About life and consciousness.

[DrmDoc]

1 hour ago, Hrvoje1 said:

If your intention was to insult me, you could be a man enough to say that openly what you got, and not hide behind the others, and behind abbreviations.

I do not know you sir or madam and neither did I intend to either directly or indirectly insult you.  I noticed the quote by MP, which ended with "snuffed it", at the bottom of zapatos' most recent comments here and found it elaborately humorous.  I perceived this quote as a cleaver diversion that was in no way a slight against you as you now imagine.  So, geez, relax!

[Hrvoje1]

After this discussion, I couldn't help the feeling that the legitimate question of mathematical description of design still eludes scientific community, as well as that of mathematical description of life. Regardless of the question are these two connected, I have searched a bit for the information on who tackled it so far, and of course found tons of material, some is seminal such as Schrödinger's What is Life?, in a sense that he was among the first physicists to deal with it in a longer essay, and Constructor Theory of Life by Marletto, in a sense that she and Deutsch went further than anyone else in their investigation, that I already knew, however there is also Chris Adami, Fritjof Capra, ... and many others. There is also Elsberry and Shallit versus Dembski discussion/critique Information Theory, Evolutionary Computation, and Dembski's Complex Specified Information, that I didn't study very carefully, but still careful enough to spot that they claim the following:
>>
 he never gives a positive account of design; we do not learn from reading his works what Dembski thinks design is. In 'The Design Inference' he simply defines design as the complement of regularity and chance, and the possibility that this complement is in fact empty is not seriously addressed. In 'No Free Lunch', he gives a process-oriented account of design:
(1) A designer conceives a purpose.
(2) To accomplish that purpose, the designer forms a plan.
(3) To execute the plan, the designer specifies building materials and assembly instructions.
(4) Finally, the designer or some surrogate applies the assembly instructions to the building materials.
<<
Now, although that account of design maybe didn't impress Elsberry and Shallit, or Deutsch and Marletto, who although address the same question of design as Dembski, never mention him at all, answering that way basically non existing challenge (to their Neo-Darwinian views), that Elsberry and Shallit's comment made me think of the quality of my account of design, given here in this discussion. Which is distilled from Deutsch and Marletto's theory, as they do not give a positive account of design either, but they do give a positive account of a system that appears to be designed:
>>
Consider a recipe R for a possible task T. A sub-recipe R0 for the task T0 is fine-tuned to perform T if almost any slight change in T0 would cause T to be performed to a much lower accuracy. (For instance, changing the mechanism of insulin production in the pancreas even slightly, would impair the overall task the organism performs.) A programmable constructor V whose repertoire includes T has the appearance of design if it can execute a recipe for T with a hierarchical structure including several, different subrecipes, fine-tuned to perform T. Each fine-tuned sub-recipe is performed by a sub-constructor contained in V : the number of fine-tuned sub-recipes performable by V is a measure of V's appearance of design. This constructor-theoretic definition is non-multiplicative, as desired.
<<
So, the appearance of design of a programmable constructor V is a measure of its complexity, related with a number of sub-constructors it can be hierarchically decomposed to, each of which has to perform accurately in order for V to perform accurately. In my opinion that definition deals more with a robustness of V, as there is nothing said about the possibility of maintenance, ie how V recovers from the situation when T0 is not accurately performed, by itself, or if external maintenance is required. It certainly does not explain the difference between designed programmable constructor and the one that just appears to be designed.
 That leads to a slightly bizarre situation that a world renowned physicist dedicates a whole paper to investigation of a notion that she never defines directly, although she tries to define precisely what constitutes the appearance of that notion. To be fair, that paper is not exactly about design, it is about life, and its precise mathematical description, while for the "real" design, it somehow looks as if the author thinks it does not need to be addressed (or that it does not exist) at all.
In this discussion, I started from the point of view that automata theory is a theory of designed systems, that are built upon physical laws that act as a basis for their functioning, but their behavior is furthermore determined by the idea of designers about the purpose of automata which is built into them, in terms of constructor theory, these ideas are recipes for the tasks these automatic constructors and their sub-constructors are supposed to perform. According to that view, phenomena that can be explained solely and entirely in terms of physical laws, such as clouds, or rain, or rivers within their natural streambed, are not designed. That looked kind of obvious to everyone, nobody actually objected to that claim. However, I started to question it myself, and took as the example Cellular Automata (CA) theory, which is a source of inspiration for many people for different reasons. And not only inspiration, but also the framework applied in concrete examples:
Packard Snowflakes on the von Neumann Neighborhood by Brummitt,Delventhal and Retzlaff
The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics by Gerard 't Hooft
I was interested only in the question if CA models designed systems in contrast to the models that describe physical systems (such as theory of gravity), since these two (snowflakes and QM) seemed to me as counterexamples. For the appearance of design within CA, there must be a freedom of choice of production rules for the next generation of cells, while for the appearance of a physical law, there must be no such liberty of choosing the rules that guide a physical system from the current state to the next one, they should be preset, or predefined for the whole universe. However, if we constrain a little bit the computation rules for CA, such as for example if we focus only on linear CA, then on the one that allows only two possible cell states, and let's say that they depend in the next generation solely on the current state of the cell itself and of its two nearest neighbours, that is two adjacent cells, then we get only 256 possible computation rules for such a system. And if we finally narrow down our interest further to only one, let's say Rule 110, due to its interesting behavior on the boundary between stability and chaos, we can analyze its evolution in the same way using our logical apparatus as we analyze motion of physical systems that obey physical laws. And if we give ourselves the freedom and imagine the existence of ultimate multiverse that contains every mathematically possible universe under different laws of physics, then we can conclude that nothing really distinguishes between designed systems and physical systems, they both just appear to be one way or the other. That really is a great conclusion, however, we don't have much proof of existence of any other universe but the one we exist in, and if we allow the possibility that we have a free will, then we are really able to "design a designed system", that doesn't just appear to be designed. Or, in Elsberry and Shallit's words, maybe there really exists in nature a third category, that is neither pure physical regularity nor chance?

