Control Over Desires?

[iNow]

On 11/29/2019 at 3:02 AM, Eise said:

Of course I am not! This is the philosophy forum! Once entered a philosophical discussion, retraction is not allowed. Philosophical discussions end when:

• the discourse participants agree (but then comes a third one who does not agree, and...)
• at least one of the discourse participants dies (ideally both at the same time during the discussion)
• at least one of the discourse participants is insulted so much by the other one that they will never talk to each other again.

Lol. Quite right. Well done!

IIRC, you’re more of a compatibilist. Apologies if that’s not correct. I’m not intentionally misrepresenting you. I’m also still acquainting myself with the language and various “tribes” involved in these freewill discussions.
 

Regardless of what you do call yourself, it seems I’m more aligned with the Consequence Argument, at least so far as I understand it today. Assuming that determinism is true, it states that:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

That resonates with me and seems to defend against the compatibalist stance most effectively. 

[Eise]

2 hours ago, iNow said:

IRC, you’re more of a compatibilist. Apologies if that’s not correct.

No, that is completely correct. One could even say (I don't think this is a usual concept, but hey!) I am a 'hard compatibilist'. Stated in one simple sentence: without sufficient determinism free will is impossible.

The consequence argument seems to be very in your line, yes. 

My problem with it is that it thinks in absolutes. Something is in control or it is not. If it in itself is controlled by something else, then it is not in control. But this makes the way we normally use the concept of control useless. Say, you drive in your car, and your crash into a streetlight (and you survive). You will be fined for not controlling your car. Do you think the police or judge will be convinced by your argument that you are not in control anyway, so there is no difference?

The problem still is that you, and the consequence argument, look for free will in physical reality, as an extra component which is causally effective, but is not caused in itself. No, it pops up in the discourse that we use daily, where we use concepts as 'promise', 'law', 'marriage', 'obligation', and especially, 'actions', 'reasons', 'meaning', 'coercing'. You won't find any of these concepts materialised in the brain as things. 'You' is also not a thing found in the brain.

Free will emerges from the same underlying processes as above concepts of 'actions', 'reasons', 'meaning', and 'coercing'. If there are reasons and actions, then we can apply the concept of free will: if you act according your own reasons, it was a free free action. If your action was coerced, it was not.If a person more or less consistently is able to act freely, he has free will. 

Above also means that the concept of free will does not even apply to physical things, because they do not act after deliberation on their reasons. So it makes no sense either to say that things have no free will: they have no will at all, so the adjectives 'free' or 'coerced' do not describe anything about these physical things. (You know, from this funny way of thinking raises questions, as we had on the forum here too, like 'how do the laws of nature force objects to behave as they describe?'. Sorry, that 'force' does not belong to the physical discourse. With your position about free will it is just the opposite. You treat 'free will' as something physical but that is just the same kind of category error.)

 

 

Edited December 4, 2019 by Eise

[iNow]

1 hour ago, Eise said:

Say, you drive in your car, and your crash into a streetlight (and you survive). You will be fined for not controlling your car. Do you think the police or judge will be convinced by your argument that you are not in control anyway, so there is no difference?

Unfortunately, I don't generally find the police or justice system in general care very much about the truth of how our brains and bodies operate. Whether or not judges and cops are convinced or care is ultimately irrelevant to the validity of my core position.

1 hour ago, Eise said:

it pops up in the discourse that we use daily, where we use concepts as 'promise', 'law', 'marriage', 'obligation', and especially, 'actions', 'reasons', 'meaning', 'coercing'. You won't find any of these concepts materialised in the brain as things. 'You' is also not a thing found in the brain.

Understood, and part of the problem here is that our language and daily usage of concepts has not yet caught up to what we've learned about our neurobiology in these last few decades.

In much the same way, I still crave fats and salt and candy and juicy burgers even though the science of the last century has confirmed they're bad for my health. The fact that I still crave them is irrelevant to whether or not they're good for me, in much the same way that the downstream societal implications of my stance are irrelevant to it's validity.

Anyway, as we usually find in these exchanges, we just come at this with a different view and use slightly different definitions. Perhaps if we applied an electric current to specific parts of my brain or surgically removed other parts then maybe I'd be more likely to align with your view on this... but absent that, I seem to lack the choice or will to be able to do so.  Cheers.

