Polednice

"Enhanced interrogation" - now there's some doublespeak! I think there is a great deal of simplicity that we must make effort to avoid here. There are far too many popular ideas of what "human nature" is, most of them bogus - that we're intrinsically polygamous, objectifying, sex-driven, violent, irrational primates. It's great that we're moving away from the speciesism of the past and recognising that we belong on the evolutionary tree, but this kind of equivocation is misleading and takes no account whatsoever of culture. Thus, even if we were to accept a natural violent streak (I think "competitive" would be a more appropriate word), that does not mean that we have a predisposition towards fully institutionalised cruelty wherever possible. Besides, you could look at it the other way, and say that we are naturally social creatures with empathy and conscious awareness, therefore it's in our interests to maintain the least cruel society possible. It all depends how you frame it, and that indicates that there's something wrong with looking at the question in those terms in the first place. I also don't think it makes much sense to extrapolate that we will become a society where nobody is punished for anything (and remember that competition ≠ violence ≠ punishment). Instead, I think we will make a happy transition from a retributive judicial system to one that is fully rehabilitative, rather than just superficially so.

Surely illogicality necessarily follows from contradiction. If not, you're adopting a self-serving framework of logic to make the hypothesis untouchable. Furthermore, the fact that the Bible is self-evidently the product of an uninformed, illiterate agricultural society does not disprove the existence of a prime intelligence, but it does mean that the Christian deity is as useless as Zeus. In discussions such as these, you must first define "God" - you absolutely may not equate "necessary first intelligence" with "the Christian deity", and if you wish to discuss the latter, you must give reason to think that the Christian deity is any more likely than the thousands of other gods man has believed in throughout history.

If the problem with humanity is that it kills other life-forms, that is also a problem with other life-forms. If the problem with humanity is that it wages war within its own species, that is also a problem with other life-forms. If the problem with humanity is that it can cause vast changes in an ecosystem, that is also a problem with other life-forms. More fundamentally, if we're not around to contemplate the welfare of the planet, who would care?

I almost always disagree with the premises of questions such as these, but more important than anything else is to get the language right. Whatever is happening, technology is not making us lazy; if anything, we are exploiting technology to be lazy. We mustn't anthropomorphise technology and view it as some external force beyond our control which is having a detrimental effect we are powerless to resist. Instead, if we are lazier because of access to technology, it is of our own volition. Now, do I think that we are lazier than we used to be? I have no idea. My guess, however, would be that we are more physically inactive in terms of burned calories, but not lazy. The term is quite broad and needs some defining before more can be said.

The fact that the orderly language of mathematics is capable of describing our universe, and the fact that our brains are powerful enough to invent and utilise mathematical concepts, is often considered a compelling example of why the universe must require a designer. This is one of the more tempting theological arguments, but I'd like you to consider some points against it, and show me where I may be making wrong steps. Essentially, I think this view is an entirely hubristic one. It seems to rest on the unwarranted (and probably unacknowledged) assumption that the human intellect is a superior one, and that the mathematics it uses is intrinsically good. It seems perfectly reasonable to think, however, that despite the wonderful efficacy of mathematics, there could be intelligences far superior to our own elsewhere in the universe with even better, even more efficient systems to understand the universe. To think that ours is special and indicative of a designer appears to place human intellect on a pedestal we can't be sure it deserves. Also, it seems that the awe felt at the fact mathematics works is a little entangled. Rather than viewing consciousness as arising from the world and then, at some point, suddenly, mystically capable of understanding the world through mathematics, is it not more logical to imagine that a universe based on the laws this one features, if it gives rise to consciousness, would necessarily give rise to a consciousness equipped to understand its laws? We are able to understand things mathematically because we evolved to understand our environment in order to survive and reproduce more effectively in it. If we were in some other universe with other laws, we would have evolved a completely different system, maybe a much more chaotic one to suit a more chaotic environment, and we would be marvelling at the wonderful way that our devised language of physics fits reality so well. I can't remember who first described the image, but I think it's similar to the caricature that a puddle one day forms in a small hole in the ground, and it thinks to itself, "My! This hole is perfectly suited to my shape! I surely can only conclude that this hole was designed with me in mind." I don't think there must be a special reason why maths fits - instead, it was a necessary consequence of our evolution, and we can't draw conclusions from our aesthetic sense that mathematics is wonderful when, in fact, it could be an unnecessarily complicated system for all we know.

The redefinitions suggested on this page are not extreme, and rather than being obfuscating, they're intended to be clarifying. You will surely accept that dictionaries provide multiple definitions of words, so if we persist with "faith", it is nevertheless important to make vital distinctions, and so we should at least be talking about Faith Type A and Faith Type B.

