Current state of the debate between free will and determinism in philosophy and neuroscience

[StringJunky]

2 hours ago, iNow said:

So you don't think our instinctive programming includes a desire to avoid ostracization from the group? I'd argue otherwise. Selection pressures tend to reinforce adherence to tribal and cultural norms, not abandon them. 

More to the point, I suggest the same chemistry driving our choices and behaviors also apply here. Through conditioning, the firing patterns and activation thresholds of those neurochemical events have been shaped to avoid triggering the  other neurochemistries within us which express as shame and embarrassment and desire to escape the situation. 

Acknowledging that the impetus of our actions comes well before we previously realized in no way changes our day to day experience. The only difference is the explanation, not the outcome. 

IMO, it's a bit like learning that it wasn't gods in the sky arguing which caused lightning storms, but is instead explained by basic physics and electromagnetism. The lightning is still the same, as is our experience of it. It didn't alter just because we became more accurate in how our descriptions of how it functions. 

Acknowledging?  You make it sound like a fact. All I see is that you've come up with a story that you like. I can't help but sense a little hubris in this subject from you when the present state of knowledge doesn't warrant it.

[iNow]

1 hour ago, StringJunky said:

You make it sound like a fact. All I see is that you've come up with a story that you like.

Because my conclusion comes from the facts of how our minds work.

I’ve been posting here on this topic for about a decade across scores of threads. I can’t fault you for not remembering my many contributions across so many of those threads, but please don’t accuse me of just making shit up and failing to support my stance. You know me better… at least I hope you do and you’re not learning to hate your neighbors like so many others across the planet these last years.

The locations of the brain activities for these choices and decisions are activated well before the locations of our brain responsible for awareness, consciousness, and sense of self. Full stop.

You can certainly form your own conclusions around what this means for the concepts of choice and decision making and free will, but my conclusion is that calling it a “choice” is a bit silly since we’re not even aware of it yet when it happens. 

My wife bitches at me about my tone sometimes, too. It doesn’t make me wrong. ✌🏼

Edited December 5, 2023 by iNow

[sethoflagos]

On 12/2/2023 at 1:20 PM, Eise said:

Me too. E.g. the dichotomy between determinism and free will. Compatibilism removes the dichotomy.

Just to be clear, is this latter statement founded on Frankfurt's objection to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) or some further thinking?

As an avid if mediocre chess player, the following version engages me:

Alice and Bob are two opposing, reasonably competent chess players. Each is supplied with one of two chess computers (Holly and Hal?) allocated by a single quantum coin flip to refer to if they wish. Each unit outputs what it computes as the strongest next three move sequence but the depth of analysis is limited, sufficient to give advantage in short range tactical play but no better than either player in long term strategy. Critically, the depth horizons are different, though the players are unaware of who's is best at the start of play. Neither can see the other's computer output.

The game progresses until Alice has high hopes of winning if Bob makes a certain attractive but blundering move at his next turn. However, she notices that her computer evaluation has suddenly nose-dived. Even with her best move, Bob has a different move available that will reward him with a winning position. However, she's noticed that Bob is in the habit of inadvertently staring at the piece he intends to move next.

a)If Bob is looking at the piece she wants him to move should Alice:

     a1) proceed with Holly's recommended move and hope Hal is too weak to alert Bob to her weakness?

     a2) play a different move that further encourages the desired response albeit compromising her winning opportunity?

b) If Bob is looking at the other piece should should she:

     b1) still proceed with Holly's recommended move hoping she is the one that's miscalculated?

     b2) find a 'confounding complication' that diverts the attention of Bob (and Hal) back to the desired option?

This scenario includes Frankfurt's assertion that Alice's attempted coercion in b2) does not absolve Bob of moral responsibility for the poor move he intended to make in case a) anyway. However, the quantum selected Holly provides Bob with a fundamentally indeterministic option (Holly's computation is purely deterministic but her selection is non-causal to my eyes at least) and this removes one horn of the 'two-horned dilemma' raised by Fischer et al.: the link between Bob's inclination and action is not wholly deterministic therefore Frankfurt cannot be begging the question here.