[Hrvoje1]

Now that I took your advice and wrote this stuff for relaxation, maybe it is time now to respond to some of your thoughts, that actually triggered my sense of imprecision of thoughts. Maybe you reacted that way because I didn't respond so far.

On ‎8‎/‎31‎/‎2019 at 2:02 AM, DrmDoc said:

I agree; an organism simply has to demonstrate that it can engage behavioral responses independent of those we might consider instinctual or programmed responses.  Non-instinctiveo/non-programmed behaviors suggest that an organism can engage a mentation process comparable to that which produces human behavioral responses.  These are the processes of thought that we engage to suppress behaviors we would otherwise engage instinctively or without thoughtful consideration; e.g., suppressing the urge to run from loud explosions while attending a fireworks display.

I think animals are genetically programmed for carefully thought, planned, intentional reactions (and thinking that precedes it), as well as for instinctive reactions, and as well for unconscious reactions, such as for example food processing or immunological response (although, that may be outside of definition of behavioral response, but it's still a response), that is, something that not only we do not control, but are also mostly unaware of. Identifying instincts with programmed responses, is in my opinion not very useful.

On ‎9‎/‎1‎/‎2019 at 2:30 PM, DrmDoc said:

Consciousness that isn't relatable to humanity isn't consciousness because it has no human reference and any definition you may ultimately settled on cannot be quantified without a cogent basis relatable to human experience.

Requiring that definition of consciousness must be related to human consciousness, doesn't mean just a lack of objectivity, proper expression I should have used is a total lack of generality of such thinking. No definition in biology can be based on comparison with human, we are not the center of universe. And consciousness is a biological notion, isn't it?
How exactly do you quantify your definition of consciousness, using a cogent basis relatable to human experience? Can you give an example of that quantification?

On ‎9‎/‎2‎/‎2019 at 5:40 PM, zapatos said:

Is a virus alive or is it not?

