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Posted (edited)
On 11/24/2023 at 9:14 AM, Eise said:

But I think predictability has nothing to do with free will. I do not feel that my free will is constrained because my wife knows me pretty well, and can predict (better than others, at least) what I will do. So why would I be disturbed by a neurologist predicting my decisions, choices and/or actions even better, as long as I am able to act according my intentions?

What if your neurologist was so competent that he became a Laplace's Demon and provided you with a scheduled listing of all your actions for the next 24 hours? Wouldn't a compatibilist's belief in determinism conflict with his freedom to deviate from the Demon's prediction only to fall foul of some time reversed Grandfather paradox?

Even if you claim that predictability has nothing to do with free will it appears from the above that compatibilism requires the future to be unknowable for free will to remain meaningful. The macroscopic diversity and non-linearity I mentioned were intended to suggest that there may be profound reasons why that future is indeed unknowable; we do not and never will know exactly the point where lightning will next strike, and that seems a necessary condition for the very existence of free will. They give free will 'elbow room'.

When you talk about the predictability of your behaviour are you not not really just talking about trust? The habitual repetitive patterns of behaviour that you have developed over a lifetime in defiance of random external stimuli? Those patterns that a wife may find reliably secure and comforting, in contrast to an archetype impulsive free spirit like Peter Pan?

How would we ever know that a Peter Pan had any free will at all? It surely takes an effort of free will curb one's impulses and train oneself to be a person a life partner could trust. This seems to be Spinoza's vision of free will

Quote

For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine freedom while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage.

                                                                                                        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

While initial urge may arguably be deterministic, the development and regular practice of 'good habits' further distances action from external influences.

Having made elbow room for some definition of free will:

On 11/24/2023 at 9:14 AM, Eise said:

As you probably know, Dennett has a kind of Darwinian view on what happens in the brain. Several strands of thoughts or feelings develop in parallel, and one of them in the end 'wins', meaning it catches access to motoric neurons, and leads to an action, be it a real bodily movement, or something spoken out. (Therefore he names his model the 'multiple draughts' model of the mind.)

As a philosophical construct that definition of free will must be an idealised perfect form. 

One issue I might raise here is that evolution doesn't habitually create perfect forms. It strongly prefers 'sufficient' forms. Given a choice of multiple alternative means to an end, it invariably seems to go the recurrent laryngeal nerve route. However, evolutionarily desirable free will may be to the survival of a species, I suspect that the most economic structure to build from readily available materials would be some merely sufficient simulation. 

1 hour ago, StringJunky said:

"Ummm... I'd love a cream cake". (determinism), but I'm not going to have one as I'm on a diet. (freewill).

True or false?

Your decision to engage in a sensible diet was a result of logical deduction. Logic transcends the boundaries of the universe and is therefore an uncaused cause.

Edited by sethoflagos
Clarification
Posted
53 minutes ago, sethoflagos said:

Your decision to engage in a sensible diet was a result of logical deduction. Logic transcends the boundaries of the universe and is therefore an uncaused cause.

Like this and the rest of your summing up +1

 

Now here's a thought

Philosophical determinism is a bit of a cop out isn't it ?

After it it is a bit like the God-did-it brigade.

Determinist. "Actions are determined !"

Questioner " Can you show me how to determine any action ?"

Determinist "No idea but I believe it can be done if all the information and all the rules are known"

Questioner "So who knows all of this stuff ?"

 

Determinist " God ?"

 

Something else I have never been able to get a determinist to clarify.

Is determinism A Priori or Posteriori or both or neither ?

Posted (edited)
39 minutes ago, studiot said:

Is determinism A Priori or Posteriori or both or neither ?

A priori (deduced) determinism demands no empirical evidence and is compatible only with faith based points of view.

A posteriori (induced) determinism takes on board the empirical evidence. 

So it could be either. There are many different flavours of determinism.

Edited by sethoflagos
bad latin
Posted
14 minutes ago, sethoflagos said:

A priori (deduced) determinism demands no empirical evidence and is compatible only with faith based points of view.

