I knew that just throwing the term in as if it is of no importance is going to be catastrophic. I don't necessarily agree that the phrase itself is contradictory in nature. I should have been more specific in terms of how I defined the phrase. A phenomenological illusion refers to a type of experience where there is a discrepancy between how things appear in our consciousness and how they actually are in reality, e. g., mirage, hallucinations etc. It recognizes the reality of the subjective experience of the illusion. In essence, a phenomenological illusion is an experience where what appears in consciousness does not align with external reality, but the experience itself is undeniably real to the subject. The only controversial thing about my statement is the claim that consciousness itself is a phenomenological illusion because the very concept of an illusion presupposes a conscious experiencer. It does presents a paradox that challenges the coherence of the notion itself. Phenomenology, with its emphasis on the reality of subjective experience, generally rejects the idea that consciousness could be an illusion and treats consciousness as if it objectively exists.
