Schrödinger's hat

You're reasoning is good, you're just missing a piece of the puzzle. For the horizontal clock, the stationary observer would indeed see asymmetrical pulses. This is because the time an event happens in one frame is related to both the time and place it happens in another. [math] t' = \gamma\left(t - \frac{v}{c^2}x\right)[/math] This is the best explanation of the concept I've seen: If you look carefully at the rotating-switcheroo you'll also see the vertical distance between the time lines get's further apart (moving clocks are slow) and the horizontal distance decreases (length contraction). The vertical moving clock would be like light bouncing straight into and out of the page, so the ticks just get further apart (a zig-zag, but we can only see a straight line because it's zigging in and out of the page). The horizontal moving clock would be like a symmetric zig-zag going up the page before the switcheroo, and an asymmetric zig-zag after.

Among other things, I think what Green Xennon is trying to say is y'all don't know what it's like:

Hank does not, or at least he does not know whether that should fit under the heading of 'be rational' or possibly 'rationally select an optimization criterion'. By the same principle, he is not yet self interested. He has not yet picked personal gain as an optimization criterion. He has only noted that he likes some arrangements for the universe, and others like some different arrangements for the universe. He is trying to decide whether he can justify attempting to arrange the universe in the way that he likes ie. rank his values as more important than other values he encounters. He has no explicit reason to think the things he likes are more important He is intelligent enough to discover what the values of the other entities are, so in this sense he has empathy. I'm trying not to assume that arbitary morals exist independantly of an entity with those arbitrary morals. I think part of the issue may be the vagueness of the word 'morals'. I am attempting to generalise; to throw as many pieces of the puzzle away and see what can be build with the remaining ones. We can perhaps add a few pieces if we find we cannot construct anything later. Hank is quite capable of detecting the values/emotions/etc of the other entities (we can assume he's not being decieved by them for now), so in that sense he is empathic, but he does not intrinsicly value optimizing for them. By the same token he has no reason to think he is special or overly deserving of having his values fulfilled. Yes, empathy was selected for by increasing survival rates of creatures (and relatives of creatures) that had it. It is not always necessary or sufficient to avoid pain/loss though. An absurd but illustrative example would be a case where someone had everything they wanted/needed for their self (but not a large surplus), in a world filled with people who were constantly in terrible pain and suffering. Their empathy will cause them great distress, acting on their empathy could lead to suffering (by depleting their resources). Let's call whatever it is he dislikes pain/loss. Yes, ethics and morals require other creatures...not entirely sure of the point. Hank can reason, one of the things he has to reason before he will act is selecting a set of optimization criteria. If empathy were one of his values, something along the lines of 'the best comprimise between everyone's values' would be a good optimization criterion. Questionposter: Yes, values are arbitrary, but you cannot just edit them at a whim. Reason can temper and alter them, especially when they start off inconsistent. 'There are some entities with some values' is a premise of this thread, so pointing out that they're arbitrary isn't very helpful.

Hmm. So this is basically a 'do no harm' rule. This resonates well with what I think and what I've read (the minecart, lever, fat man scenario comes to mind). This brings up the question of whether harm and lack-of-benefit (or utility and dis-utility) are actually distinct. Another phrasing might be: Should Hank take a (potentially or knowably) sub-optimal action? I believe the answer is yes, but I do not know why I believe this. A relevant parable might be someone who starves to death at a banquet because they do not know which food is the best. I also suspect we may have inserted utilitarianism too quickly. What if the values (Hank's own, and others') lack any sort of norm or notion of positive/negative? Hank can rank or order his own values, but not those of others. I suspect this may be heading towards the overly general swing of the pendulum. He could probably just ask the other entities 'do you mind if I do x'. (added numbers to quote for reference) Hmm, these are certainly the more interesting questions. I think I see a few categories. 1, and possibly 4 are justified by self-interest. Not really worth persuing that reason at this point. 2, 4, 6, 7 are justified by consensus in one way or another 2 by the consensus of the individual, others by the group. 3, 5, and possibly 4 require an additional layer. Some kind of empathy, global utility function, or another (possibly arbitrary) condition for 'rightness'. They could also be justified by conforming with Hank's values. This raises an interesting thought about whether 'morality' is actually a set of distinct concepts. I shall ponder and post more later.