A posteriori (induced) determinism takes on board the empirical evidence. 

So it could be either. There are many different flavours of determinism.

Thanks for your view.

Posted
18 hours ago, Eise said:

It would be nice if in the philosophy forum, arguments are exchanged, not just viewpoints. I gave an argument against the idea that unpredictability is an element of free will. So now I expect an argument for your viewpoint from you. Or an argument why mine is wrong:

My post wasn't a reply to you. I don't expect anything when I post, replying to a post is optional. 

Posted
21 hours ago, StringJunky said:

"Ummm... I'd love a cream cake". (determinism), but I'm not going to have one as I'm on a diet. (freewill).

True or false?

I constructed this to be analysed. 

No, you cannot just say that your taste, as something you acquired because of your biology and upraising, is determined, but your will to be on a diet is not. This would still be libertarian free will. In my view everything is determined, so for me it makes no sense. In compatibilist free will, all we do is determined: but possibly in different ways. There lies the crux: the question of free will is not if we are determined (we are), but along which causal pathways our will was determined.

However, you touch an interesting point: is it possible to be more or less free? I think the question is how you formed your will, what you decided, and how well you can keep to your decision. Do you identify with you being on a diet, or does somebody threaten you (e.g. you spouse wanting you to lose weight, threatening to divorce from you if don't do it)?

Posted (edited)
18 minutes ago, Eise said:

No, you cannot just say that your taste, as something you acquired because of your biology and upraising, is determined, but your will to be on a diet is not. This would still be libertarian free will. In my view everything is determined, so for me it makes no sense. In compatibilist free will, all we do is determined: but possibly in different ways. There lies the crux: the question of free will is not if we are determined (we are), but along which causal pathways our will was determined.

However, you touch an interesting point: is it possible to be more or less free? I think the question is how you formed your will, what you decided, and how well you can keep to your decision. Do you identify with you being on a diet, or does somebody threaten you (e.g. you spouse wanting you to lose weight, threatening to divorce from you if don't do it)?

Are we one person in the first place?(at any one time or otherwise)

If we have overlapping areas of identity, then that must muddy the waters.

Edited by geordief
Posted (edited)
21 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

What if your neurologist was so competent that he became a Laplace's Demon and provided you with a scheduled listing of all your actions for the next 24 hours?

That would definitely lead to a Gödel-like situation. If I know this listing in advance, I can adapt my behaviour so that I will not do some of the actions on the list. The only way to avoid that, seems to be to account for me knowing the list. But that would change the list, and therefore my actions, and therefore the list...

An easier way would be to keep the list secret, and read it the day after. Then I could be astonished about how well Laplace's Demon did his work. But it would have no impact on my actions. And neither on my evaluation of how well my actions were in accordance with my knowledge and intentions.

21 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

When you talk about the predictability of your behaviour are you not not really just talking about trust?

No. It applies to everyone who is able to predict my actions, as long as I am not manipulated by somebody else.

21 hours ago, sethoflagos said:

Your decision to engage in a sensible diet was a result of logical deduction. Logic transcends the boundaries of the universe and is therefore an uncaused cause.

Where I do agree that a logical deduction was involved, to do so, and act according to my logical conclusion makes my action free, it is not the logic itself that makes me free. How many people have come to the conclusion that they should stop smoking, on perfectly logical grounds, but do not succeed? 

18 minutes ago, geordief said:

Are we one person in the first place?(at any one time or otherwise)

That is a good question. And it would take some precise definitions to answer the question. But my short answer is: yes, we are one person, but we have conflicting motivations, and maybe also doubt about facts. That means a person is not a rigorous unity. 

18 minutes ago, geordief said:

If we have overlapping areas of identity, then that must muddy the waters.

Oh yes! But nobody promised you a rose garden, is it?

11 hours ago, mistermack said:

My post wasn't a reply to you. I don't expect anything when I post, replying to a post is optional. 

