Current state of the debate between free will and determinism in philosophy and neuroscience

[geordief]

25 minutes ago, iNow said:

IMO, no. “Mind” is yet another arbitrary concept (or set of concepts) we try to force fit into the world in an attempt to explain our experiences and communicate with one another, but it’s a rough and often unuseful map/model of the what’s actually happening, AFAICT.  

A model that appears as if it is alive** when it is just an (approximate) tool?

Or is it just forever out of reach of analysis (the "mind"  ,not the mental activity) for the reason that we cannot look directly at ourselves and so the "mind" cannot interrogate  the "mind" without intermediary?

So a subjective understanding of the mind is impossible leaving only the objective analysis of the brain's activity and what we hypothesize might account for our subjective experience of what we call the mind.

I wonder again whether the concept of the mind applies to all cultures(but how might we show that the concept in one culture applied to the same phenomenon in another culture even if the name seemed the same or similar?)

 

**Is the "mind" the seat of what it feels to be alive or are some people  quite unaware of having a "mind" and still feel quite alive?

[iNow]

All very interesting questions which I’m sure philosophers will spend another 3,000 years making absolutely zero progress answering

[TheVat]

14 hours ago, geordief said:

I wonder again whether the concept of the mind applies to all cultures(but how might we show that the concept in one culture applied to the same phenomenon in another culture even if the name seemed the same or similar?)

The anthropological stuff I've read suggests that the concept does vary somewhat (though I think Julian Jaynes's "bicameral mind" has been mostly rejected).  The only way to really get at what pre-literate societies thought would be either artistic remnants, burial rituals, or looking at modern H-G bands that have preserved their pre-agriculture way of life and might be comparable. Jaynes explored this somewhat, but unfortunately (IMO) tended to cut everything he encountered to fit his theory.  From what I read, some ancient cultures didn't identify their living essence specifically with a mind or intellect, but in a more general way, sometimes referring to their breathing as a soul,  or placing a soul in some other anatomical location, like the heart or the gut.  But there are also very ancient peoples (like Cro-Magnon) whose skeletal remains show evidence of trepanation, as if they were trying to fix the troubled brain by incising a hole in the skull.  (mean comment about former president deleted)  

Edited November 15, 2023 by TheVat
btfsplk

[geordief]

32 minutes ago, TheVat said:

The anthropological stuff I've read suggests that the concept does vary somewhat (though I think Julian Jaynes's "bicameral mind" has been mostly rejected).  The only way to really get at what pre-literate societies thought would be either artistic remnants, burial rituals, or looking at modern H-G bands that have preserved their pre-agriculture way of life and might be comparable. Jaynes explored this somewhat, but unfortunately (IMO) tended to cut everything he encountered to fit his theory.  From what I read, some ancient cultures didn't identify their living essence specifically with a mind or intellect, but in a more general way, sometimes referring to their breathing as a soul,  or placing a soul in some other anatomical location, like the heart or the gut.  But there are also very ancient peoples (like Cro-Magnon) whose skeletal remains show evidence of trepanation, as if they were trying to fix the troubled brain by incising a hole in the skull.  (mean comment about former president deleted)  

I am trying to imagine a situation in a society where communication techniques were very primitive(lots of gestures  and some vocalisations?)

If you wanted someone else to pay attention to something would you point to your eyes and the object that had to be attended to?

Would that finger be pointing at  the seeing mechanism in general  (and paying attention)?

Would a "mind" be implied by such a gesture even if the word itself had not been designated as such?

Would a word corresponding to our "mind"  have appeared in due course simply to describe what people were actually doing to survive?

[iNow]

Relation to thread topic of free will seems even more tenuous now. I haven’t yet determined whether this was done on purpose 

[AIkonoklazt]

On 11/14/2023 at 4:07 PM, geordief said:

Do they share the same mind?

 

No, because even conjoined twins don't. https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/the-hogan-twins-share-a-brain-and-see-out-of-each-others-eyes

This lends credence to the portrayal of brain as mind's tool.

