Split from AI sentience

[Eise]

On 4/25/2019 at 11:37 PM, CharonY said:

I have a question regarding the aspect of "own reasons". What in that context, would you consider to be boundary condition. You and iNow have discussed drug addiction, for example, and it seems that there is a distinction between "normal" or pristine and the addicted framework.

I think there are 2 ways to analyse the problems of an addict (but which might be only one reason, just seen from different levels of description):

• the functioning of his brain is impaired, in the sense that one of the capabilities of a person, to evaluate the results of his possible actions and act according to these, does not work properly anymore. 
• there is one reason for actions that overwhelms all others, and the addict knows this: he knows nothing good for him will come out of it, and experiences his need for the next shot as overpowering him.

On 4/25/2019 at 11:37 PM, CharonY said:

However, decisions, whatever they are, are contextual an addict may state that they want to be clean, but faced with the immediate (physiological an other) consequences, decides against it.

Decisions are always contextual. A free decision, i.e. free from any context is of course a chimera. But if one element of this context overrules all others, and this element especially overrides all kinds of good reasons consistently and repeatedly, I am inclined to say that such a person is less free.

On 4/25/2019 at 11:37 PM, CharonY said:

Unless I am misunderstanding something there is presumably a most free state, one, in which decisions are ones own independent of factors that are not recognized ones own. Is that correct?

I would not go as far as saying that there is a 'freest' state. But free will definitely comes in gradations. But, of course, there are all kind of methods to fool people in thinking that they act on their own accord, but in reality they are doing somebody else's will. But the touchstone here is, that when the person is clarified about this fact, he will feel duped.

Now, I think that iNow would react with the idea that we are manipulated by the brain to think that we act according to our reasons. However, the problem with such manipulations as described above is that the organ that is in fact manipulated in such cases, is the brain itself. iNow separates the 'self' from the brain: otherwise one could never say that the brain manipulates us. This is a hidden presumption when one states that we are not free because what we do is determined by the brain.

So to be as free as possible, one should strive for self-knowledge, for reflection on one's behaviour, being prepared to change this behaviour if it turned out to be (morally) wrong or based on false facts, and being not too much attached to one's feelings, ideas, identity etc. And when this sounds as a Buddhist program, then I think that is no accident.

[dimreepr]

1 hour ago, Eise said:

So to be as free as possible, one should strive for self-knowledge, for reflection on one's behaviour, being prepared to change this behaviour if it turned out to be (morally) wrong or based on false facts, and being not too much attached to one's feelings, ideas, identity etc. And when this sounds as a Buddhist program, then I think that is no accident.

There are no accidents...  nice post +1

[iNow]

6 hours ago, Eise said:

You take the easy target of a mystical definition of free will, namely a non-naturalistic one

This is a pretty blatant misrepresentation of my position. My stance is that free will is an illusion, one that occurs as a direct result of the underlying naturalistic processes. It’s a story we tell ourselves based on the underlying neural activity. There is nothing mystical about what I’m suggesting. I’d argue quite the opposite, really. 

6 hours ago, Eise said:

E.g. in penal justice, the question if somebody is guilty is, amongst others, dependent on the question if the accused did what he did voluntary, i.e. from free will <...> Do you seriously think that an accused can defend himself by saying he, in your meaning of the concept, has no free will, so he cannot be punished for something he could not help doing? "My honour, I was forced by my brain" is not a very good defense, don't you think?

I’ve already acknowledged that my stance leads to difficult downstream questions in terms of criminal justice and our penal system. We agree there.

Can’t we also agree that our overall approach to criminal justice is completely extraneous and separate from the core discussion here about free will? Surely you can acknowledge that any possible downstream ramifications have no bearing on the validity of our upstream conclusions regarding whether free will as an illusion or not?

2 hours ago, Eise said:

I think that iNow would react with the idea that we are manipulated by the brain to think that we act according to our reasons. However, the problem with such manipulations as described above is that the organ that is in fact manipulated in such cases, is the brain itself. iNow separates the 'self' from the brain: otherwise one could never say that the brain manipulates us. This is a hidden presumption when one states that we are not free because what we do is determined by the brain.

