PeterJ

Hang on. You cannot start with an idea that is paradoxical. If you do this you are doomed. To start by assuming the answer to the question we're trying to decide is cheating big time. . It is not for no reason that Democritus' view has not been successful. You need to go back further, reduce the atoms and void. . . .

Aha. Yes, Now I see what you mean. No, the two statements are not contradictory. Defined as it usual is physics sheds no light on metaphysical questions. As soon as we ask one we have abandoned physics. If we say that they are the same discipline at the limit, however, as I would rather heretically consider them to be, then things would be different. Hence my second statement. Physics on its own is a very restricted method and can have nothing to say about metaphysical questions. Physicists can do metaphysics, of course, but when they do this they become metaphysicians and should not be charging their expenses to the physics department. . Examples? You must know them already. They are known collectively as 'the problems of philosophy'. Physicists can have nothing to say about fundamentals, about how the universe begins, whether it begins, how big it is, the ontological status of space and time, the origin of mind and matter, ethics and many other things. This would include the question of whether spacetime is an ideal continuum or a series of points. For Einstein's favourite mathematican, (whose name slips my mind right now), this was a central problem in physics and mathematics, reconciling the staccato of numbers with the legato of the contuinuum. It is a conceptual, mathematical and metaphysical problem, not something that can be solved by peering at spacetime. This and others like it are the problems that prevent physics from constructing a fundamental theory of anything. Solving them is a task that we assigned to metaphysics long ago, and the reason why it was created in the first place. . Strangely, I may have more confidence in physics as a guide to the solutions to these problems than many physicists, for I do believe that the scientific data gives us clues. Strong ones in fact. It is very difficult to explain nonlocal effects once we have assumed that spacetime is an extended series of locations. This suggests that it is not. The fact that such a spacetime would be a logical contradiction also suggests that it is not. There are other examples. I have full confidence, or as much as any cautious physicist, in the results of physics. For me physics and metaphysics would be in full agreement, shedding light on each other and having complementary results. This view would be impossible if we hold on to our usual notion of extended spacetime, however, as we know, since then our physics will be irreconcilable with our reason and spacetime will seem to be paradoxical. We will not be able to make sense of our own idea of it. The truth is, of course, is that it would be impossible to do physics without metaphysics, and various physcists say as much in their writings. But we can do as little as possible, and in this way cut physics off from a fundamental theory. Sometime physicists do take metaphysics seriously. Paul Davies would be a good example. He comes very close to a fundamental theory in The Mind of God. But on the whole it is ignored. It is widely assumed to be a waste of time. I see this as physics shooting itself in the foot and it really annoys me, as you might be able to tell. .

Nope, Sorry. You'll have to explain the relevance. Do you disagree with those comments?

But this is just the view that is contradictory and paradoxical. It is not solving the problem but ignoring it. An infinite space filled with atoms takes us back to Democritus and this is not progress. It cannot be a fundamental view. It does not answer any questions but is just our usual folk-psychological and paradoxical view of spacetime. The only person I know who argues for Democritus (Victor Stenger) finds, as a consequence, that he has to argue for ex nihilo creation. This is a contradiction and a paradox. It is the abandonment of reason for untestable and incomprehensible speculation. This doesn't mean it is wrong, of course, but if is right then the universe is a true contradiction. I do not see how atoms can 'form a continuum'. If we assume they can,then we'd have to ask what keeps the atoms apart, and then we are back to the OPs question. You may be right that a paradox is not always a contradiction and vice versa, but I'm struggling to think of a case where they are not the same thing. In philosophy, as a far as I'm aware, they would always be the same thing. A true paradox would be a true contradiction. I believe that it is possible to get 'more to the bottom of the issues than this'. But probablistic reasoning won't do it. You'd have to reason deterministically all the way to the answer, since it would be untestable in physics.

I do not mean to be controversial here. The natural sciences offer no insight into metaphysical questions and this is why they are called metaphysical questions. This seems to be the usual view in physics. But the implications for the limtations on physics are usually glossed over or forgotten. . Actually I think that the sciences do offer an insight into metaphysical questions, especially QM, but only if we explore the reason why it cannot finally answer them, and this would mean doing metaphysics. So I see theoretical physics and metaphysics as being a single topic. If they are not then theoretical physics is nonreductive.and can never explain the world. To me this seems an orthodox scientific view. Actually I see it as little more than common sense. Once the study of absolutes is excluded from physics then it must remain forever nonreductive. No?

