Reg Prescott

Wow! I didn't realize these things were so cheap! "Dear Santa..." Again, though, supposing I were to dig into the coffers and make the 50-buck investment, I'd still have no idea how to interpret what I was seeing. To me it would just be a streak on a screen (or whatever). What I could claim first-hand knowledge of is "If I tweak this knob, and press this button, etc. I see such-and-such". I'd still have to rely on the experts for an understanding of what's going on behind-the-scenes. My knowledge (if indeed it is) of cosmic rays and their brethren would be derived from the testimony of experts. Parasitical knowledge!

Hi there. Just to focus on one point in your thoughtful post... Perhaps 300 years ago this might have been largely true (though even then Boyle-type air pumps were few and far between). In this age of "big science", however, it no longer seems plausible. Most of us do not have access to an electron microscope, or a Hubble telescope, or a particle collider. And wouldn't know how to use it even if we did! Thus, most of us, if we're to claim knowledge at all in these areas, have to accept the testimony of the experts. Ok, but if we're to claim that these models are providing us with any kind of knowledge, there must be truth-evaluable statements which can be derived from them. Otherwise, as you say, it's simply an instrument, or a tool. And a screwdriver cannot be true or false.

Yes, I think you're right. Maps/models tend to reflect our particular interests. Salient information is included; irrelevancies excluded. A map of the London Underground reflects the interests of those planning to use it. It's not much use, though, to the thirsty tourist hoping to get a pint of Fosters and some fish 'n' chips with mushy peas in a London pub.

A couple of members have commented on "models" and whether we can say of them that they are true or not. I guess this would depend on the particular model in question. Consider a map of the London Underground, for example, which might be regarded as a model of sorts. Taken as a whole it would not seem amenable to an attribution of truth or falsity, though we might be inclined to describe it as a good or bad map. Nonetheless, statements can be derived from the map which can be assessed for truth. E.g. "Euston station is six stops away from Kings Cross station" and since I just made it up, this particular statement is almost certainly false. The same applies, presumably, to various models of the atom that have been proposed (Thomson's plum pudding model, etc.).

I think here you're conflating truth and justification. What is true is just.... well, true. Our degrees of confidence that any given proposition is true, on the other hand, are likely to fluctuate, as you rightly note, depending on the justification (evidence!) we can bring to bear on that proposition. Hmm, better watch your step. You might lose friends saying things like that in these parts . Is your position, then, that science has provided us with no knowledge whatsoever of the stars, planets, universe, etc.?