The problem is that it’s NOT “just the brain.” As already stated, there are multiple other coercive agents. An easy example is the microbiome. Another might be diet, hydration levels, or electrolyte balance. Another still is ambient temperature and acoustics. The list goes on. The chemistry and electrical firing patterns of the brain are necessary, but not sufficient to explain what’s happening. 

[StringJunky]

18 minutes ago, iNow said:

This is a pretty blatant misrepresentation of my position. My stance is that free will is an illusion, one that occurs as a direct result of the underlying naturalistic processes. It’s a story we tell ourselves based on the underlying neural activity. There is nothing mystical about what I’m suggesting. I’d argue quite the opposite, really. 

I’ve already acknowledged that my stance leads to difficult downstream questions in terms of criminal justice and our penal system. We agree there.

Can’t we also agree that our overall approach to criminal justice is completely extraneous and separate from the core discussion here about free will? Surely you can acknowledge that any possible downstream ramifications have no bearing on the validity of our upstream conclusions regarding whether free will as an illusion or not?

If you can act contrary to all the inner signals telling you to do otherwise because you've intellectualized that this course of action is better, to my mind, is free will. It's the ability to over-ride viscerally-ingrained behaviours. I've noticed when these times are most prominent is when you are in a dangerous/stressful situation and everything is in-the-moment.

Edited April 30, 2019 by StringJunky

[iNow]

6 minutes ago, StringJunky said:

If you can act contrary to all the inner signals telling you to do otherwise

This appears to be an invalid description. Even when we do act in these ways, it’s NOT contrary to “all” other signals. There are multiple streams of activity firing in parallel, and some are dominant while others are weaker, but the weaker signal can still be the one which gets actioned.

However, the nondomiant stream (in this example, the ability to act contrary to the strongest one... to jump out of the plane with your parachute attached even though your strongest inclination is to crawl back inside the aircraft) is still itself one of the inner signals “telling” you what to do.

It’s not some separate self able to contradict the dominant inclination, but is instead itself just another uncontrolled neural cascade that happened to reach the prefrontal cortex and motor control areas at the right time / in the right way. 

Edited April 30, 2019 by iNow

[dimreepr]

1 hour ago, iNow said:

This appears to be an invalid description. Even when we do act in these ways, it’s NOT contrary to “all” other signals. There are multiple streams of activity firing in parallel, and some are dominant while others are weaker, but the weaker signal can still be the one which gets actioned.

However, the nondomiant stream (in this example, the ability to act contrary to the strongest one... to jump out of the plane with your parachute attached even though your strongest inclination is to crawl back inside the aircraft) is still itself one of the inner signals “telling” you what to do.

It’s not some separate self able to contradict the dominant inclination, but is instead itself just another uncontrolled neural cascade that happened to reach the prefrontal cortex and motor control areas at the right time / in the right way. 

If you can see the illusion surely you're free of it?

[iNow]

50 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

If you can see the illusion surely you're free of it?

No, surely not. Just because the bars of the cage are visible to me doesn't ipso facto mean I'm not inescapably trapped within it

[dimreepr]

1 minute ago, iNow said:

No, surely not. Just because the bars of the cage are visible to me doesn't ipso facto mean I'm not inescapably trapped within it

Are the bars real or an illusion?

[iNow]

Just now, dimreepr said:

Are the bars real or an illusion?

They seem to remain even when I'm gone. They seem present for others even in my absence. This suggests a realness to me, though I could be mistaken. Either way, that's a different topic entirely.

[CharonY]

4 hours ago, Eise said:

But if one element of this context overrules all others, and this element especially overrides all kinds of good reasons consistently and repeatedly, I am inclined to say that such a person is less free.