But if the link between Bob's inclination (the decision he would take in the absence of Hal) and the action he finally takes is indeterminate, doesn't that put the nail in the coffin for causal determinism?

Alice's actions share this indeterminant element but excepting a1) have her selecting moves she may strongly suspect of being sub-optimal. Interesting from a chessy point of view at least. 

 

 

 

   

Edited December 5, 2023 by sethoflagos
grammar

[Eise]

16 hours ago, iNow said:

No, uncoerced works just fine, and has the added benefit of eliminating the confusing subjective baggage which these 92+ other threads we have active on the topic confirm accompany any attempts to focus instead on free will.

True, 'uncoerced' sounds less ambiguous than 'free will'. But still 2 remarks:

• as you still stick to the position that we have no free will, but not specifying precisely in which meaning, people may think that for you all actions are coerced. So what would an honest 'declaration' be? E.g. "We have no libertarian free will: everything is determined. However, we are able to distinguish between actions that are coerced and and those that are not. This is the relevant meaning for our practice of blaming, praising, responsibility etc."?
• You have something in common with Sam Harris. In his pamphlet Free Will, he also argues against it, but when arguing that our practice of criminal law does not has to change much, he is doing this exactly in the same terms as compatibilists defend we have compatibilist free will. A bit mean, I would say, is that there is obviously some allergy against the words 'free will'. But not against what compatibilists really are defending. 

I hope you also see that when discussing politics, e.g. about imprisonment, we think very much alike. It looks like that our practical differences are not that big.

17 hours ago, iNow said:

If it is "not just subjective," this means it's also (at least in part) objective.

No. It means that as a society we must agree on how we should react on offenders. 'Objective' is the absolute opposite of 'subjective' only in the context of facts. It looks different in questions of morality and values. There one can give arguments for one's position, but they will never be objective. But they might convince somebody. Or it gives the possibility for someone to argue more precise against one's position. 

[iNow]

3 hours ago, Eise said:

So what would an honest 'declaration' be?

That free will as a concept lacks utility and can be largely ignored IRL

3 hours ago, Eise said:

There one can give arguments for one's position, but they will never be objective.

Ergo, it is “just subjective.”

[geordief]

7 minutes ago, iNow said:

That free will as a concept lacks utility and can be largely ignored IRL

In absolute  terms,I agree.

We all have choices**  but  they are all competing against one another and so none of them are "free" until an action is taken.

Then they appear to be free as the particular "last standing" choice  is the "king of the heap"

 

**if there was only one choice that would presumably be the antithesis of what we might call "free will"

[Eise]

On 12/5/2023 at 3:23 AM, sethoflagos said:

Just to be clear, is this latter statement founded on Frankfurt's objection to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) or some further thinking?

No. I have read a little Frankfurt, but I do not like his contrived examples. And then you pick one of the most contrived ones as example ... No, I was just referring to my conception of free will, in which (sufficient) determinism is even a necessary condition for free will to exist.

19 hours ago, iNow said:

That free will as a concept lacks utility and can be largely ignored IRL

Well, what is the difference between the meanings of my conception of free will and your's of 'uncoerced'?

19 hours ago, iNow said:

Ergo, it is “just subjective.”

Nope. But that would deviate too far from the topic of the thread. Only this: an argumentatively reached consensus between members of a speech community (be it society as a whole, or a bunch of experts) is more then just 'subjective'. 

18 hours ago, geordief said:

19 hours ago, iNow said:

That free will as a concept lacks utility and can be largely ignored IRL

In absolute  terms,I agree.

Assuming 'IRL' means 'in real life', it is not absolute, per definition.

18 hours ago, geordief said:

We all have choices**  but  they are all competing against one another and so none of them are "free" until an action is taken.

