Current state of the debate between free will and determinism in philosophy and neuroscience

[iNow]

2 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

What do you mean, "our" actions? What is this "our"?

Our = The wet meat computer bag of chemicals generally referred to as an “individual” or “human” in the English language… by saying “our” that meant more than one… a larger set of “individuals” or group of “humans” numbering greater than one.

Has this sufficiently clarified, or shall I use fat crayons and construction paper to draw you a picture?

[Eise]

Remarks on @iNow's summary.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

• Our actions have an impact on the world around us

Right, I argued for that too. It already means, that if we stand for a decision or choice, and that my action will be a determining factor of my future, I better think well about the consequences of my possible actions and how they fit to my interests.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

• Our thoughts and decisions appear to be formed prior to reaching the parts of our minds generally associated with self and awareness and consciousness

That is of no importance for my concept of free will. So you are attacking the position that consciousness is the primary cause of an action, i.e. you are attacking the concept of 'libertarian free will'.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

• Those decisions and thoughts are all driven by physical and biochemical processes (there is no magic meta physical  super natural spirit or "specialness" to conscious experience... it's just another chemical reaction across our nervous system)

'Driven'? You mean 'caused', or what? There is a subtlety here: there is no causal relationship between physical and biochemical processes and our mental phenomena. Mental phenomena supervene on these physical and biochemical processes. So yes, mental phenomena are determined, because the processes they are based on are deterministic. But they do not cause mental phenomena.

Compare with a book: it is obvious that a book, without its physical existence, cannot exist. It needs paper and ink. But it does not follow that a book is 'just paper with ink' (compare your 'meat bags'). Even stronger, while it is true that books cannot exist without their physical substrate, the essence of the book is its meaningful contents. And these are not dependent on paper and ink: you can read a book on a monitor, you can have it on an ebook reader, you can even listen to it as audio book (or worse, a human reading it to you). But thinking about how to act, we also cannot do without meaning. It arises in the values that flow into my decision how to act.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

• The evidence further suggests that our sense of consciousness and freedom to choose are themselves just a narrative we create and impose AFTER the decision event already occurred

The importance of such narratives is that we identify with our actions: we recognise them as our actions. In some cases we don't identify with our actions: e.g. when I fall to the ground because I stumbled over a stone (this one should not be called an action at all, as there is no intention whatsoever involved). Or if I am coerced to do something: as I did not act according my own motivations, but those of somebody else's, I do not identify with them.

18 hours ago, iNow said:

• This really changes nothing about the way we exist since it's always been this way, even if it understandably feels a bit weird and scary when first encountered

Now this could have been a remark of a compatibilist. If it really changes nothing in our existence, we still can use the idea of free will in our daily life. We just get rid of its (meta)physical and ideological ballast. So for me it is not understandable why you stick to an outdated, ideological, inconsistent concept of free will:

18 hours ago, iNow said:

Some people accept all of those things including the illusion, but state we DO have free will since our entire being is still acting according to those biochemical reactions. I personally find that unsatisfying given my understanding of the concept of freedom. 

We had that already before: you are beating a dead horse. What is the fun in giving another proof that 1 does not equal 3? It is inconsistent, so not worth the effort. More important is to convince people that the idea of libertarian free will is inconsistent, and instead give a proper analysis of our behaviour which we call 'free'.

10 hours ago, martillo said:

I thought in an example showing volition with enough "elbow room" proving indeterminism in the future. A sad story.

You can give examples as much as you want. But the only thing you show, is that the future depends on the actions we decide/choose for. The 'elbow room' lies in the evaluating of the reasons to act in certain ways, in the availability of real options (beaming the survivors out of the jungle pity enough was no option). But this evaluating can be just as well a determined process. For what I mean with real options, see here:

PS Why do we hear nothing anymore from you, @Anirudh Dabas? You started the discussion.

Edited November 8, 2023 by Eise

[studiot]

On a slightly different tack here is an interesting modern pdf about this issue, from a fractal invariant maths and a neuroscience point of view, from Oxford university.

 

Quote

https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article/33/8/4574/6713293

 

A third factor hindering a mechanistic understanding of brain function is rooted in our failure to construct computational models that reproduce the principles employed by the brain

 

[iNow]

11 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

just admit you're pushing epiphenominalism and call it a day.

I’ll ask now for a 3rd time this question you’ve already evaded twice: If not physical and biochemical processes, what other variable do you believe leads to cognition and mentation?

4 hours ago, Eise said:

there is no causal relationship between physical and biochemical processes and our mental phenomena.

Bullshit

[Eise]

1 minute ago, iNow said:

Bullshit

Good argument. 

Is there a causal relationship between the pixels of a monitor and the text you are reading on that monitor?

[studiot]

24 minutes ago, Eise said:

Is there a causal relationship between the pixels of a monitor and the text you are reading on that monitor?

