- misgiving over science's putative inability to deal with consciousness arises from a confusion between different meanings of the terms objective and subjective. The (supposedly confused) claim is that: Science is objective; consciousness is subjective; thus there can be no science of consciousness Science is indeed objective, but epistemically objective. That is, science attempts to get at the fact of the matter, and ideally all investigators will converge on the correct answer. One man's opinion is not as good as any other man's. That water boils at a certain temperature under whatever conditions is not a matter of taste like, say, the merits of red wine vs white wine. Conversely, consciousness is indeed subjective, but ontologically subjective. That is, consciousness exists only insofar as it is experienced by a subject. Your pain, for example, is an ontologically subjective state, hence accessible to only you, and not subject to third person scrutiny. But Searle would respond that there is an epistemically objective answer to questions regarding your pain. It is surely not a matter of opinion whether or not you are in pain; there is a (epistemically objective) fact of the matter. In conclusion, Searle sees no barrier, in principle, to an epistemically objective science of ontologically subjective consciousness. How would you respond to this, Peter?

I don't think that's quite right, Peter, strange though it may sound. The position known as "eliminative materialism" is alive and well, albeit as a minority view. Daniel Dennett, for one, advocates something like this; some have suggested his book "Consciousness Explained" might be more aptly renamed "Consciousness Explained Away". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

Great answer, Peter! - and a humbling reminder too. I've adverted to consciousness before in conversations similar to this one as a remedial to (what I see as) excessive scientistic exuberance in certain individuals. Often the point is missed and I receive a response along the lines of "Ah, yes, but we're working on that now." By "working on that" evidently what my interlocutor has in mind is establishing correlations between neurobiological activity and mental states or events (thoughts, beliefs, desires, pains, tickles, itches, etc); important work no doubt, but misses entirely the explanation-defying nature of consciousness itself, and does nothing to address the hard problem of consciousness, to wit: how is it that a slab of senseless meat is able to produce the qualitative, subjective inner states that we're all so familiar with? Thomas Huxley (yes, Darwin's bulldog) clearly understood the problem when he wrote: "[H]ow it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djinn when Aladdin rubbed his lamp." (Erm, I think a Djinn is a genie ) My aforementioned interlocutors labor under the misapprehension that by establishing correlations (Under what circumstances will that Djinn appear? - Do we need to rub the lamp a certain way? Does it work every day or only on weekdays? etc) they thereby solve the riddle of consciousness. Their laudable efforts, however, leave entirely untouched the real explanation-begging question: How did that darn thing get in there in the first place? You're quite right, Peter. Science has no explanation for this. Science has not even a candidate or potential explanation for this. We haven't even the foggiest idea what form an explanation might take! We live in exciting times.

Then the traditional response would appear to be woefully inadequate. Unless you're suggesting that it's only thanks to theories of gravity that we know falling from a 20-storey building is insalubrious? Doubtless we have many things to thank science for, but the knowledge that stepping off 20-storey buildings is bad for health is surely not one of them. I'm fairly sure highland tribesmen in darkest New Guinea, without the benefit of scientific theories, are also aware that stepping off the treehouse, rather than using the rope ladder, is a recipe for a very bad hair day indeed. Theories of gravity may come and theories of gravity may go. People stepping off 20-storey buildings, I daresay, will continue to plummet regardless. This is the kind of pre-theoretical observation theories are designed to accommodate; not a revelation brought about by the theory. The analogy is entirely inappropriate. Compare: "If you doubt the theory of evolution you might as well doubt the sky is blue - after all, [insert theory that purports to explain the blueness of the sky] is just a theory." Aren't we stealing just a wee bit too much credit here, boys and girls? All I can to this is that you'd better pray there's more to the theory than this (-- and there is!). If there was nothing more to the theory of evolution than things that are better at survival survive better, biology would be in dire straits indeed, for what we would have is not a testable empirical theory, but rather a vacuous logical tautology, bereft of any substantive content, requiring no verification and fearing no falsification; a close cousin of Women who make the best dresses make the best dresses and Elephants that are better at swimming swim better.

We seem to be at cross purposes. I said nothing of a way or method. Our theories, and those of Sherlock Holmes, are presumably made true or false in virtue of states of affairs in the world, not in virtue of the way we attempt to "validate" (whatever that means) them. I've had this difficulty in another thread of my own (on scientific testing), much to my amazement, and I've now reached the stage where I'm unsure whether: (i) There is massive confusion between epistemic issues (questions of what we can know) and ontological/metaphysical issues (what is the case in reality). (ii) Other members are not confused, but actually do subscribe to the counterintuitive and (I'd say) highly unorthodox position, held by a small number of antirealists such as Michael Dummett, that there are no verification-transcendent truths. I suspect the former (i), and in this I mean no disrespect; after all, these are the kinds of issues that generally occupy philosophers rather than scientists. The entire brouhaha might be encapsulated by posing a simple question. Consider: "What did Isaac Newton eat for breakfast on the morning of (say) 22 October 1680?" An antirealist such as Dummett claims truth goes only so far as our means of verification. Thus, insofar as the question of Mr Newton's breakfast defies verification -- presumably there is no way for us to ever know this -- it has no truth value. Is this also your position, Endy? If not, then like most of the rest of us, you hold that there is one and only one correct (true) answer to the question -- made true by states of affairs in the world, that is, what Mr Newton did or did not eat -- and wholly unconnected with the (epistemic) question of whether or not we can ever come to know this. And similar considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to scientific theories of evolution, cosmic beginnings, or anything else.

