Perfection in Nature and Frank Sinatra

[swansont]

7 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

@ studiot

 

Both yourself (on water) and swansont (on heat) raise an important point: philosophy must remain informed by findings in empirical science or else risk becoming irrelevant. On this I'm in full agreement with you both.

No doubt there are cases where philosophers oversimplify out of sheer ignorance. On the other hand, the simplification is often deliberate. I suppose we might look on this as a form of idealization; a phenomenon far from rare in empirical science itself. In treating planets as point masses, for instance, surely no one believes they are point masses.

The physicist/astronomer understands that it literally makes no difference to treat a uniform sphere as a point a mass — the answer is the same. It is unclear if and when the non-physicist understands why you are allowed to do that.

And since science is not the quest for reality, but rather for models that describe how nature behaves, there tends not to be the confusion of mistaking the map for the territory.

7 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Swansont's objection to heat being more complex than, or not even, molecular motion can, I think, be viewed in the same way. If science has indeed completed a successful reduction of our pre-scientific vernacular term "heat" to something more scientifically respectable, then all that matters for Kripke's argument to proceed is that [heat = some particular state or phenomenon]. 

That's but one example of scientists using a word that is different from what lay usage is. Acceleration would be another. A lot of non-physicists might not consider that when moving in a car at a constant speed around a curved path, they are acceleration, because they think of accelerating as speeding up.

Which is one reason that I don't accept your notion of what Darwin meant by absolute perfection. You have to look at the science to understand it. And as for what anyone else meant by the term, you would have to present their context, too, which you have not done.

7 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but does heavy water not still have the chemical formula H2O, even if the "H" in question is not the most abundant isotope? And, indeed, a little googling reveals that heavy water is regarded nonetheless as (a kind/variety of) water, much as the various isotopes of iron are regarded as iron nonetheless. For purposes of chemistry, water/iron (as opposed to jade) is the basic level kind; subordinate categories notwithstanding.

Typically denoted as D₂O

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_water

 

[Reg Prescott]

51 minutes ago, swansont said:

And since science is not the quest for reality, but rather for models that describe how nature behaves, there tends not to be the confusion of mistaking the map for the territory.

Ah, swansont, we've had this discussion before. I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things.

Many scientists share the opinion you just expressed, particularly (I would bet) in the realm of physics, a fortiori (I would bet again) in the realm of quantum physics, ever since Copenhagen and the mass retreat from scientific realism that so appalled Einstein. The later -- frustrated -- Einstein, just to name one prominent example, held that the quest of science is to provide an accurate picture of reality.

A great many scientists -- I would guess the vast majority -- do not share your opinion that "science is not the quest for reality". (No, I don't have statistics. I'll start collecting quotes if you like)

Now, you are, of course, perfectly entitled to your opinion. What's objectionable, however, is that you present this opinion as if it were a universally agreed upon fact, as if to say "ask any scientist and they'll tell you the same thing". As a statement of opinion, it's entirely innocuous; as a statement of undisputed fact (i.e. all scientists agree on this), it's simply false.

Here's a quote from the great man himself, from a letter way back in 1899, that I came across in my reading just this afternoon:
 

Quote

"I am more and more reaching the conviction that the electrodynamics of moving bodies, as it is presented today, doesn't correspond to reality, but can be presented more simply".

-- quoted in "Einstein, History, and Other Passions", Gerald Holton, p177

 

This is a man who does believe that science is, or ought to be, the quest for reality. Otherwise, if it didn't correspond to reality, why should he care? All that matters, on your account, is producing "models that describe how nature behaves".

 

51 minutes ago, swansont said:

[Heavy water is] Typically denoted as D₂O

 Ok, but it's still (a kind of) H2O, right? If that's the case then Kripke's identity statement "water = H2O" would not appear to be immediately threatened by the existence of heavy water, despite Studiot's objection.

Edited October 25, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[DrP]

15 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

Einstein, just to name one prominent example, held that the quest of science is to provide an accurate picture of reality.

"Accurate picture of reality"  -  i.e. - the best model....  which should be updated to better reflect reality if more/updated information comes along.

 

15 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

This is a man who does believe that science is, or ought to be, the quest for reality. Otherwise, if it didn't correspond to reality, why should he care? All that matters, on your account, is producing "models that describe how nature behaves".

"models that describe how nature behaves" are what we build AS a picture of reality as good as we can get them.  Are you misunderstanding this still or arguing for the sake of it to get away from some other point you refuse to concede?

 

[Reg Prescott]

15 minutes ago, DrP said:

"Accurate picture of reality"  -  i.e. - the best model....  which should be updated to better reflect reality if more/updated information comes along.

"models that describe how nature behaves" are what we build AS a picture of reality as good as we can get them.  Are you misunderstanding this still or arguing for the sake of it to get away from some other point you refuse to concede?

Here we must make the distinction between scientific realism and antirealism, in their various forms.

The antirealist will typically (though they're an eclectic bunch) claim that science aims to get observable reality right. What goes on "behind the scenes", if anything, is not the business of science, or cannot be known.

The realist, on the other hand (also an eclectic bunch), will typically claim that science aims to get all of reality right: both observable and unobservable.

The opinion swansont just expressed epitomizes an antirealist stance: All science aims for is to produce models that accurately describe what we can see. i.e., to produce theories/models that are "empirically adequate".

The realist demands more. Not only ought our theories strive to be empirically adequate, but to be true. That is to say, not only are the observable consequences of the theory/model in alignment with what we see, but that the unobservable entities, mechanisms, processes, etc. posited therein actually exist.

Edited October 25, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[dimreepr]

1 hour ago, Reg Prescott said:

Here we must make the distinction between scientific realism and antirealism, in their various forms.

That's easy, antirealism is you; scientific realism is everyone else.  

[Reg Prescott]

29 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

That's easy, antirealism is you; scientific realism is everyone else.  

You're actually quite close to the truth there. You'll have a lot more trouble finding antirealists (outside of quantum physics) than realists, I daresay, though antirealist views can be found in the writings of luminaries such as Mach, Duhem, Poincare, Bohr, etc. Oh, and not to forget the early Mach-inspired Einstein (and so I'm a little puzzled by the quote I read today. Perhaps this was his pre-Mach, pre-antirealist period. *shrugs* ).

Scientific realism -- the quest for reality -- is, after all, surely the common-sense position.

It takes a heavy dose of philosophy or an education in quantum physics to knock the realism out of the man.

As for myself, I haven't taken a stance, though I'd probably incline towards antirealism in the form of Bas van Fraassen's "constructive empiricism".

Edited October 25, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[dimreepr]

2 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

You're actually quite close to the truth there.

I thought so...

[Reg Prescott]

15 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

I thought so...

For the insomniacs out there...

https://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-real/

[dimreepr]

6 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

For the insomniacs out there...

https://www.iep.utm.edu/sci-real/

 

Looks like an excuse for the above...

[swansont]

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Ah, swansont, we've had this discussion before. I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things.

