Science, truth, and knowledge

[Carrock]

5 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

 

Different lines?

Yes.

Both are the Northern Line.

Edited October 31, 2018 by Carrock
Punctuation

[Reg Prescott]

18 minutes ago, Carrock said:

Yes

Both are the Northern Line.

You tease 

It does raise a good point, though. You may have noticed how I vacillate between the terms "statement" and "proposition".

Can we now say that the statement "Euston Station is one stop away from Camden Town station" is both true and false? And civilization as we know it grinds to a halt (much like the London Underground).

Yes, but the one statement can express more than one proposition. And vice versa: multiple statements may express the same proposition.

Propositions, we're told, as opposed to statements, are unambiguously true or false.

Edited October 31, 2018 by Reg Prescott
stupidity

[Sensei]

2 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

I'd still have no idea how to interpret what I was seeing.

So you would be in the same position as scientist who invented Cloud Chamber (aka "Wilson Chamber"). That's Nobel prize worth.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Thomson_Rees_Wilson

They also didn't know how to interpret what they were seeing. So started experimenting. That's science. Discovery -> experiments -> results -> analyze of data -> conclusions and equations.

These people spend their life making experiments.

 

[ALine]

I am going to give a generalizing statement from only reading the introductory thread post. 

By assigning an absolute "truth" you give rise to the development of further absolute truths which are un-questionable and assumably invaluable. This makes the entirety of science become a groundless belief system which has a static beginning and end. 

There is no such thing as an absolute truth, whereas there is only current truth.

 

[Reg Prescott]

1 hour ago, Sensei said:

So you would be in the same position as scientist who invented Cloud Chamber (aka "Wilson Chamber"). That's Nobel prize worth.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Thomson_Rees_Wilson

They also didn't know how to interpret what they were seeing. So started experimenting. That's science. Discovery -> experiments -> results -> analyze of data -> conclusions and equations.

These people spend their life making experiments.

 

Yes, these things take years of training and practice to attain expertise. Those of us who are not experts have little option but to accept their testimony if we are to claim knowledge at all. Or withhold from doing so, as the case may be.

The same as you do yourself, I presume, in areas where you lack the relevant expertise.

 

 

1 hour ago, ALine said:

I am going to give a generalizing statement from only reading the introductory thread post. 

By assigning an absolute "truth" you give rise to the development of further absolute truths which are un-questionable and assumably invaluable. This makes the entirety of science become a groundless belief system which has a static beginning and end. 

There is no such thing as an absolute truth, whereas there is only current truth.

 

 

Well, it's seldom the case that we hear scientists assert that such-and-such is TRUE -- and that's that!

On the other hand, it's fairly routine that scientists assert we have good reasons (evidence!) for believing such-and-such a claim. (just browse through the forums here). And to assert something is to assert that it is true -- by definition. Likewise, to believe something is to believe that it is true.

It makes little sense to say "I hereby assert X but I don't believe X" or "I believe Y is the case but Y is not true".

Science is, to a great extent at least, a belief system. Scientists have beliefs like all the rest of us. They would normally claim, though, I think, that when they do make a commitment (e.g. well tested theories in mature sciences, etc.) that the beliefs they commit themselves to are sufficiently justified. Their beliefs, in other words, are supported by ample evidence.

Again, I've no idea what is meant by "absolute truth". It's not a term I use myself. 

And to suggest, as you do, that truth changes ("current truth") leads to highly counterintuitive consequences. Would you be willing to concede, for example, that it was once true that the Sun orbits the Earth but is no longer so?

Most of us, I suspect, would prefer to say instead that it was never true that the Sun orbits the Earth, regardless of how strongly justified that belief may have been to our forebears. It was believed to be true; it was believed with justification to be true; but it was not true.

And thus no one ever had knowledge (no one ever knew) that the Sun orbits the Earth.

 

Edit P.S. - You won't have to look far in these forums, for example, to find it asserted that there is a "fact" of evolution. And facts are, by definition, true. There are no untrue facts.

Edited October 31, 2018 by Reg Prescott
typo

[TheSim]

I think you've just given a reasonable description of "absolute truth", namely in terms of facts that are considered to be unchangeable (at least if we are restricting ourselves to physical truth and ignoring metaphysical possibility).    But there is a problem here, namely  it isn't clear what the  object of a belief is or how it should be decided.

