PeterJ

Interesting thoughts. A few reactions. 'Unthinakble' need not mean 'incomprehensible. It would be unthinkable because it is undifferentiated. One mathematician who speaks of this likens it to an ice-wall, on which the intellect can gain no purchase. But this should not imply that it cannot be known, verified, comprehended. It would be our real identity, what we are, what you are. . It is ironic that mysticism is the only doctrine that states that all knowledge is possible. and thus that the universe is knowable for what it is. It is other people who usually believe it all beyond our ken and must remain a mystery. Check out McGinn's 'mysterianism'. Mysticism is the opposite of mysterianism. I see your point about the real producing the real. But it is such a big topic , and would take us so far into ideas that cause trouble here, that I think it's best to leave it as something to wonder about. . The 'I' of Genesis is the 'me' of the sage and the prophet. It would definitely be recognisable. But again, this is going to deep for the venue. You must be correct to say that whatever is real comes from the real. But for mysticism what is 'created' (produced) is not truly real. Nothing would really exist. This would be why we cannot prove that it does. Investigation of identity is mysticism, and to a lesser extent metaphysics. To 'rescue identity from mysticism' would be like trying to rescue electrons from physics. Mysticism, its practices, philosophy, teachings and motivation, is about nothing else. The claim of mysticism, i.e. the claim of people who have looked through the telescope, is that the 'I' of ordinary consciousness is not our identity. Otherwise our identity would be destroyed on our physical death. The 'I' of ordinary consciousness would be precisely what is destroyed, leaving our identity as what is left over. This could never live or die. We cannot develop a 'physics of identity' from what is not physical. The idea is a category-error. Physics does not address identity. Not even the identity of electrons. For physics the properties and attributes of a phenomenon would be what the phenomenon is, there would be no more to it. If there is anything else to a phenomenon it would be unobservable, unverifiable, untestable, and might as well be Nothing. . I think it is a dreadful mistake to try to explain the world by reference to just one of physics, philosophy and religion. It would be like trying to understand tennis while doing only mathematics. The world has to be investigated as whole, in all its aspects, with no worries about what is physics and what is not. Otherwise we will gain and great understanding of physics and no understanding of the world. The evidence for this outcome is all around us. One has to use the correct tools for the job in hand. Just my responses to your thoughts. Not pushing my view, just clarifying it. .

it's okay Fred, I would actually agree with you. I seem to have explained myself poorly. I would agree with what you say here except for one thing. When you say 'I' it might mean one of two things. If it means you, Fred Champion, then this would be an unreal (emergent, reducible) phenomenon. If, however, 'I' means what it means in Genesis, then it would refer to something real. This dual use of the word causes all sorts of misunderstandings. I can see what you mean about what is emergent being as real as its origin and in a way would agree. But whatever can be reduced cannot be as real as what cannot be reduced. That is, a piano is not more real than the electrons out of which it is made. Beaudrillard calls this reduced and ultimate reailty 'the desert of the real', and in the film the Matrix this is the chapter heading for the place in the book where Neo hides his secret software. For B, for instance, money is not real. if we go though all phenomena in the same way,. we end up with the only thing that is real. . B calls it a 'desert' because to the intellect it is undifferentiated and featureless, thus unthinkable. Physicists usually assume it is Nothing. Mysticism states that it is 'I', when we use this word to mean our real being, and not some contingent phenomena that in daily life we think of as 'I'. I feel our views are very close in many respects.

A recent book deals precisely with the reification of concepts and tools in physics. It is The World According to Quantum Mechanics by Ulrich Mohrhoff. It is a text book which explains the mathematics of QM, complete with exercises. . As such it might seem (to Swansont and other rocket scientists) to be rather elementary. But an interpretation of QM is given and this justifies the book's subtitle, which is, Why the Laws of Physics Make Sense After All'. The book represents my philosophical view precisely, but I wouldn't be able to explain the argument it makes because my maths is not good enough. I agree that it would be necessary to define 'real' for this discussion to begin to get anywhere. But I would have thought that the definition should be given by the person asking the question. I'll work with whatever definition I'm given. My default definition for 'real' would be 'having a true or independent (i.e. non-relative) existence. But this is a metaphysical and very general definition and it may not work here. It certainly would not work to say that Swansont's kidney is real in this sense. I will stop assuming that this is the correct definition, however, and wait for the one intended by the OP. I should have asked for clarification in the first place.

