It's time to stop killing meat and start growing it

[In My Memory]

Severian,

This is only true if we are willing to adopt your rationalization of your morality. If I instead say it is wrong to kill one's own species, but OK to kill other species, then there is no problem.

There is a significant problem, namely that species membership doesnt actually name a creatures morally relevant capacities, or name moral characteristics about a being that provides a moral basis for protecting it. The statement, "Its ok to kill non-members of your own species" is morally equal to the statement "Its ok to kill non-members of your own race / religion / sex / nationality / hair-color / eye color / etc".

 

In fact, my alternate rationalization here is much more in keeping with an emergence of 'morality' from evolutionary pressures, since eating something you (or your offsrping) could breed with is reducing your chances of passing on your genes. Since I can't breed with a cow, I gain an advantage by eating it instead.

Then again, evolution isnt a moral theory.

 

But of course, if we took evolution to be a moral theory, you should note there is nothing morally obligatory about keeping the human species as a whole alive and prospering, and it would be consistent for a sufficiently dominant aggressor to section off a portion of the human species for their own gain -- I think you are too nice of a person, even for someone who destroys animals lives every day, to think defend "survival of the fittest" as a moral theory with those implications, and I think you are intelligent enough to understand the naturalistic fallacy and how it implies that evolution isnt a moral theory.

 

YT,

I`de eat ANY animal as long as it wasn`t toxic and I was hungry enough' date=' even Human.

 

Survival of the fittest and all that![/quote']

Your post reminds me of one of the really interesting things about morality, the way its portrayed in entertainment. Its a kind of moral schizophrenia where the most vile killers treat people in exactly the way that people treat animals.

 

One of my favorite movies of all time is Silence of the Lambs, where a killer called Buffalo Bill abducts women, confines them, and cuts their skin off to sew into a dress. This is extremely disturbing and vile... but then again, most of the people who watched that movie probably own leather jackets, belts, or shoes and think nothing out of the ordinary about treating animals like that.

 

The movie Se7en has an extremely distrubing torture scene to emulate the harm of sloth (one of the deadly sins):

Somerset is proved right when the man is found tied to his bed, alive but suffering from severe mental and physical deterioration after spending a year completely immobile.

Nothing is more torturous than that... but then, people think nothing out of the ordinary about eating veal or sirloin steaks, and no one thinks anything out of the ordinary about inducing "immobilization stress" on animals for experimentation.

 

The harm caused by skinning and immobilizing humans for weeks at a time is identical to harm of skinning and immobilizing non-human animals. The only difference between the two is the species-membership of the creatures, but species-membership is morally irrelevant and does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing the harm of skinning humans with skinning animals.

[YT2095]

well the problem arrises when you (not YOU in particular) view my sentiments with a Moral aspect or an Ethical one.

Morals and Ethics don`t come into it as far as I`m concerned.

 

While I Have the CHOICE, and can enjoy all that it brings to me, I`de sooner NOT eat people or tortured animals and will buy "Dolphin Friendly" Tuna.

 

if I`m deprived of this Choice and the Luxury of it, I`ll do what ever I have to to survive.

 

there`s No Choice involved, ergo.. no morals ethics to be had

 

but if "Grown meat" tastes as good and the price is right, then Yes, I would choose that to eat based upon Ethics/morals that I can afford.

[Skye]

IMM, the problem is that I can say all that matters is species membership and that's that. This is the problem with ethics, it's al based on axioms, which we don't all agreee upon.

[Severian]

There is a significant problem' date=' namely that species membership doesnt actually name a creatures morally relevant capacities, or name moral characteristics about a being that provides a moral basis for protecting it.

[/quote']

 

The problem with your statement is that you are abitrarily defining what characteristics of a creature are 'good enough' to base moral distinctions on. You have no reasoning behind your argument - simply an ansatz that some characteristics are valid for moral reasoning and some are not. So when you say that species membership is not a good characteristic, I am forced to ask 'why not'? I don't think you can give me an answer which does not (at some point) lie on a foundation of an arbitrary moral choice.

 

[Edit: Skye got there before me....]

 

The statement, "Its ok to kill non-members of your own species" is morally equal to the statement "Its ok to kill non-members of your own race / religion / sex / nationality / hair-color / eye color / etc".

 

If someone thinks that it is OK to kill black people because of their race, then obviously I am going to disagree with their moral position. However, I still recognise that it is a moral position, and as such cannot be argued against on purely logic grounds. The reason that I condemn it is because it is in opposition to my moral position.

 

Then again, evolution isnt a moral theory.

 

I never said that it was. But it is certainly the view of many on this forum that morality is not 'real' and is simply a behavioural affectation left over from the evolutionary process. I personally don't believe this, but it is a valid point of view (and you must ocassionally allow me to play to the audience).