First of all, I'd like to point out an ambiguity in the title of the thread. When, under mysterious circumstances, a corpse turns up in east London, for example, it is often the case that several explanatory hypotheses or theories (hereafter, simply explanations) are put forward in an attempt to render intelligible that which was previously unintelligible: Sherlock Holmes has one, Watson has a different one, Inspector Lestrade has yet another, and so on -- but presumably not all of them can be described as correct or true. It's important, therefore, that we distinguish between what I'll follow Carl Hempel in calling a potential explanation and a true explanation. So, now we need to ask the OP: what exactly is it you're asking?: (i) Can Science provide a potential explanation for everything in the universe without a God? or (ii) Can Science provide a true explanation for everything in the universe without a God? Obviously, (ii) presents a taller order than (i). A potential explanation, if true, would explain the phenomenon under examination, but given that it's not true, it explains absolutely nothing. Only a true explanation actually explains. Given that the victim died from the bite of a venomous snake, precisely as Holmes conjectured, Watson's axe-murderer potential explanation explains nothing. There can be no doubt that many of our religious friends are convinced Creationism is the (true) explanation for life on Earth, not merely a potential explanation. Our more scientifically inclined friends, on the other hand, surely give short shrift to the possibility of Creationism being the true explanation. I take it we can all agree, as a matter of common sense, that an "explanation" which is not true (i.e. a potential explanation) explains nothing. Global warming is -- presumably! -- not explained by occult rays emanating from Donald Trump's hair. Moontanman tells us on the previous page (post #3), in no uncertain terms: "God explains nothing". I beg to differ. God explains nothing only if the God hypothesis is false, in which case we have only a potential explanation. I'm not a believer myself, but supposing against all odds that the old duffer really is up there doing all the things our religious friends attribute to him, then God does explain the existence of the universe, the diversity of life we see around us, and much more besides. Next, with regard the following... ... I'd like to ask Phi whether his view is that: (a) The scientific theory of evolution offers only a potential explanation for the diversity of life on Earth. (This is presumably the position of most Creationists.) In this case it explains nothing and, for you Phi, would be on an explanatory par with Creationism, assuming you already deem the latter untrue, or (b) We have good reasons for believing that the scientific theory of evolution offers, or at least approximates, a true explanation for the diversity of life on Earth

@ Endy. Your 1-3 above are presumably directed at me. I asked my questions not to be gratuitously annoying, but rather to highlight the dangers of you (and others) falling into the trap of perpetrating precisely that which you were fulminating against above, namely, dogmatism. In the first instance, your characterization of what constitutes a scientific theory might be more appropriately presented, I suggest, when hedged with a "by and large" or "generally speaking" clause -- lest some asshole come crawling out the woodwork with a counterexample inimical to your rigid definition. In the second instance, it's my view -- shared by many others -- that we have excellent reasons for believing there is no such thing which can be properly called "The Scientific Method". To go into these reasons would no doubt take us too far afield. The point I want to make, however, is that when scientists and science aficionados constantly assert, in no uncertain terms, this ethereal entity called "The Scientific Method" (which they all seem to agree exists, but offer wildly divergent characterizations of its nature), while there is, at least, some reason for suspecting the entire idea is illusory, is to expose oneself to allegations of dogmatic thinking. And we wouldn't want to do that now, would we?

1. Can you please share with us the "mountains of evidence" backing up string theory? 2a. Can you please tell us what "The Scientific Method" is? 2b. If I find someone who offers a different characterization of TSM from your own (assuming you offer one), can we safely assume that he/she is just plain wrong?

No, I didn't miss that part. See what I said above about "hedging". Well, I suppose Swansont could've called Scott a fine-toothed genius, or a muscular adonis, or a silver-tongued cavalier. But he didn't. He chose to call him a "buck-toothed, inbred idiot". Coincidence? Be honest with yourself, friend. It's not me you have to live with. Just you.

In post # 264 of this thread, a moderator (Swansont) refers to another contributor (Scott Mayers) as a "buck-toothed, inbred idiot" - hedged with smallprint to fool... presumably no one. I waited a couple of days after the offensive post was made to see what would happen. Nothing did. I then clicked on "report", with a short message voicing my distaste to the staff. That was a week ago. I've received no response and the objectionable post remains to this day. This raises two questions: (i) Why has nothing been done? and much more worryingly (ii) Why has no one else spoken out against this unacceptable and unnecessary cruelty? To the administration, I refer you to your own site rules: Section 2: Posting To maintain civility in discussions on SFN, the following rules are enforced: Be civil. No flaming. Refrain from insulting or attacking users in a discussion.