CharonY

I think specifically for UBI there is support from both sides. The issue is really just the implementation. Specifically right-wing support is related to demands of lower taxes and cuts to welfare which might alienate groups on the left.

Several misconceptions here. DNA is not a set of instructions, but in its simplest form encodes proteins (and has some other functions) which are elements of the cell. Some call it a blueprint, which is somewhat more accurate (but still not quite right). Adaptations do not cause mutations. Mutations are independent, but selective pressures can result in some mutations over time become more frequent than others. The DNA in an organism is not a code (the genetic code is something else). What you mean is probably just the DNA sequence and that does not stay consistent, nor is it unique for each individual. Many organism proliferate clonally I.e. the offspring has a copy of the DNA sequence as the ancestor. Likewise, during sexual proliferation DNA of the parents are merged so with the exception of few mutations there are not going to be larger changes from generation to generation (and too large differences would result in non-viable offspring). Geography can be a separator of populations as mating does not happen over large distances (usually). So whatever mixing in a gene pool happens relies on the population that is there.

I think that may be down to methodology, i.e. how the study was set up. In most surveys if you ask folks why the they vote for their respective party, You will find economic anxiety fairly up. But this is true for all parties and does not explain a shift to the extreme right. Feeling of being ignored is a bit more common but it is actually not tied to their socioeconomic study. Other studies (including the one mentioned in the article) have a more specific design. What they did is try to figure out what sentiments are predictive for voting for far right (rather than mainstream conservative) parties. So you ask all kind of questions and then try to find a pattern. Some predictors are very local, but among the themes that appear to be predictive in many countries (most studies were conducted in Western countries) are related to sex/gender and another along ethnic lines. There is an emerging split, especially among younger votes along gender lines, with indicators of sexism being a decent predictor of far-right support. However, ethnic concerns tends to be a stronger predictor. This falls under the general umbrella of status threat and when looking at the various factors. While intuitively one might assume that e.g. socioeconomic factors (especially decline) should be the main mechanism related to that, it turns out not to be. I.e. strangely the socioeconomic status or even the loss of socioeconomic status according to one study are not a predictor for far right support. But having e.g. attitudes that fall under the ethnic threat bracket is (again independent on actually socioeconomic situation). Similar studies in the US have also shown that this status threat is a strong predictor for the support of Trump (over "regular" Republicans). Structurally the argument made by the article (though written a bit from an Americanized perspective) makes a lot of sense. Let's say 20-30% of the population are by default nativist reactionaries who originally would vote conservative. The issue is that a liberal democracy simply cannot address this fears, as immigrants, once becoming residents, enjoy the same rights and protection as regular citizens. Moreover, mechanistically they (mostly) are no economic threat. I.e. the fear, as other mentioned is not based on reality that might be addressable. Therefore, these reactionaries will ultimately be dissatisfied with liberty itself and some part will be drawn to those far right authoritarian groups, as they generally do not particularly care for things like civil liberties or rights. In a parliamentary system the result is a formation of groups to the right of mainstream parties (much in Europe) but in two or three party systems (like the US) it threatens traditional positions within the party. This is what we see with traditional conservatives in the GOP. In liberal democracies there would be mechanistic safeguards protecting certain rights, which in turn is why these groups actively try to undermine them (see Hungary but also what is happening with SCOTUS). Social media is a big amplifier of resentment in this context, but I don't think that could be causative on its own. I will also note that the fundamental issue outlined in the article is that there is an underlying current of threat to liberal democracies which does not appear to be addressable. When Trump and other far right authoritarian populists/demagogues were getting power some political commentators thought that this might be a good thing for democracies in the long run. These non-traditional parties had never ruled and the assumption is that they would fail miserably (Germany is right now looking at the same idea, unfortunately). However, as we can see that is not what happened universally or even commonly. My suspicion is that social media will again play a role here, as it will be used to rewrite reality. I will note the catastrophic handling of the COVID19 pandemic as an (almost forgotten it seems) example. I.e. even with the blatantly incompetent leadership those groups only see a moderate drop in support. Trump lost in 2020 but might win again 2024. PiS lost the absolute majority but remain the largest party. We did a big swing into authoritarianism and especially autocracy and I do not really see a big swing back. Perhaps things will change but at least over last decade or so we went quite a bit into crazy land and it seems we might be be stuck there for a long while if nothing fundamental changes. After all, the only strategy so far is banking on far-right incompetence and I don't think it works.

