DrmDoc

Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary defines mentation as mental activity, which is activity relating to the mind. If a behavioral response isn't instinctual, then it is likely learned behavior as I have previous suggested. Learned behaviors in complex animals suggest the kind of sensory recognition, assessment, and memorization activity, within the brains of these animals, that could be associated with mental activity.

If I understand correctly, the question is can humans devise objective experiments or render objective observations? Generally, we quantify behaviors relative to our own, which isn't entirely an objective place to begin. However, to understand behavior with any certainty we have to judge the behavior of other species by the standards we are only capable of fully understanding to some degree, which is the standard human behavior suggests. Instinctive behaviors can be deduced from what remains of behavior through decerebration experiments and brain injury study. Decerebration involves the successive removal of brain structure as a means to identify which structures produce certain behavioral attributes. Instinctive behaviors are likely to be present from birth and issue from the primitive aspects of brain structure. Behaviors that persist after the successive removal of recent brain structures are likely to suggest those behaviors that are instinctive to a spieces. To some degree, all behaviors are a response to some stimulus, whether internal or external. However, proactive behaviors can be explained as behaviors that appear to anticipate an eventuality. If not conditioned, such behaviors require some mentation process of consequence assessment relative to the actions or inactions of the animal. With conditioned behaviors, that mentation process would have had to occur concurrent with the conditioning or learning process.

Hello SJ, Please note that I do not engage in the point/reputation option on this board. Should you find your comments rated amid our discussions or exchanges, they were not rated by me. Also, I do not believe any ratings in this discussion thread was posted by you. That option, as I have learned, is a popularity game that the adolescents on this discussion board anonymously play to pit one poster against another to, likely, soothe some unhealthy esteem or ego related issue. Should I agree or disagree with your posts, my commentary will only appear in writing. Your written words, rather than reputation points, are the only statement of your insight and opinion that is of any substantive value to me. I wish you well.

Given the police-horse analogy, my position is that some mentation process had to occur initially before the animal's acquired behavior. If a behavioral response isn't instinctive, then it is a learned response. Whether by conditioning, practice, or some other instructional form, learned behavioral responses begin with some initial period of sensory recognition, distinction, and memorization congruient with mentation. Rudimentary mentation, in my view, is merely the integration of divergent sensory information to mediate a behavioral response. This is like reacting one way to a loud noise (e.g., firecracker) while blindfold and reacting differently when the source of that noise (e.g., person standing in room) can be seen before it occurs again. This integration of sound with the added visual information that results in a modified behavioral response suggest the rudiments of thought. With conditioned police-horses, the animal learns that it needed panick amid loud noises and crowds.

An animal that responds to conditioning suggest a capacity to learn from and remember prior experiences, which suggests a mentation process. At minimum, the animal must demonstrate some mentation process that produce behaviors that appear to override the basal instincts of the animal. My investigation of brain function relative to the mediation of behavioral responses suggests that the integrations of divergent sensory data may initiate those mentation processes that produce behaviors independent of instinct. For example, a totally tactile entity might initially respond to all tactile sensory with similar behaviors. When we add visual sensory data to the entity's abilities, it now has a capacity to make a visual distinction in how it should respond to distinctly different tactile stimuli. An over simplification? Perhaps; however, the contiguous functional nature of our central nervous system--from spinal cord (primitive) to more complex neural structures (recent)--suggests significant developments in human brain structure likely began with the evolution or acquisition of sight.

Self-consciousness necessitates behaviors that suggest an awareness of a distincition between self and surrounding influence. Proactive behaviors necessitates a capacity to assess and anticipate consequence. This is evidence of anticipatory mentation prior to behavioral responses suggestive of reactions without such assessments. A mind is shown by reactions to stimuli that isn't typical of the instinctual response to such stimuli. For example, flight in response to any and all sudden loud noise suggests an instinctual response. However, calm amid some sudden and loud noise suggest a distinction process assessing a non-threat. This is an assessment of the consequences of not reacting to loud noises.

Mind is the environment of cognitive activity with the brain that arises from brain function and is quantified by a capacity to integrate divergent sensory information (tactile, visual, olfactory, aural, etc.) throught a process that produces behaviors independent of instinct. Essentially, a mind is evinced by proactive rather than reactive behaviors.

The dreaming brain, whether lucid or not, is as electrically active as a waking-state brain. In some brain areas (e.g., temporal and occipital lobes) , the dreaming brain has been shown to be more active. Also, the brain in dream sleep is not completely sensory deprive. Sensory studies have shown increased brain activity amid the dream state in response to light, tactile, and aural stimuli. In some cases, such stimuli is integrated as part of the dream experience as reported by sleep subjects. However, sensory information does not reach the dreaming brain with the same intensity as it does when the brain is in its waking-state.