 

it would be consistent for a sufficiently dominant aggressor to section off a portion of the human species for their own gain

 

Absolutely! I have actually made this argument myself on these fora. The recognition that morality is purely an evolutionary artifact instantly removes any compunction for an individual to act morally, since the only evolutionary imperative for the individual is to pass on his or her genetic traits.

[In My Memory]

Skye,

IMM, the problem is that I can say all that matters is species membership and that's that. This is the problem with ethics, it's al based on axioms, which we don't all agreee upon.

I'm not really sure what you're implying. Are you saying that people have moral disagreements, therefore its ok to kill animals? I dont think that follows.

 

Of course, even when people have disagreements, we're smart enough to weed out the naive forms of ethics and analyze certain principles for consistency through the simple rules of logical inference. Even if we dont know what actual moral rules are, we can say that a moral principle that simultaneously says A and not-A cannot possibly be true because its internally contradictory.

 

And more importantly, some moral axioms are actually reducible and can be analyzed for truthiness and consistency. For instance, there is a very ancient belief, called anthropocentricism, that human beings have a special place in the universe, and this belief was taken to be an axiomatic philosophical truth; naturally, people believed that the universe would reflect philosophical truths, so they constructed cosmologies and religions to reflect that philosophical truth. From anthropocentricism came geocentricism and scores of anthropocentric religious beliefs... but now, geocentricism is rejected as silly and superstitious, and just flat out wrong. But in a fit of moral schizophrenia, when people no longer believe that humans are the center of the physical universe, they insist that humans are the center of the moral universe, so they are still just as superstitious as they've ever been, and theres no possibility of any anthropocentric moral theories being true.

 

Many people hold moral axioms, such as the belief that humans have a special place in the universe, and that axiom forms the basis for dismissing the value of non-human animals. Of course, the belief that humans are the center of the universe is just wrong and superstitious, so it cannot be used as the basis for any moral distinctions, and all moral theories which follow from anthropocentric presumptions should be dismissed as superstitious.

 

Even if we cannot agree on what moral rules actually are, we can agree on what they are not. And if you follow any discussion on vegetarianism, you will undoubtedly see many people using fallacious or superstitious arguments in favor of killing animals, such as the claim that the entire moral universe revolves around humans and their affairs, or the claim that survival of the fittest forms the basis for any moral decisions.

[Severian]

Many people hold moral axioms' date=' such as the belief that humans have a special place in the universe, and that axiom forms the basis for dismissing the value of non-human animals. Of course, the belief that humans are the center of the universe is just wrong and superstitious, so it cannot be used as the basis for any moral distinctions, and all moral theories which follow from anthropocentric presumptions should be dismissed as superstitious.

[/quote']

 

My morality deals with how I act, and clearly humans do have a special place in my actions since I am human. It is not necessary for humanity to be special in 'the universe' in a scientific sense for me to hold the opinion that they are special to me. Therefore there is no problem with humanity holding a special place in the moral systems of humans. I would not necessarily expect an alien species to have the same moral values as I do.

[ydoaPs]

Not to sound insensitive, but they are just animals!

So are you!

 

You stand on the shore of the Indian Ocean in southern Somalia' date=' facing north, and in your left hand you hold the right hand of your mother. In turn she holds the hand of her mother, your grandmother. Your grandmother holds her hand, and so on. The chain wends its way up the beach, into the arid scrubland and westwards on towards the Kenya border.

 

How far do we have to go unitl we reach our common ancestor with the chimpanzees? It's a surprisingly short way. Allowing one yard per person, we arrive at the ancestor we share with the chimpanzees in under 300 miles. We've hardly started to cross the continent; we're still not hlaf way to the great Rift Valley. The ancestor is staning well to the east of Mount Kenya, and holing her hand an entire chain of her lineal decendants, culminating in your staning on the Somali beach.

 

The daughter that she is holing in her right hand is the one from whom we are descended. Now the arch-ancestress turns eastward to face the coast, and with her left hand grasps the other daughter, the one from whom the chimpanzees are decended (or son, of course, but let's stick with females for convenience). The two sisters are facing one another, and each holding their mother by the hand. Now the second daughter, the chimpanzee ancestress, holds her daughter's hand, and a new chain is formed, proceeding back towards the coast. First cousin faces first cousin, second cousin faces second cousin, and so on. By the time the folded-back chain has reached the coast again, it consists of modern chimpanzees. You are face to face with your chimpanzee cousin, and you are joined to her by an unbroken chain of mothers holding the hands of their daughters. ... Daughters would resemble their mothers as much (or as little) as they always do. Mothers would love their daughters, and feel affinity for them as they always do.[/quote']

 

 

Some people act like animals are just like people, and I can assure you they are not.

how far away from humans do we have to go until killing is "okay"?

 

 

Most of them are stupid and ugly little monsters, and the only good thing about most of them is the way they taste.

ever met a human?