And that is exactly why I made my remark. When you pose something, shortly after I posted an opposing view, it would be interesting to know what your arguments against my position are. Exchange of arguments is one of the corner stones of philosophy, and this is the philosophy forum. And also SFN is a discussion platform. It would be a pity when threads are just independent opinions without arguments.

Having an opinion is easy, especially in philosophy. To have a well argued opinion is definitively more work.

Edited by Eise
Posted (edited)
On 11/25/2023 at 10:50 PM, Bufofrog said:

I have given it thought and we obviously have free will.  You have managed to confuse your self by silly philosophical arguments.

Of course I know what your response will be because you unfortunately do not have free will and will have no choice except to give a silly response.

 

Edited by dimreepr
Posted
52 minutes ago, Eise said:

No, you cannot just say that your taste, as something you acquired because of your biology and upraising, is determined, but your will to be on a diet is not. This would still be libertarian free will. In my view everything is determined, so for me it makes no sense. In compatibilist free will, all we do is determined: but possibly in different ways. There lies the crux: the question of free will is not if we are determined (we are), but along which causal pathways our will was determined.

However, you touch an interesting point: is it possible to be more or less free? I think the question is how you formed your will, what you decided, and how well you can keep to your decision. Do you identify with you being on a diet, or does somebody threaten you (e.g. you spouse wanting you to lose weight, threatening to divorce from you if don't do it)?

 Thanks for your thoughts.

Posted
21 hours ago, studiot said:

Is determinism A Priori or Posteriori or both or neither ?

That's the fundamental problem, it's impossible to know where to start.

So it has no place in the question.

 

Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, Eise said:

yes, we are one person, but we have conflicting motivations

 

Can we draw a line between our motivations and our identity?

Is our identity something that we construct post  facto?

Is there a difference between how we experience our identity and how we model it (or another person's  identity)?

 

1 hour ago, StringJunky said:

 Thanks for your thoughts.

Are you still off the smokes?

:-)

Edited by geordief
Posted (edited)
18 minutes ago, geordief said:

Are you still off the smokes?

:-)

Yes, it has no hold on me now. I can take or leave it. Once in a while I'll ask for one from close friends when I'm with them. On my own I couldn't care less. It was permanent yellow finger tips that finished me off with smoking. 

Edited by StringJunky
Posted (edited)
37 minutes ago, geordief said:

Can we draw a line between our motivations and our identity?

Some can.

37 minutes ago, geordief said:

Is our identity something that we construct post  facto?

The strory depends on who we want to impress.

37 minutes ago, geordief said:

Is there a difference between how we experience our identity and how we model it (or another person's  identity)?

It all depends on one's shoe's and who gets to walk in them...

Edited by dimreepr
Posted
3 hours ago, Eise said:

However, you touch an interesting point: is it possible to be more or less free? I think the question is how you formed your will, what you decided, and how well you can keep to your decision. Do you identify with you being on a diet, or does somebody threaten you ....?

If both our inner motivations and life influences are determined, then there would seem to be no relative degrees of freedom.  In compatibilism, some actions may feel more free than others, but all are woven in the web of causality.  Even if I use a coin flip to make a decision I feel I can't.  

Posted (edited)
15 hours ago, TheVat said:

If both our inner motivations and life influences are determined, then there would seem to be no relative degrees of freedom. 

Well, if you think only libertarian free will is the correct concept of free will, and we do not have it, sure. But the concept of libertarian free will is incoherent from the outset.

15 hours ago, TheVat said:

In compatibilism, some actions may feel more free than others, but all are woven in the web of causality.

Well, if everything is determined, then of course '(actions) are woven in the web of causality'. I never denied that, and even stated it: determinism is a necessary condition for free will to exist. As I said just above what you cited:

19 hours ago, Eise said:

There lies the crux: the question of free will is not if we are determined (we are), but along which causal pathways our will was determined.

 

17 hours ago, geordief said:

Can we draw a line between our motivations and our identity?

Sure we can. What our motivations (values, intentions) are, are part of my identity. 

17 hours ago, geordief said:

Is our identity something that we construct post  facto?

That question is not quite clear to me. Can you give (counter-) examples?