I can't comment on the physics of this and can't always see what you mean, but it seems to be rather metaphysically questionnable. It does not seem to get to the bottom of the issues. It seem to take for granted the reality of mass, time, space, etc. But if our concepts of these things are contradictions then I don;t think we can assume they are correct and would prefer the opposite assumption. MN mat be an illusionist, but an illusion of a contradiciton is not a real contradiction. But I'm aware that I may be missing your point here.

John - I'm, not writing you off as closed mind, and I'm sorry if I gave that impression. But when you said you can get by without God this suggested that your objection to Him is a bit casual, since philosophy and physics cannot be shown (as yet) to get by without Him. Indeed, something like Him would be required. To say that physics is not fundamental is not a bold statement. Physics is not fundamental because this is how it is defined. For a fundamental theory we'd have to do metaphysics. Personally I see little value in the distinction between the two except for organising students and uni departments, but while it is maintained then physics must remain nonreductive. This is why it is possible to do without God, or something like God, in physics. I was pointing out that this is what allows you to do without HIm, not the success of physics in explaining the world. Physics can never do away with the need for God because doing away with Him would be a job for metaphysics.(or, if you like, common sense and reason as applied to the problem.).Physics cannot explain the world because to be plausible the explanation would have to solve metaphysical problems. . Tar - I certainly was not suggesting throwing in the philosophical towel. This is the usual practice, but I believe the fight can be won. I believe all philosophical problems can be solved. But not by way of your approach. You want to understand 'why we know time, and we know space' before trying to understand 'why we are conscious of these things'. To me this approach is bound to fail and would be back to front. My view is that we would have to understand consciousness before being able to understand spacetime. This is why God comes into the picture, since on this view to understand spacetime would require understanding what is prior to spacetime. I would say that this is not God, but it is certainly not anything that physics could establish. The question of what is prior to spacetime is a metaphysical one and need not concern physics. But then, I've slightly lost track of what we're discussing. .

Hmm. Not sure what your getting at here. I'm a bit confused. Is the point numbered 'c'. the idea of atoms in the void? If so I cannot agree that this is a sensible idea. Are you advocating ex nihilo creation?

This is is fine. If you need no godlike phenomenon then do without him. But don't become a philosopher, for then the gap in your theories may start to make you wonder. In physics you'll be okay, because physics is not fundamental. But some of us would want to dig deeper. It is not that I think you should believe in God. It is that I think you should concede that your lack of interest is not a deciding factor in whether there might be a way of making God useful in science. It is possible, if you are not careful, to let scepticism become dogmaticism, the very thing you want to oppose. .

That such a solution is required is almost completely obvious. The problem goes back to the dawn of philosophy and I expect the statistics were simlar on day one, and just as useful. Professional philosophy has lost its way and a survey of its members will reveal only confusion. If you asked these same philosophers what the soution for consciousness is, they would all say they they haven't got a clue. My advice is to note that they cannot solve the problem and go your own way.

Kritalris - Sorry to respond before Imatfaal, but you make some intersting points. , I see what you mean when you say that a real continuum (as opposed to an idealised mathematical one) cannot be 'pure', It is possible, I think, that this is exactly what Imatfaal and I are suggesting when we say that a pure continuum would be inconceivable. It's existence would be paradoxical, It would not be an instance of a category, thus innaccessible to the intellect. This would be Kant and Hegel's fundamental phenomemon, and the reason why one mathematician can conclude that universe may be more simple than we can think. A 'pure' continuum could not exist, for otherwise there would be a difference between existence and non-existence. This would be an extension along a dimension, thus an 'impurity'. It would also require that an extreme metaphysical position is true, which would make the universe paradoxical in philosophy. A pure continuum would be an ideal mathematical object, not an existing phenomenon. So maybe we three agree about the impossibility of a pure continuum as an existing object. Thus we get to the Tao, a continuum that cannot be said to exist or not-exist, and an explanation for Heraclitus' odd remarks about existence. . Then we can say that spacetime seems paradoxical because we are reifying a paradoxical concept.of it We are assuming that a pure continuum can be extended, same as we do for the number line. But this idea simply does not fly. .