[TheVat]

44 minutes ago, iNow said:

Relation to thread topic of free will seems even more tenuous now. I haven’t yet determined whether this was done on purpose 

Have you ever seen a philosophy discussion that doesn't meander?  

I thought the anthropology sidebar was sort of relevant to how we arrived at modern Western definitions of mind and how that impacts our intuitions about free will.  

TV Judge:  I'll allow it.  You may proceed, counsel.

[iNow]

Depends on what you mean by meander  

[AIkonoklazt]

1 minute ago, TheVat said:

Have you ever seen a philosophy discussion that doesn't meander?  

I thought the anthropology sidebar was sort of relevant to how we arrived at modern Western definitions of mind and how that impacts our intuitions about free will.  

TV Judge:  I'll allow it.  You may proceed, counsel.

I'd say even eastern philosophies such as Taoism matter. I think of the Book of Changes as a record of pluralistic metaphysical analogies.

[geordief]

45 minutes ago, iNow said:

Depends on what you mean by meander  

So long as it doesn't become a billabong?

46 minutes ago, TheVat said:

Have you ever seen a philosophy discussion that doesn't meander?  

I thought the anthropology sidebar was sort of relevant to how we arrived at modern Western definitions of mind and how that impacts our intuitions about free will.  

TV Judge:  I'll allow it.  You may proceed, counsel.

I am fascinated by how the human (or from other species) mind  developed.

When ,at age 11 I left that school I mentioned before  where the teacher let me recite Flannan Isle in return for getting out early the last thing he said to the class was "Never forget where you came from"

Our progenitors go back all the way to the primordial swamp

It has to be fascinating to try and understand  how those minds worked at the beginning  of their evolutionary  paths.

 

I wouldn't mind betting that we carry quite a few  remnants with us still.

Edited November 16, 2023 by geordief

[TheVat]

12 hours ago, geordief said:

So long as it doesn't become a billabong?

The question, for me, is how on earth can you fit a jumbuck in a tucker bag?  This may be a topic I meander towards in a new thread.  Perhaps after my billy has boiled.

12 hours ago, AIkonoklazt said:

I'd say even eastern philosophies such as Taoism matter. I think of the Book of Changes as a record of pluralistic metaphysical analogies.

Fair point.  Eastern and Western thought have exerted mutual influence on each other for a long time.  I Ching, or Yi Jing, hexagrams guided decision making.  Hexagrams formed by what is essentially an ancient form of random number generator, the fall of yarrow stalks.  Does this set aside the role of a free will, in favor of some other kind of causality that appears random to us?  

Edited November 16, 2023 by TheVat
adds

[AIkonoklazt]

11 hours ago, TheVat said:

The question, for me, is how on earth can you fit a jumbuck in a tucker bag?  This may be a topic I meander towards in a new thread.  Perhaps after my billy has boiled.

Fair point.  Eastern and Western thought have exerted mutual influence on each other for a long time.  I Ching, or Yi Jing, hexagrams guided decision making.  Hexagrams formed by what is essentially an ancient form of random number generator, the fall of yarrow stalks.  Does this set aside the role of a free will, in favor of some other kind of causality that appears random to us?  

The progression of the hexagrams (i.e. the sequence of broken and unbroken lines) are not random at all even if they were used in divination tools http://www.pantherwebworks.com/I_Ching/ my interpretation is more along cosmological lines (the "ebb and flow of cosmic forces") analogous to what's described in the section "The Cosmological Approach": https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-change/#CosmAppr

[Knowledge Enthusiast]

@Anirudh Dabas Hello, my friend. You should go on YouTube and type in the search box "Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality | Anil Seth". According to the person speaking in the TED Talk, our brain hallucinates and so far that hallucination has allowed us to thrive as a species. But of course, go watch the video yourself. It is a very interesting video.

