What are the benefits of understanding our free will?

[studiot]

If folks want to have a ding dong about judicial deterrence, prisons, sentences and so on can we have a proper thread for it please, rather than dragging this thread about free will further and further off topic ?

[joigus]

On 12/6/2023 at 11:10 AM, Eise said:

But... In the first place, not epiphenomenal. Epiphenomalism is in my eyes just another form of dualism. I prefer 'supervenience' as concept to describe the relationship between the brain and the mind. 

And in the second place, determinism is a necessary condition of free will. 

There are some nuances here I have to learn more about. I've heard physicists say this or that is "emergent" or an "epiphenomenon" as if they were synonyms. Maybe the "or" was an exclusive "or"...

Edited December 7, 2023 by joigus
minor correction

[sethoflagos]

18 hours ago, joigus said:

I've heard physicists say this or that is "emergent" or an "epiphenomenon" as if they were synonyms.

Google says that charge and current have been described as 'epiphenomena' of events in the 'more fundamental' underlying electromagnetic field. I could imagine someone describing them as 'weakly emergent' also, but there are problems with both usages,

However, if those field events were of appropriate frequency to effect a mental response of 'red', then in philosophy of mind the colour would be epiphenomenal to the field. In this sense, the causal relationship differs significantly from those implied in Maxwell's equations. Distinguishing physical events from mental events in this way have indeed lead some to a new form of dualism so I guess this is the extreme interpretation understandably condemned by @Eise.- "any perceived impact of free will on the physical world is illusory". 

'Epiphenomenon' again means something entirely different in medicine (symptoms that just happen to correlate)

And all three differ from the original sense employed in metaphysics.

Bad word!  

A better framing of the question may be to determine initially whether 'volition' as a concept is abstract or concrete. 

Edited December 8, 2023 by sethoflagos

[dimreepr]

On 12/6/2023 at 4:26 PM, studiot said:

If folks want to have a ding dong about judicial deterrence, prisons, sentences and so on can we have a proper thread for it please, rather than dragging this thread about free will further and further off topic ?

When I read this my iron-e-meter went pop and took out my computer for 3 days; which gave me pause for thought.

What's the point of asking a question? bc free will seems to be a synonym for I'm right.

On 12/8/2023 at 12:16 PM, sethoflagos said:

Google says

Yes it does, but it doesn't understand the question...

[Eise]

On 12/7/2023 at 7:55 PM, joigus said:

There are some nuances here I have to learn more about. I've heard physicists say this or that is "emergent" or an "epiphenomenon" as if they were synonyms. Maybe the "or" was an exclusive "or"...

It lies in the kind of relationship between the 'lower order phenomena' and the 'higher order phenomena'.

For supervenience this means ontologically we look at same system with different views: we can chemically analyse the paper of a book, measure its dimensions, chemically analyse the ink, and can even describe the form of the ink blobs on the pages. This is the view needed e.g. in forensic investigation, or archaeological research. But we can also just read the book. But it is the same book! Both views are completely OK. But it is clear you will understand nothing about the contents of the book, if you only do physical- or chemical analyses. But this is what 'freewill deniers' do: they look at the lower order phenomena only. And then, by using a magical definition of 'free will', it is easy to deny its existence. Nothing at the lower order phenomena points at some magic. So case closed. 

Epiphenomalism states that brain states cause mental phenomena, but mental phenomena cannot cause changes in the brain. But it simply doesn't fit to the concept of the naturalist conception of causation: causation implies energy- and momentum exchange (action is reaction), but in this case, we then should see energy leaking away from the brain, that never comes back. One option to get out of this, is proposing a 'mental entity' that cannot be detected by other physical means, but is the home of our mental events. In other words, a soul. Only for this reason, epiphenomalism is not a viable alternative for naturalists.

The other problem is that it is a self contradiction. Epiphenomalism means, per definition, that the processes would run just the same, if it produces mental events or not. So it would mean that philosophical zombies are possible: entities that exactly look like humans, behave exactly the same like humans, but they have no mental life. How could such a zombie write an article about epiphenomalism? He has no idea about mental events, also per definition, so when we talk with one, we might soon discover that it looks like a human, but it isn't. Which contradicts the very definition of a philosophical zombie.

Here is a short short story from Raymond Smullyan: An Unfortunate Dualist. Read it, it is fun!