Interesting question +1

 

This is also an interesting question +1

28 minutes ago, iNow said:

I’ll ask now for a 3rd time this question you’ve already evaded twice: If not physical and biochemical processes, what other variable do you believe leads to cognition and mentation?

I would say the mathematics of continued products.

[iNow]

33 minutes ago, Eise said:

Good argument. 

It wasn’t an argument, but a statement of what is obvious in my own mind. It was, however, needlessly harsh given my respect for and appreciation of you. I went for brevity and clarity instead of social grace and empathy. Mea culpa. 

Said another way: I find your comment that “there is no causal relationship between physical and biochemical processes and our mental phenomenon” to be absurd on its face, but that likely means I’m not comprehending your position accurately.

Will you please elaborate on your thinking here? 

42 minutes ago, Eise said:

Good argument. 

Is there a causal relationship between the pixels of a monitor and the text you are reading on that monitor?

The pixels shine light of various frequencies. That light is emitted from the screen and travels outward to the receiver.

The receptors in our eyes, specifically the retina, get impacted by that light and initiate a chemo-electric neural cascade down the optic nerve into our brain based on the frequency and intensity of that light, with most of the signal going specifically to the occipital cortex toward the rear of our skull. 

A series of other brain regions then awaken from their dormancy and activate to do pattern recognition and assign an emotional valence (is this visual stimulus worthy of fear, is this positive, negative, or neutral, etc.), and the storytelling parts of our brain then begin crafting a narrative to explain to ourselves the image in context of our past experiences with it. We try to make sense of it.

If the stimulus is novel, we tend to invent fresh new narratives that align with our existing model of the world and feel like a best fit, despite possibility of this being entirely fiction. We make a best guess. If it’s a familiar stimulus, we tend to seek out any marginal differences between the newly incoming image and our past experiences to update our existing mental models for enhanced accuracy.

After all of these processes have occurred, we then begin to formulate a response (even if that response is simply to continue reading). It happens quite rapidly, but there is generally a few hundred millisecond difference that is measurable between these steps and brain regions and they all occur prior to arriving to the parts of our minds associated with conscious awareness.

So, there’s absolutely a close link between the stimulus (the pixels on the screen) and the response (the reading and comprehension), but whether or not one labels that a “causal relationship” depends entirely on the definition of causal being applied. 

Edited November 8, 2023 by iNow

[Eise]

@iNow No, it is not obvious. And it really seems you have some trouble understanding me here. (Usually you haven't). And I am sorry you wrote such a long exposé on something I did not mean. I should have omitted 'you are reading'. 

My point is the relationship between the pixels and the text. 

Here I have some pixels, greatly enlarged:

Just some colours.

In reality it is the cross point of the 'x' in the word 'text' above:

(Yes, I have anti-aliasing turned on, therefore these colours).

Now: is the word 'text' caused by the pixels, or is the word just the pixels seen from a distance? And that is the point I am making: our mental phenomena are the physical and biochemical processes, just observed from a very different perspective.

By assuming that physical and biochemical processes cause mental phenomena, you are indeed entering the arena of epiphenomalism, and that is a dead end. It even leads to a form of dualism. (No I am not AIkonoklazt. But he is right on this point. Pity that he is not more polite.)

 

[iNow]

The word “text” is a narrative we apply after receiving the photons. It is not something inherent in the pixels. 

50 minutes ago, Eise said:

entering the arena of epiphenomalism, and that is a dead end

If physical and biochemical processes are not responsible for cognition and mentation, then what other variables are you suggesting are?

[Anirudh Dabas]

  

10 hours ago, Eise said:

PS Why do we hear nothing anymore from you, @Anirudh Dabas? You started the discussion.

I encountered a situation where I was unexpectedly blacklisted by the site, receiving an error message stating, "*** Forbidden. Sender blacklisted.***" This unfortunate occurrence hindered my involvement in the exchanges that I've come to value on this thread.

Anyways,

10 hours ago, Eise said:

On 11/7/2023 at 8:05 PM, iNow said:

• Those decisions and thoughts are all driven by physical and biochemical processes (there is no magic meta physical  super natural spirit or "specialness" to conscious experience... it's just another chemical reaction across our nervous system)

'Driven'? You mean 'caused', or what? There is a subtlety here: there is no causal relationship between physical and biochemical processes and our mental phenomena. Mental phenomena supervene on these physical and biochemical processes. So yes, mental phenomena are determined, because the processes they are based on are deterministic. But they do not cause mental phenomena.

Compare with a book: it is obvious that a book, without its physical existence, cannot exist. It needs paper and ink. But it does not follow that a book is 'just paper with ink' (compare your 'meat bags'). Even stronger, while it is true that books cannot exist without their physical substrate, the essence of the book is its meaningful contents. And these are not dependent on paper and ink: you can read a book on a monitor, you can have it on an ebook reader, you can even listen to it as audio book (or worse, a human reading it to you). But thinking about how to act, we also cannot do without meaning. It arises in the values that flow into my decision how to act.

