joigus

Yeah I knew Ne'eman was related to the higher echelons of Israeli politics, or the military. I do remember an interview with Gell-Mann in which he mentioned Y. Ne'eman's interests really lay in general relativity, but he was somehow forced into particle physics. I do consider this era of physics kind of a heroic one. It's not for everybody to find your bearings in this terrain of approximate symmetries and mass formulas, empirically guessed relations and the like. Great respect on my part.

You have to distinguish total spin J=3/2 from spin projection. A particle of total spin J has 2J+1 possible spin projections. Eg, a particle of spin 1/2 has 2*(1/2)+1=2 spin projections, which are -1/2, +1/2. In the case of omegas, we have 2*3/2+1=4 possible spin projections, which are -3/2, -1/2, +1/2, and +3/2. If omegas lasted long enough, we would be able to perfom a Stern-Gerlach experiment and separate them into 4 distinct beams, I'm sure. Omega- has spin 3/2 for the reason that these are isospin multiplets, so all the particles in the n-plet have the same spin. The ultimate reason for that is the concept of approximate symmetry iso-spin='same spin'. IOW, baryons with the same spin have approximately the same mass. Exactly. I wouldn't call it S, as that's reserved for strangeness. I particle physics it's traditionally called J.

Elementary algebra, as others said or implied, is using the properties of numbers that are known to be satisfied for every number in order to, eg, solve equations among other things. The word comes from an old Arabic term, al jabr, which means something like 'the restoration'. There is a so-called abstract algebra, in which you generalise the idea to less familiar, but quite consistent, quantities and operations: rings, groups, and so on. I hope that helps / complements what other have --correctly-- said.

Yes, I forgot that. I've mentioned it elsewhere in these forums though I think, or I should have, when talking about language. Brain studies indicate that the areas of the brain that usually code for sounds are used to code for images --sequences of images[?]-- in the case of people with this particular disability. I'm sorry I don't have the biblio with me. It's covered in Stanford lectures on human behaviour by Sapolsky. Makes you think whether the most primitive languages really were a mixture of mime and sounds.

I č ne cnēƿ sē According to my dictionary at hand, I've answered you in English, only Old English. If English was evolving in the seventh century, I see no reason to assume it's not doing so right now. What's probably true is that the path and the patterns, and the speed of change, are different, as communities today interact in very different ways than they used to do back then. Of course languages evolve. Centuries upon centuries of 'contamination' are perceived as 'evolution' when a sufficient number of people perceived as educated adopt those ways of expression, and refine them to remove ambiguity and add nuances. Language is very plastic. There is no such thing as the right way to say things. I'm no expert, so don't take anything I say on authority, of course. But I've interacted with experts enough to know that something like this is what's known to be the ongoing process of language evolution. Agreed. Language is a two-pronged process, I would say. Writing is, after all, a sophistication, and an priceless tool, but it's derived from speaking. Language stems from a phonetic code. Speaking is no doubt much older than writing. Grammar is an afterthought. In our heart of hearts we know there is an implicit order and hierarchy, and we try to clarify it by spelling out some rules. But the process itself is much more spontaneous.

Are you familiar with the concept of subpar? --American English.

So you claim to understand what isolation in time and interacting time mean? Care to explain it to everybody else?

Another postmodernist outcry.

This is the simplest and thereby most beautiful way to explain the argument, IMO. It's the version I was exposed to. After reading most of the material here I'm convinced it's not the way in which Cantor formulated it historically. Probably. I don't know the history of it. I don't read German either, but I doubt any ambiguities might be lurking behind a more or less obscure German word. I agree that modern formulations tend to streamline the proofs in a very interesting way. I like your phrasing: Any list of numbers that purports to be listing a connected piece of the continuum of real numbers must necessarily be missing a string. The diagonal operation of somebody's version of Cantor's theorem goes on to prove in a glaringly obvious way, that we can always construct a number not in the declared list. The truth of such declaration is thus impossible. I'm at a loss as to what else is there to be unravelled in such a simple argument.

Is that spontaneous symmetry breaking?

Some questions: How can a single proton or neutron have a meaningful entropy? What kind of entropy is that? What do the terms "time interacts" or "isolated in time" mean? BTW, photons have no mass.

It's not Van Gogh's Starry Night, but it's certainly a thing of beauty, it's motivational, and also a reminder that the stars are always making us what we are.

As said by others, the probabilistic assumption is quite independent from the De Broglie assumption (relation between wavelength and momentum), and is called Born's postulate (from Max Born, one of the founders of quantum mechanics.) As Swansont said, De Broglie waves are components of the quantum state, rather than the quantum state itself. Every one of these DB waves would be totally de-localised, and is not physical. So a more realistic quantum state has infinitely many DB waves in it, each with a different momentum. So the logical build-up is: Einstein relation: energy = h * (frequency) De Broglie relation: momentum = h / (wavelength) Infinitely many Einstein-De Broglie waves (principle of superposition) --> probabilistic interpretation (Max Born) Something like that.