[In My Memory]

Severian,

The problem with your statement is that you are abitrarily defining what characteristics of a creature are 'good enough' to base moral distinctions on. You have no reasoning behind your argument - simply an ansatz that some characteristics are valid for moral reasoning and some are not. So when you say that species membership is not a good characteristic, I am forced to ask 'why not'? I don't think you can give me an answer which does not (at some point) lie on a foundation of an arbitrary moral choice.

I certainly can give you an answer. I recommend reading "Species is a social construction" by Daniel Elstein, who provides a succinct explanation for why species-membership does not carry any moral relevance:

Biologists have their own uses for their own species concepts, and for laypeople species distinctions serve as a convenient way of describing collections of large numbers of variables. The question is whether “the species concept” is ever useful in moral philosophy, and if so, when? In asking this, which species concept we mean is automatically in question. Is it the everyday-language concept of laypeople, and if so, whose? Or is it one of the more than a dozen species concepts currently held by biologists? Anyone who argues that “the species concept” is useful in moral philosophy must first specify which species concept they have in mind. One cannot simply say "species" is morally relevant as if the term has some precise and obvious meaning- as if species were some sort of essential thing that needs no explanation, because it is God-given and beyond question.

 

For instance, the philosopher Carl Cohen writes:

We incorporate the different moral standing of different species into our overall moral views; we think it reasonable to put earthworms on fishhooks but not cats; we think it reasonable to eat the flesh of cows but not the flesh of humans. The realization of the sharply different moral standing of different species we internalize… In the conduct of our day to day lives, we are constantly making decisions and acting on these moral differences among species. When we think clearly and judge fairly, we are all speciesists, of course. (Cohen, 62)

 

I would first note that Cohen is using the term "speciesist" incorrectly, since he is talking not about the importance of "species" but about the importance of qualities that are correlated with our perceptions of species. His argument is therefore irrelevant because it ignores Singer’s point that individuals of different species (and individuals of the same species) should be treated differently insofar as they have morally relevant differences- just as men have no right to an affordable mammogram and wealthy white men have no right to the benefits of affirmative action. But what I really want to draw attention to is the question, what does Cohen mean by "species"? One might think that it would be giving Cohen the benefit of the doubt to just name one, preferably one that is accepted by many experts. Let's suppose, for instance, he is talking about Mayr’s biological species concept, which defines a species as a group of individuals capable of interbreeding and producing fertile offspring. But surely Cohen does not believe that when we "are constantly making decisions and acting on these moral differences among species,” we are making our decisions based upon matters of who is capable of breeding with whom. For, not only do we not need to know any information about the mating capabilities of these animals to make moral distinctions between them; most of us wouldn’t even know what to do with this kind of information if we had it!

 

So perhaps Cohen means a "commonsense" concept of species. That is, what is morally relevant are the distinctions that we are all capable of making simply by looking, with no scientific or philosophical training. What is morally relevant, in other words, is appearance. Yet I doubt that when Cohen wrote this passage he had appearance in mind as a morally relevant characteristic. For Cohen, unlike Darwin, the difference between humans and other animals is not merely one of degree, but one of kind. It is difficult to imagine how Cohen might hold this essential difference of kind to be based upon appearance. More likely, he would probably claim that we make distinctions between species based upon appearance, but it is not the appearance that is morally relevant but something else that is inevitably correlated with appearance. For instance, we distinguish between worms and cats based upon how they look, but the morally important distinction is ‘something else’ that is correlated by appearance.

 

But unless someone can tell us what this ‘something else’ is, it is only prudent to assume that it is a "vivid illusion,” as biologists Frank Keil and Daniel Richardson argue in "Species, Stuff, and Patterns of Causation" (Keil and Richardson in Species, 273). And remember, this ‘something else’ cannot be intelligence, self-awareness, language, or capacity for suffering, because then those properties would be the morally relevant characteristics- but no one argues that they are equivalent to "species.” This ‘something else’ must simultaneously satisfy at least two conditions, which I believe is impossible. First, it must correspond with what we really mean when we talk about species, and second, it must at least be plausible that it is really the basis of our moral distinctions between supposed species. Mayr’s biological species concept and species concepts based on genes or DNA, for instance, do not satisfy the second condition. And properties like rationality and language do not satisfy the first condition.

 

In other words, my main reason for saying that species is socially constructed is that we often unconsciously argue as if species has an essence; as if there is something about species in the background that can not be described, but which can simultaneously satisfy both the first and second condition. Given the basis of any species concept, few would argue that that basis is morally relevant in any significant way. Given the basis of Mayr’s biological species concept, few would argue that whom we have the ability to mate with is a relevant characteristic for determining how much moral consideration we should be granted (Lewis Petrinovich may be an exception, though his work is not altogether clear on the matter). Given the major basis of commonsense notions of species, few would argue that how we look should determine how much moral consideration we should be granted. Why, then, do some philosophers hold that our species can determine how much moral consideration we should be granted? I believe it is because they do not equate species with any biological or commonsense way of determining species. Rather, they are probably committing Washoe’s fallacy, thinking of species membership as some essential characteristic of an individual that, in reality, does not exist.