Which means you can't make an absolute blanket statement. Saying that science is not a quest for reality is not such a statement. I only need one example of it not being a quest for reality to show that.

It would be different if I had claimed that science never uncovered reality, since that, too, would be an absolute statement. While I would argue that you can't tell if you had revealed reality, it might be that you had accidentally done so. But that's moot, since it was not what I claimed.

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Now, you are, of course, perfectly entitled to your opinion. What's objectionable, however, is that you present this opinion as if it were a universally agreed upon fact, as if to say "ask any scientist and they'll tell you the same thing". As a statement of opinion, it's entirely innocuous; as a statement of undisputed fact (i.e. all scientists agree on this), it's simply false.

It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality.  

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Here's a quote from the great man himself, from a letter way back in 1899, that I came across in my reading just this afternoon:

That sounds like an admission that an accepted theory in science (electrodynamics) is not reality. Did we get rid of electrodynamics when I wasn't looking? If not, then we have a widely used theory in physics that Einstein has observed is not a representation of reality. 

 

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

This is a man who does believe that science is, or ought to be, the quest for reality. Otherwise, if it didn't correspond to reality, why should he care? All that matters, on your account, is producing "models that describe how nature behaves".

Obviously the first part of this is wrong, or at least, is not supported by Einstein's quote.

Caring or believing it to be so is not a prerequisite for commenting on it. As evidenced by our exchange. I do not believe it to be so, and yet here we are, talking about it. Thus it is unreasonable to conclude that Einstein held a different view, if based solely on the basis of him making similar commentary.

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Ok, but it's still (a kind of) H2O, right? If that's the case then Kripke's identity statement "water = H2O" would not appear to be immediately threatened by the existence of heavy water, despite Studiot's objection.

My answer was in response to your inquiry about the chemical formula. You asked to be corrected of you were wrong, and I did so.

To say that water and H2O are identically the same is not (strictly) correct, since there also exists heavy water, and we routinely call out this difference when using the chemical formula. However, I would categorize this as another sort of thing as another distinction that a non-scientist might not make, if they lack the necessary transactional expertise. (much like my previous examples in physics, and also what we've discussed in evolution)

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Here we must make the distinction between scientific realism and antirealism, in their various forms.

No, actually, we don't. DrP's observation is spot-on: re-hashing this looks to be a distraction.

5 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

The antirealist will typically (though they're an eclectic bunch) claim that science aims to get observable reality right. What goes on "behind the scenes", if anything, is not the business of science, or cannot be known.

The realist, on the other hand (also an eclectic bunch), will typically claim that science aims to get all of reality right: both observable and unobservable.

The opinion swansont just expressed epitomizes an antirealist stance: All science aims for is to produce models that accurately describe what we can see. i.e., to produce theories/models that are "empirically adequate".

The realist demands more. Not only ought our theories strive to be empirically adequate, but to be true. That is to say, not only are the observable consequences of the theory/model in alignment with what we see, but that the unobservable entities, mechanisms, processes, etc. posited therein actually exist.

This point would be moot if you could point out physics theories where you can objectively confirm that we've gotten the unobservable reality right. (How would you do so?) Alternatively, you could give example of theory that was discarded or changed solely based on reality concerns, rather than having experiment not matching with theory.

 

[TheSim]

Any description of science as providing a picture of reality  sounds realist to my ears, even if  all that is meant by 'picture'  is a coarse and fallible sketch of reality.

The problem with the picture-sketch metaphor, to anti-realist ears, is that it  still sounds like  it is appealing to a subjective-objective distinction , even when pragmatic users of the metaphor insist that their "picture of reality isn't supposed to be objective."    Here, the picture metaphor still suggests that scientists are passive observers of nature, whose investigative practices  are irrelevant  and non-contributory to the existence  of the entities referred to in their empirically tested theories.   

For example,  a realist physicist would understand the concept of the Higgs-Boson very narrowly and atomically as designating  only the particular sub-atomic entity  'confirmed' by experimentation.  Consequently the realist interprets successful particle accelerator experiments as proving the objective, i.e. investigation-independent existence , of the Higgs boson.  

In contrast, an anti-realist physicist would understand the concept of the Higgs-Boson  very broadly and holistically in a way that is both culturally relative and inextricably connected to  the performance of certain experiments and activities.  They might say  " 'The Higgs Boson exists'  means that IF you do This  THEN you see That,  assuming that you act in conformance with our culture so as to automatically satisfy certain implicit auxiliary assumptions that are unstated in our scientific framework. "

Edited October 25, 2018 by TheSim

[beecee]

8 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Ah, swansont, we've had this discussion before. I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things.

And you have been shown to be wrong on that and just about all you have claimed. As anyone with any intelligence should realise, is that scientific theories while not referring to any reality or truth as you like to put it, models what we observe and the predictions of that model....Obviously then as that model/theory continues to make successful predictions and align with observations, it becomes more and more certain...eg: the theory of the evolution of life, the BB, SR and GR just to name some notable models. That may offend your personal beliefs and philosophy but so be it.

Quote

- Einstein, just to name one prominent example, held that the quest of science is to provide an accurate picture of reality.

Just another example of your blanket inferences based on one obvious misinterpretation...again. Einstein like all reputable scientists constructed models that aligned with observation and the behavior of the universe around him.

Quote

A great many scientists -- I would guess the vast majority -- do not share your opinion that "science is not the quest for reality". (No, I don't have statistics. I'll start collecting quotes if you like)

Most reputable scientists most certainly believe that science is not necessarily a quest for reality, but if any supposed reality should be revealed in the continued scientific quest, then so be it.

 

Quote

Ok, but it's still (a kind of) H2O, right? If that's the case then Kripke's identity statement "water = H2O" would not appear to be immediately threatened by the existence of heavy water, despite Studiot's objection.

 Another example of a myriad of examples of you avoiding admitting you were and are wrong, and as illustrated in the following opinion...... 

8 hours ago, DrP said:

"models that describe how nature behaves" are what we build AS a picture of reality as good as we can get them. 

 Are you misunderstanding this still or arguing for the sake of it to get away from some other point you refuse to concede?

 

An article on evolution and so called "perfection" that continues to be erroneously pushed in this thread........

https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/misconcep_03

The limitations of natural selection

 

There are many reasons why natural selection may not produce a "perfectly-engineered" trait. For example, you might imagine that cheetahs could catch more prey and produce more offspring if they could run just a little faster. Here are a few reasons why natural selection might not produce perfection or faster cheetahs:

• Lack of necessary genetic variation
  Selection can only operate on the available genetic variation. A cheetah might run faster if it had "faster" alleles — but if faster alleles are not in the population from mutation or gene flow, evolution in this direction will not happen

• Constraints due to history
  Perhaps a different arrangement of leg muscles and bones would produce cheetahs that run faster — however, the basic body form of mammals is already laid out in their genes and development in such a mutually constrained way, that it is unlikely to be altered. There really may be "no way to get there from here."