Rigney, that was completely off topic, and you quoted the entirety of a very long post which had little to no content relevant to your post. The only thing it might have been related to is Marqq's post which I had already addressed in a less tangential fashion. Please keep quiet if you have nothing relevant to the discussion, and try to keep the signal/noise ratio reasonable.

Moontanman: Thanks. This is close to the direction I was trying to take this. I'm well aware that ethics can be built easily starting from rationality+empathy. I would also generalise the empathy concept a bit further. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you assumes a level of commonality in the values or utility functions of other people. 'Consider the values of others (where they appear to be internally consistent) to be as important as your own before deciding on an optimization condition' would be a more general version -- a sort of meta-empathy. I can get to this starting from being an empathic creature (ie. I already value valuing other people's values), but I am trying to figure out whether hank could get here -- or at least see if he can find a way to not-empathy (I suspect he might become paralysed with inaction). Questionposter: Morals are not entirely arbitrary. I agree that they have an individual component, and are generally calibrated by society -- but this may be because we are imperfect reasoners, or even that we are irrational. If I say 'We should aim for a state of affairs where everyone, everywhere has maximum dis-utility1 and minimum utility.' (ie. suffering as badly as possible, not just in terms of pain or torture, but in terms of the thing they would think is worst) this is obviously an absurd goal. At least it seems obvious and objective, can anyone think of a potential counter-argument? Long post: Putting quotes in spoiler tags for brevity. Marqq, what you describe is selfishness or sociopathy coupled with social rules and/or laws, not morality. It is also redundant to talk about a rationalist needing to act on subjective probabilities, noone can do anything else. They do not need to be psychic, only think of probable outcomes. You have also jumped a step ahead in saying that Hank can rationally seek to optimize his own values, disregarding the others. Please explain how Hank can get from 'I value x' to taking a course of action which optimizes for x whilst disregarding all the other things which are valued. The bit about the pebbles was meant to illustrate that other people's values can be different or even alien to our own. This does not make them invalid. You are also putting on many layers of human values, consequences of biology and society, and mixing the question of 'does this action suit my optimization criteria' with 'is this a suitable set of optimization criteria'. Immortal: I do not wish to discuss free will or moral relativity in this thread. Only the possible links between 'I value these things', 'Other entities value some other things' and empathy. Vent, the second part of your post just shifts from an arbitrary morality to an arbitrary meta-morality. I believe valuing empathy highly is a sufficient basis (meta-morality) on which to build something closely resembling accepted notions of right and wrong. I am trying to decouple my own empathy from logic in order to see what is plugged in where. Rational action is an acceptable basis for morality once suitable optimization criteria are established. You can pick an arbitrary utility function (even a subjective mix of global happiness, suffering directly caused and personal freedom) and maximize it. With empathy as a given you can even select a utility function that closely resembles the common notion of 'right'. Other notes: I do not want to discuss the how to get from rationality+empathy to a viable system of ethics yet (or whether or not you can). I believe the weakest link is rationality->empathy. If this fails then rationality->rationality+empathy->ethics/morality automatically fails, and so it makes no sense to discuss it until the first is reasonably settled. Perhaps I should have titled the thread Rational basis for empathy. Answer on the basis that this is the title, at least until we have discussed it further. 1Local utility functions -- what each individual values most/least -- calibrating a global utility function is part of the problem I wish to discuss.

What exactly are you proposing we test? I just saw pages and pages of telling people what to think and how to live their lives. You cannot structure an argument like the following: If you belive A is true and structure your life accordingly, x will happen eventually. Therefore you must believe A is true. No rationalist is capable of believing A and thus cannot test the first statement (nor should they want to in this case because it involves restructuring their entire life on an unsupported claim). You need follow a valid form of argument. A common deductive argument structure is: Premises your audience agrees with, Q, P and R are true. Manipulation of Q,P and R involving the laws of deductive logic. Therefore A. Scientific reasoning almost exclusively works as follows: Logical structure implying A iff Q. Quantitative inductive evidence showing Q Therefore Q. One other common form is: Iff not A then contradiction Therefore A Edit: John Cuthber, could you please use the forum's quote tags? They make things much easier to read. They look like this: [quote name='kla2' timestamp='1332707282' post='667506'] some stuff kla2 said blah blah blah[/quote] If you want to split it up you can insert a end quote followed by a new quote [quote name='kla2' timestamp='1332707282' post='667506'] some stuff kla2 said [/quote]some stuff I'm saying in response[quote name='kla2' timestamp='1332707282' post='667506']blah blah blah [/quote] a continued response You can also just use [quote] and [/quote] for stuff from elsewhere, or as a convenience when splitting up a long post from one person (instead of including the time stamp and name multiple times). The reply and multiquote buttons will fill this out automatically (you can also hit the edit button to fix recent posts for a short while)