If they are 'competing' I think you mean the alternatives you have in one choice. A 'free action' is an action in which I recognise that it is according my intentions and knowledge. 

Just fresh this morning:

Does Science Really Show Free Will Doesn't Exist? Here's What You Need to Know.

It is mainly reactions on Sapolsky's recent book Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will.

Quote

<snip>

(Sapolsky) simply defines free will as being incompatible with determinism, assumes this absolves people of moral responsibility, and spends much of the book describing the many ways our behaviours are determined. His arguments can all be traced back to his definition of "free will".

Compatibilists believe humans are agents. We live lives with "meaning", have an understanding of right and wrong, and act for moral reasons. This is enough to suggest most of us, most of the time, have a certain type of freedom and are responsible for our actions (and deserving of blame) – even if our behaviours are "determined".

<snip>

Sapolsky's broader mistake seems to be assuming his questions are purely scientific: answered by looking just at what the science says. While science is relevant, we first need some idea of what free will is (which is a metaphysical question) and how it relates to moral responsibility (a normative question). This is something philosophers have been interrogating for a very long time.

Interdisciplinary work is valuable and scientists are welcome to contribute to age-old philosophical questions. But unless they engage with existing arguments first, rather than picking a definition they like and attacking others for not meeting it, their claims will simply be confused.

The review of Sapolsky's book of course goes a little deeper, so if somebody is interested, go there too:

Quote

The history of discussions of free will, including the contemporary debates, is filled with various critiques and defenses of compatibilism. To evaluate these arguments, we need to be clear about what notion of free will is under consideration, and we should consider the arguments carefully. It would be egregiously unhelpful and unfair simply to define compatibilism out of existence from the beginning of the inquiry. Yet this is precisely what Sapolsky does.

Perhaps this is why he offers no arguments in the entire book against compatibilism! He focusses his attention on establishing determinism, but does not seek to refute or in any way argue against compatibilism, where free will is understood in any of a range of ways offered historically and currently.

Simply said: just another scientist who shows that my disclaimer is correct. Just in case that one day I might change my disclaimer:

Quote

There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.

Daniel Dennet, Darwin's dangerous idea.

As an aside, Dennett is one of those philosophers who are very science oriented; and one of the most vocal about the fact that we have free will (compatibilist free will, of course).

Edited December 6, 2023 by Eise

[geordief]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

. A 'free action' is an action in which I recognise that it is according my intentions and knowledge. 

If that action occurs when all the choices have been resolved ,where is the time and space for that to happen?

 

I don't think it does. I think it is the onrushing  choices beyond them (in the immediate future) that "force our hand"

They physically make the  "decision" of choice taking for us and we sit "god like" amidst our mental processes  looking down or sideways  and approving in retrospect.

 

[iNow]

6 hours ago, Eise said:

Nope. But that would deviate too far from the topic of the thread. Only this: an argumentatively reached consensus between members of a speech community (be it society as a whole, or a bunch of experts) is more then just 'subjective'. 

My understanding is that subjective and objective are a binary pair. If it’s not one then it’s the other by default. Am surely missing something obvious though, and trust you’re more than able to highlight for me where and how… though agree it’s OT. 

6 hours ago, Eise said:

what is the difference between the meanings of my conception of free will and your's of 'uncoerced'?

Mine is more plain, self-evident, and uncontrived. 

[sethoflagos]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

No. I have read a little Frankfurt, but I do not like his contrived examples. And then you pick one of the most contrived ones as example ... No, I was just referring to my conception of free will, in which (sufficient) determinism is even a necessary condition for free will to exist.

... but not sufficient determinism to remove the alternative actions necessary for free will to be any more than an abstract concept? 

This is not a compatibilist position as I understand it.

I agree that without sufficient determinism, causal connection between actions and effects diminishes and with it any significance of will, free or otherwise. A wholly undetermined world (eg Khaos) is not of this universe.

I also agree with you insofar as the Frankfurt Objection example does seem contrived. That is why I deliberately modified it to a close to real life scenario that occurs continually, every day in online chess communities. Perhaps it too is unworthy of your consideration, but for the moment, I don't see why that should be.