[Eise]

I've been ill the last 2 weeks, still not quite healthy. 

I would like to give just a short overview of different positions in the free will debate, independent of the whole contents of this thread, just in the hope to clarify a little.

Conceptually, there are 2 main view points: compatibilism and incompatibilism. Incompatibilism states that determinism and free will do not go together, so one of them is, at least partially, false. Dependent on what is supposed to be false, there are 2 main positions:

• Determinism is false: this is mainly libertarian free will. What we choose or decide to do, i.e. how we act, is at least partially, independent on previous causes. The mind has some kind of independence from the physical world
• Free will does not exist at all, it is an illusion played on us by the brain.

The extremes of both are dualism (the soul has causal influence on the physical world) in the first case, and what is sometimes called 'hard determinism' (we are 'slaves' of the causal processes in the brain) in the second. 

Compatibilism of course says that free will and determinism are compatible. It is important to see that compatibilism does not say that (a little bit of) free will is possible in a determined world. It is not some vague compromise between determinism and free will. I think that most compatibilists go even so far that they say that determinism is a necessary condition for free will (I belong to this 'camp'). If, e.g. it turns out that quantum processes play an essential role in brain process, this would be a disturbing factor in our expression of free will, not an opening for free will in an otherwise determined world.

It is also necessary to say that these or not just positions, but that for all these positions arguments are given: they are reasoned, grounded positions.

So here my first point:

Somebody who says 'yes, we have free will!', or just the opposite, has still said nothing. She (or he) must say in which sense.

Second point:

Next to certain (scientific) facts that all camps must accept, it means that the discussion is about which interpretation is the best one.

The question what means 'best' of course opens a complete new can of worms.

Third point, not that easy:

People come to very different practical conclusions based on their conception of free will, but the rational connections can be loose.

Examples:

• None compatibilist determinists thinking that we should not punish criminals, but therapise them, because without free will they are not responsible
• None compatibilist determinists saying that for our daily life it makes no difference at all: in the end, society and its judges are just as determined as the criminal
• Libertarians defending that every individual is completely responsible for his life: if people are poor, then they made the wrong choices in their lives, no need to help them, independent of the country or culture they come from
• People who think their their lives have no meaning if they have no free will (eh.. which concept of free will?)
• Compatibilists taking as default position that people have free will, but there are people whose circumstances are so extreme that they cannot be held responsible; or they miss one of the necessary capabilities for free will, e.g. to rationally evaluate their options for actions (maybe Down syndrome as an example?)
• None compatibilist determinists who say that their position leads to more tolerance to others, and lift the heavy burden of absolute responsibility, like that concept of responsibility that can be found by especially the French existentialists. I have known people falling more or less in a depression because of those views.

In the hope that this helps a little to get rid of the sharp tone of the debate in this thread.

[TheVat]

This was helpful, Eise.  I will give more reflection on the compatibilist position, which has some aspects that still elude me.  For one, 

5 hours ago, Eise said:

I think that most compatibilists go even so far that they say that determinism is a necessary condition for free will (I belong to this 'camp').

I can see part of this, where one notes that truly acausal physical events in my brain would certainly make the careful deliberation over a possible course of action impossible.  My choice would be obliterated by randomness.  Still, I would need further understanding of how my Self can exercise causal agency through some kind of downward causation, rather than just exist as an illusory link in a causal chain that precedes me.  For me to live as a freely choosing causal agent, "me" must not simply be a switchboard for neuronal signals whose causal efficacy is a comforting illusion.

 

(I hope you have a smooth recovery from your illness)

Edited November 19, 2023 by TheVat

[iNow]

39 minutes ago, TheVat said:

For me to live as a freely choosing causal agent, "me" must not simply be a switchboard for neuronal signals

Isn’t the answer here obvious, though, that you cannot possibly be anything else without invoking spirits and similar supernatural forces?

[TheVat]

1 hour ago, iNow said:

Isn’t the answer here obvious, though, that you cannot possibly be anything else without invoking spirits and similar supernatural forces?