I read portions of your document. The first ten pages or so, then small samples of each chapter. At no point did I find anything resembling an argument -- let alone any evidence based claims. All of the parts that were coherent enough to follow were simply blatant assertions, already presuming the existence of god and the truth of various gospels. The rest was bald assertions and moralizing.

Haven't fully fleshed out this idea, but here goes -- help, as well as arguments against Hank being capable of something we'd recognise as morality are welcome. Assume there is a sentient entity that values rationality above all else. Ie. it will not act unless it believes its actions are either trivial in consequence, or rationally justified; call it Hank. Hank has some other values, things that he wants to do, or likes and dislikes. He also observes other entities that claim to have a sense of self, much like his. They also communicate that they have values and desires. These claims seem credible, or at least as credible as his own claims of consciousness and desires. Some of these desires conflict. For some actions it will be true that Hank would say 'I want to do this' and some of the other entities would say 'I want you to not do that'. In this case, is there any rational reason for Hank to act on his own desire over the desires of the others? -- I would answer no to this. Is this sufficient to say that Hank must weigh the claims and values of the other entities against his own before acting, or must something akin to the principle of mediocrity be invoked? If all the entities have a common value which they rank highest (with the exception of the acting rationality one) such as 'I desire not to be murdered' or 'I wish to know where all of the 17 grey pebbles are'. Can Hank ever justify murdering someone or hiding grey pebbles? I suspect that there is a missing premise here, like an ordering principle that can be applied to values of different entities. If Hank knew he valued hiding pebbles more than all the other entities (individually? collectively? does this matter?) valued knowing where they were, I think he would be justified in hiding them. The alternatives seem to be some global utility function, or something akin to empathy (ie. somehow knowing which of the other entities' values were more or less valued than your own). Both of these are somewhat arbitrary and do not follow from the premise that Hank is rational without additional premises.

Here you are doing it again. Implying that feelings somehow change or are relevant to what is true. My feelings on this matter have no bearing on its actuality. I do not resist this, except with one possible caveat or extension to my biology to be explained shortly. Now you are not only putting words into my mouth (ie. assuming I have already taken your emotional manipulation bait when I have not), your question of 'why should it matter' is assuming some sort of meta-morality. Ie. that it should matter that it matters. It's sufficient that I care, and that everyone else cares. If noone cared it would not matter. What does this even mean? My psyche is an element of my biology. Now that I think of it I can give you an even simpler basis for morality. Assume I am rational being with some desires. In being rational, I can ignore these desires if fulfilling some or all of them would be irrational. I perceive other rational beings indistinguishable from myself other than that I am not them. They all report the same finding. The suitable null hypothesis should not be 'my desires are more important' as this is singling out an individual thing as being important without any logical basis. Thus my null hypothesis should be 'all of these desires should be in the same category' and thus any rational course of action cannot rate any of them as intrinsically more or less important based on which me-like thing they originate from. This is general, it works whether entities care about dying/ending, in which case 'keeping the things alive' becomes a rational action or not (in which case murder is perfectly fine as noone minds). I need no 'murder is wrong' or 'help others', it is all in-built into the desires other entities have and how they interact. I consider my rationality to be derived from my biology, but if rationality does not fall under your concept of biology, then feel free to consider this the exception I mentioned above. There is nothing emotional about this. Test and attempt to falsify are exactly the same thing. You are right in that they often trust the findings of other scientist (but only insofar as they believe any anomalous data is much more likely to be from the one principle they are directly attempting to falsify), but this is not faith in the believing something with no evidence sense. They have very good reasons to believe the other scientists are not misleading them. A meta hypothesis if you will of: The scientists in category x are right enough, frequently enough, that I am more likely to either find new science of a mistake I have made when using their results. However, a good scientist will not continue to believe the results on which (s)he based his/her work if (s)he has made a concerted effort to find more likely explanations for anomalous data. Assumption of a higher power, indicating consciousness/intent. What do you mean dependence? In what way do we depend? You have not shown any evidence for non-material (read abstract) things that are external to me. The only examples you have of these are those which are internal to me. Representations of abstract concepts interacting in my own brain. ????????????????????????????????????????????? It can only make sense in the context of rationality if it does something. Either it has some effect on you other than the psychological, ie. is some way of receiving input about the world, or it has some external effect. Dependent in what way? Only in the sense of the stuff we are made of comes from elsewhere and that If the above is what you speak of, then it is naturalism with a hat on. If you are claiming some special connection or powers granted by your god, it is either non-falsifyable (useless) or you have not met the burden of proof. And again, I end with yes, if faith is included in your religion. Faith and science are polar opposites. If you are excluding faith from your religion, then no they are not, but this is not what you mean and you know it. I shall also add this note: Please can the religious give some kind of definition or distinguishing label before joining a debate. LIteralist Biblical/Quranic/etc gods, Non-literal Christian gods, non-interfering theistic gods, interfering or non-interfering deistic concepts and pantheistic concepts are far more different from one another than modern particle physics and the four element model. Shifting goalposts are extremely tiresome and non-productive in a debate, and an argument for deism in no way supports an anthropomorphic god.

