PeterJ

Exactly! I would agree completely. It is not that QM breaks or does not break the LEM, but that which of these it is depends on whether, say, the wave-particle duality is, in fact, a contradiction, or whether it merely implies a third state or phenomenon. This would be an empirical matter, one that must be decided by physicists from the experimental evidence, because logic cannot help us decide. I don't think any of this is very contentious, and it would follow directly from Aristotle's defintion for a true contradictory pair. In answer to your question, Andrew, I don't think QM is special in regard to logic but that it raises, as you say, essentially the same issues as arise for the 'raining/sunny' example. Thus it remains an open question in physics whether the universe breaks Aristotles rules, Analysis shows that the universe cannot break the rules, since A wrote them in such a way as to disallow this possibility. This is what I was trying to say. It makes QM no easier to understand, and I would say more difficult, but the logic is very simple. If we don't know that there is no third option then we don't know whether it would be correct to apply the tertium non datur rule. This decision cannot be made in any kind of logic for it would be an empirical matter. . I think that's proably all I wanted to say.

I see. So if I can't do the maths for QM then I can't have an opinion on logic or the structure of reality. Shame. Best that you go on ignoring my comments then. It seems to me, ydoaPs, that you just don't want to engage with the issues and feel an overwhelming need to put me down. Yes, you've told me that the ontological structure of QM does not admit of Boolean logic. Unfortunately I think you are making a logical mistake, as I have explained, if you think this allows physics to ignore Aristotle. You fail to comment on my responses, however, so I'll assume that there's no point in me making any more. If you could point to a true contradiction breaking the rules there would be something to talk about. It's easy to write down a mathematical contradiction but not so easy to show that it has a correlate in reality. . Yeah. That's what I would expect.

Yes, the idea that QM is "not logical" is the idea that doesn't fly for me. The paradoxes in relativity may arise from a misunderstanding of the theory, but within physics they seem more likely to arise from a misunderstanding of logic. I don't think logic is devalued by this approach. It is entirely rigorous, and if it restricts the conclusions we can arrive at in logic then this is the whole idea of having careful rules, to stop us reaching false conclusions. To be completely clear - Aristotles defintion for a contradictory pair is: "Of every contradictory pair one member is true and one false." If this is not the case then there is no contradiction and the LEM becomes irrelevant. It was only when I read a clear commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione that I realised what a genius he was. He nailed it.

I've been pondering the same question. This is why I'm not quite sure that YpoaDs and I have any real disagreement. In logic the situation is easier since one can define or construct a contradiction and know that it is one. We can define a statement as being true or false and have to do this for our axioms. But in physics we are dealing with matters of fact so must establish contradictions empirically. "So, as Aristotelian logic only applies where Aristotelian logic applies, the question arises of how one can know when it applies." I would say it always applies in just the way that Aristotle specifies. But laws relating to contradictions will only apply where there is one. Say the proposed contradiction is 'It is raining' and 'It is sunny'. The LEM would not apply since obviously this is not a legitmate contradiction (it could be foggy). This would not mean that the laws of logic do not apply to the weather. They just do not apply to this pair of statements. "If one finds a case where there appears to be a contradiction, how does one know if this is a violation of LEM (or some other law of logic) or if it just a case where the logic doesn't apply?" At this moment it seems to me that there cannot be a case of a violation of the LEM except where it is a mistake in a dialectic argument. Whether the case you mention is in fact a contradiction would be an empirical matter. In philosophy often it would be a logical matter and so we can be certain of contradictions. We can construct statements that we can define as contradictory. In physics they can be defined for a theory but as Aristotle points out, whether our logic applies to reality in any particular case would not be something that logic can decide. I would say that reality cannot violate the LEM. Ambiguous logical cases where the LEM would not apply are noted by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, where he clarifies the exact application of his system, but for him reality is not an issue. If an apparent contradiction turns out to have a third option then clearly it wasn't a contradiction in the first place. The significance of this way of coming at logic is that it allows metaphysics to be solved in principle, by simply rejecting all those apparent antimonies as false contradictions. (As we do when we resolve the freewill/determinism contradiction with compatibilism). But the issue also seems relevant in QM since it seems to assumed sometimes that there is no third option even though the contradiction has not been empirically established. So Aristotle appears to fail, where in fact it would be just that we are not keeping to the rules. All of this is based firmly on Aristotle's clear instructions for the use of his logic and is not some idiosyncratic opinion. I may be making the odd mistake, but I've written about this quite publicly and received no complaints. John Corcoran is excellent on these topics if you want to read someone with more clout. He also proposes that we usually overlook the details of Aristotle's rules and so reach incorrect results.