I think I have a bit of an issue with that part. I think implicitly the argument implies that there is a rational foundation of decision making (i.e. good reasons). However, every decision happens at the intersection of biology and sociology. The way we are brought up and what we have learned together with our biology creates certain boundaries in our decision-making. Cases, where one urge becomes overriding are rare, but even then within a particular urge, the micro-decisions are governed by other elements. Now we could step back and construct these decisions as rational based on the limitations that we observe externally. We could rule that the brain is impaired, but what does it mean? It really means it works differently than one that is not under the influence. Likewise, one could argue that someone that was indoctrinated in a particular way of thinking has their brain imprinted a certain way.

This seems to be reflected on every level, in my mind. Even simple things, like the way we move our arms to grab something are determined by geometry and certain anatomical rules that we are not aware of, which can be modified by things we were taught. Of course one could argue that the execution is not part of the decision-making process but I think the boundaries are paper-thin, if we try to look at the intersection of decision-making and resulting behaviour.

[Eise]

21 hours ago, iNow said:

On 4/30/2019 at 7:46 AM, Eise said:

You take the easy target of a mystical definition of free will, namely a non-naturalistic one

This is a pretty blatant misrepresentation of my position.

Sigh... Again and again this misunderstanding. You should know me better. I see you as a naturalist, just as myself, you know that. Obviously you missed the word 'target' in my sentence. See my OP in this thread:

On 4/12/2019 at 8:24 AM, Eise said:

You are (unconsciously?) using following argumentative strategy:

1. Use a single, and outdated, heavily metaphysically loaden concept of free will
2. Argue that this kind of free will does not exist
3. Conclude that 'free will' in any meaningful sense does not exist.

This is what you said your self:

On 4/13/2019 at 2:10 PM, iNow said:

On 4/13/2019 at 12:02 PM, Eise said:

you should explicitly define the kind of free will is that you deny.

The kind that implies a type of ghost in the machine; some supraconscious self or soul beyond / untethered to the underlying neural substrate and activity.

Reread the sentence you found a 'blatant misrepresentation' again in this light. 

And remember what I also said before: we agree on this one. That kind of free will, really does not exist.

Maybe it confuses you that your position is inherently dualistic: for a self to be 'forced by its brain', it is necessary that this self is something else as the brain itself. When you see that the self is the functioning brain that position makes no sense.

So once again, the 2 points where I accuse you of the use of dualism, and that you should also clearly separate:

1. The kind of free will you explicitly attack is a form of dualism. We are on the same page here. I do not believe in the soul either. However, for me that has nothing to do with free will as we daily use it. (I say 'use', because the ideological background, an independent soul steering the brain plays no role in practical life for most people).
2. It is implicit in your arguments that we have no free will. It is impossible to say we have no free will, if one sees there is not a metaphysical difference between selves and brains. When selves are functioning brains there is just one single process, seen on different levels of description, and it makes no sense to speak of a process forcing itself. It just runs as it does.

On 1. you only have a 'Piraeus Pyrrhic victory', on 2. we disagree wholeheartedly.

21 hours ago, iNow said:

I’ve already acknowledged that my stance leads to difficult downstream questions in terms of criminal justice and our penal system. We agree there.

I am not sure if we agree. Using my naturalist definition of free will there is no difficulty. If somebody is culpable depends on the question if somebody was able to see the consequences of his illegal deeds (which includes the moral abhorrence of our society for such deeds). I.e., I do not share your stance, because you argue only against this mystical definition of free will (in philosophy it is called libertarian free will).

21 hours ago, iNow said:

Can’t we also agree that our overall approach to criminal justice is completely extraneous and separate from the core discussion here about free will?

I am afraid not. Many neuroscientists call for a reformation of our criminal justice and our penal system, based on the 'fact' that we have no free will. So if you think it has no consequences, I am curious why this discussion on free will should not have any impact on our judicial praxis? Can you explain?

21 hours ago, iNow said:

As already stated, there are multiple other coercive agents.