Edited December 11, 2023 by Eise

[joigus]

2 hours ago, Eise said:

It lies in the kind of relationship between the 'lower order phenomena' and the 'higher order phenomena'.

For supervenience this means ontologically we look at same system with different views: we can chemically analyse the paper of a book, measure its dimensions, chemically analyse the ink, and can even describe the form of the ink blobs on the pages. This is the view needed e.g. in forensic investigation, or archaeological research. But we can also just read the book. But it is the same book! Both views are completely OK. But it is clear you will understand nothing about the contents of the book, if you only do physical- or chemical analyses. But this is what 'freewill deniers' do: they look at the lower order phenomena only. And then, by using a magical definition of 'free will', it is easy to deny its existence. Nothing at the lower order phenomena points at some magic. So case closed. 

Epiphenomalism states that brain states cause mental phenomena, but mental phenomena cannot cause changes in the brain. But it simply doesn't fit to the concept of the naturalist conception of causation: causation implies energy- and momentum exchange (action is reaction), but in this case, we then should see energy leaking away from the brain, that never comes back. One option to get out of this, is proposing a 'mental entity' that cannot be detected by other physical means, but is the home of our mental events. In other words, a soul. Only for this reason, epiphenomalism is not a viable alternative for naturalists.

The other problem is that it is a self contradiction. Epiphenomalism means, per definition, that the processes would run just the same, if it produces mental events or not. So it would mean that philosophical zombies are possible: entities that exactly look like humans, behave exactly the same like humans, but they have no mental life. How could such a zombie write an article about epiphenomalism? He has no idea about mental events, also per definition, so when we talk with one, we might soon discover that it looks like a human, but it isn't. Which contradicts the very definition of a philosophical zombie.

Here is a short short story from Raymond Smullyan: An Unfortunate Dualist. Read it, it is fun!

That was very interesting, thank you.

[studiot]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

For supervenience this means ontologically we look at same system with different views: we can chemically analyse the paper of a book, measure its dimensions, chemically analyse the ink, and can even describe the form of the ink blobs on the pages. This is the view needed e.g. in forensic investigation, or archaeological research. But we can also just read the book. But it is the same book! Both views are completely OK. But it is clear you will understand nothing about the contents of the book, if you only do physical- or chemical analyses. But this is what 'freewill deniers' do: they look at the lower order phenomena only. And then, by using a magical definition of 'free will', it is easy to deny its existence. Nothing at the lower order phenomena points at some magic. So case closed. 

I agree with joigus, a very interesting viewpoint.

That is more like the old Eise we know and love. 
  +1

I have always had a great respect for Smullyan, and I sadly left his excellent book about Godel on a train a few years ago.

But I'm sorry his dualist story I find rather contrived, though I agree that there is more than a mechanistic meat machine to human ( and perhaps other) thought.

Edited December 11, 2023 by studiot

[TheVat]

4 hours ago, Eise said:

Epiphenomalism means, per definition, that the processes would run just the same, if it produces mental events or not. So it would mean that philosophical zombies are possible: entities that exactly look like humans, behave exactly the same like humans, but they have no mental life.

Thanks, this stresses the coherence problems of epiphenomenalism which as a metaphysical naturalist I reject.  Everything either supervenes on the physical, or reduces to it.  The relationship of consciousness to the physical is definitely the first one.  And consciousness then becomes, in a physicalist view, a certain sort of relationship between collections of matter.  E.g. consciousness is not a thing like my brain, it is the relationship between the body, its brain, ("me") and the external world.  Sort of like the novel is not ink on the page but the relationship created by those inked pages between a storyteller and a reader.  (don't hold me to all this, I'm still working it out....)

[sethoflagos]

8 hours ago, Eise said:

For supervenience this means ontologically we look at same system with different views: we can chemically analyse the paper of a book, measure its dimensions, chemically analyse the ink, and can even describe the form of the ink blobs on the pages. This is the view needed e.g. in forensic investigation, or archaeological research. But we can also just read the book. But it is the same book! Both views are completely OK. But it is clear you will understand nothing about the contents of the book, if you only do physical- or chemical analyses.

I read this and thought that you have just outlined the book definition of weak emergence.

This reference - SUPERVENIENCE, PHYSICALISM AND EMERGENCE - is a little longer than yours but for me, it pulls together many loose strands currently floating around the site. 

The fireworks start when we get on to strong emergence. Fasten your metaphysical safety belts.

