Current state of the debate between free will and determinism in philosophy and neuroscience

[TheVat]

If Patrick McGoohan, as Number Six, had really been a "free man" wouldn't he have selected a piece of cutlery from his kitchen and taken it along on his beach runs in order to puncture that giant angry balloon?  Clearly something was keeping him from choosing escape strategies that he wanted to try.  My theory is that all his actions were dictated by an invisible being called a screenwriter.  

[sethoflagos]

3 hours ago, TheVat said:

If Patrick McGoohan, as Number Six, had really been a "free man" wouldn't he have selected a piece of cutlery from his kitchen and taken it along on his beach runs in order to puncture that giant angry balloon?  Clearly something was keeping him from choosing escape strategies that he wanted to try.  My theory is that all his actions were dictated by an invisible being called a screenwriter.  

'Rover' was a wolf in sheep's clothing and quite lethal. The main theme of the series is the conflict between individualist vs collectivist principles which quite coincidently has been explicitly referenced earlier today by @Phi for All.

Also coincidently, I've just been musing on the difference in moral responsibility for their actions between say, a Macbeth and an actor playing Macbeth obliged to perform his part to the letter. 

Quote

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages.

 

[AIkonoklazt]

Hi, new hard determinism convert again. I'm in a bit of a pickle.

I couldn't really say "I did [this and that]" anymore, since it's not really me, right? It's everything that went in and through my body. How can I keep saying "I did [anything]" at all without being a complete bozo?

Help me out here.

[Eise]

On 12/7/2023 at 4:07 PM, sethoflagos said:

So no. I will not choose between one obscure definition of free will and another.

No idea what is obscure in my definition: "to be able to act according to what you want". I think the main problem in this understanding is that the ideological concept of free will always sneaks in. It shows e.g. when people are baffled about Libet-like experiments: it means that people automatically still assume that consciousness comes first, then the action potential in the brain, and then the action itself. But nothing of that is in my definition!  And there is also nothing in our experience that I really could have done otherwise in the exact physical circumstances, including my body and brain. So why stick to that? Because we must live with the old fashioned heritage of our Christian culture, in which our libertarian free will was used to solve the problem of the theodicy?

If you are not interested in the problem, fine. But if one wants to solve an intelligibility problem, then one has to dive deeper. 

[sethoflagos]

6 hours ago, Eise said:

If you are not interested in the problem, fine. But if one wants to solve an intelligibility problem, then one has to dive deeper.

Okay, but I'm going to have to unpick your post in reverse order since it's the baggage trailing in the wake that I take issues with.

6 hours ago, Eise said:

Because we must live with the old fashioned heritage of our Christian culture, in which our libertarian free will was used to solve the problem of the theodicy?

Can I assume here that your 'libertarian' is the selfish and impulsive spoilt brat of right-libertarianism as understood in American circles?

It's an important point since I'm drawn to a form of libertarianism based on the utilitarian principles of William Godwin. Here, while acknowledging both the validity and value of the base impulses, they are exercised within the framework of a good, solid code of ethics. For me, Aristotle's Golden Mean plus a measure of stoicism works (eg 'make a friend of hunger' counts as sound medical advice).

I try not to take offence when you condemn libertarian values as 'absurd', but I do speak English rather than American. Your point gets lost in translation.

6 hours ago, Eise said:

It shows e.g. when people are baffled about Libet-like experiments: it means that people automatically still assume that consciousness comes first, then the action potential in the brain, and then the action itself. But nothing of that is in my definition!

You oblige me to read The Libet experiment and its implications for conscious will, to understand some guy's work that no-one else can reduplicate.

My impression is that our potential responses arrive in waves starting with the base impulses, with more nuanced influences following on and consciousness emerging somewhere during the process to play a supervisory role in making the choice. Sometimes just to say 'Oops! Sorry' when the action came prematurely. 

Does this script not fit the style of the movie?

6 hours ago, Eise said:

I think the main problem in this understanding is that the ideological concept of free will always sneaks in.

Perhaps. Or perhaps it's the lack of consistency in the degree of determinism necessary in defining 'will'.

6 hours ago, Eise said:

No idea what is obscure in my definition: "to be able to act according to what you want"

One sentence linking at least five distinct concepts all subject to diverse interpretation. Easy as pie!

We differ only on the role of determinism, I think. That's our main outstanding issue.       

Edited December 11, 2023 by sethoflagos
sp

[Eise]

16 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

Can I assume here that your 'libertarian' is the selfish and impulsive spoilt brat of right-libertarianism as understood in American circles?