This is misuse of the concept of the words 'coercive' and 'agent'. (An 'agent' in philosophy is a person with knowledge, beliefs, intentions, etc). I cited already 2 times that one can only speak of coercion when a person intentionally tries to impede your acting according to your reasons. When I use the word 'coercion' I mean 'coercion', and not the metaphoric use of it.

21 hours ago, iNow said:

The chemistry and electrical firing patterns of the brain are necessary, but not sufficient to explain what’s happening. 

Sure. But these causal influences (not 'coercions') are either input to the brain for decisions (what is a decision when it does not make use of its sensory input?) or affect the capability of the brain to anticipate the results of future actions, i.e. have influence on the culpability of a person. Again, this is a continuous spectrum, not a black-or-white distinction.

Edited May 1, 2019 by Strange
Fix typo

[Eise]

Found 2 errors in my own posting, too late so I could not edit it anymore:

It is a 'Pyrrhus victory'.

Further I realise that an 'agent' is a homonym in English. The German word for the philosophical concept is often let untranslated, so just written as 'Agent'. However, the other translation is 'agens' which comes from chemistry, which means a chemical substance that has a chemical impact on some chemical system. I assume now you mean the latter. If that is the case you can forget my critique on your use of 'agent'.

[Strange]

57 minutes ago, Eise said:

It is a 'Pyrrhus victory'.

Fixed that one for you (we use the adjectival form Pyrrhic).

Wasn't sure about the chemical one; whether you meant catalyst, or reagent, or something else

[Eise]

12 minutes ago, Strange said:

Fixed that one for you (we use the adjectival form Pyrrhic).

Wow, thanks. And the first time I see the phrase 'Fixed that one for you' in the non-ironic sense in a forum. 

14 minutes ago, Strange said:

Wasn't sure about the chemical one; whether you meant catalyst, or reagent, or something else

Well, for me the question is what iNow meant. I am flexible in assigning meanings to words, you see3.

[iNow]

Rereading our exchange, I agree that I was off-base when saying you misrepresented me. I mistakenly interpreted you, and for that I do apologize. There’s a deeper issue here, though, and I’m unsure you realize it. 

You charge me with arguing against an overly simplified form of free will. You suggest that my position does not account for the richer more nuanced view of freewill you’re using. You even go so far as to agree with me that this other version of freewill doesn’t exist. 

In doing so, however, you yourself argue against an oversimplified version of my position. You suggest that we ARE our brains and hence the distinction I’m making between “us” or our “self” and the underlying neural structure and pattern of activation is unneeded to the point of being wrong. 

I could agree with that stance, that we are our brains and therefore that position is untenable. The challenge, of course, is that I’ve been saying since the start that we are influenced by MUCH more than just our brains, and that we cannot ignore those influences when discussing the concept of free will.

I laid my foundation on the chemistry of our existence, and shared how other agents (or reactants or catalysts or whatever the best word is... thank you for grasping/acknowledging my intended meaning) tend to dictate and alter that underlying chemistry in ways that are fundamental; in ways that completely alter our behaviors and thinking; in ways completely out of our control and in ways that lead directly to the removal of the very freedom you appear to assert and defend.

We are slaves to those processes and to that chemistry. It’s an insult to language itself to describe these processes as free.

I do feel like we’re repeating ourselves, though. You apply a definition that I find too broad and unnuanced to be useful or meaningful. I apply a definition that you find to be too restrictive and granular to be accurate. And so here we are...

As for your “some neuroscientists use their conclusions to argue for penal justice reform, therefore how we approach punishment is a relevant factor in deciding whether or not freewill exists” position... Well, I find that to be obviously false to the point of absurdity, but I won’t belabor it. I enjoy our exchanges and appreciate your clarity, though do find myself shocked that someone as good at logic as you cannot see why potential downstream consequences are not relevant to the validity of upstream conclusions. Related? Certainly. Relevant? Not at all.

Cheers, and enjoy the day ahead.

Edited May 1, 2019 by iNow

[dimreepr]

1 hour ago, iNow said:

Rereading our exchange, I agree that I was off-base when saying you misrepresented me. I mistakenly interpreted you, and for that I do apologize. There’s a deeper issue here, though, and I’m unsure you realize it. 