Hi there, The same way as most everyone else, I suppose: books, TV, internet resources, Gregory Peck films, testimony (Mummy and Daddy and goddamn schoolteachers), etc. I'd say my belief that Rome, and not Paris, is the capital of Italy is well justified, and thus I can claim to know this. Of course, if it turns out that my belief is untrue, then we'd say "Reg thought he knew, but he didn't". Happens a lot. Well, let's take an example of an observation. How about the observation that Halley's comet visits our solar system every 76 years (or whatever - no lawsuits, please)? Or choose one of your own. If it is indeed true that Halley's comet visits us every 76 years, Smith believes this, and he has good reasons to believe this (presumably provided by science), then we can say Smith knows this. He has knowledge. Same goes for any model or theory that is truth evaluable at all. (Some models, for example, may be more like a map: not the kind of thing that lends itself to being true or false). Whether the justification is sufficient would depend on the theory/hypothesis/claim in question. I think you're reading too much into the word "belief". The term covers not only religious beliefs; we all have them. I believe, for instance, that I'm sitting in front of my computer at the moment. And assuming I have sufficient justification for this belief (the reliability of my own senses), and that it's true, then I know I'm sitting in front of my computer. It's a justified true belief: an item of knowledge. If it turns out I'm actually in the Matrix then I didn't know after all. You'll see all kinds of assertions made on these forums every day. To assert something, except under deviant circumstances (most obviously, lying), is to express a belief that that which is asserted is true. We generally do not assert that which we do not believe. Of course the belief expressed might turn out to be wrong. In which case, it wasn't knowledge after all. Sounds good to me. Therefore if this indeed constitutes sufficient justification for a certain proposition, you believe that proposition, and the proposition is true, then you know it. Then we would (later) say that the currently affirmed proposition was false. And if it was believed by anyone, it was not knowledge, despite what they may have thought at the time. In that case, those who believed that the Sun was orbiting the Earth were wrong. They had a false belief, albeit a justified false belief. It was not knowledge. You missed one of the three essential components of knowledge. These primitive people had (i) a belief; it may well have been (ii) a well justified belief; but the belief was not (iii) true. If I understand you correctly, I'd be inclined to say not that belief "merges" into knowledge, but that you assign varying degrees of confidence to your beliefs. I don't think knowledge of a proposition admits of degrees. You either know it or you don't. I don't think a person can "70% know" that Rome is the capital of Italy. She might, though, state or exhibit (through offering her gambling odds, for example) a 70% degree of confidence in her belief that it is so. You might be extremely confident, certain even, or more diffident towards your belief. All that matters for knowledge is that the belief be true and justified, regardless of your confidence level. You may express unmitigated certainty that you know such-and-such, for example, yet still be wrong. This happens a lot, too. "Forest" is not a statement, thus not evaluable for truth or falsity as it stands. "There is a forest in front of me", on the other hand, would be truth evaluable. I'm guessing here you have sorites type examples in mind. E.g. "How many trees does it take to constitute a forest?". Vague predicates are a pain; look on them as a "problem for the theory". As for the dude who says "There are three platonic solids". Seems to me, if there are three platonic solids then he's right -- he's making a true statement. Otherwise he's wrong. As I alluded to in my response to Silvestru, a model may not be the kind of beast to which the predicates true and false apply. They would normally only be applied to linguistic entities (statements, theories, hypotheses, etc) and mental entities (i.e. beliefs). If Thompsom made any linguistic assertions regarding his model, then presumably they can be evaluated for truth and falsity. Here you make a good point. When it comes to scientific claims to truth and knowledge, we may find ourselves in the position of the "preface paradox". The writer of the book makes numerous assertions throughout the book; assertions, needless to say, that she believes to be true. Meanwhile, in the preface, we're told by the same writer "This book doubtless contains many errors for which I take full responsibility etc. etc. blah blah". She would appear to be at once -- paradoxically -- asserting that her claims are true, and that (at least some of them) are untrue. So, with regards science, unless you're willing to bite that bullet and assert that science does not produce any knowledge (!), we may have to live with the fact that much of what scientists claim is indeed true (and if we believe these claims, we have knowledge), though we cannot know which particular claims.

In this thread I'd like to explore the various relationships that obtain between science, truth, and knowledge, and perhaps help to ameliorate some very deep confusions that have been brought to my attention through discussion with fellow members. I've noticed that, in contexts related to science, some members are extremely reluctant to make any mention of the word "truth" (and its cognates: true, truly, etc.), a tendency that struck me as quite inexplicable until the reason, I think, for this misguided reticence was exposed in a very revealing comment recently. If I may paraphrase: "The making of claims to truth would compromise the open-minded character of the scientific enterprise and render it more like a religion." What I hope to show here, to begin with at least, is that such a view leads to consequences that I suspect have not been clearly thought through; consequences that I'm fairly sure the majority of our members would be unwilling to accept. Knowledge, as traditionally defined since antiquity, is justified true belief. Certain inadequacies in this definition (Gettier type counterexamples) have been brought to light in recent decades, though they needn't concern us here. The above definition will be assumed in all that follows. To have knowledge of a certain proposition, to know that proposition, then, requires three conditions to be satisfied: (1) One must believe the proposition (2) One must have sufficient justification for believing that proposition (3) The proposition must be true (1), obviously, tells us that you cannot know something you don't believe. (2) says that one must not only believe the proposition in question, but one must have good reasons for doing so. Guesswork is ruled out. Were Smith, through a sheer fluke, to correctly guess the winning lottery number, we would not thereby attribute knowledge to him. He believed, for example, that the winning number was 314269, and it is true that the winning number was 314269, but he lacked the requisite justification; he had no good reason(s) for believing as he did. Therefore, he did not know this. (3) is self-explanatory. One cannot have knowledge of that which is untrue. You might believe that Paris is the capital of Italy; you may even have good reasons for believing this; nevertheless, you cannot know that it is so. For the simple reason that it is not so. (1) - (3), then, constitute individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge (leaving aside pain-in-the-ass Gettier complications). If any one of the three is not satisfied there can be no knowledge; if all three are satisfied, knowledge is the result. Now, since truth is one of these necessary conditions for knowledge, any untrue claim -- scientific or otherwise -- cannot constitute knowledge. Without truth there can be no knowledge. Therefore, those who deny that science -- at least in some cases -- yields truth (i.e., true propositions, statements, laws, theories, hypotheses, etc.) must also deny that science produces knowledge. And this, ladies and gentlemen, is a fairly weighty bullet that presumably few among us would be willing to bite. To the following questions... How much knowledge has science produced about the cosmos, the stars, the galaxies, the planets? How much knowledge has science produced about evolution? How much knowledge has science produced about atoms and molecules? How much knowledge has science produced about anatomy, the brain, medicine? ... the denier of truth, on pain of inconsistency, must answer: "Zilch! Zero! Nada! Not a jot! Absolutely none!". As a footnote, one occasionally hears on these forums clandestine whispers of "absolute truth" or "universal truth". I personally haven't a clue what is being alluded to. The terms mean nothing to me. For the student of language, "true" and "false", are rather mundane predicates that apply to assertive sentences, from the most pedestrian ("My haemorrhoids are playing up again") to the sublime ("Jesus is the only begotten son of God"). Both sentences make assertions, and thus both are -- at least in principle -- truth evaluable. Now, who's afraid of the big bad truth?