 For example, it is physically true that a Flat Earther has  asserted the sentence "The Earth is flat".    Furthermore there are physical causes of their assertion.     Therefore if the object of the Flat Earther's belief is taken to refer to the causes of his belief  then his  assertion must be necessarily correct, regardless of the opinions of his community.  This implies that the notion of truth is vacuous; any substantial notions called "truth" refer only to matters of linguistic convention. 

Likewise,  if I believe that I  know  Saturday's lottery numbers but today is only Wednesday, then my prediction has no object unless it is taken to refer to its physical causes.  In which case my prediction is again, necessarily correct.   After the results of Saturday's lottery are announced I can at least console myself by saying that my earlier prediction is only wrong post-hoc by linguistic convention. 

Edited October 31, 2018 by TheSim

[Reg Prescott]

Hi there. I'm having trouble understanding your post -- quite possibly my own fault. How about we go through it sentence by sentence, until I get lost, and see if we can get more clear?

57 minutes ago, TheSim said:

I think you've just given a reasonable description of "absolute truth", namely in terms of facts that are considered to be unchangeable (at least if we are restricting ourselves to physical truth and ignoring metaphysical possibility).  

The commonsense notion of truth implicit in my posts so far has been the "correspondence theory of truth"; i.e., a relationship of correspondence between propositions, statements, or beliefs, on the one hand, and states of affairs in the world (i.e. facts), on the other. The facts themselves are, of course, not unchangeable. It just started to rain here, dammit!

 

59 minutes ago, TheSim said:

But there is a problem here, namely  it isn't clear what the  object of a belief is or how it should be decided.

Well, seems to me if I have a belief, say, that Donald Trump is currently US president, then the object of that belief is the man himself. My belief is about Donald Trump, and when I express my belief in the form of a spoken assertion, I predicate something of that man, namely, that he is US president.

 

1 hour ago, TheSim said:

For example, it is physically true that a Flat Earther has  asserted the sentence "The Earth is flat".    Furthermore there are physical causes of their assertion. 

Ok.

 

1 hour ago, TheSim said:

Therefore if the object of the Flat Earther's belief is taken to refer to the causes of his belief ...

This is where I get lost in your reasoning. The belief, or statement, "Donald Trump is currently US president" surely refers to Donald Trump, the man. The causes of my belief might be, for example, that I saw it on CNN, a friend told me, etc., etc. I can make no sense of the claim that the object of my belief (Trump, the man) refers to my watching CNN news. 

 

In any case, surely what does the referring when I state my belief is not the object (Trump, the human being with orange hair), but the name ("Donald Trump", the linguistic entity with eleven letters in written form). The name refers to the dude. Trump (the man) is the referent; "Trump" (the name) refers to the referent.

(Or more correctly, in my view, rather than the name referring, I use the name to refer. But let's just say the name refers for simplicity).

 

Likewise for the Flat Earther. The object of his belief/assertion is the Earth, to which, when he speaks, he predicates "is flat". The term/name "the Earth", a linguistic entity, refers to the Earth, a big round thing.

[TheSim]

From a behavioural perspective, all that a person means when saying " There is Donald Trump"  are the potential stimuli that  can provoke him to  say it.   If a person's stimulus-responses were completely understood they would never be interpreted as saying anything controversial, even if they asserted that an impersonator was "Donald Trump".    

Consider how an engineer might react if  their  version of Amazon Alexa insisted that "Donald Trump isn't the US President".   They wouldn't  think it was useful to accuse Alexa for being "factually wrong" for they would believe that they had technical insight into the causes of her wayward linguistic behaviour.  Rather, they would think there is a database hitch, or that the programmers were playing a joke, etc. 

Edited October 31, 2018 by TheSim

[swansont]

11 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

A couple of members have commented on "models" and whether we can say of them that they are true or not. I guess this would depend on the particular model in question.

!

Moderator Note

And those threads mentioning this, with which you have been involved, have been locked. If this thread goes in that direction, it will be locked as well. We've done this twice. We're not doing it a third time.

 

[Reg Prescott]

21 minutes ago, TheSim said:

From a behavioural perspective, all that a person means when saying " There is Donald Trump"  are the potential stimuli that  can provoke him to  say it.   If a person's stimulus-responses were completely understood they would never be interpreted as saying anything controversial, even if they asserted that an impersonator was "Donald Trump".    