[Eise]

15 hours ago, iNow said:

Unfortunately, I don't generally find the police or justice system in general care very much about the truth of how our brains and bodies operate. Whether or not judges and cops are convinced or care is ultimately irrelevant to the validity of my core position.

Yes and no. You have evaded my question, by heaving it to the 'general case'. I ask it a bit more pointedly: is there, according to you,  a difference between you, controlling your car, and you, not controlling your car, and therefore have an accident? If yes, what is the difference?

15 hours ago, iNow said:

Understood, and part of the problem here is that our language and daily usage of concepts has not yet caught up to what we've learned about our neurobiology in these last few decades.

Understood, and part of the problem here is that the language of neurobiology and so called scientific usage of concepts has not yet caught up to what we've learned in philosophy about free will in these last few decades. 😉. You see, such arguments do not work very well.

I see your point that we should not wag the dog. But that is not exactly the way I am arguing.

Say you go into a restaurant, and order an expensive tenderloin. After 10 minutes you want to leave, and the waiter stops you, and says 'Hey, the meal is nearly ready, you must pay'. You say 'Sorry, it is my brain, I cannot help it, I am determined, and my brain just changed my mind. You cannot blame me for that'.

First question: is your statement neurologically seen, correct? Secondly, if you were the waiter, would you accept such an argument?

Next day, you go to the same restaurant, and order the same expensive tenderloin. But the waiter says, 'no way, get out of my restaurant'. You say: 'Sorry I am not in control of my brain, I can't help it, you cannot punish me for that.' The waiter, in the meantime has refreshed his neurological knowledge, agrees you cannot help it, so he should not punish you by throwing you out of the restaurant, and accepts your order. After 10 minutes you leave again.

Do you see that it simply does not work that way? You cannot avoid to be made responsible for your actions on basis of 'I am not in control'. If you would do that consistently, you would find yourself, well, maybe even in a neurological clinic...

As said, the concept of free will is meaningful (that means it applies only) in a discourse where things like promises, responsibility, actions, reasons, etc also have meaning. 'Free will' does not apply on the level of neurons. Neurons are free, nor not free. The same way as you cannot speak of the colour of a single electron. It makes no sense to say that an electron is not white. It is a category error.

15 hours ago, iNow said:

Anyway, as we usually find in these exchanges, we just come at this with a different view and use slightly different definitions.

Yes, but. Some definitions are useful, and others aren't. Defining a free action as an uncaused action just makes no sense, as with its counterpart, a coerced action.

Let's do a speculation: imagine a much more advanced level of neurological knowledge. Neuroscientists can exactly trace what happens in the brain when a person acts. The difference between a free and a coerced action would be that in the first case just before the action the reward system of the brain is activated and is triggered by it, in the second case the circuits responsible for fear are activated, and the action is triggered by this 'fear system'. (I assume that this is highly simplified, but I hope you get the point.)

Both actions are physically determined, but in different ways. The 'free' or 'coerced' aspect of the action does not lie in 'being determined or not' but in the way how they are determined.

 

Edited December 5, 2019 by Eise

[MonDie]

I have actually arrived at an even more interesting issue, that a self-ingratiating tendency can warp a person's reality in ways that may go uncorrected.  The person with impulse control problems recognizes the failure afterward, but some self-ingratiating tendencies might correct themselves with a much larger delay, or never.  The result is sustained self-fulfilling expectations and self-fulfilling perceptions/investigations/interactions that resemble an economic bubble except that the purchased is a perception of reality rather than a real thing.  These what I'll call self-serving (bias) narrative bubbles might be more difficult to correct if there is no standardize measure of worth like the standardization of economic value.  This is a problem because some people actually do profit from an economic bubble if they sell their stock sooner, and some people might profit from these narrative bubbles too.  Ironically, these bubbles might actually be preying on pro-nepotistic processes that might otherwise promote positive family relations, and doing it in a way that temporarily exacerbates the negative side-effects of narcissistic, self-esteem-based reward systems.  If the repetitions of the pattern are not recognizable, we might be in for a round of these bubbles.  The good part is that the bubble depends on wide-spread participation to create a more satisfying illusion of reality.  If the process of awakening is accelerated, a domino effect could result.

December 14th 1:50 PM CST