You charge me with arguing against an overly simplified form of free will. You suggest that my position does not account for the richer more nuanced view of freewill you’re using. You even go so far as to agree with me that this other version of freewill doesn’t exist. 

In doing so, however, you yourself argue against an oversimplified version of my position. You suggest that we ARE our brains and hence the distinction I’m making between “us” or our “self” and the underlying neural structure and pattern of activation is unneeded to the point of being wrong. 

I could agree with that stance, that we are our brains and therefore that position is untenable. The challenge, of course, is that I’ve been saying since the start that we are influenced by MUCH more than just our brains, and that we cannot ignore those influences when discussing the concept of free will.

I laid my foundation on the chemistry of our existence, and shared how other agents (or reactants or catalysts or whatever the best word is... thank you for grasping/acknowledging my intended meaning) tend to dictate and alter that underlying chemistry in ways that are fundamental; in ways that completely alter our behaviors and thinking; in ways completely out of our control and in ways that lead directly to the removal of the very freedom you appear to assert and defend.

We are slaves to those processes and to that chemistry. It’s an insult to language itself to describe these processes as free.

I do feel like we’re repeating ourselves, though. You apply a definition that I find too broad and unnuanced to be useful or meaningful. I apply a definition that you find to be too restrictive and granular to be accurate. And so here we are...

As for your “some neuroscientists use their conclusions to argue for penal justice reform, therefore how we approach punishment is a relevant factor in deciding whether or not freewill exists” position... Well, I find that to be obviously false to the point of absurdity, but I won’t belabor it. I enjoy our exchanges and appreciate your clarity, though do find myself shocked that someone as good at logic as you cannot see why potential downstream consequences are not relevant to the validity of upstream conclusions. Related? Certainly. Relevant? Not at all.

Cheers, and enjoy the day ahead.

Another compelling argument that deserves a +1. I've often wondered what justice actually means.

 

[iNow]

1 hour ago, dimreepr said:

It’s an insult to language itself to describe these processes as free.

This sentence needs clarification: It's not the processes being described as free. It's us as subservient slaves to those underlying processes being described as free, and that's where I focus my ire. 

[Eise]

17 hours ago, iNow said:

Rereading our exchange, I agree that I was off-base when saying you misrepresented me. I mistakenly interpreted you, and for that I do apologize.

Accepted. Thx.

17 hours ago, iNow said:

You charge me with arguing against an overly simplified form of free will. You suggest that my position does not account for the richer more nuanced view of freewill you’re using.

Just to set it straight. I never used 'richer' or 'more nuanced'. If you want to describe it then it is just 'different'. If you look how some philosophers defend libertarian free will (even without a soul), then it can get terribly technical. But of course, they are still wrong...

17 hours ago, iNow said:

The challenge, of course, is that I’ve been saying since the start that we are influenced by MUCH more than just our brains, and that we cannot ignore those influences when discussing the concept of free will.

Right, it is true I simplified a little here. But just remember what I have said a few times: that the concept of free will applies to persons as a whole. So yes, you are right, it is not just the brain, it is the complete organism. So that includes many of your examples.

17 hours ago, iNow said:

I laid my foundation on the chemistry of our existence, and shared how other agents (or reactants or catalysts or whatever the best word is... thank you for grasping/acknowledging my intended meaning) tend to dictate and alter that underlying chemistry in ways that are fundamental; in ways that completely alter our behaviors and thinking; in ways completely out of our control and in ways that lead directly to the removal of the very freedom you appear to assert and defend.

I think you make an error here. I am pretty sure you have shifted the meaning of 'free will'. Just probe if my definition of free will is affected by this. Before you accuse others of having faulty logic, look carefully at your own argumentation. Please do, before I have to write such a long posting again. Just to help you a little: my 'slogan-version' of free will is 'being able to do what you want'. And what it is pertinently not: being able to be what you want'.

