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Well, there's a difference between an equation 'breaking' and giving just a wrong answer. I wouldn't say giving a wrong answer that is theoretically possible is an equation "breaking down", but when you get literal nonsense like infinite probabilities, that's when I would say an equation "breaks down".

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Generally, people (regardless of how they think it works) use the Fregean distinction in their theory of meaning. Frege used "sense" vs "reference", but there are other words for this distinction. The point is that there is a difference between reference (pointing at a thing) and sense (what about the thing you're pointing at). The standard dead horse example is the morning star and the evening star. They obviously mean different things and, for a long time, people thought they pointed at different things. It turns out that they're both Venus. So, "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" have different senses, but the same reference.

They're papers by a civil engineer talking about geology; what did you expect?

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No Anti-Realists here?

Mine remembers that I have it turned off. Click the lightswitch one next to the eraser.

Oops, shouldn't have had the negative in there, since I put the absolute value bars. My bad.

That's not how you would use probability there. In fact, I wouldn't use probability there. I'd use a range of values for position and generate a range of values for the force. Once you get the range of values, however, you can do things like calculate the probability of the force being a certain value. With a proper equation, like [latex]|F|=G\frac{{m_1}{m_2}}{r^2}[/latex], we get definite values. So, let's say we have four possible distance values: r1, r2, r3, r4. Given constant masses, they give us four constant forces: F1, F2, F3, F4. So, now we have something to work with. To find the probability of a given F, we need to find P(Fn&rn). Basic probability theory tells us that P(A&B)=P(A|B)xP(B). Since Fn is a deductive consequence of rn, we know that P(Fn|rm)=1. This means that P(Fn)=P(rn). So, the probability of any given force value is equal to the probability of the corresponding distance between the interacting objects. This, of course, means you need to know the probability distribution of the position. I didn't say it did. What I did say, though, is that multiplying a probability by a number with a unit on it is gibberish. It literally means nothing. And there's nothing in QM that I know of which co-incides with the way you're doing things. Now, this is better, since the scalar factor is unitless. However, we still have the problem of "What, exactly, is G the probability of?". Your resultant probability is vague to the point of not meaning anything at all. I'm also not sure what the lengths here are. I just went back, and still have no idea what you mean by 'poi'. Leaving aside the arbitrary use of a value equivalent to one as a multiplier, this doesn't work. Again, do the dimensional analysis. A unit divided by itself is unitless. A unitless value multiplied by a value with a unit means the resulting value has the unit of the united value. So, your area, then, is a length.

I'm not so sure about friendly; I had to get stitches after the last one But, seriously, imatfaal is right. There's a lot of discussion over any report that's not something like porn or adverts. They're really not. We have set rules (see the link at the bottom of every page) and we apply those rules when violations are reported (and when, in the course of perusing the fora, we run across a violation, the staff reports it for discussion in our hidden areas. We have both a hidden moderator forum and a hidden report center where we discuss violations of rules and trends of violations. Yes, one crackpot theory per thread. The speculation forum is no exception. And it might be even more important to stay on-topic in Speculations, since the speculators typically don't actually know the theories that they're going against. As such, they could interpret the off-topic speculations of another member in their thread as correcting them with mainstream science. That's not a desirable state of affairs. I did take a look at your warning points just now to see if you've been unjustly attacked, and they're both cut and dry cases of thread hijacking. If you disagree, however, feel free to send a staff member a PM and make your case. While there is quite a bit of variation among philosophers on some subjects, there is a class of mainstream theories. Logical Positivism, for example, is non-mainstream. This is already a thing. In fact, I've done that very thing a few times in my years before becoming staff. If you think a poster is off-topic in your thread, you ask them to stay on topic, and they don't, report one of the off-topic posts and we'll take care of it. Actually, if you see any off-topic discussions in a thread, regardless of whether or not you're the OP, please report it. The staff isn't omnipresent, so we need the help of the members to keep the forums in order. Good use of the report function is encouraged, but abuse of the report function is not (do not, for example, report a post because that person disagreed with you). There is, however, often an issue with this approach: As swansont points out, the OP is often not knowledgeable enough to know if a response is relevant or mainstream. That's why I said to report it, so we can check it out. If a discussion is off-topic, we'll split it. If it is on-topic, however, we'll put a friendly green modtip explaining why it's on-topic or do such explaining via a PM. Mainstream science is in the business of checking itself. That's one of the reasons it's science.

I'm sorry, I assumed that since you're throwing around phrases like "Schrödinger Hypothesis" you knew what they meant. In QM, we represent the state of a quantum system via what we call a state vector. When we act on a system, represented by using a linear operator on the state vector, we get a new observable property (represented by a scalar called the 'eigenvalue'). [latex]A|\Psi>={\lambda}|{\Psi}>[/latex] where A is the linear operator, lambda is the eigenvalue for the state vector Psi. To find the probability that lambda is observed, we take [latex]|<\Psi|\Psi>|^2[/latex] where <Psi| and |Psi> are complex conjugates of each other. THAT is how probability is incorporated into QM. This, however, has absolutely nothing to do with your 'equation'. In fact, as I said before, multiplying a probability by a scalar with a unit is meaningless. It literally doesn't mean anything to say something is 18i kg/m2 times more probable than something else.