Thanks. I'm getting it. . I couldn't agree more. But it is a possible position, or some people think it is. . These details cause endless problems. It's good that we're noting them and not letting them cause unnecessary arguments. Ah. I forgot that Imfataal used my post to start this breakaway discussion. The original question about Higgs fields was not me. This is the issue. I would say that an extended continuum is a contradiction. But I'm using a strict definition of continuum, ie an ideal continuum. A partial continuum (spacetime, the reals etc) is not one in a full sense. Imfataall sent me to read Weyl on this, and it seems that he came around to the idea that a continuum cannot be a series of points. It would be a contradiction, and if we say that spacetime is such continuum this causes insoluble problems. Don't get this one. My point was that the contradiction is between the two extreme views. If do not choose either then there is no contradiction. There is still a problem, but it is no longer a logical problem. (of course, this is still a choice). , In physics yes. But we have other means to test ideas. Oh hell, the box disappeared. K - Yet if you take (choose) it to be infinite for instance and you fill in a lot of other questions in so doing answering all relevant questions, in a logical way, then that can lead to testable predictions. Me - I think this is just simply wrong. If you take it to be infinite you create a paradox and a lot of philosophical problems. This is in addition to the fatal problem that it would cause for Big Bang theory. It is not possible for physics to test the size of the universe. I agree that if we say it is one mile across this idea is testable, but such theories are obviously not worth testing. . . K - You can play the same game in which you take the universe to be finite and answer all the relevant questions that way. Me - Exactly, and with same result, which is that the idea is paradoxical and causes problems. The two extreme views do not work. Luckily we do not have to choose between them, there is another option. . . K - If the one way provides you with an elegant testable concept, then you should subsequently test that. Me - Yes, but this is a big 'if'.,Physics cannot test metaphysical ideas, elegant or not. This is not to say they cannot be tested, but I think you mean testable in physics. Specifically, the idea that spacetime is a series of points or an ideal continuum is not testable in physics, It is treated as one or the other depending on the requirements of the situation. But for a fundamental view it cannot be both. I think I may have Weyl on my side here, but I need to read more. Interesting discussion. I still think we agree on the main issue, but are seeing things differently. I'm not sure I'm understanding you correctly but no. it would fail if there are two discrete points. A (perfect/ideal) continuum by my defintion could not be divided. . Yes, For such a physics we must ignore the results of human reasoning. I would not agree that this is a scientific approach to the problem but, rather, a sweeping of it under the carpet, to the detriment of scientific progress. Sorry but I can't follow this. It does not seem to be a defintion that would be useful beyond mathematics. (I would also call a unity a perfect symmetry, another term that will cause trouble for us). . Oops. Deleted the box again. Imatfaal - I think we are still defining continuum differently. Can I not conceive of a point (1,0) on the cartesian plane, self-contained, unextended, indivisible. Can I not also conceive of the line y=x ? P - Well, we can think of what we like. The question is whether our concept is paradoxical or plausible.as a description of something 'out there' in the world. If it is paradoxical then I would call it implausible. Well. just plain wrong actually. I don't believe in real paradoxes. Btw, I see the need to use all these words in a certain way in physics and have no complaints. It's just that this useage of the words, where they are ringed around with provisos, is very unhelpful when trying to get to the bottom of things. Imatfaal - But the real numbers are continuous. THey are mind-blowingly continuous - what ever scale you choose, look as the closest two numbers you can find and there is an infinity of numbers in between. PJ - Yes, in our imagination. But not in reality. A collection of numbers is clearly not continuous, since there must be something separating them. . Imatfaal - I would say that the higg's field and the electromagnetic field are continuous - I am not convinced they are a continuum. PJ - Now this I would find weird. For me the two words would mean the same thing. This really does seem a more sensible view to me. Imatfaal - The only thing I hear described physically as a continuum is space-time, and that is more poetic than philosophical in its origin. However I do think it fits the bill totally. PJ - But how can a continuum be extended? What would stop everything happening in the same place at the same time? Imatfaal - I am not sure continuous necessarily means no parts - more that parts cannot be discerned. The line y=x is the collection of points f(x) for all x - each point can be enumerated - yet it is continuous and fulfills many of the ideas of continuum. PJ - I have no problem with this just as long as we say that this is a definition of how we intend to use the words, and not a claim about spacetime. The line cannot be a continuum if it has discrete locations at which can be placed discrete numbers. Perhaps we could focus on the idea that a continuum cannot have parts, since we seem to disagree directly on this. This is both a question of defintions and of philophical absolutes. By defintion a continuum can have as many parts as we like, and as many legs and arms, but the question is whether this would have anything to do with spacetime, It may be just this assumption, built into our definitions, that makes it paradoxical. This is what I'm suggesting at any rate. Imatfaal What you mean by perfect continuum - is a unity. But I think you are wrong PJ - Yes, this seems to be the problem. Let's focus on it. . Imatfaal - I would disagree - as at some scales it would clearly still be lumpy, and you do not get lumpy disjointed continua (I think we agree on that). Fields and nothingness are the only physical (how physical is nothingness? - ed.) things that I can paint as a continuum. PJ - Yes!! Well, not fields, but nothingness certainly. The question now would be what we mean by 'nothingness'. Imatfaal - I think you have to explain therefore: what is the difference between a continuum and a unity? Your definitions conflate the two - and render one of the terms otiose; my usage, and I believe the accepted usage, at least preserves a difference between the two. PJ - I would not want to preserve a difference. But I would be fine with the term 'incomplete continuum' or maybe 'notional continuum' and saying that this is not a unity. You said earlier, I think, that a true continuum would be inconceivable. So would a unity, and for the same reason. It is only incomplete continuums (those that have parts along some dimension) that we can conceive. . Imatfaal - Actually Peter I have in my notes about Heraclitus - "not strict monist - viewed reality as multiplicity and a unity at the same instant" . This was in my stuff about unity of opposites that he banged on about. And the followers of Heraclitus (but not he himself) felt that the void was filled with flux - which is about as close to the fields EMF and Higgs as you are likely to get from 2500 years ago Pj - Yes, yes, yes. This is where I'm trying to get to, an analysis of what Hercaclitus' dcorine would mean for physics. . Imatfaal - I really do not think the division between the atoms of leuccipus & democritus and those of rutherford & bohr this context. I maintain that as soon as an entity has discernable and unbreakable graininess - whether bits in it (rutherford) or instrinsic bits (democritus) then it fails the test of continua. Pj - Agreed. Totally. (Losing tracfk of who said what here) . Imatfaal? - I though Peter was more asking about the ontology of the continuum - in an abstract form (ie removed from the vagaries of actual physics) so that then he could move on to answer the question of the OP which is clearly regarding the space-time continuum in modern physics. Kris? - Our conceptualization of spacetime is metaphysical problem ... Spot on imho. The phenomenon itself is another matter. Retired exhaused...