Consider how an engineer might react if  their  version of Amazon Alexa insisted that "Donald Trump isn't the US President".   They wouldn't  think it was useful to accuse Alexa for being "factually wrong" for they would believe that they had technical insight into the causes of her wayward linguistic behaviour.  Rather, they would think there is a database hitch, or that the programmers were playing a joke, etc. 

 

Ah, well, behaviorism is pretty much dead nowadays, isn't it? Except for the occasional stick-in-the-mud like Daniel Dennett perhaps.

A belief these days, since the cognitive revolution 60 years or so ago, is no longer construed as forms of behavior or dispositions to behavior (including verbal behavior, like say the utterance "Donald Trump is president") but a mental state which, among other things that beliefs do, is (partially) causally responsible for that behavior.

Looking back, it's kinda mindblowing (pardon the pun) how behaviorism held academia in such a vise-like grip for so long. The whole idea (pardon another pun) behind it seems... well, preposterous.

See also idealism.

Edited October 31, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[Reg Prescott]

@ Silvestru. Hi again.

In your first post (third remark) you tell us that scientists go about their business, do certain things, produce certain constructs, but that (and I quote yourself) "This is not knowledge or truth".

I'd like to show here, by way of examples, that your claim is problematic. I just spent a few minutes browsing through today's activity on the forums collecting a small sample -- which could be expanded almost ad infinitum -- of scientific assertions that I'll list below.

"Though you couldn't actually travel at the speed of light, just close to it"
"Nothing can exceed the speed of light"
"As speed increases the energy of the object increases. Energy and mass are equivalent (Obviously, I was only referring to what we currently know)"
"light speed cannot be exceeded (or even achieved) by a massive object because mass/energy would become infinite if that happened"
"Dark matter has nothing to do with expansion."
"We know a lot about dark matter (less about dark energy)"
"But galaxies are not flying apart from each other."

Two points to note first. (1) I don't know whether the claimants are scientists themselves, though I'd suggest the claims advanced are fairly typical of those made by working scientists. (2) These are all claims to knowledge/truth. Whether the claims are indeed true, hence that the claimant possesses knowledge, is of course another matter. Nevertheless, in each case the claimant is implicitly saying "these things are true and I know (i.e., I have knowledge of) their truth", and so does anyone else (have knowledge) who believes it.

 

The last quoted example is from yourself, Silvestru, so let me focus on that one for illustration. You're making an assertion; a statement. To assert something is to assert that it is true, and also that you believe it; i.e., you have a belief. (Except, as I noted earlier, in deviant cases such as lying. Clearly, this does not apply here).

And if that belief is justified and indeed true, then you have knowledge: you know that galaxies are not flying apart from each other.

If you still have any doubts, consider the following tests. Would you have said the following?:

(i) "Galaxies are not flying apart from each other, but it's not true"

Presumably we can agree this makes no sense, thus you are making a truth claim.

(ii) "Galaxies are not flying apart from each other, but I don't believe it"

Again, though not an outright contradiction, this would be an extremely peculiar locution. Thus, in making your assertion you are expressing a belief, namely that "Galaxies are not flying apart from each other".

 

Now apply the same tests to the other quotes above. I think you'll agree these are all claims to truth or knowledge or both. If pressed, I've little doubt the claimants, including yourself, would admit to fallibility in their claims, nonetheless your own claim that "This is not knowledge or truth" is belied by the evidence before us.

In each case the claimant is saying of a particular statement X that "X is true", moreover that anyone who believes X, including the claimant him/herself who obviously does believe it, has knowledge (on the assumption that the claim is well justified).

In contradistinction to your own "This is not knowledge or truth", then, our respective claimants are telling us "This is knowledge and truth". 
 

Edited November 1, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[studiot]

10 hours ago, Reg Prescott said:

The last quoted example is from yourself, Silvestru, so let me focus on that one for illustration. You're making an assertion; a statement. To assert something is to assert that it is true, and also that you believe it; i.e., you have a belief. (Except, as I noted earlier, in deviant cases such as lying. Clearly, this does not apply here).

And if that belief is justified and indeed true, then you have knowledge: you know that galaxies are not flying apart from each other.

Would you like to re-examine this in the light of the following scenario?

 

Jane, "How far is it from London to New York?"