17 hours ago, iNow said:

We are slaves to those processes and to that chemistry. It’s an insult to language itself to describe these processes as free.

Nice poetic hyperbole. Again, the insult is when you suppose that free will and determinism cannot go together. But that is wrong. We are determined, for all practical purposes^*: but that does in no way affect my definition of free will. It does affect the concept of free will you are attacking, but you are arguing with me here, not with a soul-believer or libertarian free will adept. So you must proof that my concept of free will does not work, not the concept you are attacking usually.

^*Leaving out QM again, but in my opinion QM can be at most a disturbance for free will, because it introduces random events. Without sufficient determinism, free will could impossibly exist. Our behaviour would be chaotic, without connection what we, as persons, are. Determinism is a necessary condition for free will!

17 hours ago, iNow said:

As for your “some neuroscientists use their conclusions to argue for penal justice reform, therefore how we approach punishment is a relevant factor in deciding whether or not freewill exists” position... Well, I find that to be obviously false to the point of absurdity,

Please explain: what is absurd? Neuroscientists using their conclusions to argue for penal justice reform? Or that I say there are such neuroscientists?

And I did not say 'therefore how we approach punishment is a relevant factor in deciding whether or not freewill exists'. What I said is more or less that my definition is applied daily in court, and what definitely is not used is your definition (a soul steering the brain), because it is absolutely useless. And that this is in line with how we all use the term 'free will' in daily life: we normally know pretty well (not perfectly), which acts were voluntary, and which are coerced. 

17 hours ago, iNow said:

I enjoy our exchanges and appreciate your clarity, though do find myself shocked that someone as good at logic as you cannot see why potential downstream consequences are not relevant to the validity of upstream conclusions.

I do not understand your 'downstream-upstream' metaphor. But when you think that I am good at logic, and then make blatantly logical errors, then I would propose to look again, if I really said what you think I said.

 

On 4/30/2019 at 3:31 PM, iNow said:

On 4/30/2019 at 3:26 PM, StringJunky said:

If you can act contrary to all the inner signals telling you to do otherwise

This appears to be an invalid description. Even when we do act in these ways, it’s NOT contrary to “all” other signals. There are multiple streams of activity firing in parallel, and some are dominant while others are weaker, but the weaker signal can still be the one which gets actioned.

Full ack. We are used to see a person as a single, unitary instance of something. But we are in fact a complex of motivations and predispositions, that not always go well together. Otherwise life would be much easier...

[Eise]

On 4/30/2019 at 6:13 PM, CharonY said:

However, every decision happens at the intersection of biology and sociology. The way we are brought up and what we have learned together with our biology creates certain boundaries in our decision-making.

Of course. We have only partial influence on who we are: our genetics, upbringing, and what else lay outside our influence. But that is not a problem for my concept of free will. The question is not if I can define myself as I want, but if I can do what I want. What I want is influenced by many factors: if I am able to act according to what I am or are blocked by others to do that is a completely different question. And that is what my definition of free will relates to.

On 4/30/2019 at 6:13 PM, CharonY said:

We could rule that the brain is impaired, but what does it mean? It really means it works differently than one that is not under the influence. Likewise, one could argue that someone that was indoctrinated in a particular way of thinking has their brain imprinted a certain way.

There are two relevant changes one can distinguish in this respect:

1. a personality change: this means the person has changed. But as long as his capability to anticipate the future dependent on his actions, he is in principle free
2. impairment of the capability to anticipate the future dependent on his actions: then of course the person lost a necessary condition to act freely

Of course there arises the interesting question if the change is temporary, if the change was caused by the person himself (driving drunk!), if the change was intended by somebody else, etc etc. See e.g. the 'professor Plum cases' I mentioned before in another thread.

On 4/30/2019 at 6:13 PM, CharonY said:

Of course one could argue that the execution is not part of the decision-making process but I think the boundaries are paper-thin, if we try to look at the intersection of decision-making and resulting behaviour.

That's the reason that the only 'entity' on which the idea of free will applies is the person as a whole.