The fact that there is still no precise, mathematical description of life, doesn't mean much, because we believe in the progress of science. Don't we?
And even when that task is accomplished, subcellular organisms may still be exactly somewhere in between living and non living. This really doesn't undermine the fact that precise definitions are conditio sine qua non of any sensible discussion. If that cannot be asked for in a scientific circle, then I don't know where else one can expect it. For example, if I get back to Marletto's definition of appearance of design of a programmable constructor V, I may add that it is also more about its stability, as a slight change in sub-constructor accuracy of performing its task T0, leads to significant degradation of accuracy of V's performance of T. It does not capture the essence of difference between appearance of design vs real design, whatever that is.

Edited September 14, 2019 by Hrvoje1

[dimreepr]

28 minutes ago, Hrvoje1 said:

The fact that there is still no precise, mathematical description of life, doesn't mean much, because we believe in the progress of science. Don't we?
And even when that task is accomplished, subcellular organisms may still be exactly somewhere in between living and non living.

No one has suggested otherwise, of course awareness (consciousness/life) exists on a spectrum; but the point you're missing is, at one end of the spectrum there is no awareness (consciousness/life)... 

And that is: conditio sine qua non.

[iNow]

34 minutes ago, dimreepr said:

the point you're missing is, at one end of the spectrum there is no awareness (consciousness/life)

We don’t know this for certain, and (as I said at the start of this thread) it really depends on ones definition of consciousness/life/etc).

Some folks have speculated that consciousness may be a property of matter itself. I don’t know if that’s right or wrong, but we also can’t assert with certainty and without supporting evidence/details things like this quoted bit. It seems likely, I agree, but may be mistaken... depending on our definition. 

[dimreepr]

1 minute ago, iNow said:

We don’t know this for certain, and (as I said at the start of this thread) it really depends on ones definition of consciousness/life/etc).

Is a pre-atom alive? It certaintly seems to have coalesced with a purpose... 

[iNow]

1 minute ago, dimreepr said:

Is a pre-atom alive? It certaintly seems to have coalesced with a purpose... 

Define alive

[dimreepr]

2 minutes ago, iNow said:

Define alive

No one expects the Spanish inquisition... 

[DrmDoc]

5 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I think animals are genetically programmed for carefully thought, planned, intentional reactions (and thinking that precedes it), as well as for instinctive reactions, and as well for unconscious reactions, such as for example food processing or immunological response (although, that may be outside of definition of behavioral response, but it's still a response), that is, something that not only we do not control, but are also mostly unaware of. Identifying instincts with programmed responses, is in my opinion not very useful.

If I understand correctly, you think all animals (humans included) follow genetically programmed responses of which processes of thought are also included. If that's true, then I disagree.  The distinction between an organism that engages thought--as an indication of consciousness--and one that only engages instinct is shown by the organism that demonstrates a capacity to override its programmed responses.  Viruses, for example, may mutate but do not have the capacity to override their programmed survival drive to infect the human body.  When viruses mutate, that mutation isn't a result of thoughtful consideration but is instead a result of biology and evolution itself where the strongest organism among a multitude of rapidly producing organisms survives in the hostile environment that is the human body.  Indeed, humans are generally programmed to think, while many organisms do not appear to have that programming.  Thought is what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism.  The way we distinguish those animals that do not appear capable of thought is by their inability to engage behaviors that override their programming.

 

5 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

Requiring that definition of consciousness must be related to human consciousness, doesn't mean just a lack of objectivity, proper expression I should have used is a total lack of generality of such thinking. No definition in biology can be based on comparison with human, we are not the center of universe. And consciousness is a biological notion, isn't it?
How exactly do you quantify your definition of consciousness, using a cogent basis relatable to human experience? Can you give an example of that quantification?

Our definitions define our understanding, which we gain most effectively by experience and, to my knowledge, we may only gain that experience through life as human beings.  For example, we may experience what a horse does but not what it is because we are not horses.  What horses do does not define their internal life, if such a life exists.  Assessing that internal life requires references we can identify.  Those references must be relatable to experience we as humans understand.  Human experience is the only experience we're fully capable of understanding because of the shared nature of human physiology, psychology, and biology. Indeed, humans are not the center of the universe; however, our understanding of that universe relies on references emerging from our very human experiences here on earth.    