John, making a random guess although he knows that the atlantic is just over 3 thousand miles wide, "3257 miles".

 

Would you then please re-examine my butterfly/moth example in the same light?

[Reg Prescott]

22 minutes ago, studiot said:

Would you then please re-examine my butterfly/moth example in the same light?

I'll do my best. But before I go out on a limb, risking injury and ignominy, you'll have to clarify some terms that you used (on page 1) which are unfamiliar to me.

What is "pure knowledge"?

What is "pure belief"?

And I don't understand your bracketed phrase "at the level of meaning of know". Please explain.

[studiot]

1 hour ago, Reg Prescott said:

ll do my best. But before I go out on a limb, risking injury and ignominy, you'll have to clarify some terms that you used (on page 1) which are unfamiliar to me.

What is "pure knowledge"?

What is "pure belief"?

And I don't understand your bracketed phrase "at the level of meaning of know". Please explain

There's no need to 'go out on a limb' or be defensive.

You now seem prepared to hold a reasoned discussion.
Which means to me that we cooperate to reach the best answer.

+1

Ok so what I meant by my first post.

I agree with a lot of your thesis;

I just think it is trying to make things too simple and I was generating examples of more complicated situations for discussion.

Quote

And I don't understand your bracketed phrase "at the level of meaning of know". Please explain

This is the way discussion should work so thank you.

What I was getting at there was simple to try to avoid the pointless argument of reality & existence along the lines of "I only know about my environment through my senses; how do I know I exist or what is see is real? etc etc "
That discussion, in my opinion, does not belong in this thread.

The use of pure knowledge, pure belief etc is just to offer the notion that I "know because I personally have verified it (the above existence comment not withstanding) " and "I believe because I want it to be that way" form ends of a scale or opposing notions but with some overlap as with a Venn diagram.

This stuff arises because of complexity.

The notions I know and I believe are sufficient and appropriate to the examples you are supplying, but I hold that there are more ecomplex examples where those are not enough.

 

Does this help?

[Reg Prescott]

@ Studiot

Ok then. To get us started, a few thoughts. Any additions or criticisms you might have are welcome.

Re belief and knowledge. Given the standard definition (justified true belief) we can first of all say that one cannot know what one does not believe: if you know something you believe it, too. The converse does not hold: you can believe something but not know it.

 

Quote

I know (at the level of meaning of know) that there are flying insects called butterflies. This is pure knowledge)

And you'd be almost certainly right. Still though, even without resorting to radical skepticism of the kind you alluded to -- "We're all in the Matrix" -- you/we could all be wrong about this, even if our senses are functioning perfectly. Hilary Putnam used to have a lot of fun concocting far-fetched examples to show that certain statements traditionally taken to be "analytic" (i.e. true or false in virtue of the meanings of the terms alone; no empirical inquiry required) are not so.

For example a statement like "tigers are animals". On the traditional view, we could not possibly be wrong about this, since part of the concept of [TIGER] is [ANIMAL]. It's true by definition, as they like to say. Putnam asks us to imagine first that we discover one particular "tiger" is actually a cleverly constructed, anatomically exquisite robot sent to spy on us by Martians. Presumably, upon making this shocking discovery, we'd conclude: "That's not a tiger. It's a fake. But the rest are tigers".

But now suppose they all turn out to be robots! What do we say now? This tests our intuitions, but here I side with Putnam in saying we'd conclude "It turns out tigers are not animals after all" (as opposed to "There are no tigers").

Now do the same thing for butterflies/insects...

To emphasize, no one is suggesting the above scenario is even remotely likely. It does make a conceptual point, though. You have a belief; it's a well justified belief, but it may not be knowledge.

 

Quote

I further know there are other similar flying insects called moths. (This is actually the overlap area between belief and knowledge)

Here I'm confused as to why you don't say of moths what you say of butterflies? Why are butterflies more deserving of your knowledge affiliations than moths?

 

Quote

I do not know the difference but I believe there is one. (This is pure belief)

Well, if it is indeed the case that you do not know the difference (i.e. you cannot tell one from the other) then you lack the knowledge to discriminate.

That said, it may be the case that even though you cannot distinguish moths from butterflies, you know that there is a difference. And if you believe there's a difference, you have good reasons for so believing (the expert testimony of David Attenborough, or whatever), and there really is a difference, then you have knowledge -- you know -- that the two are not the same.