Agreed. As I previously wrote, "If the hypothetical case involves an artificial means of communication between neurons, then I agree that consciousness could be possible."

I agree that synapes activation would normally necessitate the transmission of information between neurons via some electrochemical process; however, the OP here seems to be asking could consciousness exist among a collective of active neurons without neurotransmitters, which is without that which enables neuronal sharing of information. My position is that consciousness cannot exist between individually active neurons that do not have a means to share their information with other neurons to coordinate and unify their activity.

Would this sensory information reach consciousness without a neuronal means or ability to send or transmit that information? Isn't that means or ability the purpose of neurotransmitters between neurons? We know that consciousness involves an interconnected confluence of neuronal activity. If we remove the neurotransmitters and somehow allow each neuron to remain individually active, how would those separate neurons unify the process that constructs consciousness? In figurative terms, can individual construction workers (singular neurons) build a skyscraper (consciousness) without a means to coordinate and unify (neurotransmitters) their efforts?

If I understood correctly, the OP was asking if consciousness could be produced by activating individual neurons without the substance (neurotransmitters) that enable communication between neurons. Consciousness is a product of neurons working together in a concert of consciousness-producing neural activity. A single neuron or billions of active neurons cannot individually spark or create consciousness without the support of other neurons through a means to communicate and unify that process. Without a unifying link between neurons, individual activation would merely produce disjoined, chaotic, and aimless neuronal activity. If the hypothetical case involves an artificial means of communication between neurons, then I agree that consciousness could be possible.

Consciousness arises from a confluence of cortical, subcortical, and sensory activity. All this activity is made possible by neurotransmitters; i.e., consciousness is activated and informed by the transmission of neural information. Without neuratransmitters there would be no communication between the neurons that comprise and complete the circuit of brain activity from which consciousness arises; therefore, activation of individual neurons without communication between the neurons that give rise to consciousness will not produce the confluence or concert of brain activity that leads to consciousness. In short, activation of individual neurons does not equate consciousness.

Your doctor should have order a CT scan or referred you to either a sleep specialist or neurologist. Your altered perceptual experiences could be a symptom of some underlying neuropathy that has yet to fully manifest. I suggest that you return to your doctor and insist on receiving the proper medical attention your experience deserves.

Perhaps; however, I don't believe there was ever a time when ancestral animals had to make a distinction between real experience and dream experience. It's likely that the brain structures associated with memory formation evolved in an environment where real experience was the only experience. In other words, the brain structures associated with memory evolve inconjunction with afferent stimuli from the actual sensory structures of the body. During the dreaming phase of sleep, much of that actual sensory stimuli is muted by deactivations in the brain stem at the onset of atonia. Without unmuted stimuli--which informs the brain that its sensory experiences are real--those brain structures associated memory formation remain understimulated throughout the dreaming phase of sleep. The prefrontal cortex, for example, experiences a state of low-activation (hypofrontality) at the onset of dreaming. This suggests that our dream experiences do not generate the stimuli that our dreaming brain identifies as emerging from the actual sensory experiences of the body. Our animal ancestors likely didn't have to make a distinction between reality and dreaming because their brains where predisposed to stimuli originating from the real physical/material sensory experiences of the body.

There are some who might argue that dreams are forgotten because they are not meant to be remembered. However, the reason why we forget our dreams quickly involves the evolved nature of memory and the incongruity of memory with experiences that are not concurrent with real physical/material sensory experiences. Succintly, memory was evolved for the real physical/material wellbeing of ancestral animals. Our animal ancestors evolved memory through the experience of influences that had a real physical/material impact on their survival. Dreams do not involved real sensory experiences concurrent in physical/material reality. Consequently, certain memory-associated areas of the brain do not become active when the brain is dreaming because those areas are not stimulated by the faux physical/material sensory experiences of dreams. We forget our dreams quickly because their experience is not concurrent with true physicality. The lack of real physical/material stimuli concurrent with the experiences in our dreams also explains why we experience a state what many mistakenly refer to as sleep paralysis. That state is more accurately described as muscle atonia, which isn't paralysis but a relaxed condition of muscle elasticity and readiness. There is evidence suggesting that what we remember about our dreams form during the arousal process as real physical/material stimuli reenters brain structure and stimulates those areas associated with memory formation. This suggests that what we remember about our dreams suggests the way our waking-state brain interprets what it believes it experienced amid sleep. The inference is that those experiences amid sleep do not contain the imagery and experiences we recall as dreams until our waking-state brain interprets them that way--as a way, perhaps, of making the experience relatable to conscious experience. What this all suggests is that what you remember most about your dream is what your conscious mind likely perceived as most relevant or relatable to your conscious experience. However, I wouldn't suggest obsessing over remebering them without learning how to decipher whatever relevance or meaning they may have. Why remember what may not be important enough to understand? If, however, you remain interested in keeping a diary, I would suggest keeping a digital recorder at bedside for later diary transcription. I hope this helps.