I would like to offer a different perspective on the relationship between physical processes and mental phenomena, diverging from the notion that mental phenomena are solely supervening on physical and biochemical processes without being directly driven by them.

While I appreciate the distinction drawn between physical processes and mental phenomena, the assertion that mental phenomena do not directly arise from physical and biochemical processes overlooks the intricate connection between our physiology and our cognitive experiences.

The prevailing scientific understanding underscores the significant role of physical and biochemical processes in shaping our thoughts, decisions, and conscious experiences. Neuroscientific research consistently indicates that mental activities, thoughts, and decisions correspond to specific neural activities and biochemical interactions within the brain.

Contrary to the analogy of a book, where its essence is distinct from its physical existence, in the case of conscious experiences and decision-making, the essence is intricately linked to the physical processes occurring in our nervous system. These physical processes are the very substrate from which mental phenomena emerge, shaping our values, perceptions, and decisions.

Acknowledging the complexity of conscious experiences does not necessitate a departure from the understanding that our mental phenomena are fundamentally driven by the underlying physical and biochemical processes in our nervous system. The emergent nature of consciousness does not imply a detachment from its physical basis; rather, it underscores the interdependence and intimate connection between the two.

Unlike a book where its essence, like its meaning, can be detached from its physical form, in our conscious experiences, the essence seems to be inseparable from the physical activities in our nervous system. It's not just a case of the mind being a separate entity from our physical selves; instead, our thoughts and decisions seem to emerge from the very workings of our brains.

It's not about downplaying the significance of our mental experiences, but rather recognizing that the core of our decision-making and consciousness is deeply connected to the biological and neural processes in our bodies.

The idea here isn't to dismiss the meaningful content of our thoughts or experiences, but to highlight that these experiences are deeply intertwined with the biochemical and neural activities in our brains.

 

10 hours ago, Eise said:

The importance of such narratives is that we identify with our actions: we recognise them as our actions. In some cases we don't identify with our actions: e.g. when I fall to the ground because I stumbled over a stone (this one should not be called an action at all, as there is no intention whatsoever involved). Or if I am coerced to do something: as I did not act according my own motivations, but those of somebody else's, I do not identify with them.

The idea that our consciousness and the stories we tell ourselves about our decisions come after the fact is pretty intriguing. It got me thinking about how we connect with our actions and why we sometimes identify with them, and sometimes not so much.

Think about it: when we act in line with our own wishes and motivations, it feels like we own those actions. But when something happens by chance, like tripping over a stone, it doesn't quite fit the bill as an action. It lacks that personal intention behind it, right?

It's interesting to consider that we often identify with actions that align with our intentions and motivations. When our actions are in line with our own impulses or desires, there's a strong sense of ownership and recognition. Conversely, instances where actions are purely accidental, lacking any intention, or forced by external influences can create a disconnection from identifying those actions as our own.

This brings into focus the distinction between intentional acts, chance events, and coerced actions. Stumbling over a stone, resulting in an unintentional fall, doesn't fit the mold of an action as it lacks intent. Similarly, when our actions are coerced or directed by external forces, they might not resonate with our personal motivations, leading to a lack of identification.

These reflections challenge the notion of what constitutes an action and how our narratives of identification are intricately linked with our intentions and motivations. It prompts us to examine the role of intentionality and personal agency in shaping our narratives and our sense of self.

10 hours ago, Eise said:

The evidence further suggests that our sense of consciousness and freedom to choose are themselves just a narrative we create and impose AFTER the decision event already occurred

The idea that our feeling of consciousness and the freedom to choose are just stories we tell ourselves after we've already made a decision is mind-boggling. It challenges the way we usually think about our actions and the role of our conscious minds in making choices.We often believe that we're in control, consciously making decisions as we go. But this take suggests that our brains might kick things into gear before we're even aware of it, almost like our decisions are made before we realize we've made them...It's like our conscious mind is playing catch-up, creating this narrative to explain what we've already done. Really does put a question mark on how much we truly control our choices and how much is shaped by processes we aren't even aware of.However, it's not all cut and dry. Even if our consciousness pieces the story together after the fact, it doesn't mean it's not important. It's like it might still have a say in how we interpret our actions, even if it doesn't call the shots on the decisions themselves.

This whole concept, unfortunately, pushes us to rethink the age-old idea of free will and what it means to be in control of our actions. 

The idea that our sense of consciousness and freedom to choose is merely a narrative constructed after a decision has been made challenges the traditional notion of consciousness driving our choices. While I somewhat agree, I believe it's essential to maintain a balanced perspective. It's possible that our consciousness and sense of agency, while influenced by unconscious processes, still play a vital role in our decision-making.

This concept raises intriguing questions about the nature of free will, prompting us to consider the interplay between our conscious experiences and the unconscious processes shaping our decisions. It poses a challenge in understanding the intricate relationship between our perceived freedom and the underlying subconscious mechanisms that influence our actions. In essence, while our consciousness might indeed construct a narrative post-decision, the full scope and influence of conscious awareness on our choices invites a deeper examination of the complexities of human decision-making and the nature of free will.