No, sorry. In philosophical free will discussions, libertarian free will means that we, with our 'free minds' can break through determinism. The connection with libertarianism, as political ideology is loose. Where it does give some support to political libertarianism, it does not logically follow from a belief in libertarian free will. 

17 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

You oblige me to read The Libet experiment and its implications for conscious will, to understand some guy's work that no-one else can reduplicate.

I think the Libet experiment is not very meaningful as a model of free choice IRL (=in real life). The task of the test subjects was to spontaneously move a hand, i.e. without any reason why just then. Is that really a good model for what we consider free will IRL?

• Some choices what to do take considerably 'pre-thinking', e.g. the greater choices we make in life. Or in planning longer term projects, be it in private of together. (Was there thinking involved in designing the LHC? I am inclined to believe 'yes'...)
• Some choices are automatic, trained reactions. E.g. I brake for an unexpected pedestrian on the road, even before I am conscious of me seeing him. But the braking is completely according my intentions, the automatism created by consciously training driving. Sports training is another example. Consciousness is just too slow for many sports (tennis, or even worse table tennis), so you train to get automatically correct reactions. Just what you want
• I can't think of examples of actions that we do for no reason, have no importance at all, and are still conscious, willed actions.

In short, Libet's experiments have nothing to do free will as we experience IRL. (Great abbreviation, iNow!).

17 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

On 12/11/2023 at 10:12 AM, Eise said:

I think the main problem in this understanding is that the ideological concept of free will always sneaks in.

Perhaps. Or perhaps it's the lack of consistency in the degree of determinism necessary in defining 'will'.

I thought we had left that behind? Compatibilism is the position that determinism (without any wriggles!) is compatible with free will, or even a necessary condition for free will. It does not say that the world is completely deterministic. But the more randomness sneaks in, the more difficult it becomes to express out free will. Therefore I used the concept of 'sufficient free will'. 100% Determinism would be best for free will. And if e.g. in the brain quantum processes average out, then we can assume the brain to be deterministic, so that would be great.

17 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

On 12/11/2023 at 10:12 AM, Eise said:

No idea what is obscure in my definition: "to be able to act according to what you want"

One sentence linking at least five distinct concepts all subject to diverse interpretation. Easy as pie!

I think IRL you know very well what my definition means. 

[iNow]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

In short, Libet's experiments have nothing to do free will as we experience IRL.

But his work is just one set of data from many decades ago, and new work / better work since then has been performed by numerous others and has consistently supported similar conclusions. 

[sethoflagos]

4 hours ago, Eise said:

It does not say that the world is completely deterministic. But the more randomness sneaks in, the more difficult it becomes to express out free will.

So causal influences are simply a dichotomy of the determined and the random? Are these the only possibilities? Why do you omit those arising from the infintely larger sphere of the abstract?

Under conditions of physical duress, I might turn my mind to imagining a full-blooded chorus of Ritt der Walküren to summon power and fortitude from its driving ferocity. Where does all this magnificent sound come from? Do I have a high fidelity recording somehow etched into my brain? What if I change the tempo a little - or a lot? What if I decide to try out Kirsten Flagstad as Brünnhilde in place of Birgit Nilsson. I've only heard snippets of Flagstad's Brünnhilde and that was in Götterdämmerung but I can imagine her in Die Walküre, her subtly different timbre and undeniable glamour bringing an altogether different feel to the staging? What if I imagine the all-important bass trombone is thundering a little on the flat side... or god forbid! sharp!?

Each change will impact my mood and my actions on my surroundings (or at least my long-suffering wife).

Nothing of this is 'random' according to my understanding of the word. Nor can it be written into the entropy of any historical arrangement of material particles and be thus determined. And yet the sight, sound, scent, taste and touch of that conscious experience have existed since at least the dawn of time as a distinct potential in the abstract. Every bit as real as the number seven. 

So when I decide seven is greater than six and act accordingly, it's not a random decision; it isn't determined (though it may be expressed) by my environment; it just is. So I affirm that fact with my will. If and when I'm in the mood to do so.    

[Eise]

15 hours ago, iNow said:

But his work is just one set of data from many decades ago, and new work / better work since then has been performed by numerous others and has consistently supported similar conclusions. 

sethoflagos was referring to Libet, so I reacted on that. If you want to discuss newer Libet-style experiments, then maybe mention one, so we have something to discuss? But if such experiments only show that a spooky, magical and incoherent idea of free will does not exist, then it is not much use. Measuring events building up in the brain before a conscious action is done is not against compatibilist free will, so if this is the only thing these experiments show, you can let it be.

[iNow]

Yeah, we’re aligned on the neurobiology.