You're still trying to sidestep the issue. You were not questioning feelings about what I think should be, you were questioning feelings about what is, and doing so in a matter so as to attempt to imply acceptance of facts meant I was okay with murdering innocent children. This is emotional manipulation and is intellectually dishonest. Taoism has a soul and many mystical elements, Jainism is where the idea of reincarnation came from. I had not previously considered Confucianism a religion, looking at it in this light, they do share some aspects. If you took away the spiritual aspects, you would be removing the basis on which other aspects rest. I suppose you could say this form of Buddhism, or Confucianism or Unitarian Universalism were religions, but religion would be taking on a rather different meaning. The word philosophy is more commonly used in this context. At any rate, faith would not be involved in such a world view as individual moral guidelines can be argued and weighed on their own merits rather than having some unprovable but compelling reason to believe them. The possible exception to this may be some aspects of/sects of Confucianism which seem on the surface to be making an argument from authority, but I do not know enough about it to be sure. Some arrangement of physical, material things (including neural pathways) that someone does or might recognise as the abstract thing. Noone can prove that induction is valid, but you must accept induction to escape solipsism, or even use logic, or survive long enough for the thought to occur to you. Saying that induction is a valid way to learn about the world does require a small measure of faith, but it is the same level of faith I require to do anything. After that, you are completely wrong. Science is about doing everything you can to disprove an explanation about the world on the assumption that it is either incomplete or completely wrong. Every single experiment is a test of every single principle on which it is based. Engineering based upon the science requires faith that the scientific principles are sound, but the science does not. This lack of faith is exactly why scientific hypothesis and even things accepted as facts get overturned. You were making sense right up until the pray bit. You're assuming that it is conscious, and that it can hear your prayers, and that it cares, and that it is capable of interrupting said laws to do something about it. The word 'given' indicates some intent or purpose. All of this is completely out of line with science as it is positing an entity which is completely unnecessary with properties that should be detectable (responding to prayer) but have never shown up as having more effect than a placebo. Other than that, it appears to be some form of vague deism/pantheism -- ie. naturalism with a hat on.

Not that I disagree with your conclusion in any way, but there is a hidden assumption here of the nature of what is necessary (which would entail knowing the purpose of the universe/everything in it). I cannot see how parasites that can only live in an eyeball are in any way necessary or useful, but I am not all knowing. It could be argued that it's analogous to the child who does not understand why he has to work for his pocket money, why he cannot always have candy, or why he received an injection from a needle (the last two aren't so great because the harm/non-good comes from a lack of power). This is essentially the tired old 'God works in mysterious ways' argument -- somewhat absurd if you know anything about parasites or one of the many other sources of horrible senseless suffering -- but I would like to see your rebuttal.

Zorro. The parts of your post that aren't just assertions with nothing to back them up are an argument from ignorance. Many of your points have also already been covered. Please post something relevant and useful to the discussion that hasn't already been posted if you are going to say anything.