[iNow]

12 hours ago, Eise said:

Epiphenomalism states that brain states cause mental phenomena, but mental phenomena cannot cause changes in the brain.

Why do they claim that previous brain states can’t cause changes in future brain states? That’s ridiculous. The brain does nothing but change from state to state. 

[Eise]

9 hours ago, iNow said:

Why do they claim that previous brain states can’t cause changes in future brain states?

Did I claim that epiphenomalists claim that? Quite the opposite: according epiphenomalists the brain would work just as it does even without conscious, mental phenomena. That is implicit in the definition of an epiphenomenon: mental phenomena play no role in brain states. Brain states cause new brain states, that cause new brain states etc. Just a causal process. But mental events are also caused by brain states, but have themselves no causal impact on the brain. Therefore they theoretically could just not exist at all. 

[iNow]

2 hours ago, Eise said:

That is implicit in the definition of an epiphenomenon: mental phenomena play no role in brain states.

Seems silly to me, but okay. 

[Eise]

17 hours ago, iNow said:

20 hours ago, Eise said:

That is implicit in the definition of an epiphenomenon: mental phenomena play no role in brain states.

Seems silly to me, but okay. 

Why? Do mental phenomena play a causal role in brain states? If so, how? If not, why do you think it is silly?

[iNow]

12 hours ago, Eise said:

Why? Do mental phenomena play a causal role in brain states? If so, how? If not, why do you think it is silly?

Pain is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Love is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Hunger, fatigue, confusion, optimism, depression… all  mental phenomena, all influence brain states (which are themselves in perpetual flux). 

I’m sure there’s some arcane super micro precise nonstandard usage definition of causal here that I’m ignoring though. 

Edited December 13, 2023 by iNow

[StringJunky]

5 hours ago, iNow said:

Pain is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Love is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Hunger, fatigue, confusion, optimism, depression… all  mental phenomena, all influence brain states (which are themselves in perpetual flux). 

I’m sure there’s some arcane super micro precise nonstandard usage definition of causal here that I’m ignoring though. 

I'm with you here. It's not a linear process. Sometimes, when one goes especially deep we can lose the sight of the forest. At the micro level, individual processes may be linear and sequential, but zoom out and the story changes to a more complicated one.

Edited December 14, 2023 by StringJunky

[Eise]

10 hours ago, iNow said:

Pain is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Love is a mental phenomenon. It clearly influences brain state. 

Hunger, fatigue, confusion, optimism, depression… all  mental phenomena, all influence brain states (which are themselves in perpetual flux). 

Nope. All these mental phenomena are brain states. You sound like a dualist here: mental phenomena 'influencing' brain states. (I put 'influencing' between quotes, because I think you are just trying to avoid 'causing'.)

[iNow]

5 hours ago, Eise said:

All these mental phenomena are brain states.

Ah, I see. So “causal” isn’t where my definition would be called wrong, but the challenge came instead toward my use of “mental phenomenon.”

Will you please offer examples of what YOU mean by mental phenomena that aren’t themselves brain states so we may better align?

[Eise]

21 hours ago, iNow said:

Will you please offer examples of what YOU mean by mental phenomena that aren’t themselves brain states so we may better align?

I think I have written that already: All these mental phenomena are brain states. There are no mental phenomena that are not brain states.

I would suggest to get back to the original question: 

On 12/13/2023 at 8:01 AM, Eise said:

Why? Do mental phenomena play a causal role in brain states? If so, how? If not, why do you think it is silly?

[iNow]

To make this simple, is the suggestion that brain state 1 cannot lead to brain state 2? 

[Eise]

7 minutes ago, iNow said:

To make this simple, is the suggestion that brain state 1 cannot lead to brain state 2? 

No. It is one brain state causing the next one. That is simplified of course: all kind of external causes also chime in, like the input of our senses.

I don't understand your questions. I am just as a determinist as you are. Our difference lies in our different conceptions of what free will is. 

[iNow]

29 minutes ago, Eise said:

I don't understand your questions

A label repeatedly leveled at me by various respondents in these FW threads is that I’m epiphenomenalist. I don’t think I am, but acknowledge maybe I’m wrong and have been trying to better understand that position in order to be more sure. When you said:

 

On 12/12/2023 at 4:30 AM, Eise said:

That is implicit in the definition of an epiphenomenon: mental phenomena play no role in brain states. Brain states cause new brain states, that cause new brain states etc. Just a causal process. But mental events are also caused by brain states, but have themselves no causal impact on the brain.