6 hours ago, iNow said:

If not physical and biochemical processes, what other variable do you believe leads to cognition and mentation?

I do, however, would like for somebody to address this.

Edited November 8, 2023 by Anirudh Dabas

[studiot]

4 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

  

I encountered a situation where I was unexpectedly blacklisted by the site, receiving an error message stating, "*** Forbidden. Sender blacklisted.***" This unfortunate occurrence hindered my involvement in the exchanges that I've come to value on this thread.

Anyways,

I would like to offer a different perspective on the relationship between physical processes and mental phenomena, diverging from the notion that mental phenomena are solely supervening on physical and biochemical processes without being directly driven by them.

While I appreciate the distinction drawn between physical processes and mental phenomena, the assertion that mental phenomena do not directly arise from physical and biochemical processes overlooks the intricate connection between our physiology and our cognitive experiences.

The prevailing scientific understanding underscores the significant role of physical and biochemical processes in shaping our thoughts, decisions, and conscious experiences. Neuroscientific research consistently indicates that mental activities, thoughts, and decisions correspond to specific neural activities and biochemical interactions within the brain.

Contrary to the analogy of a book, where its essence is distinct from its physical existence, in the case of conscious experiences and decision-making, the essence is intricately linked to the physical processes occurring in our nervous system. These physical processes are the very substrate from which mental phenomena emerge, shaping our values, perceptions, and decisions.

Acknowledging the complexity of conscious experiences does not necessitate a departure from the understanding that our mental phenomena are fundamentally driven by the underlying physical and biochemical processes in our nervous system. The emergent nature of consciousness does not imply a detachment from its physical basis; rather, it underscores the interdependence and intimate connection between the two.

Unlike a book where its essence, like its meaning, can be detached from its physical form, in our conscious experiences, the essence seems to be inseparable from the physical activities in our nervous system. It's not just a case of the mind being a separate entity from our physical selves; instead, our thoughts and decisions seem to emerge from the very workings of our brains.

It's not about downplaying the significance of our mental experiences, but rather recognizing that the core of our decision-making and consciousness is deeply connected to the biological and neural processes in our bodies.

The idea here isn't to dismiss the meaningful content of our thoughts or experiences, but to highlight that these experiences are deeply intertwined with the biochemical and neural activities in our brains.

 

The idea that our consciousness and the stories we tell ourselves about our decisions come after the fact is pretty intriguing. It got me thinking about how we connect with our actions and why we sometimes identify with them, and sometimes not so much.

Think about it: when we act in line with our own wishes and motivations, it feels like we own those actions. But when something happens by chance, like tripping over a stone, it doesn't quite fit the bill as an action. It lacks that personal intention behind it, right?

It's interesting to consider that we often identify with actions that align with our intentions and motivations. When our actions are in line with our own impulses or desires, there's a strong sense of ownership and recognition. Conversely, instances where actions are purely accidental, lacking any intention, or forced by external influences can create a disconnection from identifying those actions as our own.

This brings into focus the distinction between intentional acts, chance events, and coerced actions. Stumbling over a stone, resulting in an unintentional fall, doesn't fit the mold of an action as it lacks intent. Similarly, when our actions are coerced or directed by external forces, they might not resonate with our personal motivations, leading to a lack of identification.

These reflections challenge the notion of what constitutes an action and how our narratives of identification are intricately linked with our intentions and motivations. It prompts us to examine the role of intentionality and personal agency in shaping our narratives and our sense of self.

The idea that our feeling of consciousness and the freedom to choose are just stories we tell ourselves after we've already made a decision is mind-boggling. It challenges the way we usually think about our actions and the role of our conscious minds in making choices.We often believe that we're in control, consciously making decisions as we go. But this take suggests that our brains might kick things into gear before we're even aware of it, almost like our decisions are made before we realize we've made them...It's like our conscious mind is playing catch-up, creating this narrative to explain what we've already done. Really does put a question mark on how much we truly control our choices and how much is shaped by processes we aren't even aware of.However, it's not all cut and dry. Even if our consciousness pieces the story together after the fact, it doesn't mean it's not important. It's like it might still have a say in how we interpret our actions, even if it doesn't call the shots on the decisions themselves.

This whole concept, unfortunately, pushes us to rethink the age-old idea of free will and what it means to be in control of our actions. 

The idea that our sense of consciousness and freedom to choose is merely a narrative constructed after a decision has been made challenges the traditional notion of consciousness driving our choices. While I somewhat agree, I believe it's essential to maintain a balanced perspective. It's possible that our consciousness and sense of agency, while influenced by unconscious processes, still play a vital role in our decision-making.