Say what you will about Frankfurt; at least his position has clarity. A quality much lacking elsewhere.

[geordief]

6 hours ago, Eise said:

Assuming 'IRL' means 'in real life', it is not absolute, per definition.

Yes that's right.My mistake(hadn't worked out what IRL stood for to be honest -over here that is the acronym for Ireland)

[Eise]

1 hour ago, sethoflagos said:

... but not sufficient determinism to remove the alternative actions necessary for free will to be any more than an abstract concept? 

I use 'sufficient determinism' because we do not live in an absolutely determined universe. Now small random hiccups may not disturb much, but if the deviations from determinism become too big, it disturbs the connections between my intentions, knowledge, decisions and actions. For free will to be possible, their relations must be pretty fix determined.

The possible actions are given by our surroundings: e.g. in a restaurant, it contains a menu card, on which my 'alternative actions' are listed. Supposing that it is a free choice, i.e. nobody coerces me to some special choice, then what I will choose then depends on me only. So given the situation, my preferences determine what action I will take. Then the action is really free. And I couldn't care less if the action potential goes up before I become conscious of my choice. 

There is simply no contradiction between determinism and free will. 

Compatibilism is not the view that there somehow is a little wiggle room in determinism in which we can choose. It is the view that free will can only exist in a determined world, so arguments in favour of determinism does in no sense argue against compatibilist free will. 

If you would like to give another 'Frankfurt case', one that can also be understood by somebody who is not in the world of active chess players, maybe we can discuss that.

Edited December 6, 2023 by Eise

[TheVat]

7 hours ago, Eise said:

Just fresh this morning:

Does Science Really Show Free Will Doesn't Exist? Here's What You Need to Know.

It is mainly reactions on Sapolsky's recent book Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will.

I posted on this a week ago in the neighboring free will thread, with an article comparing Sapolsky book to another book, which was compatibilist.  (I'm not rejoining the discussion, just adding a bit of background reading)

On 12/1/2023 at 2:49 PM, TheVat said:

https://undark.org/2023/11/17/book-review-free-will/

Offers some good summary of the discursive issues so far.  Looks at books by two authors who reach quite different conclusions about free will.  Here's a snippet that I found amusing.

 

The floating quote function has removed the quoted portion within that quote, sorry.

[Eise]

It can be done...

On 12/1/2023 at 10:49 PM, TheVat said:

https://undark.org/2023/11/17/book-review-free-will/

Offers some good summary of the discursive issues so far.  Looks at books by two authors who reach quite different conclusions about free will.  Here's a snippet that I found amusing.

Quote

Sapolsky walks us through these arguments, as well as other pro-free will concepts, including quantum indeterminacy, which challenges the idea that the universe is deterministic, and emergent complexity, the idea that reductive, discrete parts of a system (say, neurons) can produce stunningly complex results without a master plan, which challenges the idea that you can predict what an organism will do based on examining the antics of its constituent neurons. But Sapolsky concludes that even though all these concepts challenge claims that the universe is deterministic, they do nothing for the pro-free will camp.

Back over in “Free Agents,” Mitchell does not entirely disagree. He concedes that humans do not have complete and total freedom: On the contrary, he believes that “selfhood entails constraints,” and he agrees that we are shaped by our evolution, genetics, and the random variability and environmental factors that developed our brain into its own particular organ. But, crucially, in his view, that doesn’t make us automatons. Once we evolved metacognition, we lost the ability to claim that our actions are entirely disconnected from any notion of moral responsibility. Accordingly, we should continue to praise people for their achievements and punish people for their sins, since, writes Mitchell, “Brains do not commit crimes: people do.”

 

This is the way I did it:

And then copy, or better cut, the complete text from the 'Reply to this topic' box, and paste it into the topic you want.

55 minutes ago, geordief said:

Yes that's right.My mistake(hadn't worked out what IRL stood for to be honest -over here that is the acronym for Ireland)

I had to google it also. 