But feeling does not change what is true, and trying to invoke someone's emotions in order to make a point like that is emotional manipulation. Reincarnation is certainly supernatural, so are many/most interpretations of the karma concept. Nothing. Fictional characters can be entertaining, and even teach us useful lessons, but they don't require faith for this, and claiming that they can do something on their own is absurd. This depends largely on the definition of 'exists'. Abstract things cannot do anything except where they have a representation. Not only that, but not all those representations are the same. They occur in different brains/computers/pieces of paper. My Harry Potter may have different opinions than J.K. Rowling's harry potter. My solution to a differential equation must result in same output (in writing/typing/speaking) as everyone else's, but it need not be stored the same way. If there is some math/abstract realm where these things exist in the absence of a representation, I have no access to it. When someone says something exists they usually are implying that it can interact with the world, and can be accessed outside of a representation. I agree that much of the abstract is objective, but use of the word 'exists' requires either careful definition before use, lengthy debate, or some form of solipsism. Science is the antithesis of faith (ie. believing in something in the absence of or in opposition to evidence). Or have you changed the definition of that word again?

How I feel about a fact has no bearing on whether or not it is true. You were conflating or attempting to associate acknowledging your ability to (in principle) alter my values with me being okay with those altered values. I do not quite understand the role of faith in this. As far as I knew, such a set of concepts is more generally called a philosophy. In asking for an example, I am not trying to rebut the point, I genuinely want to know of some examples of such a religion. If that is the case, how are you defining god? If it is merely abstract, then it is no more or less real than Jar Jar binks. Or you may be putting it in the same category as a mathematical proof, something that follows from certain axioms? If this is the case, how exactly does it link back to the material world? I do not believe you meant either of these, perhaps you could elaborate further? Also, I do not accept that 'the abstract exists' is non-contentious or that the definition of 'exists' is taking on a fully consistent meaning. I ask for a third time that we take this up elsewhere (and possibly come back or continue this discussion in paralell). This is a very broad (and unusual? At least unusual to me) definition of religion which does not necessitate faith. It also includes many things which normally go under names like art and philosophy.

Not entirely sure what you mean. If the paint reflects diffusely there shouldn't be any real effect (other than light reflecting off of you) that depends on your position. From the photos, it looks like one of the shadows is darker than the others, I cannot tell if this is position based or from reflections in the room (if there is more light colored stuff in one direction, the shadow won't be as dark). There are also extra-dark spots where two shadows overlap. It could also be some trick of your eyes/visual processing. When there is a light near the path between you and the shadow you are less able to perceive the contrast in that region. The final option is that the reflection off of the paint is specular or otherwise directional (is it shiny or pearly looking?), you could check this by shining a smallish light from one angle at it and moving around the room (with the light fixed).

You're going to have to give me a picture or describe it more clearly. Can you take a photo?

And thus we approach my scheme of using the syllables from hirigana . Although there is a certain appeal to the binary system. Come to think of it, for the ababab system, you could just shorten it to a number, and append a syllable to the front to distinguish it from other uses of numbers. You are Hank-one trillion three hundred and seventy six billion nine hundred and eighty three million fourty two thousand one hundred and eight Or name everyone henry and append a number like the royalty do.

Normal speech is up to 7 syllables a second. Up to around [math]3.2\times 10^7\times 100[/math] seconds in a lifetime. Assuming you need to be able to say someone's name before they die, that's around 22 billion names. A conservative population growth rate of 0.5% gives us about 200 years. Or if you do not reuse names, people usually reproduce by their 30s, so we have very roughly 60-90 years.

A greater proportion of the light in the region of the shadow comes from the closest light. You can think of it this way: Any given spot has [math]l_1+l_2+l_3[/math] total light where the l are the contributions from the different lights. If you block out a light it becomes [math]l_2+l_3[/math] Blocking out the brightest one will reduce the light by more.