Which points out two differences between metaphysics and science. One avoids confirmation bias by looking for falsification rather than anecdotal evidence. It doesn't matter how many confirmations you can gather. If there's a solid contradiction, you toss the theory. This is strange thinking. Ot even crooked. The entire metod of metaphysics is the falsification of theories. This is exactly what it is. The method is called the dialectic. Your response is disappoimting. You asked me for empirical evidence. If you had wanted to talk about falsification then I would have done that. It is sophistry. And even rather daft. By your view consciousness studies can never be a scientific discipline. Do you really not know that metaphyscis is a methof of falsification, and no more reliant on anecdotes than physics? Some would say less so. No wonder you think so little of it. Science doesn't deal in proof. Do you imagine that a philosopher would not know this? This is more basic than F=MA. Science deals in proofs of falsity,just the same as metaphysics, always in search of a 'best' theory. This process is called 'abduction' by C,S, Peirce. You cannot prove what is true in either dsiciplne, but you can prove what is not. This is metaphysics 101. Why not just say you aren't interested? I don't mean to be unfriendly, but really, how was I supposed to respond? EDIT: I missed this. .Anyone claiming to know the underlying reality has to figure out a way to test it if it's going to be considered science. Of course. Mind you, it would be foolish to assume that whether it is considered science would decide whether it is plausible, reasonable or true. Hegel considered metaphysics a science, and so do I. Russell tried to formalise it precisely in his symbolic logic. It has been done by others. But I know what you mean. If it is to qualify as a physical theory,then it must be testable in physics. Likewise for it to be considered a philosophical theory it's ramifications would have to testable in metaphysics. We must give each its due for a well considered worldview. .

In my view, yes and no. Empiricism has never succeeded in overturning a result of metaphysical analysis. This could be seen as constituting an empirical proof of these results. But this argument is not overwhelming and you may not agree. I could point to a few million first-person reports confirming the results of metaphysics, but these would not constitute empirical evidence for a sceptic, just a massive coincidence. Some people reject consciousness as a scientific phenomenon for this reason, that there is no empirical proof for it. . I could point to the elegance, simplicity and systematic integrity of the fundamental theory that emerges if we take metaphysical results seriously. But this argument doesn't work for string theory so it might be rejected. I could point to the fact that no fundamental theory that ignores the results of metaphysics works. But I'm not sure this could be called empirical evidence. All in all, I think that to do metaphysics we have to imagine that we were given a brain for a reason and might as well use it, and then use whatever standards of proof and evidence we can find. There is no empirical proof that all apples fall down, but induction seems a reasonable reason for imagining they do. There is no empirical proof that Materialism is true, and never will be, but it is a metaphysical theory that some people like, so they argue that there are logical reasons for endorsing it. There are double standards. I would concede that in the sense that a physicist would use the word there is no empirical proof for metaphysical results. That is why they are metaphysical results. But in this case the OP's question 'What is real in physics' is a serious category error. It is not a question for physics. The only way to decide would be to work it out or use a form of empiricism that physics at this time does not recognise. Or, it is just asking 'what do physicists usually assume is real', which is an easy one. . For myself, I see no point in drawing any kind of line between physics and metaphysics until it can be shown that they are not entirely consistent in their findings. But I'd have to agree that the evidence of our physical senses is never going to be able to decide questions such as what is real. . If I may say some more. I respect your scepticism Swansont, and feel you take a thoughtful approach to these things. My problem here and elsewhere is that I am one of the most dogged critics of the way metaphysics is usually done. So when you criticise metaphysics I am torn between agreeing with you and defending it. You might appreciate this dilemma, since good physicists must often face the problem of defending physics in the face of the bad work that some people do, overstated claims, hasty conclusions, experimental errors, fraud and so forth. So I will defend the methods of metaphysics to the death, but I would not defend for a moment what passes for metaphysics in academia, which seems utterly dishonest and pointless to me.