Edited September 14, 2019 by DrmDoc

[Hrvoje1]

14 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

If I understand correctly, you think all animals (humans included) follow genetically programmed responses of which processes of thought are also included. If that's true, then I disagree.  The distinction between an organism that engages thought--as an indication of consciousness--and one that only engages instinct is shown by the organism that demonstrates a capacity to override its programmed responses.

I think there is no reason that among all categories of animal reactions, such as those that I mentioned, instinctive reactions should be singled out, and called programmed. Why do you think you are not programmed to think? Why do you think you are not programmed to process food that happens to appear in your stomach? Neither of these activities I would call instinctive, and still, if instincts are programmed, then why these wouldn't be also?

17 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

What horses do does not define their internal life, if such a life exists

Do we have any reason to believe that it does not exist? Again, the slippery terrain of discussing things without defining what we are talking about. So, what in your opinion is internal life?

[Hrvoje1]

1 hour ago, DrmDoc said:

Indeed, humans are generally programmed to think, while many organisms do not appear to have that programming.  Thought is what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism.

I just realized that you actually in one moment wrote that humans are programmed to think, but exactly thought is what enables us to override what we are programmed for (thinking). Hm, very confusing thoughts by your side, I couldn't see that coming.

[DrmDoc]

35 minutes ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I think there is no reason that among all categories of animal reactions, such as those that I mentioned, instinctive reactions should be singled out, and called programmed. Why do you think you are not programmed to think? Why do you think you are not programmed to process food that happens to appear in your stomach? Neither of these activities I would call instinctive, and still, if instincts are programmed, then why these wouldn't be also?

As I wrote, "Indeed, humans are generally programmed to think, while many organisms do not appear to have that programming.  Thought is what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism.  The way we distinguish those animals that do not appear capable of thought is by their inability to engage behaviors that override their programming."  I define instinct as those behaviors engaged without the appearance of a thought process.  Having a thought process is essential to consciously directed behaviors, which is opposite of those unconscious behaviors categorized as instinctive. Consciousness must be relatable to human behavior because that is the only way humans will be able to fully understand that quality.  Consciously directed behaviors is evidence of consciousness in other species because it is a reference relatable to the experience within our capacity to fully understanding.

1 hour ago, Hrvoje1 said:

Do we have any reason to believe that it does not exist? Again, the slippery terrain of discussing things without defining what we are talking about. So, what in your opinion is internal life?

We should try to remain on topic and not be distracted by comments meant to convey my thoughts on the impossibility of knowing another species entirely.

[Hrvoje1]

I hope I didn't lost you because of that oversight. While I wait for your response, let me add a few interesting links that this discussion motivated me to search for, it looks like termite mound is not that passive object as I thought, it enables active air conditioning:
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20151210-why-termites-build-such-enormous-skyscrapers 

This is about information processing in plants:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2018.0370

This is about connection between consciousness and neural networks:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S157086830900038X
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0810/0810.4339.pdf

 

[DrmDoc]

9 minutes ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I just realized that you actually in one moment wrote that humans are programmed to think, but exactly thought is what enables us to override what we are programmed for (thinking). Hm, very confusing thoughts by your side, I couldn't see that coming.

Ask yourself, can you make a conscious decision not to think?  Can you just clear your thoughts and just zone out?

[Hrvoje1]

38 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

As I wrote, "Indeed, humans are generally programmed to think, while many organisms do not appear to have that programming.  Thought is what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism.  The way we distinguish those animals that do not appear capable of thought is by their inability to engage behaviors that override their programming." 

Yes, sorry, you did write that, but what sense does it make? We are programmed to think, and thinking is what enables us to override what we are programmed for.

I think we should make some pause between our posting, because it seems that right now we are posting at the same time.

30 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

Ask yourself, can you make a conscious decision not to think?  Can you just clear your thoughts and just zone out?

No, I don't think I can do that for a very long time. I can decide not to breathe too, but also not for a very long time.