• Trade-offs
  Changing one feature for the better might change another for the worse. Perhaps faster alleles exist in the cheetah population — but there is a trade-off associated with them: the alleles produce cheetahs with longer legs (and hence more speed), but these long legs are hazardously delicate. Although longer limb bones increase stride, their chances of failing due to bending loads increases as well. In this case, perhaps no net increase in fitness would result from the faster alleles.

So natural selection may not produce perfection, but you'd at least expect it to get rid of obviously deleterious genes, wouldn't you? Maybe not....

The “bad” gene

 

Natural selection works by weeding less fit variants out of a population. We would expect natural selection to remove alleles with negative effects from a population�and yet many populations include individuals carrying such alleles. Human populations, for example, generally carry some disease-causing alleles that affect reproduction. So why are these deleterious alleles still around anyway? What keeps natural selection from getting rid of them? There are several possible explanations:

•  

  	Normal red blood cells (top) and sickle cells (bottom)

  They may be maintained by heterozygote advantage
  When carrying two copies of an allele is disadvantageous, but carrying only one copy is advantageous, natural selection will not remove the allele from the population — the advantage conferred in its heterozygous state keeps the allele around. For example, the allele that causes sickle cell anemia is deleterious if you carry two copies of it. But if you only carry one copy of it and live in a place where malaria is common, the allele is advantageous because it confers resistance to malaria.

   

• They may be maintained by mutation
  The mutation producing the deleterious allele may keep arising in the population, even as selection weeds it out. For example, neurofibromatosis is a genetic disease causing tumors of the nervous system. Natural selection cannot completely eliminate the gene that causes this disease because new mutations arise relatively frequently — in perhaps 1 in 4000 gametes.

• They may be maintained by gene flow
  The allele may be common, and not deleterious, in a nearby habitat. If gene flow from the nearby population is common, we may observe the deleterious allele in the population of interest. For example, in places like the U.S., where malaria is not a problem, the gene that causes sickle cell anemia is strictly disadvantageous. However, in many parts of the world, the gene that causes sickle cell anemia is more common because a single copy of it confers resistance to malaria. Human migration causes this gene to be found in populations all over the world.

• Natural selection may not have had time to remove them yet
  The direction of selection changes as the environment changes � what was advantageous or neutral ten generations ago may be deleterious today. It is possible that some of the deleterious alleles that we observe in natural populations are on their way out, but selection has not yet completely removed them. For example, although there is debate about the issue, some researchers have proposed that the relatively high frequency in European populations of the allele causing cystic fibrosis is a historical holdover from a time when cholera was more rampant in these populations. It is proposed that carrying the cystic fibrosis allele provided some resistance to cholera and so increased in frequency in earlier European populations. Now that these developed nations are no longer threatened by cholera and the selective environment has changed, natural selection may be slowly weeding the cystic fibrosis allele out of those populations.

• They may not really reduce fitness
  Some genetic disorders only exert their effects late in life, after reproduction has taken place. For example, the allele that causes Huntington's disease typically does not exert its devastating effects until after a person's prime reproductive years. So although Huntington's disease is certainly deleterious in terms of quality of life, it is not deleterious in terms of reproductive ability and is not selected against.

• https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/misconcep_05

• https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/misconcep_06

• https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/misconcep_07

• https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/misconcep_08

    https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/misconcep_09

The straight story

 

We've seen that misconceptions regarding natural selection and adaptation are common. Natural selection is often incorrectly viewed as the only mechanism of evolution and is commonly misinterpreted as "trying" to perfect organisms. Similarly, people tend to over-apply the concept of adaptation, looking for adaptive advantages in traits that may have evolved for some other function or through means other than natural selection. Although natural selection and adaptation are key concepts in evolutionary theory, the mechanisms of evolution are diverse and include mutation, migration, and genetic drift, and the results of evolution are contingent upon the vagaries of history.

[Reg Prescott]

8 hours ago, swansont said:

Which means you can't make an absolute blanket statement. Saying that science is not a quest for reality is not such a statement. I only need one example of it not being a quest for reality to show that.

So now you're making a distinction between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement"? Sounds a bit ad hoc to me, to say the least.

 

8 hours ago, swansont said:

It would be different if I had claimed that science never uncovered reality, since that, too, would be an absolute statement. While I would argue that you can't tell if you had revealed reality, it might be that you had accidentally done so. But that's moot, since it was not what I claimed.

That's exactly what you did claim. Your "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any waiver of the "by and large", "generally speaking" variety.

 

8 hours ago, swansont said:

It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality.  

Now you're moving the goalposts. Your original claim was "science is not the quest for reality".

Your revised claim, though, is also false. Just to stick with Einstein -- presumably a reputable physicist -- his conversion from an early Mach-inspired positivism (a form of antirealism) to his later realism in defiance of Copenhagen antirealist hegemony is well documented. Entire books have been written about it. Try these:
"Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics" by Christopher Norris 
"Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony" by James T. Cushing 
"The Shaky Game" by Arthur Fine

Just one example from the third book -- the entire texts are chockablock with them:
 

Quote

"In particular, following his conversion [from antirealism to realism], Einstein wanted to claim genuine reality for the central theoretical entities of his general theory, the four-dimensional space-time manifold, and associated tensor fields. This is a serious business for if we grant his claim, then not only do space and time cease to be real, but so do virtually all of the usual dynamical qualities."

 

 

8 hours ago, swansont said:

This point would be moot if you could point out physics theories where you can objectively confirm that we've gotten the unobservable reality right. (How would you do so?) 

Here you're confusing semantic and metaphysical issues with epistemology. A "quest for reality" does not entail that we can know when that quest has been fulfilled (though most realists hold that we can know. Popper is an exception). The latter -- "How can we know?", "How can we confirm?"-- is quite distinct from the former two. 

The metaphysical issue pertains to whether or not there exists a reality independent of ourselves. The realist typically claims there does. (What can be known about it, if anything, is a different question; a question for the epistemologist).

The semantic issue pertains to whether or not the terms in scientific theories refer. The realist -- in contrast to the antirealist of an instrumentalist bent -- will typically claim, with certain qualifications, that they do refer. If she's wise, she'll qualify this claim by restricting it to our "best theories" in the "mature sciences" etc., etc.

In the quote above, for example, we see that Einstein is withdrawing his earlier, more circumspect, antirealist stance towards GR ("The theory is not to be read literally: the theoretical posits are not meant to refer") and advancing a more daring realist position ("The terms of my theory do refer").

With regards the epistemological question ("How can we know our theories capture reality?) the realist will typically appeal to "Inference to the Best Explanation": from a set of candidate theories/hypotheses, we are licensed to infer to the truth of the theory which provides the best explanation of the data/evidence. Such an inference, the realist asserts, provides us with sufficient epistemological warrant to claim knowledge of the theory's truth, i.e. we can know, albeit without certainty, that the theory is true or approximately so.

This is all covered in the link in my most recent post.

 

8 hours ago, swansont said:

Alternatively, you could give example of theory that was discarded or changed solely based on reality concerns, rather than having experiment not matching with theory.