You could cheat slightly and use an alphabet that consists of syllables rather than one like the roman alphabet (like Japanese hirigana excluding or with special rules for one or two characters). Also, pronouncable varies from region to region (sometimes even within one language). Some have more trouble with consonant clusters than others. Some can't distinguish between syllables which are distinct in other languages. Some have sounds that are absent, or have meaning carried in tones. But for a very rough lower bound, we can use Hirigana excluding the 'n' sound, leaving us with 44 syllables. Assuming 4 syllables, we get around 3.7 million first names. 0.16 billion for 5. If you allow another 4 syllables for last (or middle) names, you get 14 or 600 trillion. I'm including some things which are a bit hard to distinguish here because I'm too lazy to do the combinatorics more accurately, like Aaaaa, but it'll be close enough. (You also get a bit more from shorter names as I only counted x not up to x syllables). This scheme takes us to 32 syllables before we have the entire mass of the visible universe consisting of humans. It'd be fewer (maybe down to around 20) if we start including things like tone, clicks from african languages, and other syllables that the japanese don't use. So I think we'd be okay until we reached other constraints, even if it got a bit cumbersome.

Baseless assertion. If it is contingent on, or interacts with the material world then it is amenable to measurement. Green is a label that I apply to a variety of things. Some of these are a class of physical phenomena (which are quite varied). The rest are phenomena that occur in my head. It only exists in the same way that 'fast' exists (I have said once already that this is another issue and is getting rather far off of the original topic. If you wish to have this discussion I would prefer we take it to another thread -- preferably one of the existing ones). Appeal to emotion and possibly the most intellectually dishonest thing you've said so far. Yes, you could change my brain so that I would want to kill people if you had the suitable knowledge. I accept this as a fact, but your attempt at emotional manipulation by implying this means I would not object to it has missed its mark. Please provide an example, I don't really know what you mean. This is precisely what I and any scientists/naturalists I know of mean by natural. The world as it is. The world that I can interact with and apply logic to. The word supernatural shifts from one vague meaning to another and I rarely see it pinned down to any intelligible meaning. Here are some proposed definitions to make communication easier: Natural -- Anything which can be measured and interacted with (in principle or practise). Definitely includes the material (anything with mass/stress-energy), I would normally include the rules which the material follows, but I shall leave that open to debate. Abstract -- The realm of ideas, maths, rules and thoughts. Things which are only interacted with by means of some representation. I am giving this its own category because it may overlap with natural in part or in whole or may not. Supernatural -- I still have no coherent definition here. Perhaps we could use it for things not in the other two categories (I cannot conceive of one). We have a far less loaded term for that: numinous. Try it out. If you want to use the words god (or God), supernatural, miraculous etc. as a pantheist would, or to describe the natural world in your day to day life, I have no problem. Unfortunately many people try the debating 'technique' of shoe-horning those words into a discussion, and then change the meaning once they do so. Now I know you wouldn't try something so intellectually dishonest, would you? Instead, use words that have a more consistent meaning, or define the ones you use rigorously. Plenty of people appreciate the numinous. Scientists as just as much, if not more, than others -- you rarely see laymen gaping in awe at a bacterium or the solution to an equation. You are right in that physics has little to do with metaphysics (other than constraining it), but one thing it has shown us is how woefully inadequate most of our early attempts at metaphysics were. The concept of a wavefunction is almost impossible to comprehend fully and intuitively, even when one can describe it more precisely than our best instruments can measure. It is so absurd that some deny it even today. Yet science led us to it and held our nose to it until we could not describe nature any other way. The wavefunction is still just a description, but when the descriptions are so wildly different to metaphysical claims, one must take it as a caution.

! Moderator Note Topic pinned as it looks like it will be useful. Please do add more

So I understood, but I've never seen it mentioned in any of my astro texts as to whether the hydrogen travels to the heavy elements or the heavy elements travel to the hydrogen. It seems likely that it's the latter if I apply my brain, but physics isn't always what seems obvious.

My values come from biology and society (more biology, really). Deduction requires axioms -- axioms which are predominantly inductive. As well as axioms which are informed by our physical state (such as: I dislike pain) which are arguably also inductive. Ideas and concepts are still accessable and examinable via deduction and induction. They do not influence the world or us except by having some materiial representation (such as a configuration of our brain, or of a machine). When they are in this form, they follow natural laws. One also has to be careful of conflating the abstract with some nebulous concept of the supernatural. Ideas and concepts bear no resemblance to an entity which could create the universe or most other supernatural and religious claims. This is leading towards a dualism/mind and or does maths/do ideas exist debate. May I suggest splitting the thread or taking it to one of the existing threads on that subject if you want to head down that path?