Yes, if any kind of physicalist account of downward causation can be ruled out.  If current physicalism allows nonlocality (per Bell's theorem), then it seems possible we don't need spooks for some kind of holistic causality.  Improbable yes, but I have no way to rule it out.  

[martillo]

On 11/19/2023 at 7:14 AM, Eise said:

I would like to give just a short overview of different positions in the free will debate, independent of the whole contents of this thread, just in the hope to clarify a little.

Your post is not an objective overview. You are just promoting your compatibilist position here.

For instance: 

On 11/19/2023 at 7:14 AM, Eise said:

Libertarians defending that every individual is completely responsible for his life: if people are poor, then they made the wrong choices in their lives, no need to help them, independent of the country or culture they come from

The libertarian position does not say that. It says that people can change their situation because the future is undetermined and their choices and actions can influence the future. Of course without total certainty because everything depends not only in our choices and decisions but also in the conditions of the situation, the environment, other people, society, etc, and even the luck because randomness also plays a role in the universe which is yet another source of indeterminism in the future.

You just want to promote your position here. It is not a look for the real true thing.

Useless discussion for me.

Edited November 20, 2023 by martillo

[Eise]

2 hours ago, martillo said:

The libertarian position does not say that.

Yes, it does. You are confusing libertarian free will with libertarianism. Wikipedia:

Quote

 

Libertarianism (from French: libertaire, 'libertarian'; from Latin: libertas, 'freedom') is a political philosophy that upholds liberty as a core value. Libertarians seek to maximize autonomy and political freedom, and minimize the state's encroachment on and violations of individual liberties; emphasizing the rule of law, pluralism, cosmopolitanism, cooperation, civil and political rights, bodily autonomy, freedom of association, free trade, freedom of expression, freedom of choice, freedom of movement^{[dubious – discuss]}, individualism, and voluntary association. Libertarians are often skeptical of or opposed to authority, state power, warfare, militarism and nationalism, but some libertarians diverge on the scope of their opposition to existing economic and political systems. Various schools of libertarian thought offer a range of views regarding the legitimate functions of state and private power. Different categorizations have been used to distinguish various forms of Libertarianism. Scholars distinguish libertarian views on the nature of property and capital, usually along left–right or socialist–capitalist lines. Libertarians of various schools were influenced by liberal ideas.

I said:

On 11/19/2023 at 11:14 AM, Eise said:

People come to very different practical conclusions based on their conception of free will, but the rational connections can be loose.

Examples:

<snip>

• Libertarians defending that every individual is completely responsible for his life: if people are poor, then they made the wrong choices in their lives, no need to help them, independent of the country or culture they come from

But I know, you have a problematic relation with words.

[martillo]

54 minutes ago, Eise said:

Yes, it does. You are confusing libertarian free will with libertarianism.

May be I have read your post too fast. I thought you were making that association, something I didn't like.

I got confused, I agree.

54 minutes ago, Eise said:

But I know, you have a problematic relation with words.

May be yes. English is not my natural language and I get confused sometimes.

Negative -1 reaction to your post removed.

Edited November 20, 2023 by martillo

[Eise]

@martillo:

Confessing you were wrong is worth a point. Thanks for that.

[Eise]

On 11/19/2023 at 5:02 PM, TheVat said:

Still, I would need further understanding of how my Self can exercise causal agency through some kind of downward causation, rather than just exist as an illusory link in a causal chain that precedes me.

Nah, it slowly gets time to think about the 'downward causation', you mentioned it already several times, and (nearly?) nobody reacted on that.

My first assumption is that the universe is physically causally closed. That means that no momentum or energy somehow just leaks away, or arises from nowhere. E.g. the neutrino was proposed as a solution for missing energy in beta-decay. Only after 30 years (or so) it was confirmed that the neutrino really existed.