This concept raises intriguing questions about the nature of free will, prompting us to consider the interplay between our conscious experiences and the unconscious processes shaping our decisions. It poses a challenge in understanding the intricate relationship between our perceived freedom and the underlying subconscious mechanisms that influence our actions. In essence, while our consciousness might indeed construct a narrative post-decision, the full scope and influence of conscious awareness on our choices invites a deeper examination of the complexities of human decision-making and the nature of free will.

I do, however, would like for somebody to address this.

You put a lot of effort into this reply to only two participants.

So how about you reply to some of the many other participants ?

 

Incidentally I thought this a good point

4 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

Think about it: when we act in line with our own wishes and motivations, it feels like we own those actions. But when something happens by chance, like tripping over a stone,

Though what do you mean about it not being an action ?

Also have you heard of reflexes and involuntary actions or the many action we carry out all the time without thinking about them at all, such as breathing and walking (can you normally feel the ground when you walk?)

[martillo]

6 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

11 hours ago, iNow said:

If not physical and biochemical processes, what other variable do you believe leads to cognition and mentation?

I do, however, would like for somebody to address this.

I would just comment that I don't know how words and images are actually stored in the brain and less know how the process of thinking with them takes place in the brain. As I have said, how actually the brain thinks is actually still a mystery for me.

Edited November 9, 2023 by martillo

[Eise]

15 hours ago, iNow said:

The word “text” is a narrative we apply after receiving the photons. It is not something inherent in the pixels. 

OK, that is not the point I was making: the point I was making is that there is no difference in the physics of what we observe: there is only a difference in how we look at the pixels. In this case from nearby vs from a distance. From nearby we see pixels; from a distance we see text (or should I say 'text'). But we are looking at exactly the same physical object.

16 hours ago, iNow said:

If physical and biochemical processes are not responsible for cognition and mentation, then what other variables are you suggesting are?

But they are! But again you are using a vague word, 'responsible'. (you used 'driven' before, also vague). What is this 'responsible'-relationship? You say it is causation, I say it is supervenience. So my answer to your question is simple: there are no other variables. But there are different ways we can look: from the low levels like atoms, molecules, and neurons; or at the higher level of persons, (true) beliefs, actions, motivations, (free) will etc. The latter we are using in day-to-day life, the former by neurologists, biologists etc.

[Anirudh Dabas]

9 hours ago, studiot said:

Incidentally I thought this a good point

13 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

Think about it: when we act in line with our own wishes and motivations, it feels like we own those actions. But when something happens by chance, like tripping over a stone,

Though what do you mean about it not being an action ?

Also have you heard of reflexes and involuntary actions or the many action we carry out all the time without thinking about them at all, such as breathing and walking (can you normally feel the ground when you walk?)

You are correct in pointing out that reflexes and involuntary actions are not typically considered "actions" in the sense we are discussing. These actions are triggered by physiological or external stimuli and do not involve conscious decision-making or intention.

When we say that tripping over a stone is not an "action," we are drawing a distinction between actions that are deliberate and motivated by our own intentions, and those that are involuntary or caused by external factors. In the case of stumbling over a stone, our fall is not a conscious decision; it is a result of our foot hitting the stone unexpectedly.

This distinction is important because it helps us to understand the role of intentionality in shaping our sense of self. When we take actions that align with our own desires and motivations, we feel more connected to ourselves and our actions. We feel a sense of ownership and agency over our behavior.

However, when our actions are involuntary or caused by external factors, we may feel less connected to them. We may question whether they are truly representative of who we are as individuals.

In the case of reflexes and involuntary actions, we should recognize that these actions are not necessarily indicative of our character or personality. They are simply physiological responses to stimuli or cues.

As for walking, yes, most people are able to walk without consciously thinking about each step they take. This is because walking is a complex motor skill that has been ingrained through years of practice. Our brains have developed automatic neural pathways that control the intricate movements required for walking.

However, this does not mean that we are not engaged in the act of walking. Our brains are constantly receiving feedback from our senses and making adjustments to our movements. We are still actively participating in the activity, even if we are not consciously thinking about it.

[Eise]

13 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

While I appreciate the distinction drawn between physical processes and mental phenomena, the assertion that mental phenomena do not directly arise from physical and biochemical processes overlooks the intricate connection between our physiology and our cognitive experiences.

That is an interesting point. Yes, that could be. Maybe for consciousness to arise, it is necessary that the processes are rooted in a specific physical substrate, e.g. electromagnetism. But that doesn't deny the idea of supervenience. It surely is not the case that everywhere where electromagnetism is involved, there is also consciousness. 

Edited November 9, 2023 by Eise
typo

[Anirudh Dabas]

  

8 minutes ago, Eise said:

16 hours ago, iNow said:

If physical and biochemical processes are not responsible for cognition and mentation, then what other variables are you suggesting are?