Most notably, Ptolemaic cosmology, just to name one. Around 1600 or so, the evidence for Copernican vs Ptolemaic astronomy was indecisive: the rival theories were underdetermined by the evidence.

Does anyone nowadays doubt the reality of the Earth rotating on its axis once every twenty-four hours or so?
 

 

 

 

5 hours ago, TheSim said:

Any description of science as providing a picture of reality  sounds realist to my ears, even if  all that is meant by 'picture'  is a coarse and fallible sketch of reality.

The problem with the picture-sketch metaphor, to anti-realist ears, is that it  still sounds like  it is appealing to a subjective-objective distinction , even when pragmatic users of the metaphor insist that their "picture of reality isn't supposed to be objective."    Here, the picture metaphor still suggests that scientists are passive observers of nature, whose investigative practices  are irrelevant  and non-contributory to the existence  of the entities referred to in their empirically tested theories.   

For example,  a realist physicist would understand the concept of the Higgs-Boson very narrowly and atomically as designating  only the particular sub-atomic entity  'confirmed' by experimentation.  Consequently the realist interprets successful particle accelerator experiments as proving the objective, i.e. investigation-independent existence , of the Higgs boson.  

In contrast, an anti-realist physicist would understand the concept of the Higgs-Boson  very broadly and holistically in a way that is both culturally relative and inextricably connected to  the performance of certain experiments and activities.  They might say  " 'The Higgs Boson exists'  means that IF you do This  THEN you see That,  assuming that you act in conformance with our culture so as to automatically satisfy certain implicit auxiliary assumptions that are unstated in our scientific framework. "

 

Quite so. And these would be the words of an antirealist of the positivist persuasion.

In other words, the positivist -- armed with his verificationist theory of meaning -- holds that all talk of unobservable reality is meaningless.

But clearly science does make appeal to unobservable entities, the critic might object. Does that mean such theories are meaningless?

Not at all. Scientific theories (this is still the positivist speaking) properly understood are about what is observable. All talk of unobservables is translatable into talk about observables, and thus meaningful, sparing us the horrors of metaphysics.

Edited October 26, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[beecee]

2 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

So now you're making a distinction between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement"? Sounds a bit ad hoc to me, to say the least.

No more ad hoc then your poor attempt to try and somehow worm perfection in with natural selection.

Quote

 

That's exactly what you did claim. Your "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any waiver of the "by and large", "generally speaking" variety.

Now you're moving the goalposts. Your original claim was "science is not the quest for reality".

 

Quite ironic you speaking of anyone moving the goal posts, considering you have actually performed that little trick in a few threads now, rather then admit you were and are wrong. But while scientific models certainly do not have any reality or truth at their goal, if they should stumble upon it, all well and good. 

Quote

Just one example from the third book -- the entire texts are chockablock with them:

Actually just your interpretations of what you believe, and in line with what agenda you are harboring. 

Quote

Here you're confusing semantic and metaphysical issues with epistemology.

And the irony meters are going off again!!!

Quote

Does anyone nowadays doubt the reality of the Earth rotating on its axis once every twenty-four hours or so?

Pretty close to the mark, and an example of stumbling onto the reality and aligning with the scientific methodology, So? I mean once again, it does nothing to support your own totally blanket claims, here and elsewhere?

The rest as usual, much ado about nothing.

Edited October 26, 2018 by beecee

[Reg Prescott]

In what follows I'll provide additional evidence, in the form of a small selection of quotes, in an attempt to further refute swansont's claim that "science is not the quest for reality", which he later revised to "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality".

First a reminder. What I'm claiming, in opposition to swansont, is that a great many scientists, I'd be inclined to say the overwhelming majority, take a 'realist' approach to their work. That is to say, they do regard their own work, or the task of science in general, as a "quest for reality". Science is not merely about predictive accuracy, but getting the world right.

I've previously stated my own, dare I say commonsense, conviction that realism is, by and large, the default position across the entire scientific spectrum. Evidence for antirealist sentiment in geology, neuroscience, or chemistry, say, might reasonably be described as exiguous. If our members know of any contemporary chemists who doubt the existence of molecules ("Well, molecules might be real or they might not be. We'll never know; just shut up and calculate"), or neuroscientists who express skepticism over the existence of axons, dendrites, and synaptic clefts, be sure to let me know. Because I don't.

This leaves myself in the unenviable position of trying to produce evidence for a position -- scientific realism -- which is simply taken for granted by the vast majority of scientists in the vast majority of scientific disciplines. It's a bit like being demanded to provide proof that cobblers believe shoes are real! I daresay the reality of shoes is not something cobblers spend a great deal of time discussing. It's simply an unquestioned assumption.

The glaring exception to all this commonsense realism is to be found in the domain of physics, and in particular, the nebulous precincts of quantum physics, where it is indeed the case that antirealist attributions are the order of the day. Take, for example, this remark from Niels Bohr:

Quote

"[t]here is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum mechanical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature" 

Bohr's comment, typifying orthodox Copenhagen antirealism, mirrors similar remarks made by swansont and certain others in these forums (and I paraphrase): "Science (or physics) is not in the business of pursuing accurate causal-explanatory accounts of reality. All that matters is generating empirically adequate models or theories that 'save the phenomena', but do not purport to represent reality".

If I can succeed in showing that even in quantum physics -- the last redoubt of antirealism -- it is not the case that all involved assent to "science is not the quest for reality", I'll take it that my refutation applies across the board to all scientific disciplines.

The quotes below are drawn from the books cited in my most recent post. Those not from the primary sources themselves (the physicists), except for the first two, are linked to the relevant primary sources, and will be supplied upon request. As you read through, ask yourself whether these men subscribe to the doctrine that science is "not the quest for reality".

 

"Physics is a kind of metaphysics... All physics is a description of reality; but this description can be either complete or incomplete" - Einstein

"If one regards the method of the current quantum theory as in principle definitive, that means that one has to forego all claims to a complete description of real states of affairs. One can justify this renunciation if one accepts that there simply are no laws for real states of affairs, so that their complete description would be pointless . . . Now I can't reconcile myself to that" - Einstein

"[...] and that Bell was justified -- despite his own results -- in holding out for a possible realist solution along the lines suggested by Einstein and Bohm"

"Einstein was by now deeply dissatisfied with what he saw as its failure to provide any adequate realist or causal-explanatory account of QM phenomena. This change of mind went along with his shift from a broadly positivist (or instrumentalist) approach according to which a scientific theory need achieve no more than empirical-observational and predictive accuracy to a realist position that entailed far more in the way of express ontological commitment" 

"The hidden variables theory was developed by David Bohm who agreed with Einstein that orthodox QM was 'incomplete' since it failed to deliver an adequate ontology in keeping with the basic principles of scientific realism" 

"In Einstein's case the conversion from Machian instrumentalism to causal realism was noted with regret -- understandably so -- by Bohr and others in the orthodox QM camp who considered it a strange lapse into old 'metaphysical' ways of thinking. To Einstein, conversely, his early position now appeared to have been just a brief unfortunate lapse from the standards and aims of proper scientific enquiry" 

"Indeed, he [J.S. Bell] repeatedly expressed a conviction that the orthodox theory MUST be in some way "incomplete' and, moreover, that a realist construal of quantum phenomena was the only approach that held out any prospect of improved scientific understanding since it alone offered a genuine trial of substantive (ontologically committed) truth-claims or hypotheses." 