I used two examples. Neither implies that all propositions that are true are about reality. If you disagree, show us in logical form, how the implication is derived.

And I did not say that you said that all propositions that are true are about reality. You seem to struggle with distinguishing a premise from a conclusion. I think you mean "They do not prove the conclusion". Do you need to see a book on logic for beginners? Would that help?

Again, it's very hard to make sense of this. Let's consider a couple of fairly uncontroversial propositions: (i) Donald Trump is president of the USA (in the year 2018) or something more scientific sounding... (ii) Copper conducts electricity Is Donald Trump a real person? Is the proposition true? If so, then it's a true proposition about reality. First of all, "how nature behaves" is not a proposition. It doesn't have the requisite form (i.e. an assertive sentence). Consider (ii) instead. Is copper real? Is it true that copper conducts electricity? Is this an example of "how nature behaves"? (if not, please provide one). If so, science has generated a true proposition about reality. Science has searched for -- and found (we presume) -- a statement that correctly describes reality. (Let it be noted here that we're using the term "proposition" rather loosely. "Statement" would be more philosophically felicitous)

I honestly haven't the faintest idea what you mean. Where have I been obtuse? I can certainly point you with no difficulty to where such accusations have been hurled in my direction. I would hope you would not simply take such gossipmongering at face value. Give me examples of my obtuseness and we'll examine them together rationally. I'm reluctant to say this, because it might be construed as indelicate or rude. But the plain fact is that one particular "contributor" understands almost nothing of what I've been saying. Virtually everything I say goes over his head. By his own admission -- as if it were needed -- he's ignorant of philosophy, and to this he adds an unquenchable hostility to, and withering contempt for, the discipline, coupled with ungrounded accusations of my hidden "agenda" (whatever the hell that is) and my being "anti-science" (I'm not). How many times do I have to explicitly state that I have no religious beliefs whatsoever -- some people just don't get the message -- and for how much longer must I look on helplessly as lies are dispensed and my character impugned? You know how people tend to be: if they hear something often enough from the gossipmongers, they're liable to end up believing it. The physicists wouldn't like it in one of their threads. The physicists, indeed, would not allow it in one of their threads. Why, then, is it allowed to go on here?

True, but I'd suggest the overwhelming majority of truth attributions that we make are not mistaken. Just try it today. If you think you see a car approaching, there almost certainly is a car approaching. If you think it's true that you're typing in a science forum then it almost certainly is true. Now, things do get a lot trickier when we're talking science. But no one -- scientific realist or antirealist -- withholds from making any knowledge claims or truth assignments. That would be a position of radical skepticism of the Cartesian variety or "we might all be in the Matrix" type. The disagreement between the scientific realist and antirealist tends to be over the observable vs the unobservable. The antirealist might grant, for example, that much, or even everything, a good theory says about observable reality is true. i.e. the observable consequences/predictions of the theory are true. In other words, if we do such-and-such we will observe such-and-such. And she would probably stop right there, making no additional truth claims. The realist goes further, claiming not only what the antirealist claims, but that we have sufficient justification for believing a good theory (not just its observable consequences) -- with certain qualifications -- is true, or approximately so. That is to say, the unobservable entities, mechanisms, etc. postulated by the theory actually exist. The realist's justification for her truth/knowledge claims would be much like those of Sherlock Holmes: the theory that provides the best explanation for the observed phenomena is likely to be true, or approximately so. Did Holmes, or anyone else (except the participants themselves), see the butler do it? Nope. Does anyone see these unobservable entities and mechanisms posited in scientific theories? Nope. It's a form of inference we all use in our everyday lives. You come home to find your house ransacked and the family jewels missing, what do you infer? You've been burgled! And you'll almost certainly be right. The scientific realist simply extends the same reasoning to (good, well-tested, etc., etc.) scientific theories.