 

[iNow]

4 hours ago, Eise said:

Please explain: what is absurd? Neuroscientists using their conclusions to argue for penal justice reform? Or that I say there are such neuroscientists? <...> I do not understand your 'downstream-upstream' metaphor.

Let’s try a different one, then. Medical doctors argue for more exercise to improve ones health, but the fact that they happen to argue for this is irrelevant to the validity of the “upstream” conclusion that exercise improves both physical and mental health. This conclusion is related to the “downstream” consequence of physician advocacy with their patients, but that advocacy is not relevant to the validity of the "upstream" conclusion that exercise is good for us. 

The same is true for any conclusions we make about freewill. Perhaps neuroscientists argue for changes in our approach to penal justice, but those “downstream” consequences are not tied to whether or not our “upstream” conclusions about the nature of freewill are valid. Those arguments or that advocacy for criminal justice reform is surely a potential consequence or “output” of the conclusion regarding freewill, but they are most decidedly not an “input” to it. 

4 hours ago, Eise said:

that does in no way affect my definition of free will. <...>. So you must proof that my concept of free will does not work

My gut bacteria and firing patterns finds your definition uncompelling and unsatisfactory. The word freedom seems off the mark given our lack of it. 

I’ll have to get back to you on what they say regarding me being required to prove anything whatsoever to you. For now, the firing patterns seem stacked against this outcome. 

Edited May 2, 2019 by iNow

[Eise]

20 hours ago, iNow said:

Let’s try a different one, then. Medical doctors argue for more exercise to improve ones health, but the fact that they happen to argue for this is irrelevant to the validity of the “upstream” conclusion that exercise improves both physical and mental health. This conclusion is related to the “downstream” consequence of physician advocacy with their patients, but that advocacy is not relevant to the validity of the "upstream" conclusion that exercise is good for us. 

The same is true for any conclusions we make about freewill. Perhaps neuroscientists argue for changes in our approach to penal justice, but those “downstream” consequences are not tied to whether or not our “upstream” conclusions about the nature of freewill are valid. Those arguments or that advocacy for criminal justice reform is surely a potential consequence or “output” of the conclusion regarding freewill, but they are most decidedly not an “input” to it. 

I think I understand: one should not argue against the truth of propositions or theories because one doesn't like the consequences. Is that what you mean?

Now I don't know why you say this, when I just cite the opinion of some neuroscientists who argue that we should change our judicial praxis because they think they have proven that we have no free will. That was not my argument, it's theirs. I am not saying 'look what they say, they threaten our judicial praxis, I won't accept that!'. I give them as example of bad philosophy: without being clear what free will means, they draw their conclusions. I asked you, and you said you deny the kind of free will that supposes there is a soul that can decide independent of any causal influences. I reacted, that that is not some feat: deny that there is a soul. To argue from that there is no soul to the conclusion that our judicial praxis is wrong, is simply bullshit. The praxis of our judicial system has nothing to do with these metaphysical kinds of conceptions of free will.

20 hours ago, iNow said:

My gut bacteria and firing patterns finds your definition uncompelling and unsatisfactory.

You have no access to this level of your functioning. Otherwise you would be able to name exactly which bacteria and patterns, I would even say talked with them. And while I know that you make some kind of joke, it shows that you believe that we have some properties, because the parts from what I am build up have these properties. Elsewhere you argued that our consciousness is an emergent property: but when it is about free will you deny that this is an emergent property. You seem to think that your bacteria and neurons must be free for you to be free. Sorry, but that is BS as well.

21 hours ago, iNow said:

I’ll have to get back to you on what they say regarding me being required to prove anything whatsoever to you. For now, the firing patterns seem stacked against this outcome. 

Well, it is simple. I say there is no contradiction between determinism and free will. To act according to reasons on one side, and that the processes on which these are based are determined on the other side, is simply no contradiction.