Interestingly many of the threats you listed are things that the reactionary forces mentioned in the article actively ignore except for the migration part. People are therefore seemingly less afraid of pollution or disease (remember COVID-19) but are mostly worried about folks coming in (or at least that is what this article argues and which some studies seem to support). In fact, addressing the many challenges, including climate change has not been a winning strategy in many (most?) areas. Edit: crossposted

I wanted to use this thread to discuss the rise of far-right sentiments across the world and start with this article https://www.vox.com/politics/361136/far-right-authoritarianism-germany-reactionary-spirit It provides some background about the the rise of democracies and includes this sentiment from Francis Fukuyama There are various lines of thoughts, but in article suggest that a lot is driven by ethnic resentment related to immigration: In many discussions on this forum, there have been puzzlement why folks like Trump with strong authoritarian tendencies have been able to gain so much ground in democracies and often fear has been an underlying current. The argument in this article is then that in countries from Hungary to India, the very idea of equality and rights (and potentially resulting demographic impacts) has become a threat to the reactionary core in society. In other discussions I (and I think others) have speculated (many years ago) that some of the craziness might be just the last reactionary embers before the rise of a more equitable and democratic society. Now we see that these "fringe" groups have become mainstream and what some of us might have dismissed as craziness has actually paid electoral dividends. So in short, does the current world give you pause and make you revisit how you thought the world would change, say 10 or 20 years ago?

What worries me is that that discussion about US as an unreliable partner has been ongoing since the first Trump presidency, but at least as far as I can see, nothing fundamental has changed. Also, both Trump and his VP have been rather vocal for supporting Russia. I mean, not supporting Ukraine.

Basically what iNow said. Europe is not able to provide the necessary support (and some far-right parties are actively undermining efforts).

Ukraine is in serious trouble. Just as Putin planned.

I thought it was more a retroactive legacy thing.

Folks that are afraid are often in favor of authoritarianism, and more specifically, to autocracy (consolidation of power into a person). The idea of a great man as savior is unfortunately deeply ingrained in most folks. Whenever things are perceived to get tough (regardless whether it is really the case or not) these tendencies get a severe boost. While there was trend of world-wide democratization (which was linked to some degree to trade and cultural exchange), there is always the tendency to backslide. In Europe, authoritarian groups have been on the rise for a while and have taken over is some countries. So even in well-established liberal democracies, there are efforts to erode certain rights (making them closer to become electoral democracies). Even looking at things from a high level we do see these trends, where liberal democracies have declined since the the height of liberal democracies in the 2010s with movement toward the authoritarian axes- (liberal democracy-electoral democracy-electoral autocracy-closed autocracies). Thus somethings started to happen around 2010 that seems to make matters worse. Many of the mechanisms are therefore not unique to the US, though there is a relationship between neoliberalism and authoritarianism. The interesting bit is that most folks might think that neoliberalism with all its emphasis on free-market and individual liberty and focusing on economic growth should in fact be more associated with ideas of freedom. Yet in reality, the opposite happened. Essentially, and perhaps paradoxically, neoliberalism with all its demands for austerity and deregulation, ultimately sees the state as a means to re-shape society along market-driven lines. However, this leads to fracturing of social cohesion (a source of "crisis" in the Marxist lingo) which required at the same time authoritarian tendencies to maintain the cohesion. In Europe, this is often happening by drawing ethnic lines (see Hungary), for example. A similar tactic is used by the GOP in the US, to blame immigrants (the use of illegal is really optional) and so on. One of crises was 2007 and the fallout was investigated rather thoroughly through that lens: https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.843250 https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112659.00013 Also: https://ourworldindata.org/less-democratic

One thing to consider is what is to be considered fit for office. Clearly, Biden is not in the shape he once was and cognitively there are folks that are better. On the other hand, his opponent is clearly not fit for office. Not only from an ideological standpoint, but he also screwed up one of biggest global challenges of recent times (COVID-19) resulting in way more deaths than necessary. So if that passes the bar for fitness, clearly Biden does too. Provided that the president puts the right people into place, they might as well nap through the presidency. I don't think the bar is actually lower than that. But I think the actual question the Dems have is whether Biden is able to beat Trump. And as others already noted, this is quite a bit more difficult to figure out.

Or not soon enough, depending on perspective.

I think this is the danger of a word that seems to be clear what in what it means, but actually isn't. It is not necessarily related to something that might or might not be popular. Rather it is the overarching anti-elite messaging (as if he wasn't rich and part of the elite himself). The populism part is really that he claims to represent the unheard masses and to rise up against... someone. Probably common sense, for the most part. The platform itself does not need to be popular in the broadest sense (though obviously, it has to resonate with someone). But it is not same as just supporting things that the majority of people want (e.g. common sense gun laws, abortion rights, higher salary for teachers etc.). And again, the misunderstanding is understandable, but just not what the term more commonly refers to (exception for a fairly narrow time in the long past). Populism tends to come out of the tool box in times of crisis, as an important factor is not stating things that are popular, but rather promising to fix things that are not. It was less about being for something, but rather against. And these promises are usually vacuous. Populists/demagogues were fueled in Europe due to the immigrant crisis. What these group did was to whip up fears (and data be damned) and promised to take care of it somehow. Including deporting folks who did not look like them.