"[David] Deutsch is an out-and-out realist with regard to these multiple coexisting parallel worlds and spends a good deal of time chastising instrumentalists for their abject evasion of the issue. In this respect he is fully in accord with Einstein, contending that it must be the aim of any adequate physical theory to describe and explain the way things stand in reality, rather than merely to 'save the phenomena' [...]" 

"Einstein himself started out by espousing a Machian instrumentalist approach according to which the chief demands of a scientific theory -- such as special relativity -- were that it should be observationally and predictively adequate without any further (ontological) commitment to the reality 'behind' phenomenal appearances. However, he abandoned this doctrine in his later writings, chiefly on account of his deep dissatisfaction with the orthodox quantum theory and his belief that instrumentalism [i.e. antirealism - RP] had often been used -- by physicists like Bohr and Heisenberg -- as a means of protecting their theory from any challenge on alternative (rational and realist) grounds" 
 

Edited October 26, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[beecee]

58 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

In what follows I'll provide additional evidence, in the form of a small selection of quotes, in an attempt to further refute swansont's claim that "science is not the quest for reality", which he later revised to "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality".

Selections of quotes are not evidence that science "must" or "should" be representations of reality, whatever that is........

Quote

First a reminder. What I'm claiming, in opposition to swansont, is that a great many scientists, I'd be inclined to say the overwhelming majority, take a 'realist' approach to their work. That is to say, they do regard their own work, or the task of science in general, as a "quest for reality". Science is not merely about predictive accuracy, but getting the world right.

Your inclination/s in the past on this forum have been shown to be greatly astray and/or misinterpretations and out of context remarks.

 

Quote

I've previously stated my own, dare I say commonsense, conviction that realism is, by and large, the default position across the entire scientific spectrum.

Your so called "common sense" has already been found wanting in this thread, with your perfection/natural selection errors, and certainly in other threads such as claims re Newtonian gravity and planetary orbits, with no concessions at all on your part in relation to those errors, and now we switch tact to whether science is after realism and/or truth. This changing subject matter without conceding on the topic when shown to be wrong appears to be your "modus operandi"

We'll leave the rest of your rambling and supply some material......

http://www.textetc.com/theory/truth-in-science.html

extract:

 

Many problems were noted long ago. How much evidence needs to be assembled before a generalization becomes overwhelmingly certain? It is never certain. David Hume (1711-76) pointed out that no scientific law is ever conclusively verified. That the sun has risen every morning so far will not logically entail the sun rising in future. Effect is simply what follows cause: laws of function are only habit. {7}

There are further difficulties with induction. Scientists make a large number of observations from which to generalize. But these observations are made with a purpose, not randomly: they are selected according to the theory to be tested, or what the discipline prescribes as relevant. Then the eye (or any other organ) does not record like a camera, but interprets according to experience and expectation. Theory is to some extent threaded into observation. Finally, there is the reporting of observations, which must be assembled, regimented in accordance with the theory being advanced or refuted.

Does this worry scientists? Not at all. Whatever the philosophic difficulties, science works, and its successes are augmented every day. Besides, the problem can be circumvented by employing statistical relevance. We assemble the factors that might be relevant and see how probability changes as a result. For example: if the probability of Event E given Cause C is changed by Factor A, then A is relevant — matters which can be set out in probability theory.

The first point to be emphasized is the diversity of science. All sciences are objective and empirical, presenting results that can be independently verified by a qualified practitioner. But each discipline in practice, and sometimes each sub-discipline, has its own traditions, ethos and procedures. And these in turn are the product of long training and a communality of views, even to some extent of mentalities: good botanists do not make good astrophysicists.

Some Concluding Thoughts

Those who attack science for its remote and reductive nature, its cold-blooded efficiency and elitist decision-making should not forget how well science actually works. Scientific observations may be theory-laden, but those theories are tested in a communality of practice. If once depicted as mechanical and predetermined, science appears less so now that quantum and chaotic processes have been more widely recognized. Science does bring great operational efficiency, and its findings cannot be called myths in the sense understood in anthropology or literary criticism. {28} Science attempts not only to understand nature, but to control nature, and there is hardly an aspect of life today that could be conducted without its help. In short, science does seem essentially different from the arts, and its successes would be miraculous if there was not some correspondence between its theories and "reality", whatever that "reality" may be.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/im-a-scientist-and-i-dont-believe-in-facts/

They say that we have found ourselves in a world lost to emotion, irrationality, and a weakening grasp on reality. That lies don’t faze us, and knowledge doesn’t impress us. That we are post-truth, post-fact. But, is this actually a bad thing?

I’m a factual relativist. I abandoned the idea of facts and “the truth” some time last year. I wrote a whole science book, The Memory Illusion, almost never mentioning the terms fact and truth. Why? Because much like Santa Claus and unicorns, facts don’t actually exist. At least not in the way we commonly think of them.

We think of a fact as an irrefutable truth. According to the Oxford dictionary, a fact is “a thing that is known or proved to be true.” And where does proof come from? Science?

Well, let me tell you a secret about science; scientists don’t prove anything. What we do is collect evidence that supports or does not support our predictions. Sometimes we do things over and over again, in meaningfully different ways, and we get the same results, and then we call these findings facts. And, when we have lots and lots of replications and variations that all say the same thing, then we talk about theories or laws. Like evolution. Or gravity. But at no point have we proved anything.

Don’t get me wrong. The scientific method is totally awesome. It is unparalleled in its ability to get answers that can help us extend life, optimize output, and understand our own brains.

 

Scientists slowly break down the illusions created by our biased human perception, revealing what the universe actually looks like. In an incremental progress, each study adds a tiny bit of insight to our understanding.

But while the magic of science should make our eyes twinkle with excitement, we can still argue that the findings from every scientific experiment ever conducted are wrong, almost by necessity. They are just a bit more right (hopefully) than preceding studies.

That’s the beauty of science. It’s inherently self-critical and self-correcting. The status quo is never good enough. Scientists want to know more, always. And, lucky for them, there is always more to know.

more at link......https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/im-a-scientist-and-i-dont-believe-in-facts/

 

[swansont]

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

So now you're making a distinction between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement"? Sounds a bit ad hoc to me, to say the least.

How it sounds to you doesn't budge the needle.

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

That's exactly what you did claim. Your "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any waiver of the "by and large", "generally speaking" variety.

If we accept that there are acceptable theories and models that do not reflect reality, it must not be a requirement. We don't reject theories on the basis of whether they do so. Good thing, too, as it's an impossible test.

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Now you're moving the goalposts. Your original claim was "science is not the quest for reality".

Last I check, physics was part of science.  