[sethoflagos]

1 hour ago, Eise said:

I use 'sufficient determinism' because we do not live in an absolutely determined universe. Now small random hiccups may not disturb much, but if the deviations from determinism become too big, it disturbs the connections between my intentions, knowledge, decisions and actions. For free will to be possible, their relations must be pretty fix determined.

Concur without exception.

1 hour ago, Eise said:

The possible actions are given by our surroundings: e.g. in a restaurant, it contains a menu card, on which my 'alternative actions' are listed. Supposing that it is a free choice, i.e. nobody coerces me to some special choice, then what I will choose then depends on me only. So given the situation, my preferences determine what action I will take. Then the action is really free. And I couldn't care less if the action potential goes up before I become conscious of my choice.

Concur without exception.

1 hour ago, Eise said:

There is simply no contradiction between determinism and free will.

Exception: Hard determinism precludes free will.

1 hour ago, Eise said:

Compatibilism is not the view that there somehow is a little wiggle room in determinism in which we can choose. It is the view that free will can only exist in a determined world, so arguments in favour of determinism does in no sense argue against compatibilist free will.

Self-contradiction: Compare with your statement "we do not live in an absolutely determined universe" in the first quoted section. This is the basis of your definition of 'sufficient determinism' and hence your most vital justification for the exisence of free will. The applicable degree of determinism is a vital element in understanding your use of the term. You certainly clarify that degree in your framing of 'free will'. However you appear not to in critical cases when framing 'determinism'. 

You seem to implicitly demand 'wiggle room' to frame free will, only to deny its existence when framing the degree of determinism require to justify a 'gospel' Compatibilist position.

Cake = Have + Eat again on the face of it.

1 hour ago, Eise said:

If you would like to give another 'Frankfurt case', one that can also be understood by somebody who is not in the world of active chess players, maybe we can discuss that.

The example I prepared requires no special understanding of the rules of the game beyond what a child may comprehend after a few hours exposure.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 hours ago, TheVat said:

The floating quote function has removed the quoted portion within that quote, sorry.

In my book, that counts as an entirely sufficient book review ☺️

[iNow]

2 hours ago, Eise said:

I had to google it also. 

Apologies all for using IRL without explaining it meant in real life. My bad entirely. 

[Eise]

15 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

17 hours ago, Eise said:

There is simply no contradiction between determinism and free will.

Exception: Hard determinism precludes free will.

I hate the words 'hard determinism' (and of course its companion 'soft determinism'). Compatibilism's determinism is just as hard as what is supposed to be 'hard determinism'. 

15 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

Self-contradiction: Compare with your statement "we do not live in an absolutely determined universe" in the first quoted section. This is the basis of your definition of 'sufficient determinism' and hence your most vital justification for the exisence of free will.

Nope. Compatibilism is the view that there is no contradiction between the concepts of determinism and free will. Incomaptibilsm and compatibilism do not really differ in their positions what determinism is. They differ in their conception of what free will is. 

So to make the steps as clear as possible:

• Compatibilism is the position that there is no conflict between determinism and free will
• Even stronger: without determinism free will would be impossible
• So if the world is completely determined, the possibility for free will exists
• Randomness in relationship between events only disturbs the possibility for free will to exist
• We know the real world is not deterministic through and through
• Given that randomness possibly plays only a small, maybe even no role, free will is possible

So my idea of 'sufficient determinism' just means that we need enough determinism for compatibilist free will to be possible. 

15 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

You seem to implicitly demand 'wiggle room' to frame free will, only to deny its existence when framing the degree of determinism require to justify a 'gospel' Compatibilist position.

The wiggle room does not exist: either events are random, or they are determined. Randomness disturbs compatibilist free will, determinism makes it possible. To say it simple: the more events relate deterministically, the less our free will is disturbed by random events.

15 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

The example I prepared requires no special understanding of the rules of the game beyond what a child may comprehend after a few hours exposure.