No, it has nothing to do with Trump. The idea of calling groups populists predates that for a very long time. And the common part is that folks were railing against an elite. Specifically, if they use prejudice and fear to make their point. Also, the repetition that populism just means the will of people is just not true, even if you repeat it once more. Especially in the past (around 19th century) there have been populist movements that were associated with development of democracy (largely, because ideas related to democracy were evolving), but that has not been true at least since the 20th century (where different forms of populism across the political spectrum were associated with the creation/strengthening of authoritarian structures and heck, in a way that might have been what people wanted, but it clearly did not further democracy). From Wiki: Margaret Canovan, 1981[8] As noted, populists was never a well-defined term, but using the simplest definition of anti-elite one could claim that two examples of populism are: - demanding tax increase on the ultra-wealthy to finance social programs and - calling for deportation of citizens with immigration backgrounds to combat crime. However, at least theoretically the former could (doesn't mean that they do) provide economic calculations showing how that might work. Conversely, the second example is based on prejudice and fear-mongering because it is not based on actual data/research and also would have issues of legality. As such, the latter could be considered demagoguery.

I disagree with the definitions, especially in this context. In Authoritarianism imposing will on others is often a consequence, but is not the definition in the political sense (which I assume is the context). Authoritarianism in a political system refers to system in which strong central powers by maintain their power by limiting elements of pluralism. Capitalism has nothing to do with bettering oneself as such. It minimally just refers to an economic system characterized by private ownership of means of production which is geared to maximize profit. Again, there are consequences of such systems, such as accumulation of wealth (and in an unfettered system it means that the means of production will inevitably accumulate in few hands). But the consequences of definition are not how the system is being defined. Capitalism doesn't necessary lead to authoritarianism. However, wealth relates to power and folks, who effectively have the wealth of small nation, indubitably have great power. Now, if they somehow abstain from the political arena, it might be less problematic. Likewise, if they have a system in place to constrain their influence. But if they wield it unchecked and influence media, politicians, academia and so on, then again we have concentration of power, which goes towards authoritarianism. So populism is an interesting term as on its face it may be what you said, but there is more to it, when we look at in which contexts it is being used and what it describes in those contexts. Specifically, populism was to my knowledge never a clearly defined term. The one point that is characteristic for most uses of populism is an anti-elite (and often anti-establishment) use. The issue there, of course, that those claiming to be anti-elite frequently are part of the very same. However, I don't think that there was ever a clear foundational meaning. Specifically, it was rarely used in the same way groups would consider themselves "socialist", "conservative" or otherwise. It is only rather recently where group define it the way you do, i.e. following the will of the people (whatever it might mean) and I think it is mostly because media conflate populism with demagoguery and as a consequence, demagogues who are called populists are now claiming to be follow the fill of the people, ironically often by using authoritarian tactics.

Yes, it is again the issue of science vs pop science. Edit, tbf the article actually states: Which is a fair assessment. Depending on the level of textbooks some may simplify it to that degree. There is no instantaneous structural change unless you use it in an unusual way. There are activity changes (and while there are molecular changes, they are typically not lasting after single activation from what I remember). And yes, we always knew that the brain does not have e.g. a push-button area. Rather any activity is a complex process involving many factors, e.g. you have sensory processes (you hear someone tell you to push a button) you have to interpret these sounds (cognitive processes) you have to motivate yourself to initiate movement, you have to see where the button is you have to initiate movement and so on. Of course you need various parts of the brain engaged in a coordinated way and very fast, too.

Long shot, but what buffer are you using for the FeCl3?

Ah the pain of controlling iron in media. So as you probably noticed the moment the medium turns neutral, insoluble ferrihydrite will form. So only using only dibasic potassium phosphate won't work (not sure how you acidified it, but you need to titrate with monobasic to ensure that it buffers, for example). However, you mentioned that it also precipates in presence of CAA alone? I would check the pH of the CAA (without buffer) first. In my memory, there wasn't any particularly strong interactions with amino acid mixes, or digested proteins, so I would focus on ensuring that the buffer system maintains a stable pH <7 first. A second thing I am wondering about the concentration of the FeCl3 solution. It is awfully high isn't it? Are you sure that you really have 2.6g/10 mL (i.e. 260 g/L)? It is possible that that concentrations other reactions might occur (though one could test by drying the sample and run powder x-ray diffraction to check whether it is ferrihydrite, for example. I will also add that anything with complex additives (CAA, tryptone, peptone, etc.) can have somewhat low iron contents, but they might be less limiting than one might think. Typically one needs to purify it further to ensure reproducible amount of iron in the medium (that is why many standard medium do not add iron, despite the fact that almost all bacteria need it in significant amounts).