Edited by Eise
Posted (edited)
4 hours ago, Eise said:

Well, if you think only libertarian free will is the correct concept of free will, and we do not have it, sure. But the concept of libertarian free will is incoherent from the outset.

 

Understanding "Free Will"  ?

If you are going to understand free will you need to start by realising that this is a compound statement with an inherent tension or partial contradiction.

Furthermore if you are going to fully understand it you cannot pick and choose specific or particular definions alone.

~Fully automatically points to 'understanding' being a range rather than a single instance.

We can then see that both free and will also have ranges of meaning rather than just one.

 

Sometimes it is easier to define the negation or opposite of something and then say that the something is 'everything which is not the negation'.

 

Working along these lines what is the opposite or negation of free will ?

Do we negate one or both terms ?

Opposites to free couls be 'forced', or 'constrained' , which are different.

But 'will' implies a degree of forcing, therby opposing the idea of free.

Constraints are weaker than forcing, to which there is no opposition.

So we come to the idea that free will is anything within a set of constraints.

Physics make considerable use of the idea of 'degrees of freedom'.

On use of degrees of freedom is in making the distinction between a structure and a mechanism.

Structures ( and indeed other systems) can also be what is known as overdetermined.

Mechanisms are where a structure is underdetermined, so has one or more degrees of freedom, so is 'free' to take up a range of positions.

Does the mechanism therefore possess 'free will ?

 

Note for @Alkonoklazt  Computer systems and programs also conform to this underdetermined/overdetermined/uniquely determined  classification.

 

Don't know why the @function is not working properly ?

Edited by studiot
Posted (edited)
9 minutes ago, studiot said:

 

Understanding "Free Will"  ?

If you are going to understand free will you need to start by realising that this is a compound statement with an inherent tension or partial contradiction.

Furthermore if you are going to fully understand it you cannot pick and choose specific or particular definions alone.

~Fully automatically points to 'understanding' being a range rather than a single instance.

We can then see that both free and will also have ranges of meaning rather than just one.

 

Sometimes it is easier to define the negation or opposite of something and then say that the something is 'everything which is not the negation'.

 

Working along these lines what is the opposite or negation of free will ?

Do we negate one or both terms ?

Opposites to free couls be 'forced', or 'constrained' , which are different.

But 'will' implies a degree of forcing, therby opposing the idea of free.

Constraints are weaker than forcing, to which there is no opposition.

So we come to the idea that free will is anything within a set of constraints.

Physics make considerable use of the idea of 'degrees of freedom'.

On use of degrees of freedom is in making the distinction between a structure and a mechanism.

Structures ( and indeed other systems) can also be what is known as overdetermined.

Mechanisms are where a structure is underdetermined, so has one or more degrees of freedom, so is 'free' to take up a range of positions.

Does the mechanism therefore possess 'free will ?

 

Note for @Alkonoklazt  Computer systems and programs also conform to this underdetermined/overdetermined/uniquely determined  classification.

 

The ability to potentially* act without constraint from pre-determined behaviour patterns.

*It doesn't logically follow that we exercise it all the time

Edited by StringJunky
Posted
18 minutes ago, StringJunky said:

The ability to potentially* act without constraint from pre-determined behaviour patterns.

*It doesn't logically follow that we exercise it all the time

Wouldn't a counter example to this definition be someone at the beginning of a nuclear physics course saying

I have free will to pass my exam ?

She may be able to pass that exam at the end of the course, but at the beginning  she can only wish.

Posted
14 minutes ago, studiot said:

Mechanisms are where a structure is underdetermined, so has one or more degrees of freedom, so is 'free' to take up a range of positions.

Does the mechanism therefore possess 'free will ?

No. It has no will. It's behaviour is not formed by personal taste, intention, values, etc etc. Why do you start from the beginning? I use a clear definition of free will: 

We are said to have free will if we can act according our intentions and believes.

You may shoot holes in this definition, but I find it useless to start the whole discussion from the beginning.

17 minutes ago, studiot said:

Sometimes it is easier to define the negation or opposite of something and then say that the something is 'everything which is not the negation'.