But they are! But again you are using a vague word, 'responsible'. (you used 'driven' before, also vague). What is this 'responsible'-relationship? You say it is causation, I say it is supervenience. So my answer to your question is simple: there are no other variables. But there are different ways we can look: from the low levels like atoms, molecules, and neurons; or at the higher level of persons, (true) beliefs, actions, motivations, (free) will etc. The latter we are using in day-to-day life, the former by neurologists, biologists etc.

By "responsible.", I think he meant to convey that physical and biochemical processes are the underlying mechanisms that give rise to cognition and mentation. However, I understand your point about the distinction between causation and supervenience.

Would it be right for me to put it simply as:

In the case of causation, one event (the physical or biochemical process) brings about another event (cognition or mentation). This is a direct, linear relationship.

In the case of supervenience, one event (the physical or biochemical process) is the foundation upon which another event (cognition or mentation) exists. However, the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process). Instead, the higher-level event emerges from the lower-level event in a more complex and nuanced way.

I agree that there are different ways to look at cognition and mentation. In everyday life, we tend to focus on the higher-level aspects, such as our beliefs, actions, motivations, and free will. However, neuroscientists and biologists study the lower-level aspects, such as the firing of neurons, the release of neurotransmitters, and the structure of the brain.

It is likely that the answer lies somewhere between causation and supervenience.

[Eise]

18 minutes ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

In the case of supervenience, one event (the physical or biochemical process) is the foundation upon which another event (cognition or mentation) exists. However, the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process). Instead, the higher-level event emerges from the lower-level event in a more complex and nuanced way.

Hmm, this might be confusing. You say 'the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process)'. I think it is, but not via causation, but supervenience. I do not know if my figurative language helps here: I would say that we can only speak about causation 'between peers'. A firing neuron affects another neuron.

Maybe you mean that the same mental phenomenon can be based on different neural constellations. Just as text, text, text and text differ physically, but represent the same: the word 'text'.

[Anirudh Dabas]

1 hour ago, Eise said:

14 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

While I appreciate the distinction drawn between physical processes and mental phenomena, the assertion that mental phenomena do not directly arise from physical and biochemical processes overlooks the intricate connection between our physiology and our cognitive experiences.

That is an interesting point. Yes, that could be. Maybe for consciousness to arise, it is necessary that the processes are rooted in a specific physical substrate, e.g. electromagnetism. But that doesn't deny the idea of supervenience. It surely is not the case that everywhere where electromagnetism is involved, there is also consciousness. 

Edited 35 minutes ago by Eise

I agree that it's an intriguing notion that consciousness might require a specific physical substrate, like electromagnetism, to emerge. It's plausible that consciousness is an emergent property of certain physical systems, and electromagnetism could be one of those crucial ingredients. However, as you rightly point out, this doesn't contradict the concept of supervenience.

I've come to think that mental phenomena are dependent on physical processes, but not in a straightforward, causal manner. It's not as if every instance of electromagnetism (per se) instantly sparks consciousness. Instead, consciousness arises from the interplay of physical elements, and electromagnetism might be a key player in this dance.

To illustrate, consider the analogy of a computer program. The software code, which represents the program's instructions, is ultimately executed by the hardware, which includes the CPU, memory, and other physical components. Without the hardware, the software code would be inert, unable to produce any meaningful output. In the same way, consciousness might emerge from the intricate physical processes of the brain, with electromagnetism playing a crucial role in enabling these interactions. 

Better yet, consider the analogy of a holographic projection. A hologram, like consciousness, emerges from a complex interplay of physical elements. While the hologram itself is not present in any one individual element, it's nonetheless profoundly affected by the behavior of those elements.

So, while "electromagnetism" might be a necessary condition for consciousness, it's not a sufficient condition.

[AIkonoklazt]

21 hours ago, iNow said:

I’ll ask now for a 3rd time this question you’ve already evaded twice: If not physical and biochemical processes, what other variable do you believe leads to cognition and mentation?

 

I already gave you my answer last time. Now it's my turn to question your reading ability.
Meanwhile, I'll just take your refusal to answer as an admission that you are indeed pushing epiphenmonialism.

After all, what other designation fits "if not physical processes (that "biochemical" term can be omitted; it's just extra blurb) then there couldn't be anything else" talk that you've been giving? Exactly nothing.

20 hours ago, Eise said:

@iNow

By assuming that physical and biochemical processes cause mental phenomena, you are indeed entering the arena of epiphenomalism, and that is a dead end. It even leads to a form of dualism. (No I am not AIkonoklazt. But he is right on this point. Pity that he is not more polite.)

 

@Eise Sorry the rest of you have to bear witness with the tit-for-tat but he and a whole bunch of people weren't too "polite" with me to begin with on some other random forum thread somewhere. When I'm confronted with open disdain I send it back.

15 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

I do, however, would like for somebody to address this.

@Anirudh Dabas someone else asked me and I said I don't know. This self-quote is for reference's sake (as in "I didn't question dodge a question I have zero answer to"):
 

Quote

I have no idea. I'm not sure what to make of Penrose-esq theories, either. I'm far more interested in what consciousness does or does not entail, rather than theorizing. It may be something unreachable. I would liken it to that old Nova episode illustration where a 2D stick figure is suddenly confronted with a 3D world.