I think the conclusion you provide is an oversimplification. It is common knowledge that a) even for relatively simple tasks many different brain areas are getting mobilized. The precise extent depends on how we measure activity (and how precisely) as well as how we stimulate activity (e.g. passively, actively, under stress etc.). b) the notion that all brain areas are hyper-specialized was pretty much outdated when I was a student. Areas have primary functions but stimulation by activities can be distributed. c) canonical mappings are fundamentally best guesses based on the method used. Electrophysiology is traditionally invasive but non-invasive methods using machine learning to decode measurements have been implemented recently which I believe is the main gist of the paper (not my are of expertise). Brain-wide activity studies related to motor activation have been at least around for a more than a decade in animal studies. I.e. the study is an extension of what we know, not a challenge to what we know.

I am wondering how strongly these predictions are dependent on perception. E.g. the US economy is fairly strong, but the perception of it is quite different. Likewise, a proportion of the population believes that there is a Joe Biden scandal (though they are probably unsure what it might be).

I think there is a bit of a wishful thinking going on that other than a brainwashed cult is going to favor a democracy-endangering autocrat. But if we look at where things tend to swing when things are tough or perceived as tough, we have to reckon that this is not the case. In Germany a Nazi-affiliated party is in multiple parliaments and is on its way to become the second largest party. A country where part of the curriculum you learn about the horrors of Nazism in a very unique perspective of all things. Ah well, back to yelling at clouds.

I think this statement is a bit misleading as it seems to suggest that there is a large swath of people just waiting to drop Trump. Yet this does not seem to be the case. Even if you assume that 30% of the US (which already would be huge) was the basis, the favorability rating suggests that on top another 10% actually like him. About 50% have an unfavorable view, and if we assume that they indeed don't want him and are not going to be swayed otherwise, there is basically just a gap of 10%. Even in the best scenario the case for any candidate is going to be tight. If we look at polls, Harris underperformed Biden vs Trump by around 2 points. Dinging Biden would not likely change that (it would just change a Harris/Biden matchup). In other words, what happened post-debate is that Biden's chances might have dropped and even if folks would fare better than Biden in the current situation, past data does not suggest that it is clear that they would be better situated than Biden pre-debate.

I still have not seen any good data or insights that suggests that this is the case. Given the unfavorability/favorability level of Trump as the sole presented data, it would suggest that about half the population is Trump's base.

That sounds like wishful thinking. They would just attack the "extreme socialist left" which would include everyone but themselves. They don't need a name. Heck, Trump repeatedly attacked Obama instead of Biden and it does not seem to matter. While the commentator talks about tearing up the rule book, I think they are gauging the public and voters by their own, obsolete playbook. All the listed arguments might have been valid 20 years ago, I suspect most won't work today. It might be a sign of getting old, but I suspect that norms and rules have become more volatile due to ever faster and changing forms of communication and media consumption. Thinks that were unthinkable 10 years ago are normal now and probably outdated in five years from now. The pandemic has shifted the ground even faster. It is not just about Trump, but it may be more connected to issues of social cohesion (or lack thereof) and separated realities.

The issue is that having him drop out has clear risks but the benefits are uncertain. In part, there is just not enough data to devise an "optimal" strategy:https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/358559/biden-harris-whitmer-newsom-shapiro-buttigieg-alternative-nomination-candidate-2024 Also, it seems that swing voters are at best volatile and I wonder whether anyone has a good model to figure out how they would actually vote. For example, in this a swing voter would need to find Trump's conduct and desire to overthrow democracy not disqualifying, be swayed by signs of weakness in a debate (but not as much as by someone who is outright ignoring the debate and just piles on lies). Some suggestions are that there are folks who are either in a worse economic situation than pre-pandemic (or believe they are) and therefore believe in an economic benefit of a Trump presidency (but then, how would they be swayed by arguments, if they vote based on personal experience/feelings)? I.e. much of the factors appear to be undefined and intangible and I am not sure how to construct a sound strategy around that. I suspect the best would be somehow a person who would just sway folks by charisma alone rather than anything related to facts or evidence.