Atomic Politics, 60 Years Later

[Pangloss]

As we solemnly note the passing of the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, I noticed that the evil empire specter was raised again by the left, and the deceptive spin about necessity was perpetuated by the right. (An interesting case of pole reversal, by the way, since Truman was a Democrat.)

 

While both sides have some good points here and there, I think it's sad that we continue to beat ourselves up about Hiroshima. IMO, what's done is done.

 

Consider:

 

- The moral decision to bomb civilians in that war was done years before, and every air power in that war committed that same atrocity. They were all "keeping up with the Joneses". Whether you blame the British, the Germans, or the Americans, what really is the point in the end? Don't we all already agree that civilian bombing was a morally reprehensible aspect of that war?

 

- While the number of "lives saved" may not have been as high as many put it, the decision, given the context of civilian bombing that already existed in the war, is an obvious one no matter how many lives were saved. (Note I'm not saying correct, I'm saying obvious. Again, the point being that we shouldn't keep beating ourselves up over this.)

 

- The issue of "we must remember history in order not to repeat it" is preserved regardless of whether we issue a national self-flaggelation annually. We can see the images and recognize the tragedy without broaching the subject of blame. This does have value -- nobody wants to see the event repeated. It almost doesn't matter what the causes were. What matters is that the tragedy not happen again. Whether, to you, that means "avoid war at all costs", or "war only as a last result", is really a personal decision, and has nothing to do with Hiroshima. (And can't we all agree that it's morally reprehensible to SPIN Hiroshima for political gain?)

 

 

 

(As a side note, I think the idiot "Americans" who stand at Hiroshima holding apology banners should be forced to ride the London subway wearing inappropriate clothing with loose wires sticking out of their shirts. That way they'll get a first-hand experience with how useful and appropriate that kind of apology is.)

[Pangloss]

Just to expand on this a bit, there was a fascinating guest editorial in today's New York Times by a 39-year-old Japanese man that was very different from the usual sort of thing you hear on this anniversary. The full story can be found here, but it's registration-required, so here are a couple of quotes I found particularly interesting:

 

WHEN people ask my thoughts on the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, I always feel uncomfortable. As a Japanese, I know how I'm supposed to respond: with sadness, regret and perhaps anger. But invariably I try to dodge the issue, or to reply as neutrally as possible.

 

That's because, at bottom, the bombings don't really matter to me or, for that matter, to most Japanese of my generation. My peers and I have little hatred or blame in our hearts for the Americans; the horrors of that war and its nuclear evils feel distant, even foreign. Instead, the bombs are simply the flashpoint marking the discontinuity that characterized the cultural world we grew up in.

 

My mother used to talk about the American occupation of our hometown in northern Japan when she was a child. Our house, the largest in the area, was designated to be the Americans' local headquarters. When the soldiers arrived, my great-grandmother, nearly blind at the time, was head of the household, my grandfather having died during the war.

 

My great-grandmother and my grandmother faced the occupiers alone, having ordered the children to hide. The Japanese had been warned that the invading barbarians would rape and pillage. My great-grandmother, a battle-scarred early feminist, hissed, "Get your filthy barbarian shoes off of my floor!" The interpreter refused to interpret. The officer in command insisted. Upon hearing the translation from the red-faced interpreter, the officer sat on the floor and removed his boots, instructing his men to do the same. He apologized to my great-grandmother and grandmother.

 

It was a startling tipping-point experience for them, as the last bit of brainwashing that began with "we won't lose the war" and ended with "the barbarians will rape and kill you" collapsed.

 

Just one year later my uncle sailed to the United States to live in a Japanese ghetto in Chicago and work in a Y.M.C.A. Eventually his strivings led him to become the dean of the University of Detroit Business School. My mother followed my uncle, making the United States her base.

 

To be sure, the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still plays a part in the imagery of popular culture. But more meaningful references to Japan's nuclear past, like those in the story of Godzilla (awakened from his slumber by American atomic tests) or the cartoonist Keiji Nakazawa's best-selling series about a Hiroshima survivor, have morphed into the cultural equivalent of elevator music.

 

For my generation, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the war in general now represent the equivalent of a cultural "game over" or "reset" button. Through a combination of conscious policy and unconscious culture, the painful memories and images of the war have lost their context, surfacing only as twisted echoes in our subculture. The result, for better and worse, is that, 60 years after Hiroshima, we dwell more on the future than the past.

 

Fascinating stuff. The rest is well worth reading too. Check it out.