 

[iNow]

Let me preface by stating my desire is to stand shoulder to shoulder with you and ensure we’re both looking upon the same landscape. If there are any inaccuracies below, it’s due neither to ill intent or malice. It’s an authentic account describing my perspective. With that said...

You acknowledge that my underlying points about limits to and blockers of our freedom are valid (the example of drug addiction being the most obvious). You agree that these points refute the definition of freewill I’m using. You agree that no such version of freewill exists.

You then state that you’re framing the discussion using a different definition of freewill. In your different definition, it appears that no underlying points or counter arguments can demonstrate it to be invalid. Your definition generously accepts those points as included within. Therefore, you dismiss the relevance of those points I’ve introduced and repeat your assertion that freewill actually does exist... based on your definition.

We keep talking past one another. We agree that the term free will applies to us as a whole organism, as well as all of the subcomponents within us. We seem to disagree about calling it free. 

You stipulated earlier that coercion makes an action unfree. You seem to refuse, however, to acknowledge that the various blockers and agents that I continue introducing (the ones actually determining our actions and decisions) are themselves validly described as types of coercion. 

Happy weekend. 

Edited May 4, 2019 by iNow

[dimreepr]

You two are loving this debate... No coercion seems necessary. 

But my (ant hill) question remains, we can choose to die.

All other, less free, life seems to want to hang on to it.

Edited May 4, 2019 by dimreepr

[iNow]

14 hours ago, dimreepr said:

But my (ant hill) question remains, we can choose to die.

All other, less free, life seems to want to hang on to it.

What do you mean by choose?

How do you know the inclination is not being driven by factors beyond our control? Is depression a choice?

Why do you think other animals can’t/don’t also do the exact same thing?

Why am I asking so many damned questions...

[Eise]

21 hours ago, iNow said:

You acknowledge that my underlying points about limits to and blockers of our freedom are valid (the example of drug addiction being the most obvious). You agree that these points refute the definition of freewill I’m using. You agree that no such version of freewill exists.

If you mean that I acknowledge that drug addiction impairs free will, I agree. However I think we differ in how we use this example.

You (correct me if I am wrong) seem to use it to show that we are determined by 'low-level' chemical processes, and this dependency on chemical processes shows that we are not free. 

I on the other hand on one side agree that the basis of all our mental process lie in our brain processes, but on the other side state that this has nothing to do with the question if we are free or not. Our free will depends on the capability to anticipate possible futures dependent on the actions I could do next. If this capability is impaired, we are less free, and drugs can induce that.

So I agree that libertarian free will does not exist, but on other grounds than you do. Simply said, I deny libertarian free will mainly on two grounds: that I assume that our brain processes are 'sufficiently determined', and that the concept of free will I am proposing needs determinism. Without determinism free will would be impossible.

21 hours ago, iNow said:

We keep talking past one another. We agree that the term free will applies to us as a whole organism, as well as all of the subcomponents within us.

No, not of subcomponents. 

21 hours ago, iNow said:

You stipulated earlier that coercion makes an action unfree. You seem to refuse, however, to acknowledge that the various blockers and agents that I continue introducing (the ones actually determining our actions and decisions) are themselves validly described as types of coercion. 

'Validly'? No, no way. Those blockers and agents do not try to force their reasons upon me, they have no intentions. They just change our behaviour, unwillingly. They only show that our mental events have a physico-chemical basis. It is like denying that computers make calculations because in fact they just behave according physical laws.

6 hours ago, iNow said:

How do you know the inclination is not being driven by factors beyond our control?

Many, maybe most of my inclinations are beyond my control. It is true, I am determined by my genes, accidental biological occurrences, upbringing, culture in which I grew up etc etc. But the question of my will being free refers to the capability to being able to act according to my inclinations, and is not obstructed in that by others.

And just a silly question: does a thermostat control the temperature in a room? If not, can I then just do away with it? Does the fact that a thermostat is pretty simple device that can easily be understood, resp built, defy its function to control temperature? Does 'control' mean 'absolute control', even over itself? What does it mean, when the police reports that the accident was due to the driver losing control of his car?