As Moontanman said, it's a shame that discussions of this fascinating topic have to always descend into such arguments. Surely we're not talking about what would be a scientific approach to these phenomena, but just what would be a common sense and sane approach. it cannot be sane to make assumptions and call them facts. End of.

Quite so. I was talking about definitions, not assumptions. Chalmers, David, - 'Facing up to the problem of consciousness' and 'Moving on from the problem of consciousness'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19 & 4(1):3-46 (1995) Also Mcginn, but can't remember where. But besides the citations it's pretty obvious that such a solution is required.

Sorry. I must have misread the comment. Can't get the hang of the quotes system. I'll do a dialogue. : R - Ah, the problem here I've now come across several times: that is that physicists like to euphemistically call a contradiction a paradox. And subsequently quite a few of them get the two mixed up. A paradox is seemingly a contradiction, thus not a contradiction at all: yet an illusion for instance. A contradiction can't be in science, because that would entail believing in magic. P - Not quite. Check out 'Dialethism', For dialethism there would be true contradictions but no magic. A true contradiction is a true paradox, I would say, while many so-called contradictions and paradoxes are in the eye of the beholder. . R - Now I'm a bit at a loss. Your OP starts off with a given continuum yet now you leave that be and thus become off topic it seems.Yet it is your thread so I guess you may state on this topic the possibility of there not being a continuum at all. Which you then continue doing under the heading compatibilism. Well given the strong probability of the Higgs field by current science and that having to be an omnipresent field in our entire visible universe everywhere where normal atoms can be presumed to exist, a continuum for our visible universe has at least to be probable as well in current science. P - . Ah, A misunderstanding. No, I am not the thread starter. You are assuming here that a continuum can be extended. This is exactly what I am arguing against. I'm suggesting that this is a logical contradiction. R - The choice of not choosing is a true contradiction and isn't compatible with anything IMO. P - It is not a contradiction. It is the reduction of two categories, and thus the solution to a contradiction. It may seem 'illogical', but it is not a contradiction according to Aristotle's rules. R - I only accept meta physics (I'd prefer to call it philosophy) i.e. asking and answering questions that can't be observed such as: "is the universe infinite or not?" as a practical means to an end to find out where to start looking for testable positions. P - There are no testable positions,. This is why they are metaphysical problems. You have to make up your mind on the basis of human reason.