[Pangloss]

Just to kinda spur the discussion a bit, let me show you a bit of text that a far-left (but well-meaning) friend of mine sent me recently on this issue:

 

Historians and military enthusiasts immediately discuss the savings of lives because we (US and Allies) did not need to invade (100,000 casualties predicted). I've not come across historians discussing what would have happened if we had held tight and continued firebombing Japan for another month or two. Would they have capitulated without further major land or sea battles???

 

Anyone want to point out the rather obvious logical flaw in this reasoning?

[Thomas Kirby]

With your comments against Americans who apologize for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, you have already overloaded this discussion. It's a slightly fancier way of saying that they should be shot in a horrible manner. What are you trying to say? Are you trying to say that people should be shot to death for thinking that those bombings were war crimes and acting on those opinions?

 

The biggest tragedy of such bombings is the fact that they prove that we chose three times not to take the high road. I say three times because we did it to Dresden too, with even more casualties even though the bombing was not atomic. If you ask me, and I'm going to tell you whether you ask me or not, it would have been a lot more humiliating to the enemy to show them that we were better than they were than it was to show them that we would choose to be more evil than they were, more deserving of contempt, and that we could get away with murder.

 

We neglect to consider the kind of behavior that we want others to emulate. We have validated the bombing of civilian targets as normal in the course of war, in spite of agreements and declarations to the contrary. It also wasn't long after declarations against bombing nuclear reactors that the U.S. and Israel went around bombing every one of them that they could excuse. Do we mean anything we say? Do we want everyone wanting to do these things to us and each other? We have to set an example.

 

I realize that there is heavy contempt against people who try to take the high road. That's part of the problem.

 

(edited in a bit later)

OK, let me reverse myself a bit on this. Pangloss, your comment about riding the subways was way too easy to misinterpret, and I had to try several times to catch on to what you were saying. I still can't agree that the apologies have no value. If the police who shot the bombing suspect apologized it would be one helpful sign that they weren't going to do it again. A real apology acknowledges that the offending party did wrong and it includes an implicit promise to not do it again, or make ones best effort. Thus I apologize for the harshness of my tone and promise to do my best not to do it again. At least here we are fighting using words instead of fists, rocks, or firearms.

[DV8 2XL]

The moral decision to bomb civilians in that war was done years before, and every air power in that war committed that same atrocity. They were all "keeping up with the Joneses". Whether you blame the British, the Germans, or the Americans, what really is the point in the end? Don't we all already agree that civilian bombing was a morally reprehensible aspect of that war?

 

The biggest tragedy of such bombings is the fact that they prove that we chose three times not to take the high road. I say three times because we did it to Dresden too, with even more casualties even though the bombing was not atomic. If you ask me, and I'm going to tell you whether you ask me or not, it would have been a lot more humiliating to the enemy to show them that we were better than they were than it was to show them that we would choose to be more evil than they were, more deserving of contempt, and that we could get away with murder.

 

Are we making the error of judging the people that made those decisions in the Nineteen Forties by to-days standards?

[john5746]

I brought up this topic a year ago. While in japan, some japanese were drawing a map of Japan and they pointed out Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think they were expecting a response of remorse from me. I didn't express this feeling. I felt at the time that the US was justified in dropping the bombs.

 

Since then, especially after 9/11, I just can't condemn one without condeming them both. We now know that the Japanese were already considering surrender at Potsdam. They wanted their emperor to remain in power. Something we allowed after dropping the bombs anyway. The main reason for dropping the bombs was to quell Soviet influence in Asia and possibly keep it at bay in Europe.

 

If I were in the same situation today, I would express regret for the bombings. America was the good guy in the War and showed that during the occupation. It is over, but just as the Japanese should remember the atrocities in China and the Germans should remember the Holocaust, we also should remember those bombings.

[Thomas Kirby]

Are we making the error of judging the people that made those decisions in the Nineteen Forties by to-days standards?

 

What were their own standards supposed to be?

[Pangloss]

I suppose that's a fair point, Thomas, but in this case the people who are apologizing aren't the people who did it. So their apology also has no value for that reason. In fact, by "apologizing", they're actually saying something else entirely -- something that nobody who was alive on August 6th, 1945, anywhere on the entire planet, could have possibly understood, because the socio-political context for their apology did not yet exist.

 

But this is a minor point, really. I hope I haven't derailed this thread with my personal indulgence about the apologizers. Let me get back to the main discussion at hand with your quote here:

 

The biggest tragedy of such bombings is the fact that they prove that we chose three times not to take the high road. I say three times because we did it to Dresden too, with even more casualties even though the bombing was not atomic. If you ask me, and I'm going to tell you whether you ask me or not, it would have been a lot more humiliating to the enemy to show them that we were better than they were than it was to show them that we would choose to be more evil than they were, more deserving of contempt, and that we could get away with murder.