You not only believe "there is one [i.e. a difference]", but know it!

Personally I can't tell Hungarian from Polish. I'm pretty sure -- dare I say I know -- they're different languages, though.

[DrP]

Just now, Reg Prescott said:

Ok then. To get us started, a few thoughts. Any additions or criticisms you might have are welcome.

Re belief and knowledge. Given the standard definition (justified true belief) we can first of all say that one cannot know what one does not believe: if you know something you believe it, too

The problem here is that you are trying to confine the conversation by defining things according to your own 'beliefs'.  All this 'Do you agree that....' biases any conversation.

For example - I do not agree with your above statement. Here is my example from personal experience - Back when it was 'believed' that black holes were a singularity I was pretty certain that this could not actually be the case in reality. I 'knew' they were a singularity according to the maths...   but I did not believe that they would be like that in reality (and it turns out they aren't, so my hunch was true). I don't know if this is a good example or not...  it is just annoying that before discussing anything we need to first say "right, knowing this and that and this also we all must agree on THIS" before the conversation goes on. No thanks.

 

I don't think that starting any conversation with "Before we start discussing this you must agree with my statement" - especially when that statement is a little spurious and depends soley upon context and semantics.  I didn't bother reading the rest because.....  OK - I went back and read the rest - what is your point? It is just philosophical musings that don't draw any conclusions.... is it leading up to some point supporting your earlier stance about science, truth and knowledge?  I'll just stay out of it I think - you seem to be having a nice conversation with Studiot so I'll stay out of it.

Have a good day.  

 

 

[dimreepr]

14 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

we can first of all say that one cannot know what one does not believe

Sure you can: I know smokings bad but I don't believe it'll affect me.

[Reg Prescott]

Re the above (DrP). You're under no obligation to accept the standard definition of knowledge (justified true belief). If you don't, though, you may find yourself countenancing absurdities.

Neither are you under any obligation to accept the definition of a bachelor being (at least) an unmarried male. But would you be willing to countenance "My pal Tom is a bachelor. And he's married"?

Or for that matter "I know Donald Trump is president but I don't believe it"? 

Rather you than me.

 

 

23 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

Sure you can: I know smokings bad but I don't believe it'll affect me.

You're conflating two claims: (i) your knowledge (if it is) that smoking is bad, and (ii) your belief that you won't be affected. Different claims. They needn't be inconsistent.

Were you to say "I know smoking is bad but I don't believe it's bad" then you would be courting absurdity. Or "I know smoking will affect me but I don't believe it will".

In your example, though, several things could be said without a red face.

E.g. I don't believe it will affect me ... because I only smoke after Partick Thistle win the Premier League. (Or in my own case, I only smoke after sex. No risk of lung cancer here)

On the other hand, you might smoke like a chimney and just be in denial. *shrugs*

There are bound to be a few oddball cases. Consider the grief stricken parent: "I know he's dead, but I can't quite believe it".

 

Edited November 1, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[dimreepr]

16 minutes ago, Reg Prescott said:

You're conflating two claims: (i) your knowledge (if it is) that smoking is bad, and (ii) your belief that you won't be affected. Different claims. They needn't be inconsistent.

Were you to say "I know smoking is bad but I don't believe it's bad" then you would be courting absurdity.

In your example, though, several things could be said without a red face.

E.g. I don't believe it will affect me ... because I only smoke after Partick Thistle win the Premier League. (Or in my own case, I only smoke after sex. No risk of lung cancer here)

On the other hand, you might smoke like a chimney and just be in denial. *shrugs*

There are bound to be a few oddball cases. Consider the grief stricken parent: "I know he's dead, but I can't quite believe it".

1

My first answer still applies.

[Reg Prescott]

13 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

My first answer still applies.

I edited as you were typing, and added... Or "I know smoking will affect me but I don't believe it will".

You were denying my claim that "one cannot know what one does not believe".

Could you say the sentence above (about smoking) without blushing? I'd be scared.

Now you can say anything you like, of course. It's a free country. But you might be deemed irrational. Horror of horrors! A fate worse than lung cancer on a science forum!