This question about how many senses, to an extent, depends on how we conceptually compartimentalise it, I think. One way would be to count as many senses as types of receptor cells that can be distinguished as per development. Another would take into account cells responding to different stimuli even if they belong in the same developmental lineage... I'm not sure what the standard definition in modern biology is, but I seem to remember balance --mentioned by @dimreepr and also suggested by @Genady concerning acceleration-- as an independent sense. In any case, a definition is in order. I don't think, eg, sense of humour merits it, no matter how important it is in life.

Why? The point has been settled. You don't get it, that's all. I can see that.

I hope my brain lasts for something more than a few seconds yet. It remains to be seen if my brain's attention to your arguments will last that long --last time we discussed something I didn't find it very promising. Again (because you missed it the first time): A world made up of false, fluctuation-generated, memories would not display correlations like those manifest when I watch my family album, legal documents, history books, etc, and compare them to my sensorial memories. Have you actually listened to Susskind's explanation? His point about Boltzmann's wife? You could have 1st-order coincidences, so to speak. Much more unlikely would be to have 2nd-order. Let alone 3rd, 4th, and apparently unlimited in the order or depth --if you will--. This is not a world of Boltzmann brains, only too obviously. This is a world in which what I see has been seen by many other 'processes' out there. You cannot simulate that with a thermal fluctuation.

If by "not very convincing" you mean "not convincing you", I would agree instantly. You have proven to be... How should I put it... very resilient to solidly understanding many ideas involving infinity, or perhaps very stubborn in your own views about them. Here's a piece of conversation between a student and Susskind about Boltzmann brains, elaborating on what they would be and why they wouldn't explain the world as wee see it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hh0lJZbUfo&t=1680s Upon the student stubbornly insisting on them and their properties, he ends at about t=1800s, "Don't worry about it: This is not the right theory of Nature." The reason is a world of Boltzmann brains spontaneously popping out of a thermally-dead universe would not bring about the correlations we see in the real world. Comments concerning George Washington and the cherry tree.

Obviously he means quark. And we're not Boltzmann brains. Structure formation in our world is not to do with fluctuations, obviously. The contents of my mind come from events in the past. It obviously cannot be the case that the contents of my mind, and my feeling of them having to do with events in the past both!!! arise from thermal fluctuations. And not everything should be considered. Silly ideas don't have to be considered, when they're silly for obvious reasons.

As far as my understanding goes, emergence --at least in the weak sense S.H. was talking about-- is not about whether or not we can explain something in terms of its parts/constituents, etc. After all, how can we be sure that we can't instead of we haven't been able to just yet? It's rather about whether the properties in question make sense at all for said 'constituents' or 'parts' or 'more elementary' elements. Phase transitions only make complete sense in what's called the thermodynamic limit, ie, infinite number of particles; or, if you will, all extensive --additive-- properties being infinitely large, and therefore scale-independent. A phase transition does not make sense at all for, say 17 molecules. It's not that it becomes fuzzy, so to speak. I wouldn't even know how to start talking about that. It's like trying to talk about a 'shiny atom' or an 'uninhabitable photon'. What would that even mean? It's a property of the collectivity, not of its parts.

I think there are contexts where the "weak emergence" approach is certainly useful, and I would go as far as to say that actually spectacularly so. One such example is how the equation of state for a real gas is inferred by assuming finite volume for each molecule and how molecules repelling each other at short enough distances while attracting each other at longer distances gives you a modification of the ideal-gas law that results in explaining phase transitions, the triple point of water, etc. If that's not emergence in action, I don't know what is. As Hossenfelder says, conductivity and other macroscopic parameters give you other examples. There are other contexts where it's not at all obvious what the level from which the law is inferred might be. Example: People have suggested time could be an emergent property. What more basic level can we postulate so that time is a highly-derived, emergent property? I do see a domain in which it's helpful, and by no means trivial.

It's actually not 137. It's just thereabouts. IOW, why is the electron's charge in dimensionless units what it is? The number is probably not 'trying to tell us' anything, for a reason similar to why the distance Earth-Sun is not trying to tell us anything, despite Kepler spending years and years thinking about numbers like those --planetary distances and periods. We don't have a unified theory, so the number looks quirky. The day we understand interactions as several allowed versions of the same mechanism, we will probably understand these numbers as accidents is some more encompassing/general/ etc. space of states.

GRate answer!

The voiding approach sounds reasonable. I generally brings about great relief.

They aren't. Extra dimensions and/or parallel universes are not mainstream physics. Study some physics before you talk.

Right. Microphenomena cannot be directly observed --eg. an electron going from an excited state to the ground state-- for the very simple reason that observation happens by virtue of thousands upon thousands of microphenomena producing coordinated responses in macroscopic systems. Never mind dust mites or bacteria.