Boltzmannbrain

Ok, this is helpful. I will look at some of these concepts more carefully. Thanks.

Thanks a lot for this. I did take an advanced calculus course that covered maximums, minimums, boundaries, etc, but I have long forgotten most of it. Using "bounded" instead of "ends" does answer some of my concerns, but I still fell like there is more for me to learn about this part of mathematics. In other words, I still have ideas that are not answer by what I know up to this point about this topic. I will look at my old notes. Yes, but what keeps me curious is when infinite becomes finite. For example, an infinite number of numbers/points has a finite distance.

I agree. I wasn't saying that 1.5 has to be in the interval. I was saying that since the interval of points (if I can say this) ends at 1.5, then how is there no end point. This doesn't seem right. Imagine a line segment [0, 10]. Assume that the segment can revolve about the point 0. At the halfway point, at 5 units, we we break the segment, keeping the number 5 on the part that revolves. We revolve the broken segment to some degree then reattach another 5 at the end of the part that doesn't revolve. The segment [0, 5] cannot revolve past the segment [5, 10] anymore. The one 5 is taking up the space (even though it is 0 space) that the other 5 needs to revolve through.

Yes, with what you say here, "... it ends at 1.5, but it does not contain the end point. It contains everything before 1.5 ...". So the points end at 1.5, but there is no end point? If that is not a contradiction, then it is a least a very hard thing to comprehend. Are you saying that some interval like [1, 1.5] is the same length as the interval [1, 1.5)?

Sorry, I meant points. This is what I am having a hard time understanding. Now my main issue is that these points that make up a line segment do not behave like points/objects in a row. Is that maybe a what I am getting wrong? Or can these points be seen as being in a row?

I finally have time to respond. But let's just think about this geometrically and logically for a moment. In the case where a line segment ends at 1.5, we are able to take 1.5 from the end of a line segment. And then we say that it no longer ends. How does that make any sense?

Thanks for the replies Genady and Lorentz Jr, but I am interested in one aspect of this problem. I am interested in why the line segment should change its geometry after taking off a number from one end of it. It seems like the number 2 in the example has a special quality geometrically speaking. If all there is are is numbers then why is 2 an end point but not anything else?

The real numbers cannot have a next number, but I don't understand how that can be logical. For example, consider the segment inclusively from 1 to 2, so there are the numbers 1 and 2 at each end of the segment. We can take off a number like 1.3 or 2 from it. If we take the number 2 away, we are left with something like the segment 1 to the limit 2 - 1/x as x goes to infinity (or whatever it is). So my ultimate question is, why can we take off the end of the segment if it is something that we call 2, but we can't take off another number? The segment only has real numbers; what makes 2 so special that it can end a segment and be removable?

I put equivalent in bold because now we are getting to the heart of the issue. By "equivalent" are you saying that they are the same thing (interchangeable)? If so, then this statement becomes an argument that the consciousness (mental aspect of it, not the physiological aspect) does not actually exist. If yes, then two things are happening simultaneously: one, as you said, "an activation of a specific circuit"; two, subjective perception arises. The former is a physical description of the system, and the latter is not a physical description of the system. Please tell me your answer to my question above. So computational irreducibility is reducible? Yes, that is a good point.

Yes, I definitely see what makes it different, its very nature. It is not physical. Physical properties affect the physical in one way or another. The consciousness does not. It shouldn't be there; it is unpredictable. Also, a normal physical property is observed. The consciousness observes; it does not get observed. Those are two completely different things. And I agree that when these physical properties are put in the correct process, a consciousness emerges. But given our understanding of fundamental physics, there is nothing known to this day that would predict such a property. It is irreducible now. I put "now" because I suppose maybe we just have to add consciousness to our models once we understand exactly what brings about consciousness. I don't know enough about how reducibility applies to computer science. From Wolfram, "Computations that cannot be sped up by means of any shortcut are called computationally irreducible. The principle of computational irreducibility says that the only way to determine the answer to a computationally irreducible question is to perform, or simulate, the computation". Computational Irreducibility -- from Wolfram MathWorld

An implication of reductionism is that the whole should be predicted by its parts. We can predict systems like the ones you mention. And if the system is too complex to predict, we usually do not observe anything as different as a conscious. The properties that arise are normal physical types of properties that have not yet been modeled. But the consciousness is not anything like the unexplained physical properties that are in complex systems.

If we are assuming that things like atoms are not conscious (by consciousness I mean awareness) then we pretty much know. Although there is a theory IIT trying to reduce consciousness that appears to be just panpsychism, but it is still pretty radical. Maybe we are talking about 2 different definitions of consciousness.

An implication of reductionism is that you can always make correct predictions about a system by knowing its parts. An example of this is for science. Most of the time science can make predictions by knowing the parts well enough. But where hard reductionism fails is for the consciousness. The parts that come together are thought not to be conscious. So we have the opposite of reductionism, emergentism, or, another way to put it, irreducible.

So your life experience and common sense has led you to believe that you need a haircut in order to breath? What is going on here? What am I missing, seriously?

Then why am I wrong?

I interpreted the OP to be asking, at least in part, about what human nature is and what it wants. That is why I gave the answer that I did. I probably misunderstood what you were getting at. Yes, and I gave examples that I do not believe are done in order to breath.

Right, I misread your post. Then those would be examples of something you might do that is not so you can breath.

I disagree. I don't watch t.v. or get a haircut so that I can breath.

This sounds like physicalism. Keeping the topic of dualism out of it, I think we are talking about the same thing. Hmm, most of these things I do to avoid pain. For example, I cook to avoid the "pain" of hunger. And some others are to avoid emotional pain.

Everything?! What if I want to eat ice cream for the pleasure it gives me? Is that not doing something for pleasure?

Life experience and just common sense. I mean what typical things can you think of that is not a function or pleasure or pain? Thank you for your valuable time. I can only imagine what you had to put off to impart your wisdom onto me.

Then I disagree. I believe that almost everything we do is for pleasure or to avoid pain. But I do believe that altruism exists too, but very rarely in comparison.

So you are saying our determination is a more fundamental reason why we do things?

I assume you are taking umbrage with the "everyone" part. You can see it everywhere: charities, socialism, "media police", cancel culture, etc.

Citation: me Try: to make an attempt (from Webster's Dictionary) But seriously, it seems that the most fundamental motivation for almost everything that we do is determined by pleasure and pain.