Hi there, With all due respect, I find it hard to make head or tail of a comment such as this. First of all, a great many scientists DO claim -- as a matter of documented fact -- that the task of science is to generate, or attempt to generate, true propositions of nature (Want quotes?). Isn't this just common sense? Secondly, if the task of science is not as I've described above, what do you feel is the proper aim? To generate false propositions about nature? The words "truth" and "reality" seem to strike terror in the hearts of certain members. Yet you all use them, and their cognates, every day! "Daddy, is it true that the climate is changing?" "Daddy, is it true that smoking causes cancer?" "Daddy, is it true that copper conducts electricity?" Er, what do you answer?

Welcome back, Eise. Yes, the thread has matured and flourished into a strapping young football hooligan in your absence. A paradigm for all to follow. I don't think there's any difference. On the previous page I observed: The kind of statement above is what's known as an "intensional [sic] context"; a context where standard rules of extensionality tend to break down. (Intensionality -- with an "s" -- is not to be confused with intentionality with a "t". Unfortunate, I know, but we're stuck with it. See also discrete and discreet.) One such rule: in standard (extensional) contexts any term can be substituted for a co-referring term with no change in truth value. E.g. in the statement "Johnny Rotten is lead singer of the Sex Pistols" we can substitute "John Lydon" for "Johnny Rotten" salva veritate (as the pretentious assholes say) -- i.e., with a guarantee that the truth value of the statement, whatever that is, remains unaltered. In an intensional context, the rule is no longer trustworthy. E.g. supposing "Eise believes Johnny Rotten is a punk rocker" is true. There's no guarantee that "Eise believes John Lydon is a punk rocker" is also true. You might not know the two names refer to the same virtuoso -- shame on you! -- and thus it's possible you would assert one and deny the other. Another test for extensionality is existential generalization. E.g. from the truth of "Johnny Rotten lives in London" we can infer the existence of London. Not so for intensional contexts. From the truth of "Sid Vicious is searching for a flying elephant" we infer at our peril to the existence of said airborne pachyderm. Likewise "Professor Bloggs is engaged in a quest for reality", regardless of what we take "reality" to be, does not admit of a reliable inference to the existence of said reality. Thus, to believe one is engaged in a quest for something -- whether it be pink elephants, Grolsch beer, reality, or the fountain of youth -- just is to be engaged in such a search. No distinction can be drawn. The (intensional) statement "Eise is looking for an honest lawyer", if indeed you are engaged in such a search, is not falsified by adducing evidence that there exists no such beast. Contrast with a claim like "Eise is an honest lawyer" -- a good old fashioned extensional context -- which would be falsified by ... well, need I say more? What's most remarkable, I find, in this thread and other current threads I've glanced at is that certain supposedly hard-nosed scientific types express skepticism over reality at all. Comments such as (I paraphrase): "What is this truth and reality you speak of?" I thought it was the philosophers who were supposed to entertain airy-fairy, pie-in-the-sky, far-fetched, zany, wacky notions. What do they think scientific theories purport to describe: the contents of an envatted brain? One wonders how they even get on the bus in the morning given that reality and truth are apparently so elusive. Tell 'em to stop cramping our style!!

Can someone explain to me how "curmudgeon" status is attained? I've got a lot more neg rep points than that et pet dude, yet he enjoys the much coveted curmudgeon status. My hero!