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Most notably, Ptolemaic cosmology, just to name one. Around 1600 or so, the evidence for Copernican vs Ptolemaic astronomy was indecisive: the rival theories were underdetermined by the evidence.

And there's no other reason? One was not simpler?

Oo course, you were careful to say "around 1600 or so" as by 1610 this was not the case, since geocentrism could not account of Galileo's observations of the phases of Venus. But since the issue was not decided at that point — both models had their proponents — it's hard to see how the final decision was based solely on what was real, rather than by observation.

 

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Does anyone nowadays doubt the reality of the Earth rotating on its axis once every twenty-four hours or so?
 

No. Why does that matter?

You seem to be missing the point. There's nothing that says if science arrives at the point of describing reality that it has erred. It's just not the goal. If that's where the model ends up, that's fine. If a model describes reality, it agrees with observation. But a model can agree with observation even if it does not describe reality. "Describing reality" is not the metric by which we reject a theory.

 

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Quite so. And these would be the words of an antirealist of the positivist persuasion.

In other words, the positivist -- armed with his verificationist theory of meaning -- holds that all talk of unobservable reality is meaningless.

But clearly science does make appeal to unobservable entities, the critic might object. Does that mean such theories are meaningless?

If it's so clear, please list some of these instances.

12 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Not at all. Scientific theories (this is still the positivist speaking) properly understood are about what is observable. All talk of unobservables is translatable into talk about observables, and thus meaningful, sparing us the horrors of metaphysics.

Please list some examples. Indirect measurement is still a measurement.

6 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

First a reminder. What I'm claiming, in opposition to swansont, is that a great many scientists, I'd be inclined to say the overwhelming majority, take a 'realist' approach to their work. That is to say, they do regard their own work, or the task of science in general, as a "quest for reality". Science is not merely about predictive accuracy, but getting the world right.

I've previously stated my own, dare I say commonsense, conviction that realism is, by and large, the default position across the entire scientific spectrum. Evidence for antirealist sentiment in geology, neuroscience, or chemistry, say, might reasonably be described as exiguous. If our members know of any contemporary chemists who doubt the existence of molecules ("Well, molecules might be real or they might not be. We'll never know; just shut up and calculate"), or neuroscientists who express skepticism over the existence of axons, dendrites, and synaptic clefts, be sure to let me know. Because I don't.

The opposite of "not all theories describe reality" is not "no theories describe reality".  

[Strange]

41 minutes ago, swansont said:

The opposite of "not all theories describe reality" is not "no theories describe reality".  

I find it remarkable that someone who claims to have studied philosophy shows such a poor grasp of logic. 

[beecee]

6 hours ago, swansont said:

You seem to be missing the point. There's nothing that says if science arrives at the point of describing reality that it has erred. It's just not the goal. If that's where the model ends up, that's fine. If a model describes reality, it agrees with observation. But a model can agree with observation even if it does not describe reality. "Describing reality" is not the metric by which we reject a theory.  

Can we ask Reg if he agrees with that statement? [without too much hullabaloo and rhetoric preferably]...otherwise the following is just so obviously true.

5 hours ago, Strange said:

I find it remarkable that someone who claims to have studied philosophy shows such a poor grasp of logic. 

 

[Reg Prescott]

On page 2 of this thread, I made the following observation quoted below, regarding "participants [who] adopt a must-win-the-debate attitude that precludes them from recognizing competing points and good arguments. XXXXX, your style suffers from this a lot, and while you think it makes you victorious, it just frustrates others that they continually have to keep pointing to what they said two minutes ago, which you ignored in favor of waving your hands and repeating your same refuted arguments" (a quote from a moderator)

 

Quote

Sorry to say swansont, but that's exactly what you've done since I've known you, and it's exactly what you're doing now. In my previous thread on "Challenging Science" I abandoned all hope of impartial, rational discussion when you dismissed Max Born's expert testimony on the role of dogma in science on grounds of "fallacy of appeal to authority". After I refuted this, the flaccid, must-win-the-debate response from yourself was (roughly), "Well, he might be an authority on science, but he's not an authority on dogma".

When heights of silliness such as these are attained, it's time to call it a day, and focus on those members willing to play by the rules.

 

And in pointing out the fallacious argumentation of my interlocutor earned myself another 3 neg-rep points for the collection. One gets the distinct impression that rule violations -- and that includes logical fallacies -- constitute a problem on this site only when perpetrated by the newbies -- even when none have been perpetrated! The top boys, on the other hand, could argue "All men are electric toasters" and probably get a standing ovation.

 

Well, here we are again, folks. Today's collection of absurdities includes:

 

1. Swansont claims (top of page 4): "science is not the quest for reality"

 

As an unqualified blanket statement, the claim is patently ludicrous, as I've tried to show. There may exist scientists who hold such a view (swansont himself apparently), though to claim that all do is not only jawdroppingly false, but commits the fallacy of presenting as undisputed fact that which is mere opinion.

Perhaps sensing the absurdity of his own assertion, the backpedaling begins in swansont's next post, where we're told a distinction must be drawn between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement". It's a distinction I'm not familiar with myself (I suppose I need to get out more). What next: a distinction between an "absolute blanket statement" and a "really very super-duper absolute blanket statement"?

In the same post, the backpedaling leitmotif continues as swansont tells us "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality". When it was pointed out that he had moved the goalposts (another logical fallacy), swansont's facile rejoinder (third post) amounted to: "Last I check, physics was part of science". 

You don't say! We might say physics is to science what a one-foot wide goal is to a twenty-foot wide goal. The target just got an awful lot narrower.

Downsizing of the goal post breadth notwithstanding, swansont's revised claim is still manifestly untrue, as I have shown. It is not the case that even in the restricted domain of physics all involved believe "science is not the quest for reality". Once again, opinion is being presented as universally accepted fact.

 

2. Leaving swansont aside, if anyone else here is able to compile a list of the assorted rule violations (ad hominem, flaming, etc.), not to mention the reams of mindless proselytizing, propaganda, irrelevancies and spam, before the universe suffers the heat death, you're a better man/woman than I.

But hey, they're top boys so it doesn't matter. All that really matters here, as far as I can discern, is to keep saying "You're wrong. You're very really super-duper absolutely conclusively wrong". Say it often enough, loud enough, while waving your arms and stamping your feet, and who knows, someone might even believe it.

Now, may I have my regular order? Three neg rep points to go.

 

Edited October 27, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[beecee]

54 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

1. Swansont claims (top of page 4): "science is not the quest for reality"

 

As an unqualified blanket statement, the claim is patently ludicrous, as I've tried to show.

Tried being of course the operative word....failure in that endeavour is obvious.

Science's goal is certainly not any truth or reality as you seem to want to force down others throats....If in the process, we discover that....all well and good. 

Quote

 

2. Leaving swansont aside, if anyone else here is able to compile a list of the assorted rule violations (ad hominem, flaming, etc.), not to mention the reams of mindless proselytizing, propaganda, irrelevancies and spam, before the universe suffers the heat death, you're a better man/woman than I.