Yes, I agree that nothing needs god. But you missed mine, which is that we do need something very like him. Ringer - It is no use saying 'The answer to those questions is simply technology, and that we don't have all the pieces.'. The natural sciences cannot have all the pieces. Of course they don;t need God. A million years worth of new data is not going to change this. You say - "The analogy doesn't work because your comparing observable/measurable phenomena were evidence is used in attempting to an unobserved/non-measurable concept that is supposed to explain everything." This is a difficult sentence to untangle. But you seem to be agreeing with me. It is no use expecting to decide God's existence in physics. Physics has nothing to say on the matter. Only if we give God observable and measurable properties is he of any interest to physics. The fact remains. Physics is nonreductive, and this leaves room for speculation about God whether physicists like it or not. Hence some physicists are theists. To refute God it would be necessary to use logic, not telescopes. , .

(This is not what I meant by 'regretting asking the question'. I was referring to your seemingly rude reply to imatfaal. No matter) Your list seems a good one, but there's another possibility. There is a dilemma here but we are not forced to choose between the horns of it. You may be forgetting compatabilism, the idea that spacetime is not a continuum or a series of points. Remember, it is our concept of spacetime that we are discussing, not the thing itself. Our usual concept is paradoxical, this is clear, but it would not follow that spacetime is paradoxical. Usually where a concept is paradoxical we abandon it. I agree with what you say mostly, but not when you say that 'there is a necessity to choose'. I'm suggesting that there is a solution and it would require that we do not choose. This would be a general solution for metaphysical problems, which all take the form of a dilemma and seem to present us with a necessity to choose, but which can be solved by not choosing and opting for compatabilism. By this view spacetime would be a series of points and a continuum, depending on how we wish to conceive of it for our practical purposes, but which for an ultimate view, or by reduction, would be neither. It would seem paradoxical only because of the way we think about it, not because it is a true contradiction. I daren't delve too deep into this because it would be innapropriate here, but in brief I would suggest that spacetime is a metaphysical problem, so must be solved in the same way as all metaphysical questions. Or to put it another way, the current view in physics, by which spacetime is paradoxical, would be nonreductive. The solution would be to reduce the continuum and the series of points to a phenomenon that has these two properties as aspects, and not to attempt to make a continuum and a series of points the same thing by using very loose definitions, or to choose one view over the other. Otherwise we are forced to suppose that there are true contradictions, as does Melhuish, Priest, Routley and, or so it seems from what you say. Krauss et al.

Hmm. I'm not sure it's this simple, but I can roughly agree. The thing is, it is no use saying that science does not need God. It means nothing. Science is not concerned with fundamental theories so we would not expect it to need God, or any other fundamental phenomenon come to that. It's like saying that psychology does not need electrons. It might depend on our definitions not only of God but also of science. If we call metaphysics a science (which I would, but not many do) then science would need something rather like God. In the end I don't think it's helpful to judge the plausibility of God by whether he is useful or necessary in physics. It would have some bearing on the issue but will never be a clincher. Or not until physics has a fundamental theory that does not require Him. But everything would depend on how we define Him. Also, there is the possibility that there is a God that is not fundamental but emergent, as He would be for Kabbalism and Gnosticism. A sort of intermediate power and a strictly natural phenomenon. If I had to argue for God's existence, (which I never will), then I would ask why science cannot find a fundamental theory, and why in consciousness studies some researchers have concluded that we need an extra ingredient in our theories to make then successful. Maybe 'God' is a poor idea, but we need something to play the role that He is often assigned.

" Only Reality Itself is , the real thing. Any model may approach, but will possibly fall short of reality itself . However , this does not stop us getting as near as we can " Yes. Hence the title of Bradley's essay on this topic 'Appearance and Reality'. And, of course, in the beginning was the word.. There seems to be meaningful sense in which language, the giving of names to things, perhaps their stabilisation as concepts through their given names, actually creates the thing. Your two sentences here seem equivalent to Lao-tsu's seemingly contradictory comment that the Tao cannot be spoken and yet must be spoken. Language has to give up at a certain point, but we must do the best we can with it. Bradley's 'Reality' and Lao-tsu's 'Tao' would be the same phenomenon. Not sure this is on topic though.