I don't know why you re-quoted those remarks. ydoaPs.. Do you have some sort of problem with them? Did I suggest that I was an expert in QM and the maths? Did you mean to suggest something helpful to the discussion? Why is this always such an unpleasant place to have a conversation? It sems to be unique among forums for its unpleasantness. So, the spin is clockwise and anti-clockwise at the same time. Where is the logical problem? Obviously this is not a contradiction if both states can exist at once.

I'm afraid I have no idea what these sybols mean, Andrew, They could be ancient runes. Heisenberg uses the example, 'Here is a table' and 'Here is-not a table', I'd have to ask what the symbols claim about the universe, and in what way this claim would imply the failure of the LEM. Any disagreement here, I hasten to say, is not about physics or its associated maths as far as I'm concerned. It is about how to interpret Aristotle and apply his rules, and how to relate them to QM and the data, which would be a given. . . Keepimg the physics at my level here's what I'm proposing. The wave-particle duality is often seen as implying the breakdown of Aristotle's dialectical logic as a description of reality. But this duality is not a logical contradiction. If an electron is not a particle and not a wave then it is something else. If it is not here and not there then no it is nowhere. No logical problems arise. Conceptual problems arise but they are not the issue. It would only be where we assume that an electron must be one thing or the other that logical problems would seem to arise, But if we make this assumption then we are breaking the rules. Aristotle tells us that whether this duality is a logical contradiction would be an empirical matter, not something we can just assume. If we assume it is a contradition and logical problems arise then this would indicate the falsity of our assumption. It's a very simple issue but deceptively deep. The universe would transcend Aristotle's logic, but not contradict or entail any modfication to it, This would be just as Kant proposes. Reality would transcend the categories of thought. But it would not break the laws of thought, even in physics. This would be impossible because Aristotle designed them to cover all the possibilities.

I'm proposing that there is no such thing as a true contradiction. Here 'true' would mean 'out there in the world'. If quantum theory departs from Aristotle that's fine, it's a theory.and can do what it likes. But there is as yet no evidence that reality itself departs from his rules. Some folks would see the particle-wave duality, superposition etc. as requiring a modification to the rules (Heisenberg et al), but this is not the case. Aristiotle covered all the bases. My main point wouldbe that in order to legimately apply the LEM we must be sure that we are dealing with a contradiction. For a contradiction one member of the pair must be true and the other false. This is not something that the LEM decides, it is what we must decide before we know whether to apply the LEM. Aristotle makes this very clear and it is really just common-sense. So, in order to show that QM requires abandoning the LEM we would have to show that it contains a contradiction for which there is a third option. But if there is a third option then there is no contradiction in the first place. For this reason Aristotle's rules cannot be broken by reality. They are rules for the dialectic, not for reality. I suspect that there's a bit of a mismatch here between what I'm suggesting and the objections that are coming up, but we'll see. Is that more clear? . This problem is much more important in metaphysics, where Aristotle is regularly abused as a matter of course, but it comes up quite often in relation to QM.

The LEM assumes there are no other possibilities where there is a contradiction. If there is no contradiction then the LEM is irrelevant to anything. So, to show a breach of the LEM one first has to first establish a contradiction. . . If the LEM does not apply in some situation then that's no problem. This would not be a breach of the LEM. I'm suggesting that QM does not breach the LEM. To say it does not apply at all would be to say that no contradictions arise in QM that are subject to it, which cannot be true. But if parts of QM have no use for it that would not be surprising or have any philosophical consequences. . To show that QM somehow invalidates the LEM we would have to identify a true contradition within the theory which does actually have a third option. If it simply does not apply in some situation this would be uninteresting. It only ever applies where there is a contradiction as specified by Aristotle. Andrew - The best book I've found on the topic so far is CWA Whittaker, Aristotle's De Interpretatione - Contradiction and Dialectic. It's very good indeed. He disusses the small print for the 'laws of thought' at length, it being the topic of the book. John Corcoran is also very good and he has pointed out the mistake we regularly make with logic by overlooking the small print. On the whole this error goes unnoticed. It causes major problems in philsophy, but none in physics afaik just as long as we identify contradictions properly.

I think you are abusing Aristotle in the same way as most people do, as well as being arrogant about how well philosophers understand QM. But I'll wait for an example of a contravention of the LEM before going on, if you can find one. It would be impossible for QM to break the LEM since Aristotle allowed for all possibilites. It's just that people don't read the small print. If you can prove that there is such a thing as a true contradiction you will become famous.

