are there any physicists at all ? which agree with compatibilism

[empleat]

Hello,

i am curious, are there any physicists, which would agree with compatibilism, i found only and mostly philosophers, or neurologists, which support compatibilism.

 

In physics seems most favorable is indeterminism, because it is first condition for free will and because determinism cannot be tested and what cannot be tested is pointless to even do, you could stop doing experiments right here, because which experiment you choose to do and what varables you will set is already determined.

Most of physicists deny free will completely, or at least they are incompabilists, or can yet support indeterminism.

I personaly don't think compatibilism allows for free will to exist in any meanigfull way.

 

And second, i can't find almost any living physicists, or quantum physicists, i tried google living quantum physicists and it found list on wiki, in which 90% are dead.

I tried google them using like 20 phrases and found only couple.

Can you link me most prominent living, physicists please ?

I am especially interested in those who engage in free will, or at least expressed themsevels about free will.

Edited August 15, 2018 by empleat

[Strange]

15 minutes ago, empleat said:

And second, i can't find almost any living physicists, or quantum physicists, i tried google living quantum physicists and it found list on wiki, in which 90% are dead.

1 hour ago, empleat said:

I tried google them using like 20 phrases and found only couple.

This was the first result Google gave me: http://www.jimal-khalili.com/blogs/2016/9/7/do-we-have-free-will-a-physicists-perspective

This was followed by several other similar articles by or about different scientists.

[swansont]

I am a physicist and the fact that I am unsure what compatibilism even is should give you a data point regarding what you want to know. I do experiment, and my anecdotal experience has been that experimentalists care a lot less about how philosophy impacts physics than theorists, and the theorists who care the most are studying issues related to foundational physics.

Sean Carroll is another name you can follow up on.
https://www.preposterousuniverse.com

[Eise]

13 hours ago, empleat said:

i am curious, are there any physicists, which would agree with compatibilism, i found only and mostly philosophers, or neurologists, which support compatibilism.

Of course, because you do not have to know anything about physics. Combatibilism is the viewpoint that determinism and free will are compatible. So one can ask the question 'Suppose the world is determined, would free will be possible?' A physicist is not much better equipped than any other intellectual to tackle that question.

The answer is event stronger: determinism is a necessary condition for free will. Randomness, as e.g. appears in physics, is at most disturbing our free will, it potentially breaks one-to-one relations between cause and effect: the effects are not precise anymore, but have only a certain probability.

But for that you need the right understanding of what free will is: it is not a magical interference by the soul on the brain. It is the expression for the fact that our actions are caused by our wishes and beliefs. In my short slogan: free will means you can do what you want, but you cannot be what you want. Latter is what most people assume. Something like 'If I am not totally free, then I am not free at all'. But such a 'total freedom' is not empirically given. The relation between reasons and action however, grosso modo, is. 

[t686]

Things that appear to be totally nondeterministic (thick fluid on a vibrating speaker will turn into worms, but over time their shape stays the same but they get smaller and smaller (the term fractalised) and automata that have nonstandard rules (like the "fire automata" on softology's blog) are insufficient and just get smaller and smaller over time with no change (they just become fractalised ie the same copy as the original but in a tiny package and much more of the same original shape filling the original boundary), so it appears that something needs to be deterministic but the "appearance" of nondeterminism as a side effect.  Norton's dome is an example of using distributions (which have no particular point but things spread out) to prove a certain shaped hill with a ball on top will never roll down or roll down at an unknown time just by following the logic, but with determinism vs. nondeterminism, not sure where norton's dome falls.