 

Biologists and philosophers of science have had a tremendous amount to say about species, and much debate has ensued on this topic. But in nearly every philosophical discussion of animal rights (with some notable exceptions), the concept has been unanalyzed and taken for granted, as if the “problem” has been solved. The use of the term "species" within the philosophical context of animal rights has hardly been addressed at all. Why is this? That is, why do philosophers feel comfortable discussing questions of the moral relevance of species without first asking what species is, or what we should mean when we talk about species in the context of animal rights?

So thats the problem in a nutshell: the use the word "species" in a morally relevant context, it needs to be defined. But biological definitions of species only state a creatures breeding group without providing information to make moral decisions by; and other definitions of species which correlate abilities and capacities shift moral distinctions away from species membership and over to the abililities and capacities, which makes species-membership irrelevant to actual moral decision making.

 

You can extend the principles above to provide objections to racism, sexism, nationalism, and any other kinds of prejudice.

 

I never said that it was. But it is certainly the view of many on this forum that morality is not 'real' and is simply a behavioural affectation left over from the evolutionary process. I personally don't believe this, but it is a valid point of view (and you must ocassionally allow me to play to the audience).

I just dont think many people who hold that opinion have a very well-developed idea of morality. For instance, I've been in debates with logical positivists who insist that its impossible to make first-order evaluative judgements (which implies that moral statements cannot be true or false), but moral judgements are singled out because of an intuitional belief that they are "special".

 

In fact, people make evaluative judgements all the time without thinking about it, and they can do so coherently. For instance, computer programmers have the capacity to write "efficient" code and "sloppy" code, where both pieces of code do the same job, but one piece does the job more quickly and elegantly; the distinction between efficient and inefficient code is an evaluative judgement which can be true or false, or in this case it can be "better" or "worse". This immediately contradicts the positivist thesis that first-order evaluative judgements are impossible, and these principles extend to moral evalutions as well.

 

I think most people have naive notions about morality, such as believing that morality has to be etched into the fabric of the universe like the cosmological constants, or that morality has to be some kind of physical object to be "real". When people reify moral language and talk about it as if its supposed to be some kind of object, then a problem arise; but those problems are just a consequence of quirks in our language, and has no other moral relevance whatsoever.

 

Absolutely! I have actually made this argument myself on these fora. The recognition that morality is purely an evolutionary artifact instantly removes any compunction for an individual to act morally, since the only evolutionary imperative for the individual is to pass on his or her genetic traits.

Very good! Even the most intelligent people I know still fall for the erroneous claim that evolution is a moral theory, like Richard Dawkins, Michael Shermer, Penn Gillette, and others.

 

My morality deals with how I act, and clearly humans do have a special place in my actions since I am human. It is not necessary for humanity to be special in 'the universe' in a scientific sense for me to hold the opinion that they are special to me. Therefore there is no problem with humanity holding a special place in the moral systems of humans.

I'm not exactly sure why you think approaching morality from the bias and prejudices of your own point of view is anymore superior than approaching morality from the prejudices and bias of any other human-centric point of view.

 

Peter Singer makes an interesting comment on the subject, he argues that theres no coherent way to approach morality from a human-centric point of view, but the only way to make a truly fair moral judgement is to approach it from the "point of view of the universe", or a point of view that doesnt unfairly weight one possible moral outcome more heavily than other moral outcomes. Its essentially no more rational than a sadist approaching morality for the sadists prejudices and bias, the the sadist unfairly weights his preferred outcomes above all other outcomes; the sadist then cannot be making an actual moral judgment. So that fact your morality deals with the way you act is irrelevant, and if you defend the claim that humans have an intrinsic value that applies to other creatures on the planet, then you must defend it from the universal point of view (one that says humans have a special place in the universe), otherwise you're not making a moral judgment at all.

[Royston]

So would anyone eat artificially produced brain dead infants if they tasted of lightly seasoned gammon steak...or would the stigma of them being 'human shaped' prove too much.

 

You can eat monkey in (I think it was Venezuela) that are shaven and look like little people...what's the difference between eating them, and what I've just suggested.

 

What's the difference between eating monkey, and a cow with big lovable eyes.

 

I can't justify eating meat, except I like the taste of it...I have no idea what conditions half the meat I eat was raised in, and I don't think anybody else does...especially when you get a quick meaty snack, I eat peperamis for christ sake.

[Severian]

First, it must correspond with what we really mean when we talk about species, and second, it must at least be plausible that it is really the basis of our moral distinctions between supposed species. Mayr’s biological species concept and species concepts based on genes or DNA, for instance, do not satisfy the second condition.