But hey, they're top boys so it doesn't matter. All that really matters here, as far as I can discern, is to keep saying "You're wrong. You're very really super-duper absolutely conclusively wrong". Say it often enough, loud enough, while waving your arms and stamping your feet, and who knows, someone might even believe it.

Now, may I have my regular order? Three neg rep points to go.

 

And again we play the victim card, and the whole forum is against him, instead of recognising his own monumental errors here and elsewhere, concentrating on eliminating them, and being man enough to admit he is wrong.

Again reg, without your useless rhetorical ramble, please show empirically how perfection is relevant in the manner you prescribe and how it ties in with natural selection and evolution, as per the title of this thread. Or alternatively you can show conclusively how science's goal is reality and truth....Oh, and as a bonus, what is this reality and truth you speak of?

As a wise man recently said, "I find it remarkable that someone who claims to have studied philosophy shows such a poor grasp of logic". 

 

Edited October 27, 2018 by beecee

[swansont]

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

 

Well, here we are again, folks. Today's collection of absurdities includes:

 

1. Swansont claims (top of page 4): "science is not the quest for reality"

 

As an unqualified blanket statement, the claim is patently ludicrous, as I've tried to show. There may exist scientists who hold such a view (swansont himself apparently), though to claim that all do is not only jawdroppingly false, but commits the fallacy of presenting as undisputed fact that which is mere opinion.

I didn't claim that all scientists hold this view. I have to concur with a previous poster's sentiment; assuming the issue isn't simply reading comprehension, your grasp of logic is appallingly bad for someone who is purportedly schooled in philosophy

An individual scientist's views are their own. They may wish to search for reality. I don't care. But you are exchanging that personal view for that of the institution and practice of science. I ask: where is it in the process that we check to make sure that we have described reality? We check behavior, to be sure — we compare the theory and the data. Where is the check on reality? Of all the papers I've read, I can't think of a single one in which such a discussion occurs, and there are many example where we freely acknowledge that we are not doing that. How is that possible? How is that to be permitted, if science itself is to reveal reality, rather than be a tool by which some individuals attempt it?

 

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Perhaps sensing the absurdity of his own assertion, the backpedaling begins in swansont's next post, where we're told a distinction must be drawn between a "blanket statement" and an "absolute blanket statement". It's a distinction I'm not familiar with myself (I suppose I need to get out more). What next: a distinction between an "absolute blanket statement" and a "really very super-duper absolute blanket statement"?

Again, this is surprising coming from someone claiming to be schooled in philosophy.

I refer you to Monty Python for an example

'All wood burns,' states Sir Bedevere. 'Therefore,' he concludes, 'all that burns is wood.' This is, of course, pure bullshit. Universal affirmatives can only be partially converted: all of Alma Cogan is dead, but only some of the class of dead people are Alma Cogan. 'Oh yes,' one would think. 

In other words, if one claims that something is universal or absolute (e.g. all that burns is wood) one only needs to come up with something that but isn't wood in order to negate that. But the opposite is not the case (all wood burns)

When you claim that science is the quest for reality (and it is surprising you would do so, as you stated "no blanket statements can be made about science") all I have to do is find one example of science not being a quest for reality and I have falsified the claim

So, as above, to state that all of a group of people use science as a quest for reality does not mean that all of science is a quest for reality, for universal affirmatives can only be partially converted.

 

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

In the same post, the backpedaling leitmotif continues as swansont tells us "It is a fact that physics uses models that are never intended to be representations of reality". When it was pointed out that he had moved the goalposts (another logical fallacy), swansont's facile rejoinder (third post) amounted to: "Last I check, physics was part of science". 

You don't say! We might say physics is to science what a one-foot wide goal is to a twenty-foot wide goal. The target just got an awful lot narrower.

I hope by now we have corrected your deficiency in understanding this area of logic.

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

Downsizing of the goal post breadth notwithstanding, swansont's revised claim is still manifestly untrue, as I have shown. It is not the case that even in the restricted domain of physics all involved believe "science is not the quest for reality". Once again, opinion is being presented as universally accepted fact.

This is a straw man — I never claimed this. It is your retelling of what I claimed, twisted so that you can make a rebuttal.

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

2. Leaving swansont aside, if anyone else here is able to compile a list of the assorted rule violations (ad hominem, flaming, etc.), not to mention the reams of mindless proselytizing, propaganda, irrelevancies and spam, before the universe suffers the heat death, you're a better man/woman than I.

This is a common tactic. Imply that there are myriad rules violation, but not pointing them out, not reporting them, often as part of a persecution complex. (Most people who complain don't even know what an ad hominem attack actually is.) 

14 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

The top boys, on the other hand, could argue "All men are electric toasters" and probably get a standing ovation.

And there we have it. Pointing out your errors or disagreeing with you is soooo unfair.

 

[Reg Prescott]

8 hours ago, swansont said:

I didn't claim that all scientists hold this view. I have to concur with a previous poster's sentiment; assuming the issue isn't simply reading comprehension, your grasp of logic is appallingly bad for someone who is purportedly schooled in philosophy

 

Yes, you did. For so long as you continue to distort the facts, impugn my integrity, and question my competence, I will continue to remind our members of these facts.

From swansont's post at the top of page 4: "And since science is not the quest for reality, but rather for models that describe how nature behaves [...]"

You did not say "By and large, science is not the search for reality" or "Generally speaking, science is not the search for reality" or "Some/most scientists do not see science as the search for reality".

What you said was an unqualified "science is not the search for reality".

Your assertion, then, takes the form of a universal generalization; commonly known as a "blanket statement". To refute a universal generalization all that is necessary is to produce a single counterexample. I have produced several, all from the domain of quantum physics where, in this particular case, they are most scarce.

Your statement "science is not the quest for reality" is therefore refuted.
 

8 hours ago, swansont said:

(i) When you claim that science is the quest for reality (and it is surprising you would do so, (ii) as you stated "no blanket statements can be made about science") all I have to do is find one example of science not being a quest for reality and I have falsified the claim

More distortion. More disingenuousness. More misquotation.

(i) It's surprising I would do so for the simple reason I did not do so. What I did do is refute your own claim by showing it is not the case that science is not the quest for reality. In other words, some scientists may see it this way; others do not.

(If the point is not clear, compare with a group of sailors on a ship with differing views on what is being sought. Some seek this; some seek that; some seek the other. Inasmuch as "seek" is an intentional (in the philosophical sense) verb, and ships presumably lack intentionality, the ship itself is not engaged in a search or quest. Ships do not search for anything; its occupants do.)

(Note also that it matters not whether the object of the quest even exists. The statement "Ponce de León was searching for the fountain of youth" is true, even if said fountain is entirely illusory.)

(ii) I did not claim "no blanket statements can be made about science". What I did say was (2nd post, page 4):

"I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things."

Any fool can make a blanket statement about science (E.g. "All scientists are electric toasters"), and many fools do. The statements they make are almost invariably false. 