Not in my opinion. It would be impossible for Aristotles rules to be incompatible with Reality. They're rules for logic - not for things. Things can do what they like. . If you can find an example of a true contradiction, or an actual exception to the LEM you'll make a name for yourself. Philosophers are still arguing about the possibility and empirically the case is not settled.

Oh, okay. Got it. This was my mistake. What I'm proposing is that QM would not require a modifcation to the LEM, so it seems that we need not disagree. It's Heisenberg's view that I would oppose, since he concluded that QM showed that the universe broke Aristotle's rules for thinking.

Hmm. No good just stating this about QM. I'm disagreeing.

I see no problem with Aristotle's logic if applied properly. No need to complicate matters. There could never be a real life example of a failure in his logic since it does not make predictions for reality, The rules apply where the conditions apply, and if the conditions do not apply then his rules are irrelevant. IF we have a contradiction THEN the laws of thought can be applied to them. First we have to establish the contradiction.

BalckSunGod - Nice comment. You might like this. "Although all forms, and thus all universes, are possible, and any particular form is mutable, it becomes evident that the laws relating to such forms are the same in any universe. It is this sameness, the idea that we can find a reality which is independent of how the universe actually appears, that lends such fascination to the study of mathematics. That mathematics, in common with other art forms, can lead us beyond ordinary existence, and can show us something of the structure in which all creation hangs together, is no new idea. But mathematical texts generally begin the story somewhere in the middle, leaving the reader to pick up the thread as best he can. Here the story is traced from the beginning. Unlike more superficial forms of expertise, mathematics is a way of saying less and less about more and more. A mathematical text is thus not an end in itself, but a key to a world beyond the compass of ordinary description. " George Spencer Brown - Laws of Form

“The reason why our sentient, percipient, and thinking ego is met nowhere within our scientific world picture can be easily indicated in seven words: because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it. But of course, here we knock against the arithmetical paradox; there appears to be a great multitude of these conscious egos, the world, however, is only one. This comes from the fashion in which the world-concept produces itself. The several domains of “private” consciousness overlap. The region common to us all where they all overlap is the construct of the “real world around us.” With all that an uncomfortable feeling remains, prompting such questions as; is my world really the same as yours? Is there one real world to be distinguished from its pictures introjected by way of perception into every one of us? And if so, are these pictures like unto the real world or is the latter, the world “in itself,” perhaps very different from the one we perceive? Such questions are ingenious, but, in my opinion, very apt to confuse the issue. They have no adequate answers. They are all, or lead to, antimonies springing from the one source, which I called the arithmetical paradox; the many conscious egos from whose mental experiences the one world is concocted. … There are two way out of the number paradox, both appearing rather lunatic from the point of view of present scientific thought (based on ancient Greek thought and thus thoroughly “Western”). One way out is the multiplication of the world in Leibnitz’s fearful doctrine of monads: every monad to be a world by itself, no communication between them; the monad “has no windows,” it is “incommunicado.” That they all agree with each other is called “pre-established harmony”. … There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of minds or consciousnesses. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth, there is only one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads. And not only the Upanishads. The mystically experienced union with God regularly entails this attitude unless it is opposed by strong existing prejudices;…” Erwin Schrödinger The Oneness of Mind

Yes. The idea that science can measure consciousness is just plain daft. I don't know how anyone can believe otherwise when it's so obvious. There's lots of bluster here but no counter-evidence and It's perfectly safe to say there never will be any. I'm not sure it's worth arguing about something so blindingly apparent so I'l stop. Objectors will need to produce some evidence or they're waiving their arms arouinf for nothing. We've known for millenia that consiousness is not measurable.

..."Just as a thought experiment- imagine that I could copy myself- every atom, molecule and electron replicated exactly in terms of its position and motion. Would that copy say he was conscious if you asked him?" I don't know, and nor do you. What has his first-person report got to do with anything anyway? Why ask, why not just meausre whether he is conscious? Oh yes, because you can't. So you have to ask, and you end up with a science that is not empirical. Some science. You seem to be ignoring a million articles on the topic as well as common sense.

Well, I have given a reason. Science cannot observe this phenomenon. Science is not 'accessing it' and never will. Do you not know the 'other minds' problem, or the unfalsifiability of solipsism? It would be impossible for anybody to demonstrate the existence of consciousness, It can only be inferred or extrapolated from our own undemonstrable experience. This has all been said before a thousand times and often in respectable journals. It's just the facts, and we either accept them or not.

