BrainMan

Worse yet, we don't yet understand all that well how our own minds work- and the history of cognitive science shows that we are notoriously bad at imagining how our minds should work, as we have been wrong about it time and time again. What we are capable of knowing, and how we are capable of knowing, are unresolved scientific questions. To simply presume that we know these things is beyond irresponsible.

I have no idea what you mean by that. What I have suggested is basically a brand of pragmatism, which has recieved a fair amount of play in the philosophical world in the past century. It is not the "end of philosophy", it is the beginning of a philosophy that takes our own epistemic position in the universe seriously instead of just pretending we have absolute knowledge from the start. I'm sorry to hear that. It is a shame that you are proud of your dogmatism.

I don't remember the show exactly (I have seen it though), but I am quite sure that forensics is the major thrust of what they do. That along with good old detective work beyond forensics.

This requires an observer to imagine the situation. You cannot imagine a reality independant of observers, you must at least assume a God's eye perspective which you then take to claim that a reality exists.

I think it is irrelevant whether or not there is a "reality independant of observers". Given we are observers, there is no way to know. The only reality that is important for us is the reality that depends upon our observations and the details of our minds. Reality for us, based upon our minds, is the only reality we can ever know.

Regardless, I'm more than willing to accept the possibility of a perfectly objective reality- and I even set out specific criteria of how it could- in principle- be established. Unfortunately, you fail to even accept the possibility that you are wrong, and you certainly make no strides to establish yourself as correct- you simply assume it. That is a shame. I don't think you understood the argument if you think the argument is limited to perception- it isn't!

First you have to specify how it is that the human mind and the developments through history lead us to such a conclusion, and then you need to show exactly what it is about such a process that is inevitable for any intellegent creature. You haven't done that. Sorry, but you don't have an argument here, all you have is an assumption- and a poor one at that! And given the nature of the first post and what is at issue here, your posts amount to nothing more than question-begging. Try again.

He meant "Seasonal Affective Disorder", I'm sure.

Boy is that specific. *rolls eyes in duisgust* But thanks for making my point for me!

But no specific change falls under the term "synaptic plasticity" and no one agrees upon what it means exactly. Microbiologists almost inevitably use the term very differently from psychologists, for example. If you try to publish a paper and are using the term "synaptic plasticity", Im quite sure reviews will want you to be more specific and say exactly what you mean. Don't give me that "I and several professional researchers" crap. I'm tied close enough to the area to know what is going on...

I have thought a lot about this as well nameta9. The objectivity of science is objectivity for us- or intersubjectivity. With vastly different minds, there is always the chance that we would have a vastly different science. However, there are a couple of issues here. First, from whose point of view would the sciences be "different"? Given that our minds organize data in very different ways, what exactly would count as "being the same" between the two sciences and how would we ever know if they are (or are not) "the same"? Given it is possible for there to be similarity between sciences, whatever remains invariant with respect to every (possible) transformation between sciences could safely be called objectivity. Sound reasonable? The important questions are: How different can two intellegent minds (possibly) be? Is there a limit to the possible differences? Must there, of necessity, be strong similarities between any two minds, and must they always be reflected in the science(s)?

The term "synaptic plasticity" doesn't explain anything at all. You would be better off thinking of the term as an advertisement for research than as a scientific term. [it has no agreed upon meaning. It is mostly just a codeword for "changes occur" without any specification of what those chages are, on what level they occur, why they occur, and what they do.]

Very short answer: The brain uses representations of the world, and representations of the body, in order to select a motor response that is beneficial. We have something very close to a homunculus mapping out our bodies in our brains, and incomming stimuli, the representations of the world, are integrated with the representation of the body which creates a perspective- we do not just experience the world, we experience it from somewhere, with a unique, first person perspective. This information is made available to the brain in such a way that it is useful for the selection of a motor response in any given situation. On top of that, we represent some of our own internal processes which gives us a unique perspective on our own internal thinking process which, when combined with information about our place and relationship with the world (and people) around us, along with a bit of a story-like understanding of our own lives, comes to take on the characteristic of what we call "the self".

No, you wouldn't find such things easily in a SA article. Here is something a bit more thorough: http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9704009 Enjoy! [Notice the full text is offered below the abstract...]

I posted this some time ago in another thread: http://www.geocities.com/haripaudel/Parallel_Universes.htm This is a link to Max Tegmark's SA article about multiverses, where he presents his own theory about the level 4 multiverse. The ideas are perfectly testable, according to Tegmark. All the people saying that "it is unprovable" are wrong (so far as "proof" means scientific support, which is the most any scientific theory can hope for).

Interesting. I didn't really think of that. Even if the experimenter thought it could cause injury or death, he/she would have to believe that the experiment is just so important that the risks (to his/her self) are worth it.

There are a few directions you could go with this. Here are a few things that might get you started: 1) Look up the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (or the Whorfian hypothesis). Should be lots of info on this on the internet. 2) Look up info on "expectancy effects" (aolong with taste), and you might find something useful. ( For example: http://www.acs.appstate.edu/~garberll/effectsoffoodcolor.htm ). Look at the relations of taste and other things, like smell, to get some idea of what it might mean for words to have an effect on taste. 3) As someone else suggested, just play around and experiment. Blindfold people and tell them they have never had the food before. Give the food really strange names or slip in a "this is really good" or "this tastes like dirt" and see how that affects what people say about the food. [You might use normal, everyday food and put it in a blender so people can't tell what it is without taste...]

When you offer unsolicited advice to someone, you are implicitly suggesting that the other person is incompetent or just too stupid to figure it out for themselves.

The Nuremberg Code, #6: "No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects." Do any of you agree with this? Disagree? Is it ok to perform deadly experiments given you use yourself as a participant?

I think the loss of blood pressure to the brain would be a serious problem very early on. I doubt the person would remain conscious long enough to know what happened.

One way to increase memory abilities is to make up little stories or songs or poems related to the subject. Consider: Ok, I admit it, this post had little to do with memory. It was just an excuse to post something I thought was neat. Bite me! Edit: Fixed the link

Sort of true. But it depends upon what we are trying to remember. The more confusable the stimuli (like line lengths from 1 to 3 inches) the fewer items we can remember, and less confusable stimuli (like faces) can actually extend the number to quite large amounts. Also, groups of items can be joined together into meaningful units (chunks) that can extend what we are capable of keeping in memory. I don't know what this means. Memory is notoriously unacurate. To call long term memory "infinite" is misleading at best. It is better for long term retention, but not necessarily better for number of items remembered on some particular test right after the six days. Not quite true. But I think what your teacher was getting at was that when you give more meaning and attention and thought to something you will remember it better. Just glancing at words on a page will not help you remember the content very well. [Wanting to remember something will make it more meaningful, and thus it will be more memorable...] The attempted application of statistical trends in experimental situations to real settings. I wouldn't call this false, but I would take the numbers here with a grain of salt...

The math really doesn't have to be that complicated. It is enough just to say that the probability of choosing right on the first pick is 1/3, and therefore the probability of it being one of the other two doors P(C1 U C2) is 2/3. We are shown a door that is not a winner, so P(C1 U C2) = P(C1) = 2/3.

If you can place the sets in one-to-one correspondence with each other, then you have proven that they have the same cardinality. (I think.) All you need to provide is a function that maps one set onto the other in such a manner (one-to-one). If the sets have a different cardinality, there will be no such function.

The question is, COULD math have developed differently (remaining consistent) such that .999... does not equal 1, but is only very close to it?