 

Everything else in your post -- Monty Python and your pro bono analysis of my psychological condition -- is mere smoke and mirrors and merits no further attention.
 

Edited October 27, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[beecee]

13 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

Yes, you did. For so long as you continue to distort the facts, impugn my integrity, and question my competence, I will continue to remind our members of these facts.

From swansont's post at the top of page 4: "And since science is not the quest for reality, but rather for models that describe how nature behaves [...]"

You did not say "By and large, science is not the search for reality" or "Generally speaking, science is not the search for reality" or "Some/most scientists do not see science as the search for reality".

What you said was an unqualified "science is not the search for reality".

Your assertion, then, takes the form of a universal generalization; commonly known as a "blanket statement". To refute a universal generalization all that is necessary is to produce a single counterexample. I have produced several, all from the domain of quantum physics where, in this particular case, they are most scarce.

Your statement "science is not the quest for reality" is therefore refuted.
 

More distortion. More disingenuousness. More misquotation.
 

I rest easy in the fact that all members here are able to see who has misinterpreted, misquoted, acted dishonestly in continued obtuseness and general disregard and ignoring of the facts, here and elsewhere that absolutely invalidate all that you have claimed...and it certainly is not swansont.

Quote

(i) It's surprising I would do so for the simple reason I did not do so. What I did do is refute your own claim by showing it is not the case that science is not the quest for reality. In other words, some scientists may see it this way; others do not.

And as I have continually explained to you, and as you have insidiously continued to ignore, mainstream science in general dispute your claim that science is the search for truth and/or reality...The evidence and the scientific methodology shows it is not....Of course every discipline in this big wide wonderful world will always have mavericks that stand against the general well held view. You standing for them, does not validate your already invalidated claims.
 

Quote

 

(ii) I did not claim "no blanket statements can be made about science". What I did say was (2nd post, page 4):

"I've also remarked before that perhaps the only blanket statement that can be safely made about science is that no blanket statements can be made about science. Scientists say all kinds of things about science, and not infrequently, mutually contradictory things."

 

Sure a blanket statement can be made about science, ignoring the pseudo and maverick brigade which is only a small percentage anyway, but obviously make a lot of noise on forums such as this open to any Tom, Dick, Harry or Reg. Let me make that blanket statement now...science is the pursuit of knowledge of how the universe operates, based on repeated observations and experiments as detailed by the tried and true foundations of the scientific methodology. 

 

Quote

Any fool can make a blanket statement about science (E.g. "All scientists are electric toasters"), and many fools do. The statements they make are almost invariably false. 

You said it, not me. 

Quote

Everything else in your post -- Monty Python and your pro bono analysis of my psychological condition -- is mere smoke and mirrors and merits no further attention.

He certainly is not the only one to make that observation..at least four have inferred it in one way or another.

[Reg Prescott]

Just in case any of our esteemed readers (if there are any) have been dazzled by the mirrors or blinded by the smoke ...

 

To be engaged in a search or a quest requires a mental representation of that which is being sought. To borrow the jargon of philosophy of mind, it requires intentionality: that property of certain mental states to be about something, or directed at something. Simply put, it requires a mind.

At the risk of stating the blatantly obvious, a person, for example, can conduct a search or pursue a quest; a brick, on the other hand, cannot. Bricks, as far as we can tell, don't have minds.

The claim "science is not the quest for reality", then, if read literally, would be what Gilbert Ryle described as a "category mistake".

Science -- depending who you ask -- has been variously characterized as a method, an institution, a body of knowledge, and perhaps other things, too. Methods, institutions, and bodies of knowledge, however, do not possess intentionality and therefore, like bricks, do not conduct searches or pursue quests. Not having minds, they're not the kinds of things that can conduct a search. We might say they're not in the searching line of business.

Given a literal reading, then, we might grant -- depending on one's philosophy of language -- that swansont's "science is not the quest for reality" is true, but true in the same way that "The Royal Society doesn't hope for world peace" and "The Bank of England doesn't have lustful thoughts about Anne Hathaway" are true.

The Royal Society and the Bank of England are not the kinds of things that can have hopes or lustful thoughts, respectively, just as science, construed as an institution (or method, or body of knowledge), can conduct a search or pursue a quest. And if one of our members started a thread entitled "Is the House of Commons a quest for true love or not?" we might wonder if we were in the presence of a lunatic or an imbecile.

Swansont strikes me as neither a lunatic nor an imbecile, thus if we are to give his claim a more charitable reading, attributing it with substance and intelligence, we must view the original statement as elliptical, and construe it in terms of the participants: the scientists themselves. Scientists, unlike bricks, institutions, bodies of knowledge, and methods, do possess intentionality and so are capable of conducting, or refraining from conducting, a quest/search.

Duly construed, then, swansont's statement would read something like: (i) "the pursuit of science is not the quest for reality" (the "pursuers" being, of course, the scientists), or (ii) "scientists are not engaged in the quest for reality".

Now, since swansont's original claim "science is not the quest for reality" was unqualified by any mitigating clause such as "by and large" or "on the whole", on pain of misrepresenting my interlocutor's own words, (ii) must be understood as:

(iii) All scientists are not engaged in the quest for reality
or more simply
(iv) No scientists are engaged in the quest for reality

And as we've seen, as a universal generalization of the aims and goals of scientists, the statement (iv) is false. Scientists, being the eclectic bunch they are, express divergent views on these aims and goals. 

Now, if I'm to argue, as I am doing, that swansont's claim is false, in order to be consistent I must assert that its negation is true. And, allegations of logical ineptitude from the usual hot air balloons notwithstanding, that's precisely what I have been doing. Thus, once again, I hereby affirm:

~ (iv)
or in plain English
(v) It is not the case that no scientists are engaged in the quest for reality
or even plainer
(vi) There are scientists who are engaged in the quest for reality

 

Discerning readers may have noticed Swansont actually admitted as much himself in his most recent post, apparently without realizing he was refuting himself ...

22 hours ago, swansont said:

I didn't claim that all scientists hold this view [i.e., science is not the quest for reality - RP]. I have to concur with a previous poster's sentiment; assuming the issue isn't simply reading comprehension, your grasp of logic is appallingly bad for someone who is purportedly schooled in philosophy

... only to take away, or try to take away, with the other hand what he had offered with the first ...

22 hours ago, swansont said:

An individual scientist's views are their own. They may wish to search for reality. I don't care. But you are exchanging that personal view for that of the institution and practice of science. I ask: where is it in the process that we check to make sure that we have described reality? We check behavior, to be sure — we compare the theory and the data. Where is the check on reality? Of all the papers I've read, I can't think of a single one in which such a discussion occurs, and there are many example where we freely acknowledge that we are not doing that. How is that possible? How is that to be permitted, if science itself is to reveal reality, rather than be a tool by which some individuals attempt it?

... leaving us once again to puzzle over how an institution or a practice -- as opposed to the individuals who compose that institution or carry out that practice -- can be said to have embarked, or declined to embark, on a quest.
 

Edited October 28, 2018 by Reg Prescott