My next assumption is that the brain is also physical, so we will never find physically causal holes in brain processes. That means that we will never find that a soul interacts with the brain: not as input (which would have been a nice gateway for proposing that we have libertarian free will), nor as output (which would have been a nice gateway for epiphenomalism). (And both together for interactionism.) Neither the neurologist, nor the physicist, studying the brain on their respective levels, will ever have to refer to some none-physical causes. So a 'cause' coming from 'elsewhere', (and wouldn't a downward causation be such a cause from 'elsewhere?) does not fit in this picture. So case closed.

But to speak with PBS Spacetime's Matt O'Dowd: "not so fast".

Take the following computer program:

wait 10 minutes;
shutdown computer;

Such a kind of program can be written for every kind of computer system I know: Linux, Windows; and I am pretty sure Mac too, in short, all kinds of computer systems.

Now imagine we give a computer running such a program to a physicist, and ask him to explain why this Linux computer stops after 10 minutes, but we allow him only to explain it on physical level. Theoretically, he can succeed (maybe 10 minutes is a bit short...). Using the physical architecture of the computer, and the laws of quantum mechanics he can causally explain why the computer shuts down. That means also, that his explanation is 'physically causally closed'.

But now we give him another computer, running with Windows, and ask him again to explain why the computer turns off after 10 minutes. Now he must start all over again, because the hardware is different, and so are the changes because of the different operating systems. Assume he will just as well succeed. But let a programmer look, and she can tell in one glance why the computer stops. Would that count as 'downward causation'? Personally, I am inclined to say 'yes', because at least I have a better feeling of understanding why the computer stops by the programmer's explanation.

Let's take a more complicated example: we organise a virtual tournament between two chess computer programs, A and B. A and B both have a red light, which signifies who has won the match. In about 70% of the cases, the light at A burns after a match. So we see the red light mostly flashing up on the A-side, but sometimes on the B-side. We ask the physicist for an explanation why sometimes the light at the A-side burns, and sometimes at the B-side, same conditions as above. Well, assume again he is able to understand what is happening, in a similar way as the simple program above. But did we learn something from his explanation? And do we now have a full understanding why in 70% of the cases the light at A-side flashes up?

In the first place, we would understand much more if we knew, at a higher level, the lights depend on games of chess, and signify which program won the match.

But in the second place, how correct the explanations of the physicist might be, can we say that he really understands why in 70% of the A wins? 

Let's ask the system administrator: "no, they are the same programs, both X-Chess". Are you sure? So she looks better, and suddenly she says "Wait! B is version 1.0, A is version 1.1. One moment, I'll look up the release notes". And there it is:

Quote

Improvements in version 1.1

• implemented 'en passant' rule
• implemented 'castling'

Now we understand why the light on the A-side turns on more often! B just can't do certain moves, because they are not implemented in it. What would you say, @TheVat? Is this also an example of downward causation? At least, we need the knowledge that the hardware has implemented two chess programs, and by understanding chess, we understand what physically is happening: A's light burns, or B's.

I'll make the arc to my compatibilist understanding of free will. Only on the level of persons mental phenomena, intentions, believes, observations, aesthetical and ethical values, and actions exist. So only on that level, free will can be meaningfully defined: as acting according my intentions, believes, observations, aesthetical and ethical values. Nevertheless, all the mental phenomena 'run on the physical wetware of the brain'. And therefore the physicist and the neurologist will simply not be able to find these on their respective level of explanation.

Imprisoned on one side by their detailed view on reality, and mostly by using a meaningless, useless and theological concept of free will, they do not see the wood for the trees.

[TheVat]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

Neither the neurologist, nor the physicist, studying the brain on their respective levels, will ever have to refer to some none-physical causes. So a 'cause' coming from 'elsewhere', (and wouldn't a downward causation be such a cause from 'elsewhere?) does not fit in this picture. So case closed.