Edited November 1, 2018 by Reg Prescott

[DrP]

On ‎31‎/‎10‎/‎2018 at 2:54 AM, Reg Prescott said:

Science is, to a great extent at least, a belief system

But it updates it's beliefs in the light of new supporting evidences. Unlike other belief systems, like religions, which claim absolute truth...  even when new evidences come to light which totally ridicule the original beliefs. How can a scientist claim his theory is absolute truth if he is willing to update it the next day when more evidence comes to light....  basically he can't (and doesn't anyway - he claims the best modal according to the evidence).

I read an article in the New Scientist last week about the possibility that the LIGO measurements in the first experiment were an artefact of the random noise...  the pattern in the random noise was so slight but matched what they were expecting to find if a gravity wave were to pass.  I still need to finish reading the article (or I might just wait to see what unfolds) but it was behind a paywall and I don't like paying for online articles.

 

Just now, Reg Prescott said:

I edited as you were typing, and added... Or "I know smoking will affect me but I don't believe it will".

You were denying my claim that "one cannot know what one does not believe".

Could you say the sentence above (about smoking) without blushing? I'd be scared.

You can believe it wont effect you whilst knowing that it causes cancer.   It doesn't kill EVERYONE that smokes...  just the unlucky ones that are more susceptible to the damage. Some people smoke all their lives and it doesn't kill them.... Have I missed the point or are we doing language/semantical acrobatics again? Where is it leading? ....  being fair - reading it back maybe dimreapers comment doesn't make any sense. As a partial dyslexic I think I might stay out of this discussion as it is heavily dependent on symantics and definitions. ;-) ...  once again - have a nice day.  

[studiot]

1 hour ago, Reg Prescott said:

Still though, even without resorting to radical skepticism of the kind you alluded to -- "We're all in the Matrix"

If you are still referring to my line

Quote

studiot

(at the level of meaning of know)

Then good we are agreed.

(incidentally is see I wrote the level and I should have written this level or added appropriate to this thread - sorry)

But I don't agree the next part that you follow it with.

1 hour ago, Reg Prescott said:

you/we could all be wrong about this, even if our senses are functioning perfectly. Hilary Putnam used to have a lot of fun concocting far-fetched examples to show that certain statements traditionally taken to be "analytic" (i.e. true or false in virtue of the meanings of the terms alone; no empirical inquiry required) are not so.

For example a statement like "tigers are animals". On the traditional view, we could not possibly be wrong about this, since part of the concept of [TIGER] is [ANIMAL]. It's true by definition, as they like to say. Putnam asks us to imagine first that we discover one particular "tiger" is actually a cleverly constructed, anatomically exquisite robot sent to spy on us by Martians. Presumably, upon making this shocking discovery, we'd conclude: "That's not a tiger. It's a fake. But the rest are tigers".

But now suppose they all turn out to be robots! What do we say now? This tests our intuitions, but here I side with Putnam in saying we'd conclude "It turns out tigers are not animals after all" (as opposed to "There are no tigers").

Now do the same thing for butterflies/insects...

To emphasize, no one is suggesting the above scenario is even remotely likely. It does make a conceptual point, though. You have a belief; it's a well justified belief, but it may not be knowledge.

All this is true but irrelevant to my way of thinking.

My example does not rely on artifices.

Here is an expanded version

 

1) I can see a Red Admiral Butterfly and a Hawk Moth and can observe that there is sufficient obvious difference for me to be able to reliably distinguish one form the other.

I am happy with what you call the standard definiton or name for both the phenomenon I observe as a Red Admiral and the phenomenon I observe as a Hawk Moth.

So I know and have tested for myself that there are Red Admirals and Hawk Moths and they can be seen to be different.

Furthermore it is irrelevant to my knowledge whether these things are really insects or just cleverly constructed drones or holograms.
I still call the phenomena a Red Admiral or a Hawk moth.

 

3) However left to my own devices because I am not a specialist in this area I would not make a classification difference between moths and butterflies -they appear to be the same sort of insect to me.

Yet I also know that specialists distinguish for reasons unknown to me and that I cannot therefore deploy.

Since I am used to not having to personally verify every little thing that other specialists tell me I choose to believe that they are not kidding me.

 

2) (1) and (3) taken together show that I was giving butterflies and moths equal weight (to answer your question). 1, 2 & 3 also refer to the first mention of this example.

 

Quote

studiot

Knowledge and belief, (why was belief omitted from the original list?) are more focused, but still retain a degree of multifaceted character.