 

I diagree with this. The first objection is clearly bogus. Just because we may disagree about the term we use to describe something does not mean that it cannot be used as a moral basis. Secondly 'plausibiliy' is a matter of personal opinion, so it cannot be used in this way. DNA seems a rather good way to judge species in my opinion, although I would rather use phenotype rather than genotype.

 

So thats the problem in a nutshell: the use the word "species" in a morally relevant context, it needs to be defined. But biological definitions of species only state a creatures breeding group without providing information to make moral decisions by; and other definitions of species which correlate abilities and capacities shift moral distinctions away from species membership and over to the abililities and capacities, which makes species-membership irrelevant to actual moral decision making.

 

But then all we need do is define it! The biological definition of ability to breed seems fine to me, although one must of course extend 'breeding' to artificial means (eg. a woman doesn't stop being human if she has a hysterectomy), and a child with Down's is still human even though they will never have off-spring. Why is this insuficient information for you to make moral decisions?

[In My Memory]

Severian

But then all we need do is define it! The biological definition of ability to breed seems fine to me, although one must of course extend 'breeding' to artificial means (eg. a woman doesn't stop being human if she has a hysterectomy), and a child with Down's is still human even though they will never have off-spring.

I dont want to get into the specifics, but the claim that "... cant breed, but it is still a human and deserves moral protection" is dubious at best.

 

But, more importantly, I'll grant that the biological definition of species provides a distinction between them. However, now you need to bridge the gap between something merely being a factual difference between two beings, such as their breeding group, and a morally relevant difference between them, where a morally relevant difference is some distinction that rationally justifies treating two beings different in a way that bears moral weight. For instance, I am 5'8 and 115 lbs, and I think its reasonable to assume you have a larger build than me; that is a factual difference between us, but one you would hopefully agree does not justify killing one of us and not the other (at least in normal circumstances).

 

The biological definition of breeding is a factual difference between creatures, but its only a factual difference between beings with no further moral relevance -- unless you have an explanation why breeding groups determine whose valueable and whose not.

 

Edit to add

Why is this insuficient information for you to make moral decisions?

Because it doesnt tell me anything about the creatures actual capacities. Its easy to show that no amount of knowledge of a creatures breeding group tells you any information to make a moral decision by: imagine that a hypothetical person, Bob, asks "is it acceptable to kill oogles so long as it saves lundle lives?". You know nothing else about the creatures, except the creatures breeding groups. Can you provide an non-arbitrary answer to Bobs question, even with a dozen textbooks telling you about the breeding groups of oogles and lundles? I dont think you could, so knowing a creatures breeding group doesnt tell you anything useful.

 

So how could you possibly defend species-based moral distinctions? It is impossible.

[Pangloss]

Kudos to Severian and IMM for elevating this discussion.

[YT2095]

You can extend the principles above to provide objections to racism, sexism, nationalism, and any other kinds of prejudice.

 

again as I was saying even THESE you list are "Optionals" because we Have the luxury of Choice!

 

beleive me these things Also fly out of the window as Prejudices when circumstances dictate (IE/ Life threatened or those you hold dear are threatened).

there are exceptions yes, But they make the headlines as Extraordinary, they are Not the "Rule".

[In My Memory]

Severian,

 

My morality deals with how I act, and clearly humans do have a special place in my actions since I am human. It is not necessary for humanity to be special in 'the universe' in a scientific sense for me to hold the opinion that they are special to me. Therefore there is no problem with humanity holding a special place in the moral systems of humans.

Remember when you made a comment about arbitrary moral distinctions? You're making an arbitrary distinction above, because there is absolutely no reason why anyone should prefer the statement "humans do have a special place in my actions since I am human" over the competing statement "animals do have a special place in my actions since I am an animal", nor is there an indication to prefer that statement over the competing statement "caucasians have a special place in my actions since I am caucasian".

 

The same moral principle, that you only need to concern yourself with members of your own group, can simultaneously defend killing all non-human animals, protecting all non-human animals, and killing all non-caucasian humans, so we have anthropocentricism, biocentricism, and racism are being endorsed by the same moral standard. You should see how this is hopelessly contradictory, so it cannot form the basis for any valid moral judgements at all.

 

Your principles are not only arbitrary, but ambiguous because you are a member of many different groups with are all inclusive and exclusive to animals and humans, but you havent provided reasons for why one group membership should form the basis for moral distinctions as opposed to any other group membership. Essentially, your argument rests on an ambiguous distinction of groups, which ultimately undermines the argument you're attempting to make. See A Critique of Cohen's "Kind" Argument For Speciesism by Nathan Noblis for the severity of this ambiguity.

[the tree]

I honestly can't see any reason not to go for cultivated meat.

 

Once established, cultivated meat would take up so much less land, and require much less animal feed that of course it would be economically viable.