The definition of downward causation, in philosophy of mind, is not one that requires a cause to be from elsewhere.  It is compatible with emergent states of mind in a physicalist view.  I.e. downward causation is a causal relationship from higher levels of a system to lower-level parts of that system.   From our perspective as conscious creatures, we can perceive this as mental events acting to cause physical events.  (we see higher order activity as mental)  It doesn't require an ontologically dualist view that the mental events are other than an emergent process of a physical neural network.  

So I agree that on that high-order level where I form intentions, free will can be meaningfully defined as acting according my intentions.  To be a compatibilist, if I am understanding that position, is to say there is an irreducible value to such high-order processes like intention forming, which gives meaning to free will.  The sum of neural signals was greater than its parts.

Edited November 21, 2023 by TheVat
pyto

[AIkonoklazt]

I see that to some people, anything outside of physical origin is "supernatural," which to me is just physicalist rhetoric to debase anyone who isn't a physicalist (pluralists included). I've seen too many of those.

5 hours ago, Eise said:

My next assumption is that the brain is also physical, so we will never find physically causal holes in brain processes.

 

Not talking of "souls" here but isn't that infinite regress of mental events?

There's also the issue of the mind not being limited to the brain, or even the body (don't have the link handy to copy and paste again but I can find it again)

p.s. Eise didn't use the term "supernatural." i wasn't referring to him.

[Eise]

19 hours ago, TheVat said:

The definition of downward causation, in philosophy of mind, is not one that requires a cause to be from elsewhere.  It is compatible with emergent states of mind in a physicalist view.  I.e. downward causation is a causal relationship from higher levels of a system to lower-level parts of that system.

I hope you also read the rest of my posting...:

On 11/21/2023 at 3:26 PM, Eise said:

But let a programmer look, and she can tell in one glance why the computer stops. Would that count as 'downward causation'? Personally, I am inclined to say 'yes', because at least I have a better feeling of understanding why the computer stops by the programmer's explanation.

And, yes, I have put quotes around 'elsewhere'. I wanted to express that from the view of the physicist or neurologist there is no reason to suspect that there is still a causal component missing, i.e. they do not have the full picture: in their view the system is 'physically causally closed'.

I do not have time now to fully explain my ideas, but even then, these do not lead me to a definite position if 'downward causation' is the correct concept to describe what happens.

So here is just one thought: a system can express free will only when a higher level description in terms of intentionality and actions is valid. To give a negative example (much used in the metaphorical sense, but still leads to confusion sometimes):

Objects want to move with constant speed in a straight line, but planets are forced  to move in ellipses around the sun by its gravity.

Assigning free/forced speech just makes no sense here. But for humans it does. BTW, same holds for 'laws of nature': they do not force objects to behave like they do; they are descriptions of regularities we discover in nature.

19 hours ago, TheVat said:

To be a compatibilist, if I am understanding that position, is to say there is an irreducible value to such high-order processes like intention forming, which gives meaning to free will. 

I might have a problem in this 'irreducible value'. Can you explain?

- - - 

@AIkonoklazt: To be honest, I have no lust discussing with you. For me, you speak too often in a denigrating tone to, and about others. Maybe you should reflect a bit more on yourself, when you have the experience that people react hostile at you, and are even thrown out from other fora, as you wrote yourself:

On 5/29/2022 at 2:01 AM, AIkonoklazt said:

I've tried other places of debate and discussion (most notably Reddit and LinkedIn), but they inevitably devolve into hostility. Some are hostile and insulting from the getgo, others descend into it after a few messages. Ars Technica forum locked me even before I could even respond to questions. I'm going to give this a go one last time before giving online discussion forums a rest.

I love exchange of arguments, but not when the question is "who is right". Seeing what the better arguments are, that is interesting. I only have a simple question, but I will only ask it, if you are prepared to down your voice a bit. Maybe you have deeper insight in this stuff then I do. But nobody wants to be treated as if he or she is dumb, or an asshole, or both.

 

Edited November 22, 2023 by Eise