Indeed, because the OED is the official arbiter of language (not at all an impartial, descriptivist observer), and the fundamental character of theology is necessarily defined by people with no direct interest in the discussion rather than those who wish to set some ground rules before carrying on. Forgive me, let us surrender to the wisdom of the Holy OED. The point here is that while there may be generally accepted vernacular uses of the word "faith" that involve anything we simply do not know, we cannot use this definition in an argument about theology because it allows believers to surreptitiously equate their superstitions with belief in natural, terrestrial things that they do not "know" with certainty, and that is entirely disingenuous. If you must use a word other than "faith", then by all means suggest one, but a definition cannot be used that equates religious belief with ordinary trust.

I think the definition of "faith" needs to be expanded slightly to: belief in something without evidence that you do not and cannot know. The examples of human trust and science results are all things that can be known given the acquisition of more data. The fundamental characteristic of faith is that there is nothing that can illuminate the belief.

You're obfuscating the issue again by putting linguistics in apposition with concepts when you ought to consider only one at a time. Where do you think the definitions of "chair" and "table" come from? There is no absolute authority, no external decree, which necessitates that those letters and the sound patterns they represent must signify the concept of a chair and a table. Like money, they obtain their definitions from widespread understanding and mutual acceptance. Similarly, the word "god" is understood to refer to a certain set of ideas, and yet you are playing on the concept of god, stating that the concept is undefined. That may well be true, but we're talking about word-use, and, again, your unrelenting insistence on using the word "god" in a way that does not match up with popular use of the term cannot do anything but confuse the discussion. This is the etymological fallacy and is not a valid way to go about using the language.

If I were to try to have a discussion with someone about a chair, but insisted upon using the word "table" to denote the chair, it would not be permissible for me to accuse others of a lack of willingness to understand because they don't accept my redefinition of "table". A chair is a chair, a god is a god, and you appear to be talking about neither.

I'm wondering what you all think about the current state of the neuroscience of creativity. Personally, as someone chiefly interested in phonological neuroscience and how it relates to poetry through language and music through sound, this field holds the greatest possible intrigue for me. At the same, I think the level of science reporting, and even the assumptions made first-hand in research articles, is below even the average of other science journalism, which we all know is low. My main gripe is that I think researchers and science writers alike are implicitly pandering to a self-help culture by jumping on evidence such as blue computer screens or alcohol drinking as increasing our ability to do word-puzzles, and suggesting that this demonstrates sitting in a blue room can foster creativity. This is such a giant non-sequitur, and I think it's disgraceful. It's wonderful that the field is so popular in best-selling science books at the moment, but it's disheartening that it's popular because it's filled with tempting lies.

It would surely also be cheaper to deal with overpopulation with terrestrial politics! I share concerns for overpopulation, but, despite the gravity of the problem, I do not believe there is any way of ethically legislating preventative measures. We require public understanding and education so that people are informed enough to not have children unnecessarily. I think part of this must come from biology, so that we can continue to dispel the myth that there is something magical about having one's own child - it's just a bunch of shared genes; so what? I think even fertile couples should prioritise adoption over having their own genetic offspring.

I do not think there is anything special or wonderful about virginity, and see no valid reasons whatsoever for two people to wait until marriage to have sex. That said, I do not think that sex is an act to be treated whimsically, and so a serious degree of self-reflection is necessary before entering into it with anyone.

Hi folks! I'm currently an undergraduate student of Medieval English Language and Literature in the UK, but, having come to the realisation that I made a foolish choice for a degree, I am tentatively slithering my way into cognitive linguistics (my degree does feature some linguistics, so I will do a masters in straight linguistics, specialising in evolutionary and cognitive studies, and then move into hard experimental psychology of language).

I personally don't think it's helpful to consider "religions" and "cults" as separate entities, but that doesn't mean I think the popular conceptions of "religions" and "cults" are to be considered similar. Instead, given the complex, multi-faceted ways that they both can work, and the extent of the overlap between harmless- and harmfulness of each, I think it simply makes more sense to consider individual structured beliefs in supernatural entities and the harm they cause. With that in mind, many organisations traditionally considered cults would be more benign than some religions, and vice-versa.

First, you'd have to make sure to differentiate between letter combinations and sounds - the graphemes we use (letters and combos that represent sounds, e.g. 'f', 's', and 'th' etc. etc.) do not map one-for-one onto phonemes (the actual sounds that constitute language). Thus, you would have to use a standardised phonetic alphabet. Even given this, you would further have to recognise that not all languages use the same phonemes, and not all languages have the same number of phonemes. If you were to combine all the phonemes of all languages, you would have a supply that far exceeds that of any one language today. And, lastly, we mustn't forget the tonal languages such as Mandarin Chinese, which use the same fundamental phoneme but alter its inflection to alter its meaning (often imperceptible to Westerners not brought up with the language). Thus, a name like 'Ab' could count as four or five names if you say it in four or five different ways.