The extra land could be used to grow more arable crops that'd keep the economy happy, or maybe forests could be planted to benifit the enviroment.

Meat factories wouldn't need to be built on fertile soil, so you could build one in the middle of a developing country and you'd be giving food and employment.

It'd be a way out of unduly killing animals and I bet there'd be less of a risk of mad-cow desiese what with it being in a controlled enviroment.

 

Now whose value system doesn't that complement.

[YT2095]

well if it Tasted good was not packed with uneeded chems and the price was right, I`de certainly switch over

 

where do I sign?

[Mokele]

Killing animals is wrong for exactly the same reasons as killing mentally similar humans, because they have an experiential welfare that makes them inherently valuable.

 

Odd tangent: what about the confounding effect of phylogeny? Octopi are quite smart, but they evolved this intelligence completely independently of ours, and while some of the outputs are similar, the internal mechanisms are likely very different. How does pain work in an animal that can regenerate limbs easily, and has more nerve mass in the limbs than in the brain? Is their pain homologous, or even analagous, to ours?

 

For vertebrates, it's likely a matter of quantitative differences, but when you're talking about invertebrates, there's the risk you're comparing apples and oranges.

 

After all, if you think its ok to destroy animal lives because they dont do anything except eat, sleep, and stink, what do you say about the value of human infants, the severely mentally handicapped, or the senile? Should they be cut up and fed to mentally superior people too?

 

Well, doing that *would* guarantee a favorable outcome next election...

 

The fact something is a human doesnt has nothing to do with anything, because species membership is not a moral characteristic. Species membership is as morally irrelevant as race and sex membership, and cannot form the basis for our moral decisions.

 

Why not? Race and sex characteristics are minor and insubstantial, but the same cannot be said for differences between species or across even greater taxonomic divides.

 

For instance, what about eating a sponge, which has no neurons, or a jellyfish, which has only a rudimentary nerve net?

 

Furthermore, I can argue that race and sex *can* be used in morally relevant decisions that have to do with known physical aspects (resistance to skin cancer or strength, for instance) that differ. I'd argue that the 'women and children first' rescue mentality is an example of moral differences: when the population as a whole is at stake, males are essentially disposable compared to females. While such examples are rare and hard to come up with, due to the afforementioned similarities, I'd argue that the differences between species must be taken into account before equating them morally.

 

In that case, potential personhood doesnt form the basis for a moral distinction between animals and mentally similar humans at all, and your reasons for valuing the experiential welfare of terminally ill infants, the mentally retarded, the senile, comatose, and other "marginal persons" should logically extend to animals. The wrongfulness of taking any animal life should then be just as severe as taking the lives of the aforementioned persons.

 

And what if personhood *is* a factor? Just because you don't think it's a person doesn't mean you won't keep them around for sentimental reasons; I'm quite doting on my plants.

 

Of course, even when people have disagreements, we're smart enough to weed out the naive forms of ethics and analyze certain principles for consistency through the simple rules of logical inference.

 

I think what Skye was saying was rather that differences in the basic assumptions cannot be reconciled because they are all, in the end, just assumptions.

 

we can say that a moral principle that simultaneously says A and not-A cannot possibly be true because its internally contradictory.

 

Why? Why assume an ethical system must be logically consistent? If it were the real world, sure, but it's not, it's just a guide for behavior. Just because my computer throws an error now and then doesn't mean it's useless, or that I can't trust any of the data.

 

Of course, the belief that humans are the center of the universe is just wrong and superstitious, so it cannot be used as the basis for any moral distinctions, and all moral theories which follow from anthropocentric presumptions should be dismissed as superstitious.

 

Can they be dismissed, though? While I'm keeny aware of the diversity of life, humans *are* exceptional; we've achieved a level of mental development never seen before on this world. Even if the difference is merely quantitative, we're still an outlier; enough quantitative difference is a qualitative difference itself, if it's unusual.

 

and other definitions of species which correlate abilities and capacities shift moral distinctions away from species membership and over to the abililities and capacities, which makes species-membership irrelevant to actual moral decision making.

 

Not actually; species membership *determines* various other capacities (senses, complexity of nervous system, etc) in a way that race or sex do not. While the *actual* moral difference may be something such as the ability to see UV light (to use a random variable), *species* becomes an effective proxy, and a useful one. If we know that members of species X can see UV, while members of Y cannot, we don't need to concern ourselves with testing an individual's UV sensation when we can easily determine it from species.

 

Species (or other taxonomic levels) *is* morally relevant, not on it's own, but because it correlates so highly with numerous relevant traits.

 

To switch tracks, if species is irrelevant, so are all other taxonomic levels, including Kingdom. Do you run comprehensive checks to make sure *every* plant you eat doesn't have a nervous system? No, of course not, you know they don't because they're plants. Same thing with species: if we know what species has what traits, we can use species as a quick and easy proxy for the presence or absence of traits.