1) I know ( at the level of meaning of know) that there are flying insects called butterflies. This is pure knowledge)

2) I further know there are other similar flying insects called moths. (This is actually the overlap area between belief and knowledge)

3) I do not know the difference but I believe there is one. (This is pure belief)

So in summary the flow of thought is as follows

Pure knowledge is something I know because I have personally verified (and yes I therefore also believe it)
There are moths
There are butterflies

I do not know the difference for the reasons just outlined.
But I believe there is a difference (pure belief)

 

So I have tried to answer your questions and clarify my points, you can say if the came across.

 

I also underlined a question, in my quote, you have yet to answer which was that you linked three notions in your original thesis but omitted 'belief', leaving the introduction of that notion till later.

Surely there can be no hidden agenda in my asking why?

[dimreepr]

30 minutes ago, DrP said:

are we doing language/semantical acrobatics again?

yep...

[Eise]

Sorry that I have not so much time to chime in. I have a lot of other stuff using nearly all my energy. Then there is not so much time for deep thoughts.

But I could not let this pass:

On 10/31/2018 at 11:19 AM, Reg Prescott said:

Ah, well, behaviorism is pretty much dead nowadays, isn't it? Except for the occasional stick-in-the-mud like Daniel Dennett perhaps.

Dennett is definitely not a behaviourist. It seems to me you have never read something from him. Maybe just about him. I could not find an online version of it, but maybe you can find it: "Skinner skinned", from Dennett's book "Brainstorms".

For the rest, I feel as if I am in a time machine flying back to the days I studied philosophy. I already forgot (not in this thread if I am correct) the distinction between 'intention' and 'intension'... Great you brought that back to me.

Just some fast shots:

• I recognise a lot of your thoughts, and, as info for the others, Reg is using standard terminology in general accepted philosophy, and his ideas are not extreme
• I can imagine that it is difficult to see where Reg stands: maybe it helps to see that Reg is not attacking science in itself, but more the accounts many people have of understanding what science can accomplish, and how it accomplishes it. It is about what knowledge means, what truth is, what facts and theories are, etc. 
• It is notoriously difficult to give an account of the relation between language and reality (and what latter exactly is...). As science must use language (even if it is 'just' mathematics), the difficulties in this respect work through all the way to science. It might even be impossible to give a consistent account of the relation between language and reality. (Because such an account must be given in language...?)
• And as a hint to Reg: I suggest you slow down a little, you overwhelm people here with a torrent of philosophy. And it might also help to be patient and polite. Let the irony and cynicism be. I think it would be a pity if your threads always get closed.

[beecee]

2 hours ago, Eise said:

Sorry that I have not so much time to chime in. I have a lot of other stuff using nearly all my energy. Then there is not so much time for deep thoughts.

But I could not let this pass:

Dennett is definitely not a behaviourist. It seems to me you have never read something from him. Maybe just about him. I could not find an online version of it, but maybe you can find it: "Skinner skinned", from Dennett's book "Brainstorms".

For the rest, I feel as if I am in a time machine flying back to the days I studied philosophy. I already forgot (not in this thread if I am correct) the distinction between 'intention' and 'intension'... Great you brought that back to me.

Just some fast shots:

• I recognise a lot of your thoughts, and, as info for the others, Reg is using standard terminology in general accepted philosophy, and his ideas are not extreme
• I can imagine that it is difficult to see where Reg stands: maybe it helps to see that Reg is not attacking science in itself, but more the accounts many people have of understanding what science can accomplish, and how it accomplishes it. It is about what knowledge means, what truth is, what facts and theories are, etc. 
• It is notoriously difficult to give an account of the relation between language and reality (and what latter exactly is...). As science must use language (even if it is 'just' mathematics), the difficulties in this respect work through all the way to science. It might even be impossible to give a consistent account of the relation between language and reality. (Because such an account must be given in language...?)
• And as a hint to Reg: I suggest you slow down a little, you overwhelm people here with a torrent of philosophy. And it might also help to be patient and polite. Let the irony and cynicism be. I think it would be a pity if your threads always get closed.

While ref is certainly and obviously practising his philosophy he has learnt, he also just as certainly made some monumental scientific gaffs. And that primarily is why he has had such a big problem. I also am in a period of much to do with little time to do it in.