This struck me as an obvious disagreement I would have with that stance and the simplest rebuttal against claims that I am epiphenomenalist myself. It seemed quite silly to me… to suggest that a new brain state cannot be caused / influenced / shaped by a past one… or have “no causal impact on the brain.”

Ergo: If that’s what being an epiphenomenalist means, then I’m clearly not one.

However, while the above quote suggests there is a relevant meaningful difference between mental phenomena and brain states, the next quote below seems to suggest the opposite:

 

3 hours ago, Eise said:

All these mental phenomena are brain states. There are no mental phenomena that are not brain states.

And we agree if this is the case. I’m attempting to validate that agreement, but also respect that you may be using terms differently than I do and so I’m working to validate my own comprehension in parallel.

So… in that first quote… the implication was that there’s some sort of important difference between a mental phenomenon and a brain state. If so, what is that?

29 minutes ago, Eise said:

Our difference lies in our different conceptions of what free will is. 

Not entirely, though definitely agree we align in other important ways.

It is our notion of how the concept of “freedom” applies / does not apply to these FREE-will explorations that seems to differ most (and to be frank I don’t entirely disagree with you there either).

Please understand that I’m not approaching this topic with my mind up nor closed, but instead looking to challenge my existing preconceptions and better comprehend the various threads in this quilt were weaving together. To that end, I am grateful for your contributions and partnership in doing so. 

Edited December 15, 2023 by iNow

[Eise]

59 minutes ago, iNow said:

A label repeatedly leveled at me by various respondents in these FW threads is that I’m epiphenomenalist.

Yes. The reason is that you state that brain states cause mental phenomena, but the mental phenomena themselves have no causal impact. This 'construct' is exactly what epiphenomalism is.

1 hour ago, iNow said:

So… in that first quote… the implication was that there’s some sort of important difference between a mental phenomenon and a brain state. If so, what is that?

The perspective. Like my comparison with the book. On one side, you can study its physical and chemical properties, on the other side you can read it. But obviously, there is no contradiction. Both perspectives are valid, but somebody who studies the physical properties of a book is not in the position to claim that the book is 'just' paper, ink and nothing more. But you are saying this a lot: we are just wet meat robots. You are right that we are wet meat robots, but that is not the whole story: we, as wet meat robots, are so advanced that we are conscious, i.e. can experience ourselves, but not at levels below, like descriptions in terms of neurons, molecules, atoms etc. Watch it, if you feel the inclination to use the word 'just' (except you are talking about justice...). Most of the time, when people use the word 'just' in such a context, they leave out exactly what is essential.

Once again traffic jams: it is obvious that all cars are moving forwards, slowly, and sometimes standing still, but never backwards. But what if I say that in a traffic jam something is moving backwards? Somebody who 'just' looks at the cars will declare me insane: no car is moving backwards! But if you look how a traffic jam develops, you can see how the highest concentrations of cars move backwards! The reason of course is that I look at another level, not on the level of single cars, but as the cars as 'collective'.

 

[iNow]

2 minutes ago, Eise said:

You are right that we are wet meat robots, but that is not the whole story

It is if we're talking about the cause of behavior and actions.

4 minutes ago, Eise said:

if you look how a traffic jam develops, you can see how the highest concentrations of cars move backwards

I may need you to elaborate here. They don't move backwards, they simply move in the same direction more slowly... in aggregate. Individual cars may temporarily change gears and and go in reverse, but the overall flow doesn't tend to reverse.

[Eise]

On 12/15/2023 at 3:47 PM, iNow said:

On 12/15/2023 at 3:43 PM, Eise said:

if you look how a traffic jam develops, you can see how the highest concentrations of cars move backwards

I may need you to elaborate here.

Obviously. I wrote 'the highest concentrations of cars' not 'the cars'. Look e.g. at this video (clearest from 0:50, using time lapse). There you can clearly see that no car is going backwards, but the congestion does.

The backward moving congestion is an emergent phenomenon, that cannot be explained on the level of individual cars.

[iNow]

The congestion propagates backward, yes. I’m not denying higher order effects, but it’s still individual cars and drivers which lead to that congestion in aggregate and any behavioral focus must be at the vehicle/driver level. They are navigating larger situational restrictions, but it’s still them doing the navigating. 

Edited December 18, 2023 by iNow