Just in case any of our esteemed readers (if there are any) have been dazzled by the mirrors or blinded by the smoke ... To be engaged in a search or a quest requires a mental representation of that which is being sought. To borrow the jargon of philosophy of mind, it requires intentionality: that property of certain mental states to be about something, or directed at something. Simply put, it requires a mind. At the risk of stating the blatantly obvious, a person, for example, can conduct a search or pursue a quest; a brick, on the other hand, cannot. Bricks, as far as we can tell, don't have minds. The claim "science is not the quest for reality", then, if read literally, would be what Gilbert Ryle described as a "category mistake". Science -- depending who you ask -- has been variously characterized as a method, an institution, a body of knowledge, and perhaps other things, too. Methods, institutions, and bodies of knowledge, however, do not possess intentionality and therefore, like bricks, do not conduct searches or pursue quests. Not having minds, they're not the kinds of things that can conduct a search. We might say they're not in the searching line of business. Given a literal reading, then, we might grant -- depending on one's philosophy of language -- that swansont's "science is not the quest for reality" is true, but true in the same way that "The Royal Society doesn't hope for world peace" and "The Bank of England doesn't have lustful thoughts about Anne Hathaway" are true. The Royal Society and the Bank of England are not the kinds of things that can have hopes or lustful thoughts, respectively, just as science, construed as an institution (or method, or body of knowledge), can conduct a search or pursue a quest. And if one of our members started a thread entitled "Is the House of Commons a quest for true love or not?" we might wonder if we were in the presence of a lunatic or an imbecile. Swansont strikes me as neither a lunatic nor an imbecile, thus if we are to give his claim a more charitable reading, attributing it with substance and intelligence, we must view the original statement as elliptical, and construe it in terms of the participants: the scientists themselves. Scientists, unlike bricks, institutions, bodies of knowledge, and methods, do possess intentionality and so are capable of conducting, or refraining from conducting, a quest/search. Duly construed, then, swansont's statement would read something like: (i) "the pursuit of science is not the quest for reality" (the "pursuers" being, of course, the scientists), or (ii) "scientists are not engaged in the quest for reality". Now, since swansont's original claim "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any mitigating clause such as "by and large" or "on the whole", on pain of misrepresenting my interlocutor's own words, (ii) must be understood as: (iii) All scientists are not engaged in the quest for reality or more simply (iv) No scientists are engaged in the quest for reality And as we've seen, as a universal generalization of the aims and goals of scientists, the statement (iv) is false. Scientists, being the eclectic bunch they are, express divergent views on these aims and goals. Now, if I'm to argue, as I am doing, that swansont's claim is false, in order to be consistent I must assert that its negation is true. And, allegations of logical ineptitude from the usual hot air balloons notwithstanding, that's precisely what I have been doing. Thus, once again, I hereby affirm: ~ (iv) or in plain English (v) It is not the case that no scientists are engaged in the quest for reality or even plainer (vi) There are scientists who are engaged in the quest for reality Discerning readers may have noticed Swansont actually admitted as much himself in his most recent post, apparently without realizing he was refuting himself ... ... only to take away, or try to take away, with the other hand what he had offered with the first ... ... leaving us once again to puzzle over how an institution or a practice -- as opposed to the individuals who compose that institution or carry out that practice -- can be said to have embarked, or declined to embark, on a quest.

Yes, you did. For so long as you continue to distort the facts, impugn my integrity, and question my competence, I will continue to remind our members of these facts. From swansont's post at the top of page 4: "And since science is not the quest for reality, but rather for models that describe how nature behaves [...]" You did not say "By and large, science is not the search for reality" or "Generally speaking, science is not the search for reality" or "Some/most scientists do not see science as the search for reality". What you said was an unqualified "science is not the search for reality". Your assertion, then, takes the form of a universal generalization; commonly known as a "blanket statement". To refute a universal generalization all that is necessary is to produce a single counterexample. I have produced several, all from the domain of quantum physics where, in this particular case, they are most scarce. Your statement "science is not the quest for reality" is therefore refuted. More distortion. More disingenuousness. More misquotation. (i) It's surprising I would do so for the simple reason I did not do so. What I did do is refute your own claim by showing it is not the case that science is not the quest for reality. In other words, some scientists may see it this way; others do not. (If the point is not clear, compare with a group of sailors on a ship with differing views on what is being sought. Some seek this; some seek that; some seek the other. Inasmuch as "seek" is an intentional (in the philosophical sense) verb, and ships presumably lack intentionality, the ship itself is not engaged in a search or quest. Ships do not search for anything; its occupants do.) (Note also that it matters not whether the object of the quest even exists. The statement "Ponce de León was searching for the fountain of youth" is true, even if said fountain is entirely illusory.) (ii) I did not claim "no blanket statements can be made about science". What I did say was (2nd post, page 4): "I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things." Any fool can make a blanket statement about science (E.g. "All scientists are electric toasters"), and many fools do. The statements they make are almost invariably false. Everything else in your post -- Monty Python and your pro bono analysis of my psychological condition -- is mere smoke and mirrors and merits no further attention.