 

I agree, and in my opinion that was well said. You're absolutely right -- we didn't take the high road. We allowed ourselves to be dragged down. If I may, for a moment, quote one of my personal heros:

 

Man is man because he is free to operate within the framework of his destiny. He is free to deliberate, to make decisions, and to choose between alternatives. He is distinguished from animals by his freedom to do evil or to do good and to walk the high road of beauty or tread the low road of ugly degeneracy.

 

Martin Luther King, Jr., The Measures of Man, 1959.

 

Yes, we chose the low road. So often the people who had to deal with WW2 are lionized, as if they were some kind of saints. I believe that their true heroship lies in the fact that they were NOT perfect. That they DID make mistakes. And therefore the true failure on our part would be to not learn from them.

 

So we agree on this point.

 

We have validated the bombing of civilian targets as normal in the course of war, in spite of agreements and declarations to the contrary. It also wasn't long after declarations against bombing nuclear reactors that the U.S. and Israel went around bombing every one of them that they could excuse. Do we mean anything we say? Do we want everyone wanting to do these things to us and each other? We have to set an example.

 

These are valid questions, but one of the points I'm trying to make here is that this has nothing to do with Hiroshima. You're talking about a socio-political context that did not exist at that time, and I feel that it does those people a disservice to try to spin what happened to them for political gain.

[DV8 2XL]

Different from ours; colonialism was in full swing, disenfranchisement of groups of citizens based on the amount of melanin in their skin. The Allies had a few skeletons in their closets too. I'm not saying that it was hypocritical of them to hold the Axis powers responsible for their actions, or that the actions of the West licensed death-camps and the like, but to apologize now for the actions that were taken by people that are two, sometimes three generations removed from us....

[Pangloss]

As another side note, I haven't read it, but I'm told that "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire", by Richard B. Frank takes a really interesting look at these very issues. It's a recent book, I believe originally published in 1999.

 

The comments from readers on the Amazon page are fascinating.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0141001461/qid=1123384487/sr=8-3/ref=pd_bbs_sbs_3/103-4951205-6402255?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

 

Come to think on it, Chapel's "Before the Bomb" covers similar ground in a different way, looking at the public debate that took place in the American public in 1945 about how best to end the war. Alas, I've not read this one either, but I've heard it's interesting.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0813119871/qid=1123384912/sr=1-2/ref=sr_1_2/103-4951205-6402255?v=glance&s=books

[JohnB]

While the number of "lives saved" may not have been as high as many put it

I read a number of years ago the estimated Allied casualties from the invasion of Japan would be some 800,000 in the first wave. It was estimated that the invasion would take about 2 years and cost some 10-15 million lives.

I agree, and in my opinion that was well said. You're absolutely right -- we didn't take the high road. We allowed ourselves to be dragged down.

To put it gently, bulldust. The job of a Commanding General during conflict is to end the war victoriously for his side. To do this he must inflict maximum casualties to the enemy with minimum casualties to his own. He must destroy the enemies ability to wage war. Don't like it? Tough, that is how the game must be played if you intend to win.

 

With all due respect, I suggest you ask some people who were bloody there what they think of the idea of taking the "high road" and having the war drag on for an extra year or two.

If you ask me, .... it would have been a lot more humiliating to the enemy to show them that we were better than they were

You are assuming a cultural relevence that didn't exist. In their eyes, it would not have shown we were better, it would have demonstrated we were weaker. That we did not have the will to do what must be done to win the war.

 

I believe in the US you call this sort of discussion "armchair quarterbacking"? We just ask if the view is good from the cheap seats.

[Pangloss]

I read a number of years ago the estimated Allied casualties from the invasion of Japan would be some 800,000 in the first wave. It was estimated that the invasion would take about 2 years and cost some 10-15 million lives.

 

These figures have been disputed over the years, to varying degrees, but I can't say that you're wrong (and in fact I tend to agree with you). The other apsect of this that should be considered is that the Japanese might have been brought to surrender by other means, such as continued firebombing.

 

But my reaction to that is that it doesn't really matter if you die in a firebombing or an atomic explosion -- what's the difference? And it seems unlikely that the Japanese would have surrendered under the situation of continued firebombing. They were going to fight to the last man, and only the shock of the quickness and totality of the single-explosion atomic bombs brought them around.