 

In fact, people make evaluative judgements all the time without thinking about it, and they can do so coherently. For instance, computer programmers have the capacity to write "efficient" code and "sloppy" code, where both pieces of code do the same job, but one piece does the job more quickly and elegantly; the distinction between efficient and inefficient code is an evaluative judgement which can be true or false, or in this case it can be "better" or "worse". This immediately contradicts the positivist thesis that first-order evaluative judgements are impossible, and these principles extend to moral evalutions as well.

 

I'm afriad this is a bad analogy: better and worse are quantifiable aspects of code. If both do the same thing, which has less errors, takes less runtime, takes less resources, and will be easiest to modify if/when necessary. Which, if any of these, take precedence, determines "better" or "worse", thus the evaluation is soley situational and not really relevant to the discussion.

 

Very good! Even the most intelligent people I know still fall for the erroneous claim that evolution is a moral theory, like Richard Dawkins, Michael Shermer, Penn Gillette, and others.

 

In what sense erroneous? That we cannot look to nature for moral guidance, sure, otherwise we'd all be advocating parasitism, rather than just the lawyers, politicians and middle managers living that way.

 

However, our species *has* been shaped by evolution, including our minds, and it's naive to think that our moral system is not influenced by this. Would we have the same attitude towards property if our species didn't need tools to hunt? Would we have the same attitudes towards sexual morality if our species were seasonal breeders? Would we have the same attitude towards kids if we laid eggs and left them? All of this leads into the question: how much of our values are valued just because of our heritage? Answering this with a tool that is the product of the same heritage is like trying to calibrate a tape measure by checking it against a different portion of the same tape measure.

 

So how could you possibly defend species-based moral distinctions? It is impossible.

 

Easy. Is it better to kill and oodle or a luddle? If we know that oodles are substantially more intellectually advanced (and that's our criteria), then we kill the luddle.

 

The fallacy is that you're ignoring all the correlates of species. Yes, breeding group alone means nothing, but in reality, breeding group can indicate different traits, and thus you can use it as a proxy.

 

Think of it like evolutionary field studies. Fitness is *damn* hard to measure, but if we can ascertain that it correlates to fat reserves, we can evaluate that instead and have a much easier time of it. Species is a useful correlate/proxy for the traits of interest.

 

Mokele

[Severian]

The biological definition of breeding is a factual difference between creatures' date=' but its [i']only[/i] a factual difference between beings with no further moral relevance -- unless you have an explanation why breeding groups determine whose valueable and whose not.

 

Of course it is factual. That is the point. Your moral distinction between creatures is also factual. And you also do not have an 'explanation' of why your distinctions have any moral standing. You just claim that they do. For example, you would say that a cow has fewer 'interests' than a human and therefore is worth less than a human, but you have not justified why 'interests' constitute a viable metric of worth. You haven't even properly defined 'interests' - for example, it seems that you would not count a plant's interest in photosynthesis as an interest of moral significance.

 

Remember when you made a comment about arbitrary moral distinctions? You're making an arbitrary distinction above, because there is absolutely no reason why anyone should prefer the statement "humans do have a special place in my actions since I am human" over the competing statement "animals do have a special place in my actions since I am an animal", nor is there an indication to prefer that statement over the competing statement "caucasians have a special place in my actions since I am caucasian".

 

Again, I agree that my definitions are abritrary, but I never claimed that they were not. You did, but yours are just as arbitrary because they are based on unproven arbitrary axioms.

 

The appeal to anti-racism is a straw man, since the suggested criterion of interbreeding clearly eliminates your racist scenario.

 

In fact, I find your position against arbitrariness rather amusing, because it has logical consequences which I imagine you would be dead against. The only way one can come up with a non-arbitrary moral code is to derive it from physical law. So, if for example, a law of physics logically led to a moral conclusion, then it would not be arbitrary. I imagine you would not be happy defining this as morality though.

 

Alternatively, a non-arbitrary moral code could derive from a divine entity, ie. God. Although people may disagree what God's decree on morality was, the actual morality handed down from God would be fixed and therefore not arbitrary. One could then of course argue whether one wishes to define this decree as 'morality', and I suppose the supposition that it is is just as arbitrary in itself.

[gcol]

UNFAIR TO CARROTS: DEATH TO ALL HUMANS!

 

Just see it from my point of view, a sentient carrot. Here I am, rooted to the ground and forced to eat dirt, and prey to murderous humans and rabbits. No-one thinks of us, do they? Nor my cousin the cabbage.

 

Had evolution dealt me a kinder hand, giving me legs and teeth, then you humans had better watch out. Just before being sliced up and thrown into boiling water I would just love to snack on a human steak, rare, with fava beans.

 

Moral principles? Don't make me laugh. You are all selfish and anthropocentric.