On page 2 of this thread, I made the following observation quoted below, regarding "participants [who] adopt a must-win-the-debate attitude that precludes them from recognizing competing points and good arguments. XXXXX, your style suffers from this a lot, and while you think it makes you victorious, it just frustrates others that they continually have to keep pointing to what they said two minutes ago, which you ignored in favor of waving your hands and repeating your same refuted arguments" (a quote from a moderator) And in pointing out the fallacious argumentation of my interlocutor earned myself another 3 neg-rep points for the collection. One gets the distinct impression that rule violations -- and that includes logical fallacies -- constitute a problem on this site only when perpetrated by the newbies -- even when none have been perpetrated! The top boys, on the other hand, could argue "All men are electric toasters" and probably get a standing ovation. Well, here we are again, folks. Today's collection of absurdities includes: 1. Swansont claims (top of page 4): "science is not the quest for reality" As an unqualified blanket statement, the claim is patently ludicrous, as I've tried to show. There may exist scientists who hold such a view (swansont himself apparently), though to claim that all do is not only jawdroppingly false, but commits the fallacy of presenting as undisputed fact that which is mere opinion. Perhaps sensing the absurdity of his own assertion, the backpedaling begins in swansont's next post, where we're told a distinction must be drawn between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement". It's a distinction I'm not familiar with myself (I suppose I need to get out more). What next: a distinction between an "absolute blanket statement" and a "really very super-duper absolute blanket statement"? In the same post, the backpedaling leitmotif continues as swansont tells us "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality". When it was pointed out that he had moved the goalposts (another logical fallacy), swansont's facile rejoinder (third post) amounted to: "Last I check, physics was part of science". You don't say! We might say physics is to science what a one-foot wide goal is to a twenty-foot wide goal. The target just got an awful lot narrower. Downsizing of the goal post breadth notwithstanding, swansont's revised claim is still manifestly untrue, as I have shown. It is not the case that even in the restricted domain of physics all involved believe "science is not the quest for reality". Once again, opinion is being presented as universally accepted fact. 2. Leaving swansont aside, if anyone else here is able to compile a list of the assorted rule violations (ad hominem, flaming, etc.), not to mention the reams of mindless proselytizing, propaganda, irrelevancies and spam, before the universe suffers the heat death, you're a better man/woman than I. But hey, they're top boys so it doesn't matter. All that really matters here, as far as I can discern, is to keep saying "You're wrong. You're very really super-duper absolutely conclusively wrong". Say it often enough, loud enough, while waving your arms and stamping your feet, and who knows, someone might even believe it. Now, may I have my regular order? Three neg rep points to go.