I would say Searle is wrong. It would mean basing a whole science on first-person reports and I can't see much use for such a limited approach. So far it's got us nowhere. Science should be first-hand, I would say, and not rely on anecdotes. A scientists should be studying the phenomenon itself, not asking for directions to it. The problem would be that the word 'science' has some leeway as to meaning. I do think that consciousness can be addressed by science, but not while we limit the use of the word to the natural sciences and the evidence of our physical sense alone. If we call metaphysics a science of logic then this changes things, and if we call Buddhism a science of mind things change a lot. This would entail calling mind a sixth sense, so that the meaning of 'empiricism' is extended. Also, more importantly, I would disagree with Searle that consciousness is ontologically subjective. I'm not even sure that this phrase makes any sense. How can ontology be subjective unless the whole world is subjective? . Counter-example? It is yet another inconclusive article claiming that success is nearly ours! Just a little longer to wait and, of course, more funding required. The article shows just how far we have to go.

I ommtted the 'yet' for a reason. This is not a phenomenon accessible to observation. The inability of science to deal with this phenonemon is surely rather obvious.

You'll find that there is no need to believe in mutliple minds, and for me that stuff about split brains is irrrelevant. What we see is multiple egoic consciousnesses, but we have not yet shown that they do not emerge from a singularity, and mysticism would state that they do. Indeed, it is said that we can verify that they do.

Hi ydoaPs Okay, I'll bite. I'd like to just send you to a couple of essays, but I'll summarise in case it works. A legitimate dialectical contradiction depends on two things: 1. The contradiction is between A/not-A. (Ie. A/B is not a contradiction unless B stands for not-A) 2. It is a fact that one of A or not-A is true and the other is false. If you examine the contradictions of metaphysics and physics they usually do not meet these conditions. Very often the second condition is ignored, and quite often both. If an electron is a wave and a particle this would not be a contradiction. If both Materialism and idealism are false this would not require any modification to A's rules. Aristotle allows for all existential situations. The rules cannot be broken by Nature because where Nature seems to break them then there cannot have been a contradiction in the first place. That's it in brief. I rely heavily on Whittaker's book on 'De Interpretatione' for my grasp of Aristotle and it is very clear. Unmissable I would say. It seems that people do not often read the small print for the laws of thought. It might help if you could cite a specific contradiction that we could analyse.

Sillybilly - Yes, that's true. But at least articles on consciousness can get published these days, and it isn't just assumed that consciousness is a folk superstition. Elsewhere another researcher points out that if consciousness reduces to matter then the problem of consiousness is in fact the problem of matter. The problem of matter is no easier than the problem of consciousness. 'Consciousness Explained' gets my vote for the most idiotic book title ever. Damn good marketing though. I think you;re right, we do live in exciting times. I suspect things are changing big time and that it won't be long before science begins to change its mind about religion. The philosophers need to change first for this to happen, but I think maybe they are going to change. Academic philosophy is coming in for a lot of criticism these days for making no progress in two millennia, and this may lead them to rethink their approach. I feel that people like Hawking and Tyson are making some good points. Fingers crossed.

Phi - "Science understands this concept that you can't truly prove a theory, only support it with evidence. How does a religion I decide to pick up prove reality? Is it just magic? " It's a question that deserves an answer, but really all it takes is to read a book or two. It's not as if it's a secret. Let's ignore dogmatic religion because, well, it's dogmatic. Everybody uses the method you describe at times. But esoteric religion is also the pursuit of the sort of knowledge that only comes with identity and with apperception, the study of ones own mind. Religion also uses metaphysics, which is the use of logic to work stuff out or demonstrate it. No magic necessary. Of course, religion can be different things to different people. But this brief answer would apply wherever religion is more than dogmatic theism. The religious ideas of the 'people of the book' are often rejected or considerably modified by those who bypass the book for a direct exploration of reality. Anybody can undertake such research, but it cannot be done for someone else. A decent answer would take too long and really one needs to do ones own delving into these things for any hope of a decent understanding of them. The literature is vast. As for consciousness being an illusion, moth, this idea more or less went away with Behaviourism. It's the scientific equivalent of hiding under the bedclothes. And yet, mysticism does say that consciousness is largely a deception, and that even Mind has to be transcended for Reality.

It seems to me that evolution is off-topic, or not very important to the topic. More importantly and less contrversially science (the natural kind) cannot explain consciousness, and this alone means giving a negative answer to the OP's question. It hardly needs saying that it cannot explain metaphysics either. Horses for courses.