Well, I expect he did regret asking, I have trouble following you, kristalris, but I do not see any disagreement here, just different perspectives on the problem. Wikepedia says: "Modeling an object as a continuum assumes that the substance of the object completely fills the space it occupies. Modeling objects in this way ignores the fact that matter is made of atoms, and so is not continuous; however, on length scales much greater than that of etc.etc. " This seems to sum up one issue. We can think of a series of points as a continuum, but this does not make it one. We can do the mathematics of spacetime by modelling it as a sea of points and calling this a continuum, but this is to create the paradox.that leads to OPs question. By the definition I prefer, a true continuum would be indivisible and unextended. Also inconceivable, for reasons given by Imatfaal.

If God is not required for our current scientific theories then this is hardly surprising. We define physics expressly to exclude divine beings and deities. The existence or non-existence of God is by definition of no concern to physics. This is the reason why which it is would make no difference to physics,. God existence or non-existence only makes a difference in physics if we define God in a way that would make Him testable in physics under controlled and repeatable conditions. If we do not do this, and I doubt that many people do, then the best we can do is test Him in metaphysics, beyond physics. Here we find two seemingly contradictory facts. First, any plausible metaphysical theory would need an absolute or ultimate phenomenon. Second, all attempts to define God so that He would meet the job spec for this phenenomon do not work. This suggest to me that 'God', the God we have in our heads when we use this word, does not exist. But this is only what most religions say, if we delve into them. It is probably a minority of religious people who hold a view of God by which He would be ridiculous in physics. Obviously most physicists do, but this is not relevant to anything. What is relevant is that many religious people say that any idea we may have of God is not even an approximation. Even the early Christians taught that it would be incorrect to say 'God exists'. or 'God does not exist', Not really arguing, just saying that it would be unfair to adopt a naive or superficial concept of God and then ridicule that, and also pointless. If you examine the 'God' of Plotinus, the pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, the Sufis, the Kabbalists, the non-canonical Christian gospels and such like, then the plot thickens.

Yes, the words are such a problem. One reason I post here is to practice getting my words to line up with the way they are used in physics. It's quite easy to say something that makes perfect sense in metaphysics but which is pure goobledygook in physics and makes one look a right idiot. I need to understand more about the various uses of 'continuum' and 'unity' in physics, I think we do not disagree about continuums and unities. For me it would be definitionally impossible to conceive of either a unity or a continuum, for in their most minimal state they would be the same thing. So we agree on this, but are defining 'unity' differently. Thanks for the mention of Weyl's "das kontinuum". I will definitely be having a look at it, I'll be amazed if I can understand the mathematics. I would question the use of 'continuum' to describe... 'the clear distinct discrete entities that make up the real number line but which also form a prototypical continuum'. This seems to be the very opposite of a continuum, just a collection of discrete entities. If we want to call it a continuum, would we not have to assume that there is a continuous medium underlying or joining up all these discrete entitites - real numbers, Higg's bosons or whatever - an empty number line prior to the numbers, or in physics something like an aether? To call the discrete entitites that populate the real number line a 'continuum' seems to be misuse of the word. To call the Higg's field a continuum would seem dodgy to me, and this may be what prompts the OP's question. If it isn't, then what is? Because I take 'unity' to mean the same as 'continuum' you'll see why for me an 'infinitely extended unity' would be an impossble object. By 'perfect continuum' I would mean a phenomenon which has no parts and is thus a unity. Is there a better term for what I mean by 'pefect continuum'? It seems to me that what you would call an 'ideal condensate' is about as close to a 'perfect' unity or continuum as one can get, either conceptually or observationally, before it becomes unextended and inconceivable. Do you see what I mean? Or is that more goobledygook?

Have I? As far as I know I've never even seen one.

Nah. I was on LSD. But you're right, it was a bit of a non-sequitor. I saw two UFOs, not necessarily two extraterrestrial spacecraft. I should have said - UFO fanatics who insist that they are extraterrestrial on the basis of no evidence and who think that scientist are fools for not believing them - etc. .

"Trying to understand nature in the absence of metaphysics is impossible." (Cladking) It seems this way to me also. Indeed, it seems rather obvious. And it is a relevant point. Philosophers often point out that the subject/predicate structure of language causes problems when trying to construct fundamental theories. Bradley, for instance, proposes that in metaphysics this structure is necessary but impossible to maintain for a completely reductive theory. Russell points out that all our statement take the form 'there esists an x such that...' , and this places a limit on what language can describe. I'm tempted to quote Lao-tsu also but will refrain. So I'd say that language cannot completely describe a complete and consistent 'theory of everything'. Mathematics would have the same problem, as Russell discovered. The theory would have to leave something unsaid, perhaps in the form of an undefined term or two. The problem arises as soon as we try to define 'everything' in a set-theoretic way,