Of course, just because I don't know what X is doesn't mean there couldn't be an X. It'd be a fallacy of paucity in imagination.

16 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

It's possible that our consciousness and sense of agency, while influenced by unconscious processes, still play a vital role in our decision-making.

@Anirudh Dabas I made some comments about this 5 or 6 pages back. Took me some time to find it again:
 

Quote

1. Infinite regression of mental events presumes a mechanistic conception of the mind
2. Influences do not make determining factors. There can be competing influences of comparable strengths at play. I think you asked for (generic) "real world" example from another user. I suppose we can think of a prospective shoplifter. One influence would be the physical surroundings and the person's judgement of it. There may be very little monitoring, no cameras, and/OR the law is not so harsh so if you're caught you're in for a long jail sentence (e.g. what happened in San Francisco... but I digress). Such "easy target" practically serves as encouragement. On the other hand, if the person's caught, it's a pain to deal with people coming after you, someone stopping you at the door, shame (of being outted by a security guard, if shame is even a factor) and the aversion of such situations, or even deal with a police offer and a ride inside a police car (who knows, some people may not like the inside of a police car) et cetera.
3. If the aforementioned influences takes any amount of time to consider, even just for a second, what is happening during that time? Isn't effort expended, no matter how small, point to an active will instead of a passive reaction? Are all rational thoughts simply to be categorized as passive reactions?

 

Edited November 9, 2023 by AIkonoklazt

[iNow]

7 hours ago, Eise said:

again you are using a vague word, 'responsible'. (you used 'driven' before, also vague). What is this 'responsible'-relationship?

Lots of folks keep saying I'm arguing for epiphenomenalism, and I simply used those exact words found in the definition of epiphenomenalism. They're not my words, and in fact I'm fairly certain you're one of the people who posted the wiki link from which they were drawn. Here it is for reference: 

Quote

Epiphenomenalism is a position on the mind–body problem which holds that physical and biochemical events within the human body (sense organs, neural impulses, and muscle contractions, for example) are the sole cause of mental events (thought, consciousness, and cognition).

I note still the question remains unanswered. If physical and biochemical events are NOT the sole cause of mental events, then what other variables do you suggest ARE involved?

7 hours ago, Eise said:

You say it is causation

I actually haven't. I've said "it depends on how you define it."

4 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

I already gave you my answer last time.

My apologies for missing it, but it seems I'm not the only one who did. Will you kindly please repeat it so we may align on this point you seem to believe is so self-evident and obvious?

4 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

someone else asked me and I said I don't know. <...> just because I don't know what X is doesn't mean there couldn't be an X

I see. So you say I'm arguing for epiphenomenalism, that epiphenomenalism is a wrong dead end, and when I ask what other possibilities exist for the underlying elements leading to mentation and causation, you respond, "I have no fucking idea, I just KNOW that it MIGHT be wrong."

Right. Okay, haas. Got it. Super strong position you're arguing. 

FWIW: I also acknowledge it MIGHT be wrong, but as it stands today nobody can explain where or how. That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence, so dismiss you I do. 

One final point of clarification: I'm not arguing for epiphenomenalism and all of the baggage which comes with it. I'm saying our mentation is rooted in chemical and biological processes, physical processes.

If you disagree, then the onus is on you to show WHAT ELSE leads to mentation. Not just physical processes? Okay, what then? Not just biochemistry? Okay, what then?

Go ahead and lay that out, folks... I'll wait (mostly likely indefinitely given the trend in these last several replies). 

[TheVat]

When I hear "emergence" I am reminded of the ancient maps that would show unknown areas of the world with the caption, Here there be monsters.  It is a nonexplanation of a casual structure we simply do not understand.  The big question for those who wish to confer causal powers on mind is of emergence and downward causation.

Emergence and downward causation are best understood in light of one another. Downward causation would occur when a whole, which includes various parts, influences the behavior of those parts. A whole, or a property of a whole, is emergent when it is capable of exercising downward causation, so again the question of how we would discover and demonstrate downward causation.  This seems really challenging with conscious creatures who are interacting with their environment.  You have lower order signals from outside interacting with higher order mental states.   Sometimes there is thought without behavior.   Sometimes, as we have seen, there is behavior without thought, or only thoughts post hoc.  Sometimes mind seems to exercise prior restraint (to borrow lamguage from my nation's first amendment) and block behavior, e.g.  I'm just going to ignore that. 

We don't understand emergence because we don't understand what is the possibility of downward causation.

[Anirudh Dabas]

10 hours ago, Eise said:

10 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

In the case of supervenience, one event (the physical or biochemical process) is the foundation upon which another event (cognition or mentation) exists. However, the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process). Instead, the higher-level event emerges from the lower-level event in a more complex and nuanced way.