That is a very definitive statment. What is your basis? Is this merely your opinion or is it based on some evidence in brain study? Please, elaborate.

I don't think we can definitively say that "a salamander has no notion of death". What we can say with some certainty is that its responses--physiological and behavioral--suggests that a salamander may feel pain and certain emotions on an instinctual level. However, I do agee that there is a significant distinction between the basal experience of fear or pain and experiencing same when informed by intellect.

Although I agree that human cognition likely modifies the experience of emotions in ways that are distinctly human, that distinction may only apply to the thought and assessment processes subsequent to the initial stimuli rather than to the basal experience and instinctual effects suggested by the initial physiological and behavioral responses we share with other animals under similar emotional stimuli. Although we may interpret an animal's physiological changes and behavioral displays as emotional effects, we cannot presently determine whether that animal recognizes or interprets its experience as we do. Again, this is a distinction between what the animal may be feeling and what it may be thinking.

However, with emotions, the issue is what the salamander is feeling rather than what it is thinking. Emotions aren't necessarily about words or some cognitive assessment, reasoning, or forethought of action or outcome. For example, fear, like pain, elicit instinctive physiological and behavioral responses that do not require an assessment of the experience beyond the instinctive responses associated with immediately avoiding or eliminating some perceived threat--like when we instinctively jump when surprised by loud noises. Instantly, we feel fear and respond, without thought, with behaviors distancing us from the noisy threat. There is no thought of dying or even of injury in the initial moments, just the drive to move away from some threat that has engaged our fight or flight instinct. It isn't until after our initial responses to the noise that we engage in the mental assessment processes we cannot adequatedly determine in other animals. With emotions, it isn't as much about thought processes as it is about the perceptions that drive our behavioral responses. In my view, fear is both a behavioral response and behavioral drive. In your salamander example, what drives its behaviors is likely its perception of a threat, which produces all the physiological and cognitive changes essential to avoiding or eliminating that threat. Although we cannot definitively say that fear is among those motivating cognitive changes, we can evaluate the salamander's physiological changes while under threat, compare them to what we know of comparable changes in humans experiencing fear, and make a cogent assessment of what the threatened salamander might be feeling relative to humans.

The same could be said about whether lizards or other animals experience pain. Injury to some animals, including lizards, causes physical reactions and detectible levels of physiological changes suggestive of pain much like those suggestive of emotion, particularly fear. The greatest distinction between humans, lizards, and other animals, as I perceive, is our inability to interpret all the expressions of pain and emotion by other animals as we are able to interpret the expressions of our own. Although we are able to detect similar physiological and certain behavioral responses suggestive of humanlike emotion in other animals, we'd probably be more confident of those responses as emotion if they were accompanied by all the human markers of emotions--but they aren't, therefore, our only recourse is to rely on what the physical evidence suggests.

Actually, I said: Although our brains may be dissimilar to other animals, some do appear to engage behaviors suggestive of emotions.

Although our thyroid and sex glands may stimulate our emotions, their structure is not where emotion is perceived or experienced. Rather than a source or location of emotion, our adrenals activate in response to directives from our emotional centers. If the OP is asking about the location in the brain where emotional stimuli is received and where a response to that stimuli is initiated, that location is in the structures of the brain stem. Without the function structures like the amygdala and hypothalamus provide, our behaviors would likely be without emotional content.

With just the brain stem, emotions are more about physical reactions to stimuli than cognitive recognition and assessment. For us, the experience of emotions without cortical function would be much like our experience of pain, wherein, the intensity of our reactions are immediate, instinctive, and correspond to the intensity of the pain experienced. The experience of emotions by more instinctually driven animals likely correspond to the intensity of the instinct-affecting influence; e.g., the greater a threat, the more intense the fight or flight response.

As what seems the general nature of emotions, fear and rage are behavioral responses to stimuli. Therefore, such animals may only experience those emotions when adequately stimulated. However, having a brain stem does not automatically confer emotions on a species. The brain stem appears to confer instinctual behaviors and animals with only brain stemlike structures likely react with the emotions we associate with instinctual behavior. Although brain stem function is the likely source of instinctual behaviors, cortical function enhances the mediation of those behaviors. It is the cortex that gives us the ability to mediate our fear, rage, hunger, and sexual desire in ways that can produce behavior more favorable to our immediate goals and circumstances. Through cortical function, we process our emotional responses with a consideration of consequences exceeding the instinctual needs or desires of the moment. Our cortex gives us the measure of cognition, forethought, and planning that has enabled our continual dominance of other instinctually driven species.