 

 

To put it gently, bulldust. The job of a Commanding General during conflict is to end the war victoriously for his side. To do this he must inflict maximum casualties to the enemy with minimum casualties to his own. He must destroy the enemies ability to wage war. Don't like it? Tough, that is how the game must be played if you intend to win.

 

But in fact that's not actually how the game is played anymore.

 

We could have nuked (or otherwise flattened) cities in Iraq and Afghanistan now, just as we nuked our enemy in 1945. We chose not to, at a cost of 1500 American lives (so far), because we universally agreed, without even having to have a debate about the issue, that it would be a moral wrong.

 

We chose differently in WW2. Beginning in the Battle of Britain, the decision was made on both sides that that was going to be a "total war", involving every segment of the population, including civilian. Cities were bombed for the specific purpose of "destroying their willingness to wage war" (Churchill?).

 

We don't do that anymore.

 

 

With all due respect, I suggest you ask some people who were bloody there what they think of the idea of taking the "high road" and having the war drag on for an extra year or two.

 

In my case that means something very personal -- the likely death of my grandfather in a Japanese prison camp in the Philippines, and not having him around when I was growing up. As you can see, I have, in fact, given thought to the implications of not using the atomic bomb.

 

So, "with all due respect", let's hold off on the judgemental rhetoric. This is a respectful discussion.

 

 

In their eyes, it would not have shown we were better, it would have demonstrated we were weaker. That we did not have the will to do what must be done to win the war.

 

I agree.

 

 

I believe in the US you call this sort of discussion "armchair quarterbacking"? We just ask if the view is good from the cheap seats.

 

I could ask you the same question -- how's your view from the cheap seats? Like I said, this is a respectful discussion. If you're not interested, the door's right over there.

[JohnB]

Firstly, let me apologise for the "cheap seats" comment. I'm crook at the moment and I'm afraid "fingers were engaged before brain was in gear".

 

Secondly, I agree with about the fire bombing, I don't think it would have had as much effect. I seem to remember that some 200,000 died in the first raid on Tokyo, so if you add up the number of cities that would have had to burn, the death toll would have been horrendous.

 

Add to that that while this wearing down was going on, fighting was continuing on the various islands. An extra six months of jungle warfare would have killed many Allied and Japanese troops needlessly.

 

You realise the option of blockading the Japanese Isalands was also considered? Starving them into submission. This was veiwed as too horrible to really contemplate.

But in fact that's not actually how the game is played anymore.

Yes it is. Look carefully at what I said. "The enemies ability to wage war." The peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq were never the "enemy". The enemy in both these cases were the ruling regimes, not the peoples of those two nations, hence waging war on the people would be generally counterproductive. The average Iraqi was not willing to support the regime, this being the case then attacking the general populace would have brought people out to defend their homes and families.

 

WW2 was nation against nation, people against people, a different war which required different tactics.

We don't do that anymore.

So the USA has no nuclear warheads aimed at any city on the planet? I don't think so. If it came down to it, we do do that. Any other idea is a fantasy.

 

If your Grandfather was a prisoner then I truly feel for him. Please remember that we were fighting the Japs long before the yanks got their act together. The whole thing is very personal for many Australians. You only mention one family member, many of us lost more than that to the Pacific War. Even the survivors are changed.

[Pangloss]

I can respect that interpretation. What you see as examples of how we're doing the same thing today, I see as very dramatic differences as a result of how those decisions were made in WW2. But that's okay, that's how it goes in debate sometimes. I see a lot of value in your comments, even though I disagree with them, and I appreciate you posting them.

[JohnB]

I was looking for figures for Olympic and Downfall, there is some very interesting reading out there.

 

Anyway I came across this article by Richard B. Frank.

 

Not really germane to the debate but if his book is as interesting, then it would be a good read.

[atinymonkey]

I suppose that, despite the reasons and the debate, 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing is something that every person should feel guilty about. It may be that the US has a particular amount of national self-flagellation, but I doubt that they stand alone on that aspect. Anything that encourages a nation to think as individuals about other individuals in foreign lands and the impact of war, can't be a bad thing. At least it keep's us distant from the old lie 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori'.

[Pangloss]

Good post, tiny. Really made me think.

 

 

 

(My personal favorite Horace quote, by the way, is:

"When discord dreadful bursts her brazen bars,

And shatters locks to thunder forth her wars.")

[Pangloss]

Anyway I came across this article by Richard B. Frank.

 

Thanks for the link' date=' yeah I thought the article was really interesting as well. Here are a couple of particularly noteworthy quotes:

 

 

 

The critics share three fundamental premises. The first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knew that Japan was about to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation.

 

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

 

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.