Coercion. The question if somebody acted out of free will or was coerced is a meaningful question. The same question about a falling stone is useless. A stone has no will, because it has no intentions and believes. 

Posted
22 minutes ago, Eise said:

Coercion. The question if somebody acted out of free will or was coerced is a meaningful question. The same question about a falling stone is useless. A stone has no will, because it has no intentions and believes. 

I don't like the use of the word coercion because it is stronger than forced.

 

34 minutes ago, Eise said:

No. It has no will. It's behaviour is not formed by personal taste, intention, values, etc etc. Why do you start from the beginning? I use a clear definition of free will: 

We are said to have free will if we can act according our intentions and believes.

You may shoot holes in this definition, but I find it useless to start the whole discussion from the beginning.

My question was Rhetorical.

Do you seriously believe there is only one unique use of the term free will employed ?

On the face of it your definition sounds good but it is incomplete.
Intentions and beliefs ?  All of them all of the time ?

Is free will a general state or doe it apply sometimes and not others ?

No I was not starting at the beginning, but do I not have a point  (that you ignored) ?

1 hour ago, studiot said:

Furthermore if you are going to fully understand it you cannot pick and choose specific or particular definions alone.

 

Posted (edited)
34 minutes ago, studiot said:

I don't like the use of the word coercion because it is stronger than forced.

Can be: I am not a native English speaker. But in philosophical discussions, 'coercion' is the most used word.

34 minutes ago, studiot said:

My question was Rhetorical.

Do not use rhetorical questions in philosophical discussions, except when it is perfectly clear that it was meant as such.

34 minutes ago, studiot said:

Do you seriously believe there is only one unique use of the term free will employed ?

Some are definitely better than others. 

34 minutes ago, studiot said:

On the face of it your definition sounds good but it is incomplete.
Intentions and beliefs ?  All of them all of the time ?

Reread my definition:

1 hour ago, Eise said:

We are said to have free will if we can act according our intentions and believes.

Often we cannot. And as my intentions can be inconsistent (see my reaction to Giordief), and I may not be sure about what I really believe in, so no, it often will not be the case that I can act in such a way that all of my intention and believes are fulfilled. But once I made decision, then it can becomes quite clear: can I act according my decision, or does somebody  intentionally block my action?

Edited by Eise
Posted
5 hours ago, Eise said:

That question is not quite clear to me. Can you give (counter-) examples?

Not quite sure what was in my head when I posted that.Maybe this would be an example of what I had in mind.

 

When you form a close attachment to another person , that (in your ,and in all likelihood in others') minds defines who you are.

It is a commonplace to hear said that when such a person is lost then a part of the person is lost too.

 

Again ,Stringjungky gave up smoking some 5 or more years ago and those who try to motivate people like him to quit an addictive habit often (I think) say that you have succeeded in your change of behaviour when you identify in your own mind as a "non-smoker"

 

I quit some 30/40 years ago but I don't meet that criterion and still miss the habit ,especially the offering of a cig to a friend or a stranger. 

 

If you give me a clue ,perhaps I could think of a counter-example?

22 hours ago, geordief said:

Can we draw a line between our motivations and our identity?

Is our identity something that we construct post  facto?

Is there a difference between how we experience our identity and how we model it (or another person's  identity)?

 

Posted
3 hours ago, Eise said:

Coercion. The question if somebody acted out of free will or was coerced is a meaningful question. The same question about a falling stone is useless. A stone has no will, because it has no intentions and believes. 

I agree. Intent has to be accompanied with freewill, which requires some form of decision-making - the ability to distinguish and act on some range of choices.

Posted
On 11/13/2023 at 7:32 AM, dimreepr said:

If we understand where free will, which is the point of this topic, actually exists in the human condition, then that knowledge when accepted by society, would automatically lead to a more refined understanding of justice and how to more appropriately deal with the perpetrator.

I was going to disagree but no matter how hard I try I can't force my fingers to type a negative response.  So I guess we don't have free will.

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