The problem of good

[Night FM]

This is what I arrived at by taking part of the Epicurean paradox and reversing it. (In some quotes, I've heard it argued that God is malevolent if he is able and not willing to prevent evil, though according to Wikipedia, it argues that God is "not completely benevolent").

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicurean_paradox

Therefore, if God is able to prevent good, but not willing to do so. God is not completely malevolent. Or that if God is both able and willing to prevent good, then where does good come from?

I think this would make a good counter to arguments that "God is evil" merely because of the existence of evil or on the basis of God "having created evil". To be consistent, one would have to argue that God is not "completely evil" even if they would still argue that God is not completely benevolent. Or likewise, if God was "completely evil", then he presumably would be able and willing to prevent any good from occurring (which would raise the question as to where good comes from)?

Edited September 27 by Night FM

[Eise]

If you read the Wiki article you must have noticed that the Epicurean paradox is a trilemma.

• If a god knows everything and has unlimited power, then they have knowledge of all evil and have the power to put an end to it. But if they do not end it, they are not completely benevolent.
• If a god has unlimited power and is completely good, then they have the power to extinguish evil and want to extinguish it. But if they do not do it, their knowledge of evil is limited, so they are not all-knowing.
• If a god is all-knowing and totally good, then they know of all the evil that exists and wants to change it. But if they do not, which must be because they are not capable of changing it, so they are not omnipotent.

You only mention one of the options to get out of this 3-folded horn.