Both would be conscious, but not long term decisions.

And I can foresee what is coming now, when I mentioned a decision not to breathe... another proof of human rising above other species, right?

I don't think however that suicidal ability is something that affirmatively describes a human being to a great extent.

Edited September 14, 2019 by Hrvoje1

[DrmDoc]

1 hour ago, Hrvoje1 said:

No, I don't think I can do that for a very long time. I can decide not to breathe too, but also not for a very long time.

Both would be conscious, but not long term decisions.

And I can foresee what is coming now, when I mentioned a decision not to breathe... another proof of human rising above other species, right?

I don't think however that suicidal ability is something that affirmatively describes a human being to a great extent.

The position I was trying to convey is that there are clear distinctions in relatable behavior that we may use to reference and identify certain qualities of awareness relatable to other species.  By no means am I inferring humanity is the only species capable of consciousness; however, I do suggests that there are many not capable of that quality as humanity expresses.  I've suggested that certain behavioral distinctions could be used to identify species with lesser measures.  What distinguishes human consciousness is our ability to create a cognitive environment within our brain structure that is capable of generating behaviors independent of those considered instinctual as I've defined in previous comments.  What raises this cognitive environment above all others is that it is evidence of a mind, which is something many species do not appear to have.  

Edited September 14, 2019 by DrmDoc

[Hrvoje1]

I think you should really try to be consistent, at least just a little bit. If you say that your thoughts on impossibility of knowing another species entirely are distraction,
then you should not return constantly to comparisons between human and other species.
You specifically talked about instinct as the only programmed behavior, identifying these two notions, until I told you that thinking is also genetically programmed behavior, and you agreed about that with respect to human, which I even didn't notice because that followed only after you disagreed about that with respect to other animals, and after you bundled that acknowledgment of your error with some convoluted logic, such as, that thinking enables us to override that what we are genetically programmed for, thinking in the first place. Which is impossible and logically inconsistent. How would thinking enable us not to think? Especially if we are programmed for it?
Besides that, the fact that we can suspend temporarily our thoughts on any particular subject, certainly doesn't prove that animals cannot think, or that they cannot suspend their thoughts too.
And you defined instinct as "those behaviors engaged without the appearance of a thought process", and thought as "that what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism", in other words, as that what enables and precedes behavior that is not instinctual, ie animal. Circular, isn't it? I hope you have some outside criteria to break that circularity, that you didn't present so far, because this looks like vacuous anthropocentric philosophy, not science.

And I think you didn't answer this question:

22 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

How exactly do you quantify your definition of consciousness, using a cogent basis relatable to human experience? Can you give an example of that quantification?

Did you?

Edited September 15, 2019 by Hrvoje1

[DrmDoc]

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I think you should really try to be consistent, at least just a little bit. If you say that your thoughts on impossibility of knowing another species entirely are distraction,
then you should not return constantly to comparisons between human and other species.

I perceived your question as an attempt to deviate from our consciousness topic into a discussion specifically about the inner life of horses.  My comments regarded what humans could not fully know about other species without references relatable to humans and the inner life of horses was merely an example.  However, if you insist on this deviations, are you capable of knowing and explaining the inner life of horse without using relatable human references?

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

You specifically talked about instinct as the only programmed behavior, identifying these two notions, until I told you that thinking is also genetically programmed behavior, and you agreed about that with respect to human, which I even didn't notice because that followed only after you disagreed about that with respect to other animals,...

To be clear, my comments were a response to  your insertion of the term "programmed" into this discussion, which is a more inclusive term than instinct relative to behaviors.  In previous comments, I regarded instinct relative to behaviors that specifically emerge "without the appearance of a thought process."  Your use of programmed is relatable to areas and aspects of brain function that produces both instinctive behaviors and our thought processes.

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

...and after you bundled that acknowledgment of your error with some convoluted logic, such as, that thinking enables us to override that what we are genetically programmed for, thinking in the first place. Which is impossible and logically inconsistent. How would thinking enable us not to think? Especially if we are programmed for it?