1 what? In a meterstick's reference frame, it's still a meter. I'm still shy of two meters tall in my frame, no the ambiguous '1'. So, this is a state vector?

The probability of one photon doing, what, exactly? 4-mass is invariant and photons are massless. Period. Photons don't have spatial extent. Do you mean wavelength? And what's the radius of the Earth got to do with anything? Are we measuring from the photon being at the surface? If so, we can't treat the Earth as a point particle. What do you mean by 'tension'?

This is complete gibberish. First, your conditional probability in there is meaningless. What's a 'unit'? The probability of the unit doing what, exactly, given the origin? Given what about the origin? Why on earth would this undefined probability be dependent on some undefined thing about an arbitrarily chosen point in space? What does it even mean to multiply a probability by number with a unit? It's generally not accepted to leave imaginary numbers in the denominator, so I'll go ahead and multiply the numerator and denominator by the complex conjugate for you: [latex]G=-P(u|o){\times}\frac{m(u)}{r^2}i[/latex] So, let's do some unit analysis. Your units for gravity are ikg/m2 since probabilities are unitless. Yeah, that's not a unit of force. And even if it was, we've got the negative back, so it's not even a pushing force like you wanted.

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There are two main approaches to the fundamental reality of what science does. The first, called Scientific Realism, is that the goal of science to find the least wrong description of reality that it can. The other set of approaches, called Scientific Anti-Realism, is precisely not that. Most of the versions of Anti-Realism make the distinction between believing a theory is true and accepting that it is empirically adequate. The empirical adequacy, I shall argue, leads inevitably to Scientific Realism. This is often called The No Miracle Argument. In presenting it, I shall discuss Larry Laudans critique of Realism. Laudan has an introductory quote to his paper by Hillary Putnam (from which the class of arguments got its name) that I actually like, though Putnam should have tagged his quantifiers: The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesnt make the success of science a miracle (Putnam, 1975). Setting aside the quantifier issue, though Laudan disagrees, I do think it is true that the success of science is indeed an indicator that scientific realism is true. Laudan splits scientific realism into two partstruth and reference. The argument he gives for his opposition is as follows: If scientific theories are approximately true, they will typically be empirically successful. If the central terms in scientific theories genuinely refer, those theories will generally be empirically successful. Scientific theories are empirically successful. (Probably) Theories are approximately true and their terms genuinely refer. Laudan appears to have put it this way to give himself an advantage rather than to charitably present the position of the people he is criticizing. This is readily apparent in his attack on (2) as he describes it. He gives examples of theories realists say truly refer which are empirically unsuccessful. However, if we flip all of the conditionals to more accurately reflect what the realists hold, that issue vanishes:If scientific theories are empirically successful, the scientific theories are likely to be approximately true. If scientific theories are empirically successful, the central terms in scientific theories probably genuinely refer. Scientific Theories are empirically successful. Scientific theories are likely to be approximately true and their central terms probably genuinely refer. Notice that once we have the premises such that it accurately reflects the sentiments given in the Putnam quote, we now have a valid deductive argument rather than an abduction like Laudan gave. But what of the premises? I shall discuss them in order, but first we need to know what Laudan means by empirical success. Laudans definition is: a theory is successful so long as it has worked, i.e., so long as it has functioned in a variety of explanatory contexts, has led to confirmed predictions and has been of broad explanatory scope." So, it should be obvious that when talking about empirical success, were looking at the set of observation statements from prediction e:{e1, e2,, en} and the likelihood function for the theory P(ei|h). So, if P(ei|h)>P(ei|~h), that is the observation statement is more likely on the theory being true than the theory being false, for a sufficiently large portion of e (which satisfies Laudans definition of empirical success), the theory is more likely to be true (since it is trivial to show that P(h|e)>P(h) iff P(e|h)>P(e|~h)). That gives us the revised premise 1. Premise two is trivially true on any correspondence theory of truth given revised premise (1):If scientific theories are empirically successful, they are likely to be approximately true. If a statement is true iff it accurately corresponds to reality (that is, it accurately refers). By Hypothetical Syllogism, If scientific theories are empirically successful, they likely accurately correspond to reality (that is, they accurately refer) So, on a correspondence theory, premise (1) gives us premise (2) for free, and it has been shown that premise (1) is true. This means that the truth of scientific realism only relies on the empirical success of science. Since every use of technology is a test of various scientific theories (the computer used to type this paper relies on Electro-Magnetic theory and Quantum Mechanics, for instance), Id say that scientific theories are indeed rather empirically successful. From which it is validly concluded that scientific realism is true. So, we see, that if one accepts a theory as empirically adequate (as the Anti-Realists say to do), one ought to actually believe that the theory is true.

This weekend, I went to a certain 'Museum' and learned quite a bit. For instance, how antibacterial resistance works: I also learned that the ancient Greeks in Athens mocked Paul and Christianity over 500 years before Paul was even born. Unfortunately, I didn't think to take a picture of that one.

You can rewrite them in simple sentential logic, then use a assignment table to quite trivially see that they are both tautologies. In fact, the second one is of the form of an axiom of classical logics.

Anders Hoveland has been banned for plagiarism, copyright infringement, soap-boxing, trolling, and racism/sexism.

One thing I did notice about the math is putting periods at the end of equations. Be sure not to confuse the periods with ill-printed time derivatives.

I just skipped all of the exercises because I already knew the math, so I can't really comment.

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