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das

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  1. stop playing the fool
  2. note Nx refers to itself (n+1) N x ≡ R(3) * n N x and is circular Self-referring statements is a circular statement.
  3. Ponicare Russell et al said self referencing statements ie impredicative definitions are invalid texts books on logic tell us self referencing ,statements (petitio principii) are invalid Godel uses at least 2 in his incompleteness theorem 1 The general result as to the existence of undecidable propositions reads: Proposition VI: To every ω-consistent recursive class c of formulae there correspond recursive class-signs r, such that neither v Gen r nor Neg (v Gen r) belongs to Flg© (where v is the free variable of r). Godel gives a prof of this he uses in that proof forumlas 1-45 formula 16 is self referencing 16. 0 N x ≡ x (n+1) N x ≡ R(3) * n N x note N x appears on both sides of the formular formula 28 which is defined from formular 16 is self referencing 28. 0 St v,x ≡ ε n {n <= l(x) & v Fr n,x & not (∃p)[n <= l(x) & v Fr p,x]} (k+1) St v,x ≡ ε n {n ∃p)[n < p < k St v,x & v Fr p,x]} note St v,x appears on both sides of the formular thus his incompleteness theorem is derived from 2 invalid self referencing statements and according to colin leslie dean his theorem is thus invalid http://gamahucherpress.yellowgum.com/books/philosophy/GODEL5.pdf GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM. ENDS IN ABSURDITY OR MEANINGLESSNESS GÖDEL IS A COMPLETE FAILURE AS HE ENDS IN UTTER MEANINGLESSNESS CASE STUDY IN THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF ALL VIEWS By COLIN LESLIE DEAN B.SC, B.A, B.LITT (HONS), M.A, B,LITT (HONS), M.A, M.A (PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES), MASTER OF PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES, GRAD CERT (LITERARY STUDIES) GAMAHUCHER PRESS WEST GEELONG, VICTORIA AUSTRALIA 2007
  4. sorry godel states godel is useing circular statement and philosophy poncicare russell et al say they are invalid sorry impredicative statements are as godel ponicare and russel said they are said they are and they are invalid as godel says they are
  5. godel uses impredicative statements which philosophers say are invalid thus as dean points out godels theorems are invalid it is no uses giving us the standard view as dean overthrows it
  6. if you cant say ramsey is right or wrong you cant say dean is wrong when he uses ramsey to show godel s invalid
  7. then why do you argue dean is wrong when he says godels theorems are invalid because he uses invalid axioms and statements based on the testimony of ramsey russell ponicare and philosophers
  8. then are they right
  9. why are you reluctant to say ramsey russell ponicare and philosophers are wrong
  10. simple question is ramsey et al right in saying AR is invalid are ponicare russell etal right in saying impredicative statements are invalid they are either right or wrong -which is it-simple question
  11. is ramsey right when he says axiom of reducibility has no place in mathematics are ponicare russell and philosophers right in saying impredicative statements are invalid
  12. i asked for a simple yes or no-is that so hard are those mathematician right or wrong when they say ar IMPREDICATIVE STATEMENTS ARE INVLAID IS A YES OR NO SO HARD
  13. simple yes or no ramsey say the axiom of reducibility is he right or wrong russell wittgenstien and others say the axiom id invalid are they right or wrong Poncicare Russell and philosophers say impredicative statements are invalid are they right or wrong
  14. go read any book on philosophy and they all say circular statements ie petitio principi are invalid http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/circular.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question even godel said they made mathematics false any first year phil students know this look on the net and you will see
  15. sorry i know why he is invalid he tells us he uses impredicative statements and these are philosophically invalid -thus making his proof invalid
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