As I see it, I've made no errors of logic with exception of, perhaps, in not conveying my thoughts in ways you might more clearly understand.  Regarding "How thinking enable us not to think?", thinking enables the behaviors we choose and not choose to engage.  However brief, choosing not to think is a product of our thought processes.

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

Besides that, the fact that we can suspend temporarily our thoughts on any particular subject, certainly doesn't prove that animals cannot think, or that they cannot suspend their thoughts too.

I've made no blanket assertion that "animals cannot think", particularly when humans are also animals.  What I've asserted is a perspective of how we may identify and reference that quality in other species.

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

And you defined instinct as "those behaviors engaged without the appearance of a thought process", and thought as "that what enables humanity's ability to override it programming and rise above all other species and organism", in other words, as that what enables and precedes behavior that is not instinctual, ie animal. Circular, isn't it? I hope you have some outside criteria to break that circularity, that you didn't present so far, because this looks like vacuous anthropocentric philosophy, not science.

What appears to be "circular" here is this discussion, which is probably caused by an absence of mutual understanding.  Perhaps my comments in this latest response will further that understanding.

3 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

And I think you didn't answer this question:

Did you?

Quantification of my perspective on consciousness requires an understanding of brain function and brain evolution.  Since we are talking science, we cannot argue that consciousness isn't a product of brain function.  Much of what we understand about our brain and it's functional structure is rooted in animal studies.  Conversely, much of what we understand about the brains of other species is based on studies of our own.  The reciprocity among interspecies functional studies is how I'm able to cogently convey reference relatable to human experience; e.g., Decorticate animal study.

Edited September 15, 2019 by DrmDoc
grammar, punctuation

[Hrvoje1]

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

are you capable of knowing and explaining the inner life of horse without using relatable human references?

I am not familiar with horses, I don't work with them on a daily basis, don't study them professionally, so probably I am not, with or without it. But if you ask such people does inner life of horse exist, I doubt they will say it does not, whatever sensible way you define it.

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

To be clear, my comments were a response to  your insertion of the term "programmed" into this discussion

I joined the discussion on page 3, and the string "prog" doesn't appear in it, from there until page 7, when you said:

>>I agree; an organism simply has to demonstrate that it can engage behavioral responses independent of those we might consider instinctual or programmed responses.  Non-instinctiveo/non-programmed behaviors suggest that an organism can engage a mentation process comparable to that which produces human behavioral responses. << 

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

thinking enables the behaviors we choose and not choose to engage.  However brief, choosing not to think is a product of our thought processes.

We don't choose behaviors that we engage exclusively by thinking, and choosing not to think cannot lead to a very successful life. So, this is not that relevant, mostly people don't think when they sleep.

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

What I've asserted is a perspective of how we may identify and reference that quality in other species.

The best way would be unbiased, although, that is not entirely possible.

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

What appears to be "circular" here is this discussion

We can always drop it, if you think so, in a decent manner. Thank you for your time, etc...

15 hours ago, DrmDoc said:

e.g., Decorticate animal study.

OK, do you decorticate animal brains professionally? How do they take it, well or not so well? I hope that helps to determine where do instincts come from, and where thoughts come from. Is there a clear cut between them, as there is a clear cut between that what has been removed, and what has been left?

Edited September 16, 2019 by Hrvoje1

[Hrvoje1]

13 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

We don't choose behaviors that we engage in exclusively by thinking,

I meant to say that we don’t make choices only by thinking, but also based on emotions, that do not need to be instinctual. And even when we do, thinking can be logical or intuitive. So, classification of mental activities into only two categories: instinct and thought, is simplistic.

[DrmDoc]

30 minutes ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I meant to say that we don’t make choices only by thinking, but also based on emotions, that do not need to be instinctual. And even when we do, thinking can be logical or intuitive. So, classification of mental activities into only two categories: instinct and thought, is simplistic.