In what follows I'll provide additional evidence, in the form of a small selection of quotes, in an attempt to further refute swansont's claim that "science is not the quest for reality", which he later revised to "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality". First a reminder. What I'm claiming, in opposition to swansont, is that a great many scientists, I'd be inclined to say the overwhelming majority, take a 'realist' approach to their work. That is to say, they do regard their own work, or the task of science in general, as a "quest for reality". Science is not merely about predictive accuracy, but getting the world right. I've previously stated my own, dare I say commonsense, conviction that realism is, by and large, the default position across the entire scientific spectrum. Evidence for antirealist sentiment in geology, neuroscience, or chemistry, say, might reasonably be described as exiguous. If our members know of any contemporary chemists who doubt the existence of molecules ("Well, molecules might be real or they might not be. We'll never know; just shut up and calculate"), or neuroscientists who express skepticism over the existence of axons, dendrites, and synaptic clefts, be sure to let me know. Because I don't. This leaves myself in the unenviable position of trying to produce evidence for a position -- scientific realism -- which is simply taken for granted by the vast majority of scientists in the vast majority of scientific disciplines. It's a bit like being demanded to provide proof that cobblers believe shoes are real! I daresay the reality of shoes is not something cobblers spend a great deal of time discussing. It's simply an unquestioned assumption. The glaring exception to all this commonsense realism is to be found in the domain of physics, and in particular, the nebulous precincts of quantum physics, where it is indeed the case that antirealist attributions are the order of the day. Take, for example, this remark from Niels Bohr: Bohr's comment, typifying orthodox Copenhagen antirealism, mirrors similar remarks made by swansont and certain others in these forums (and I paraphrase): "Science (or physics) is not in the business of pursuing accurate causal-explanatory accounts of reality. All that matters is generating empirically adequate models or theories that 'save the phenomena', but do not purport to represent reality". If I can succeed in showing that even in quantum physics -- the last redoubt of antirealism -- it is not the case that all involved assent to "science is not the quest for reality", I'll take it that my refutation applies across the board to all scientific disciplines. The quotes below are drawn from the books cited in my most recent post. Those not from the primary sources themselves (the physicists), except for the first two, are linked to the relevant primary sources, and will be supplied upon request. As you read through, ask yourself whether these men subscribe to the doctrine that science is "not the quest for reality". "Physics is a kind of metaphysics... All physics is a description of reality; but this description can be either complete or incomplete" - Einstein "If one regards the method of the current quantum theory as in principle definitive, that means that one has to forego all claims to a complete description of real states of affairs. One can justify this renunciation if one accepts that there simply are no laws for real states of affairs, so that their complete description would be pointless . . . Now I can't reconcile myself to that" - Einstein "[...] and that Bell was justified -- despite his own results -- in holding out for a possible realist solution along the lines suggested by Einstein and Bohm" "Einstein was by now deeply dissatisfied with what he saw as its failure to provide any adequate realist or causal-explanatory account of QM phenomena. This change of mind went along with his shift from a broadly positivist (or instrumentalist) approach according to which a scientific theory need achieve no more than empirical-observational and predictive accuracy to a realist position that entailed far more in the way of express ontological commitment" "The hidden variables theory was developed by David Bohm who agreed with Einstein that orthodox QM was 'incomplete' since it failed to deliver an adequate ontology in keeping with the basic principles of scientific realism" "In Einstein's case the conversion from Machian instrumentalism to causal realism was noted with regret -- understandably so -- by Bohr and others in the orthodox QM camp who considered it a strange lapse into old 'metaphysical' ways of thinking. To Einstein, conversely, his early position now appeared to have been just a brief unfortunate lapse from the standards and aims of proper scientific enquiry" "Indeed, he [J.S. Bell] repeatedly expressed a conviction that the orthodox theory MUST be in some way "incomplete' and, moreover, that a realist construal of quantum phenomena was the only approach that held out any prospect of improved scientific understanding since it alone offered a genuine trial of substantive (ontologically committed) truth-claims or hypotheses." "[David] Deutsch is an out-and-out realist with regard to these multiple coexisting parallel worlds and spends a good deal of time chastising instrumentalists for their abject evasion of the issue. In this respect he is fully in accord with Einstein, contending that it must be the aim of any adequate physical theory to describe and explain the way things stand in reality, rather than merely to 'save the phenomena' [...]" "Einstein himself started out by espousing a Machian instrumentalist approach according to which the chief demands of a scientific theory -- such as special relativity -- were that it should be observationally and predictively adequate without any further (ontological) commitment to the reality 'behind' phenomenal appearances. However, he abandoned this doctrine in his later writings, chiefly on account of his deep dissatisfaction with the orthodox quantum theory and his belief that instrumentalism [i.e. antirealism - RP] had often been used -- by physicists like Bohr and Heisenberg -- as a means of protecting their theory from any challenge on alternative (rational and realist) grounds"

In another thread started by myself (you may have noticed) one of the contributors claims: "Science is not the quest for reality" and "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality." Do you feel these assertions are consistent with the claim: "He [Einstein] expected scientific theories to give an account of physical reality"?