I read it a second time, and I do not get it. Might be just me.

Edited December 7, 2023 by Eise

[sethoflagos]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

The wiggle room does not exist: either events are random, or they are determined. Randomness disturbs compatibilist free will, determinism makes it possible.

La plus sa change, la plus c'est la meme chose.

5 hours ago, Eise said:

Compatibilism's determinism is just as hard as what is supposed to be 'hard determinism'. 

 

5 hours ago, Eise said:

Compatibilism is the position that there is no conflict between determinism and free will

 

5 hours ago, Eise said:

So if the world is completely determined, the possibility for free will exists

 

5 hours ago, Eise said:

We know the real world is not deterministic through and through

If you believe that these four statements are mutually consistent and affirm compatibility, then that's fine. We can leave it at that.

It's an interesting position but not one I would care to take on board. Thanks anyway.

 

[Eise]

@sethoflagos: are you sure you used the compatibilist definition of free will? If you apply the libertarian definition of free will, sure, then these statements are inconsistent. 

[sethoflagos]

19 minutes ago, Eise said:

@sethoflagos: are you sure you used the compatibilist definition of free will? If you apply the libertarian definition of free will, sure, then these statements are inconsistent. 

I try to steer a course through life in such a way that I never get boxed into an undesirable situation from where there is no escape. One key principle that has helped me in this over the years is to resist any urge to commit myself to a dogmatic position unless it has the firmest of foundations. I might drift through most days with the spirit of Sartre in my blood yet spend other darker days going full on Freddie Ayer. There is value to be found in both so why commit to one tribalist belief and so deny myself the benefits and personal connections I can only find with the other camp? This is not the way to maximise my options for overcoming any future challenges to my comfort and well-being. 

So no. I will not choose between one obscure definition of free will and another. Neither will I even commit to the existence of any abstraction of free will since the concept is so nebulous it seems to have lost any shred of meaning that I could pin a flag on. 

That is not to say that I am reluctant to take decisive action when necessary, but nine times out of ten I shall wait until I believe it IS necessary (much to my wife's irritation!) and then act in the surety that I have done so in the light of all relevant considerations and to the best of my judgement.

I trust that clarifies precisely where I stand on this issue (and many other diversity limiting false dichotomies as it happens).

In the words of the Prisoner - "I am not a number!" 

So yes, I do find the Compatibilist position inconsistent. But only on certain days. Others not so much. 

 

[TheVat]

19 minutes ago, sethoflagos said:

I try to steer a course through life in such a way that I never get boxed into an undesirable situation from where there is no escape.

A bachelor, then.

😀

  One reason I resist adopting a firm stance on free will (and why I've minimized participating in this chat) is that no position really seems to resolve any issues in life or in the mysteries of cognitive science.  Some like to strike bold philosophical postures, but at the end of the day, if they haven't gone insane, they still behave as beings who make decisions and are held responsible for them.  

[sethoflagos]

50 minutes ago, TheVat said:

A bachelor, then.

😀

Given that my wife and I are often residing in different countries, I must declare this a moot point.

[iNow]

9 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

I do find the Compatibilist position inconsistent. But only on certain days. Others not so much. 

This made me chuckle. +1 for the entire post. I also hope it felt good to get that out. 

Edited December 8, 2023 by iNow
Forgot it… literally I then T

[sethoflagos]

1 hour ago, iNow said:

I also hope it felt good to get that out.

Yes, it did rather, and thank you. 

It was a bit bloggy, I know, but these days I find it difficult to get a complex train of thought in order without actually writing it out longhand. Otherwise I get halfway through and forget both the point I'm responding to and the response I intended to make.

Apologies to those who find that sort of thing too me-me-me. 

[AIkonoklazt]

As a brand-spanking new convert to hard determinism (as of this thread), I feel awesome.

I'm not responsible for a darned thing. I couldn't be. I have no qualms in joining the meat robot army because well, I have no choice.