I've noticed how the context of your responses deviate from the initial and central focus of mine and the topic of this discussion.  Rather than continue down a path of seemingly endless deviations, let's see if we can wrap this up by returning to your central argument.  The following quote appears to be your central argument:

On 9/14/2019 at 8:51 AM, Hrvoje1 said:

Requiring that definition of consciousness must be related to human consciousness, doesn't mean just a lack of objectivity, proper expression I should have used is a total lack of generality of such thinking. No definition in biology can be based on comparison with human, we are not the center of universe.

This is my central argument in context with yours:  "Your comments here suggest that your idea of consciousness cannot be defined by human comparisons because you believe such comparisons lack objectivity. Consciousness cannot be defined or hypothesized without an initial point of reference. The word itself, consciousness, is a human invention and idea you would not be exploring in this discussion without that "human" origin.  What small measure of understanding you may now hold about the nature of consciousness is based on references defined by your very human experience.  In science, consciousness relatable to humanity is the only sort we are capable of fully understanding because of the reciprocity in brain function and behaviors among humans.  Consciousness that isn't relatable to humanity isn't consciousness because it has no human reference and any definition you may ultimately settled on cannot be quantified without a cogent basis relatable to human experience." 

Above, is the entirety of my argument in context with the central focus of your argument without deviation. My comments, particularly those in bold typeface, couldn't be clearer when received in context with the central focus of yours. There's no definition for consciousness without references relatable to humans.

[Hrvoje1]

On ‎9‎/‎15‎/‎2019 at 4:43 PM, DrmDoc said:

e.g., Decorticate animal study.

It seems that nowadays these studies are performed on animals in which that condition was not artificially induced for experimental needs. Kudos to human race.

43 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

The word itself, consciousness, is a human invention and idea you would not be exploring in this discussion without that "human" origin.

I don't know what ideas a chimpanzee can explore during his or her life. I bet they can learn to recognize that word invented by humans, understand it perfectly, and demonstrate that somehow to people. I have great confidence in apes intelligence, after I saw how fast and accurate their memory is.

54 minutes ago, DrmDoc said:

Consciousness that isn't relatable to humanity isn't consciousness because it has no human reference

It seems that detecting consciousness depends a lot on the interspecies communication barrier. The higher that barrier, the less we are inclined to acknowledge consciousness on the other side, and that can be said for intelligence too. Although, this is biased and irrational.

However, if there is a proof that consciousness requires neural network to be implemented, I may stand corrected regarding plants. Although, maybe the same functions as in neural networks can be implemented in plants information network too.

[DrmDoc]

23 hours ago, Hrvoje1 said:

I have great confidence in apes intelligence, after I saw how fast and accurate their memory is.

If you can answer within the context of this response, isn't your "confidence" and what you "saw"  in apes based on your very human references for what identifies and defines "memory"?  Isn't your assessment of  a "fast and accurate" ape memory based on a human reference for what determines memory that is fast and accurate? Given your prior comments, is your statement here "biased and irrational."  Relying on references relatable to human experience should not be discounted for objectivity.  Such references are the only window of insight fully open to our comprehension of other species. In congruence with our prior exchanges, references relatable to human experience are integral to our understanding of how qualities such as consciousness manifest in nonhuman species. 

[Hrvoje1]

Although it is important to strive towards objectivity, in a colloquial conversation not every statement is supposed to be objective. Obviously, my "confidence in apes intelligence" has to do with scientific rigor as much as your definitions. It is more a statement of admiration than anything else, and it was exactly because of comparison between chimps and humans, although, both memory speed and accuracy can be measured objectively, without reference to human memory speed and accuracy. Besides that, I don't know if you know what experiments I refer to, but these could not be performed to confirm intelligence of some species that has no visual sense, due to a nature of task they are supposed to perform. Just as much as mirror experiments are inadequate to establish consciousness of such species...

[DrmDoc]

Your should understand that our "scientific rigors" for assessing qualities such as intelligence, memory, and consciousness are definitively based on the only perspective we as humans are fully capable of experiencing, referencing, and understanding.  To be clear, it is neither "biased" nor "irrational" to acquire knowledge and insight of other species based on definitions and references that you, being human, can only understand from your human perspective and experience.