Okay. Let's agree to differ about the limits of physics and whether it is capable of describing the world. But let us for the moment suspend disbelief sufficiently to concede that it might not be. Then we can talk about Taoism and metaphysics. . Metaphysics takes the results of physics as a priori knowledge and extrapolates from it in an attempt to explain these results within a fundamental or completely general theory. So it is both the first chapter and the last. It comes both before and after physics. It also takes into account phenomena that are not observable, consciousness being the most prominent. Metaphysics says, okay, so we have nonlocal effects, curved space, Higgs fields, cause and effect, the laws of logic, our human ability to reason, the evidence of our own senses, the evidence of our own experiences, the findings of many generations of philosophers and so forth. Let us put them all in the mix and see if we can construct a fundamental theory that would explain how all this is possible. Really it is just thinking. When we look for an interpretation of QM, we are thinking about metaphysics. I cannot understand why physicists are so allergic to it. Taoism grows out of three texts in particular, the Lao-tsu, Chuang-tsu and a third the name of which slips my mind for now. These are philosophical texts. You might argue, as you do, that all philosophy might as well be religion, but I think you'd struggle to define these words in such a way as to make them synonyms. Whitehead calls the Christianity he knew 'a religion is search of a metaphysic', and this seems the correct use of the words to me. Religious Taoism, (which is an official branch of Taoism), was created about 500 years after Lao tsu. Gods were invented, along with a punishment and reward system, heaven and hell and all that, and Lao-Tsu was elevated to sainthood. From a philosophical perspective this might be seen as a degeneration of Taoism. But it nicely illustrates how a perfectly good philosophical doctrine can be turned into an incomprehensible muddle of beliefs and dogmas. It explains how it is possible to agree with Whitehead, while nevertheless believing that the writings of, say, Meister Eckhart, represent a sound metaphysical position. You look at Taoism and see it just as Whitehead sees Christianity. But in both cases the core philosophy that underlies all the surface clutter of these religions is being ignored. As you say, everyone practices their own religion. In metaphysics things are different. We have to demonstrate our arguments and make them valid and sound, and where they reach a result we are not free to endorse some other result, as if it was all a matter of opinion. If Lao-tsu's and Chuang-tsu's description of the world is wrong then let us falsify it. But let us not dismiss it unthinkingly on religious grounds. Religion has nothing to do with anything in metaphysics. Or not unless we are prepared to let our reason be infected by temperament and prejudice, and limited by dogma and orthodoxy. It's the metaphysical scheme of Lao-tsu that is of interest in physics, not any of the later religious elaborations. In physics there is no case for walking in his footsteps, no grants would be available for ten years sitting in meditation, but we can easily examine what he claims to have discovered for its plausibility and usefulness, especially since as yet we have no better fundamental theory. This is off the cuff. Hopefully it isn't all waffle.

Okay Thanks for the clarification. A lot of people have said the same thing though. There are dozens of articles out there explaining this as 'splitting' an 'electron'. Yet, despite this torrent of news, an electron has not been split. It's no wonder people get the wrong idea about such things. Anything for a headline I suppose. It makes no difference to me whether an electron has been split or not, so I'm certainly not arguing, but there's something I do not understand here. The Scientific American article begins... "In a feat of technical mastery, condensed matter physicists have managed to detect the elusive third constituent of an electron - its 'orbiton'" How can this be announced if it is a fact that an electron has no constituents?

I would have thought Scientific American was careful enough for most people.

Okay. But most article use the word 'split'. They should be more careful.

Or, we can leave space. Obviously this is not usually thought to be possible in physics, although a few well-known physicists have argued that it is. I cannot prove that it is. But a vast quantity of people claim that it is possible to transcend time and space to see what is prior. For instance, seeing as how I've already blotted my copybook by mentioning Lao-tsu, he would be one of them. He writes 'Knowing the ancient beginnings is the essence of Tao'. That is to say, his Taoism is all about knowing this. I'm not trying to derail the thread. It's just that this other view should at least get a mention. For Lao-tsu Taoism is not a religion but a philosophy and metaphysical scheme. As such, it works, and overcomes the problems that are being discussed here. Just because it would work is, I agree, not a reason to fall over and endorse it. But neither can we completely dismiss it without coming up with something better. Some people who argue for the views of Lao-tsu and his like are anti-science. I am not anti-science, but I wish its limits were better recognised. Massimo Pugliucci has just posted a relevant article on this topic at Scienta Salon subsequent to his hosting a discussion between Brian Greene and Peter Galison. My browser won't copy the link, but it'll be googlable under the title 'The Evidence Crisis' - Scienta Salon (his blog and online journal).

Okay, I get that Swansont. I suppose it's a fair use of the word if it means the lowest level accessible to physics. But it is very misleading term outside of physics. It could be interpreted to mean that particles that are indivisible are fundamental. Didn't someone recently split an electron? I'm sure I read about the experiment somewhere. Fred - I feel you are stuck in physics mode, whereby we can know nothing except what our physical sense can detect. We'll probably have to go on disagreeing about this.

Yes, I'm not using it the way physics uses it. I'm using the dictionary definition. Physics uses the phrase 'fundamental physics', a phrase which assumes that whatever is fundamental is observable, like a planet or hydrogen. I'm suggesting that there is no such thing as fundamental physics.