Hmm, this might be confusing. You say 'the higher-level event (cognition or mentation) is not determined by the lower-level event (physical or biochemical process)'. I think it is, but not via causation, but supervenience. I do not know if my figurative language helps here: I would say that we can only speak about causation 'between peers'. A firing neuron affects another neuron.

Maybe you mean that the same mental phenomenon can be based on different neural constellations. Just as text, text, text and text differ physically, but represent the same: the word 'text'.

I understand your point about causation. It's true that we can only really speak about causation between events that are on the same level. For example, a firing neuron can cause another firing neuron. But the relationship between the physical and mental realms is probably more complex than that.

I think it's helpful to think of the physical realm as the foundation upon which the mental realm can emerge. The physical realm provides the building blocks for the mental realm, but it doesn't directly determine it.

For example, the same mental phenomenon, such as a thought or feeling, can be based on different neural constellations. Like you said, just as the word "text" can be represented by different physical patterns, so too can a mental phenomenon be represented by different neural patterns.

This suggests that the mental realm is emergent, meaning that it arises from the complex interplay of physical processes. The mental realm has its own unique properties and dynamics that cannot be reduced to the physical realm.

So, to answer your question directly, I do mean that the same mental phenomenon can be based on different neural constellations. This is because I believe the mental realm is emergent, and its properties are not simply determined by the physical realm.

 

8 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

@Anirudh Dabas someone else asked me and I said I don't know. This self-quote is for reference's sake (as in "I didn't question dodge a question I have zero answer to"):

Maybe the question was asked for effect, rather than to elicit an answer. 

 

4 hours ago, iNow said:

One final point of clarification: I'm not arguing for epiphenomenalism and all of the baggage which comes with it. I'm saying our mentation is rooted in chemical and biological processes, physical processes.

If you disagree, then the onus is on you to show WHAT ELSE leads to mentation. Not just physical processes? Okay, what then? Not just biochemistry? Okay, what then?

Don't get me wrong, I totally agree with you.

But, just for fun: (these views are speculative and there is no scientific consensus on any of them. However, they do provide some possible answers to the question.)

1. Consciousness could be a fundamental property of the universe, like gravity or electromagnetism. I believe the term is panpsychism.
2. Consciousness could be a product of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics allows for the possibility of non-local events, which could be responsible for the emergence of consciousness.
3. Consciousness could be a product of information processing. It could be that consciousness arises from the complex interactions of information-processing systems, such as the human brain. (I know, it isn't very likely.)
4. Consciousness could be a product of evolution. Based on the idea that consciousness evolved as a way for organisms to better understand and interact with their environment. I think it's certainly possible.

snapping back to reality,

I think it's right to challenge those who disagree to show what else could lead to mentation besides physical processes. If they claim that there is something else, then they should be able to identify it and explain how it works.
✌️

[iNow]

3 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

I believe the mental realm is emergent, and its properties are not simply determined by the physical realm.

I don’t know what a realm is in context of neuroscience, but if mental events are not solely due to physical inputs, then what else do you recommend we measure and look at to better understand them?

3 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

I believe the term is panpsychism

Correct, and maybe it is. Maybe it isn’t. Somewhat peripheral to my stance though 

3 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

It could be that consciousness arises from the complex interactions of information-processing systems, such as the human brain. (I know, it isn't very likely.)

I struggle to agree with you here. Why would that be unlikely? What other systems would be worthy of consideration?

3 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

If they claim that there is something else, then they should be able to identify it and explain how it works

I understand you agree and this comment confirms that, but your mention of realms isn’t terribly different IMO.

[AIkonoklazt]

13 hours ago, Anirudh Dabas said:

I think it's right to challenge those who disagree to show what else could lead to mentation besides physical processes. If they claim that there is something else, then they should be able to identify it and explain how it works.
✌️

I believe there are ultimately multiple things, and not just two, that make up the universe. I don't think dualism cut it; Why call things "non-physical" instead of "non-mental" and have things only in two baskets? My intuition points to pluralism, but of course I can't demonstrate such a thing, much less show what "interactions" are between those things. It's like asking an astrophysicist to come up with as well as demonstrate some kind of metaphysical theory, like "show me why and how white holes are the results of collisions between higher dimensions" (forgot where that theory was from and who proposed it, maybe it was Tegmark); Astrophysicists who cough up theories like those are rightly accused of doing metaphysics because well, they are.

I'm not going to theorize. I can't demonstrate any of it even if I do anyhow. It'd be epistemically equivalent to, you know, "demonstrating" exactly "what it is like" for me to experience anything to anyone else. Not possible.

@iNow There you go. I can't "lay out pluralism."

[StringJunky]

All science is wrong in the end. What matters is that scientists can do useful things with the theories they have until something else supersedes it. That's the way science rolls. A fact is only correct in a contemporary sense... it answers the questions of the day. What we have today is what we have to work with.

Edited November 10, 2023 by StringJunky