So now you're making a distinction between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement"? Sounds a bit ad hoc to me, to say the least. That's exactly what you did claim. Your "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any waiver of the "by and large", "generally speaking" variety. Now you're moving the goalposts. Your original claim was "science is not the quest for reality". Your revised claim, though, is also false. Just to stick with Einstein -- presumably a reputable physicist -- his conversion from an early Mach-inspired positivism (a form of antirealism) to his later realism in defiance of Copenhagen antirealist hegemony is well documented. Entire books have been written about it. Try these: "Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics" by Christopher Norris "Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony" by James T. Cushing "The Shaky Game" by Arthur Fine Just one example from the third book -- the entire texts are chockablock with them: Here you're confusing semantic and metaphysical issues with epistemology. A "quest for reality" does not entail that we can know when that quest has been fulfilled (though most realists hold that we can know. Popper is an exception). The latter -- "How can we know?", "How can we confirm?"-- is quite distinct from the former two. The metaphysical issue pertains to whether or not there exists a reality independent of ourselves. The realist typically claims there does. (What can be known about it, if anything, is a different question; a question for the epistemologist). The semantic issue pertains to whether or not the terms in scientific theories refer. The realist -- in contrast to the antirealist of an instrumentalist bent -- will typically claim, with certain qualifications, that they do refer. If she's wise, she'll qualify this claim by restricting it to our "best theories" in the "mature sciences" etc., etc. In the quote above, for example, we see that Einstein is withdrawing his earlier, more circumspect, antirealist stance towards GR ("The theory is not to be read literally: the theoretical posits are not meant to refer") and advancing a more daring realist position ("The terms of my theory do refer"). With regards the epistemological question ("How can we know our theories capture reality?) the realist will typically appeal to "Inference to the Best Explanation": from a set of candidate theories/hypotheses, we are licensed to infer to the truth of the theory which provides the best explanation of the data/evidence. Such an inference, the realist asserts, provides us with sufficient epistemological warrant to claim knowledge of the theory's truth, i.e. we can know, albeit without certainty, that the theory is true or approximately so. This is all covered in the link in my most recent post. Most notably, Ptolemaic cosmology, just to name one. Around 1600 or so, the evidence for Copernican vs Ptolemaic astronomy was indecisive: the rival theories were underdetermined by the evidence. Does anyone nowadays doubt the reality of the Earth rotating on its axis once every twenty-four hours or so? Quite so. And these would be the words of an antirealist of the positivist persuasion. In other words, the positivist -- armed with his verificationist theory of meaning -- holds that all talk of unobservable reality is meaningless. But clearly science does make appeal to unobservable entities, the critic might object. Does that mean such theories are meaningless? Not at all. Scientific theories (this is still the positivist speaking) properly understood are about what is observable. All talk of unobservables is translatable into talk about observables, and thus meaningful, sparing us the horrors of metaphysics.

For the insomniacs out there... https://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-real/

You're actually quite close to the truth there. You'll have a lot more trouble finding antirealists (outside of quantum physics) than realists, I daresay, though antirealist views can be found in the writings of luminaries such as Mach, Duhem, Poincare, Bohr, etc. Oh, and not to forget the early Mach-inspired Einstein (and so I'm a little puzzled by the quote I read today. Perhaps this was his pre-Mach, pre-antirealist period. *shrugs* ). Scientific realism -- the quest for reality -- is, after all, surely the common-sense position. It takes a heavy dose of philosophy or an education in quantum physics to knock the realism out of the man. As for myself, I haven't taken a stance, though I'd probably incline towards antirealism in the form of Bas van Fraassen's "constructive empiricism".

Here we must make the distinction between scientific realism and antirealism, in their various forms. The antirealist will typically (though they're an eclectic bunch) claim that science aims to get observable reality right. What goes on "behind the scenes", if anything, is not the business of science, or cannot be known. The realist, on the other hand (also an eclectic bunch), will typically claim that science aims to get all of reality right: both observable and unobservable. The opinion swansont just expressed epitomizes an antirealist stance: All science aims for is to produce models that accurately describe what we can see. i.e., to produce theories/models that are "empirically adequate". The realist demands more. Not only ought our theories strive to be empirically adequate, but to be true. That is to say, not only are the observable consequences of the theory/model in alignment with what we see, but that the unobservable entities, mechanisms, processes, etc. posited therein actually exist.

Ah, swansont, we've had this discussion before. I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things. Many scientists share the opinion you just expressed, particularly (I would bet) in the realm of physics, a fortiori (I would bet again) in the realm of quantum physics, ever since Copenhagen and the mass retreat from scientific realism that so appalled Einstein. The later -- frustrated -- Einstein, just to name one prominent example, held that the quest of science is to provide an accurate picture of reality. A great many scientists -- I would guess the vast majority -- do not share your opinion that "science is not the quest for reality". (No, I don't have statistics. I'll start collecting quotes if you like) Now, you are, of course, perfectly entitled to your opinion. What's objectionable, however, is that you present this opinion as if it were a universally agreed upon fact, as if to say "ask any scientist and they'll tell you the same thing". As a statement of opinion, it's entirely innocuous; as a statement of undisputed fact (i.e. all scientists agree on this), it's simply false. Here's a quote from the great man himself, from a letter way back in 1899, that I came across in my reading just this afternoon: This is a man who does believe that science is, or ought to be, the quest for reality. Otherwise, if it didn't correspond to reality, why should he care? All that matters, on your account, is producing "models that describe how nature behaves". Ok, but it's still (a kind of) H2O, right? If that's the case then Kripke's identity statement "water = H2O" would not appear to be immediately threatened by the existence of heavy water, despite Studiot's objection.