Pardon my earlier rather silly post. I was trying to get across that I am not just shooting the breeze, but trying to convey certainty. Some responses to remarks above. There is no such thing as a fundamental particle. This is obvious. In order to exist a particle requires the prior, or at least simultaneous, existence of time and space. Clearly, then, particles are not fundamental. The question of whether something that is non-physical can exist is an easy one. We all know that this is possible. Even if all mental phenomena have a physical correlate, they are still not res extensa. The more difficult question is whether something can exist if it is fundamental. If it is fundamental then it has an independent existence. Otherwise is has only a relative existence. But how, if it is independent, can it exist in the absence of space and time? It cannot. This is why the only fundamental theory that makes the slightest bit of sense would state that what is fundamental does not exist in time and space, and, also, that it would be misleading even to state that it exists. Rather, it would be real. Sometimes people describe it as existing and not-existing, allowing for the two ways we might conceive of it. I say 'it', but of course we're talking here about the source of every phenomena and 'the world as a whole, so we cannot actually separate ourselves and describe it as an object. The logic would be what is important here. A fundamental theory for which the Absolute exists in the same way as the Moon will inevitably fail and have to remain non-reductive. This is the reason why physics cannot understand ex nihilo creation. It sees the absence of time and space and assumes this must be Nothing. It is a good theory, but it is non-reductive. For it to work, we would need a phenomenon that looks exactly like Nothing to any observer, but is in fact the source of all existence. Either that or it's turtles all the way down.

I see it like this. If there are two particles they have a spatial relationship. Each particle occupies a different location in space. No spatial relationship, no particles. There can only be one fundamental phenomenon. If there were two it would impossible to explain this cosmic coincidence. As they would be fundamental they could not be dependent on each other, each could exist independently, and one could not cause the existence of the other. The logical problems associated with a fundamental phenomenon, (such as Fred's point about the impossibility of motion and change emerging from a phenomenon that does not interact or change), can only be overcome by denying the true reality of motion and change. This was asserted by, for instance, Parmenides and Zeno. If we reify motion and change, or the phenomena that change and move, then there is no possibility of constructing a fundamental theory. The logic simply cannot be made to work, as history shows. As to how form can arise from formlessness. or change arise from changelessness, this is a deep and difficult topic. Spencer Brown models the process as a calculus in his Laws of Form, and this may be the easiest way in to this idea for someone coming from physics. The idea that if there is one thing then there must be two, and that if there are two then there must be three, and so forth, appears in the Tao Te Ching, but that's a more difficult read. It is the Tao that I'm talking about here. however, as being fundamental. Yes, I know, I know. It's all pink fairies and flying spaghetti monsters. Nevertheless, I promise to pay £10,000 to the first person who can prove it is, and would be happy to have the money held by a third party in the meantime, James Randi style.

A fundamental phenomenon is one that can exist independently and is not emergent or relative. In this sense it is real, where dependent, composite or relative phenomena are emergent. like money or atoms. Fred is looking at relative existence and calling it 'real'. This doesn't work as a fundamental theory because it isn't fundamental. How can there be two fundamental things? As studiot says, two things implies three things. And so on... The idea of two fundamental things with a space between them is incoherent. We would have to go deeper for a fundamental theory.

That's a very good question. It seems to be a terminal objection.

If all phenomena are relative then no phenomenon is fundamental. I don't buy that. The reason you don't how to take the meaning of 'non-composite phenomenon' may be that for all phenomenon would are relative. I would agree that all space-time phenomena would be relative, but I would not agree that they originate in a relative phenomenon, since then the original phenomenon would have to two phenomena. But each to his own.

Fred. I've misread you a couple of times here. Sorry about that. I'll follow up on just one issue. A composite phenomenon must reduce to a non-composite phenomenon. A non-composite phenomenon must reduce to, what?

Okay. Sorry. I must have misread your post. I find a lot to disagree with here. First would be the idea that there is empty space between the spheres that space is made out of. The second would be the idea that a continuum can be extended. I see the logic that leads you to posit a finite smallest thing, but the same logic can be made to lead to the idea that all things are composite, and reduce to voidness or emptiness. But I don't want to argue. Just saying there's another view.

No, no. That isn't your least bad idea. It is a very unorthodox idea that what is emergent is less real than what it emerges from. Is a piano more real than the electrons from which it is made? I find your idea back to front. You say that space comes from something, therefore it is real. I would say it comes from something, therefore it is not real. It does go to show that one cannot take anything for granted in these discussions. I never would have guessed that someone would see emergence in this way, as a movement towards reality rather than away from it. I see now why we are at odds, and why my view must seem strange to you. I see no reason to assume that space is real, but I see your line of thought. My response would be that if space is a continuum there are no little spheres from which to build anything.

Hi Tim. I think you nicely make my previous point.

Yes. Quite right. I'm too quick to argue. But I'm a cynic. I do not see learning about neuroscience as being equivalent to learning about consciousness. Now I come to think of it, I wonder why we're talking on a thread that asks if the universe is a brain cell. The answer is no. It's not a teapot either.

Ha. Very good! And very Zen.

Kaku on Mind? Does he know anything about it? I thought he simply assumed it reduces to brain. I'd recommend Schrodinger instead. .

But according to physical theories a brain in a vat is exactly what we are. It's just that we call the vat a skull.