 

Long live the Veggie revolution! Every carrot has a soul, you know.

[Skye]

Skye' date='

 

I'm not really sure what you're implying. Are you saying that people have moral disagreements, therefore its ok to kill animals? I dont think that follows.

 

Of course, even when people have disagreements, we're smart enough to weed out the naive forms of ethics and analyze certain principles for consistency through the simple rules of logical inference. Even if we dont know what actual moral rules are, we can say that a moral principle that simultaneously says A and not-A cannot possibly be true because its internally contradictory.

 

And more importantly, some moral axioms are actually reducible and can be analyzed for truthiness and consistency. For instance, there is a very ancient belief, called anthropocentricism, that human beings have a special place in the universe, and this belief was taken to be an axiomatic philosophical truth; naturally, people believed that the universe would reflect philosophical truths, so they constructed cosmologies and religions to reflect that philosophical truth. From anthropocentricism came geocentricism and scores of anthropocentric religious beliefs... but now, geocentricism is rejected as silly and superstitious, and just flat out wrong. But in a fit of moral schizophrenia, when people no longer believe that humans are the center of the [i']physical[/i] universe, they insist that humans are the center of the moral universe, so they are still just as superstitious as they've ever been, and theres no possibility of any anthropocentric moral theories being true.

 

Many people hold moral axioms, such as the belief that humans have a special place in the universe, and that axiom forms the basis for dismissing the value of non-human animals. Of course, the belief that humans are the center of the universe is just wrong and superstitious, so it cannot be used as the basis for any moral distinctions, and all moral theories which follow from anthropocentric presumptions should be dismissed as superstitious.

 

Even if we cannot agree on what moral rules actually are, we can agree on what they are not. And if you follow any discussion on vegetarianism, you will undoubtedly see many people using fallacious or superstitious arguments in favor of killing animals, such as the claim that the entire moral universe revolves around humans and their affairs, or the claim that survival of the fittest forms the basis for any moral decisions.

I don't believe you can draw comparison between the physical and metaphysical aspects of anthropocentrism for much the same reason (I presume) as you said can't base an ethical system on evolution, i.e. there's a fundamental philosophical divide between the physical and metaphysical.

[bascule]

Odd tangent: what about the confounding effect of phylogeny? Octopi are quite smart, but they evolved this intelligence completely independently of ours, and while some of the outputs are similar, the internal mechanisms are likely very different. How does pain work in an animal that can regenerate limbs easily, and has more nerve mass in the limbs than in the brain? Is their pain homologous, or even analagous, to ours?

 

That's the big problem I have with my blanket "non-tetrapod" approach to animals I feel morally OK with eating. I eat squid (ika) and octopus (tako) as sushi, yet when I think about it I realize these are both highly intelligent creatures and maybe I shouldn't feel morally OK eating them...

[In My Memory]

Mokele,

Odd tangent: what about the confounding effect of phylogeny? Octopi are quite smart, but they evolved this intelligence completely independently of ours, and while some of the outputs are similar, the internal mechanisms are likely very different. How does pain work in an animal that can regenerate limbs easily, and has more nerve mass in the limbs than in the brain? Is their pain homologous, or even analagous, to ours?

I'm not sure, but I think we are reasonably intelligent enough to understand that creatures need to take in sense data of their environment, and they need to know when they've been injured (it has a tremendous survival advantage). We can also observe their behavior where they appear to be stressed by "painful" stimuli, they have certain behaviors that indicate distress, and they respond to pain killers. Its kinda hard to imagine that creatures with sense organs dont actually use them to sense, so I dont think its unreasonable to believe that non-vertebrate animals have similar pain experiences as people.

 

I just want to make another comment: I cant tell whether your statement, "Is their pain homologous, or even analagous, to ours", is just a quirk of language or something else. At first sight, I thought you were implying that pain experiences only matter so long as they are sufficiently human enough (note that I reject anthropocentric presumptions, and I dont think pain matters anymore for it being the pain of particular species or not).

 

Why not? Race and sex characteristics are minor and insubstantial' date=' but the same cannot be said for differences between species or across even greater taxonomic divides.

 

For instance, what about eating a sponge, which has no neurons, or a jellyfish, which has only a rudimentary nerve net?

 

Furthermore, I can argue that race and sex *can* be used in morally relevant decisions that have to do with known physical aspects (resistance to skin cancer or strength, for instance) that differ. I'd argue that the 'women and children first' rescue mentality is an example of moral differences: when the population as a whole is at stake, males are essentially disposable compared to females. While such examples are rare and hard to come up with, due to the afforementioned similarities, I'd argue that the differences between species must be taken into account before equating them morally.[/quote']

Nitpick: I'd deny that your examples are genuinely examples of racism or sexism, because it doesnt fit a form of prejudice that says "I will give X preferential treatment because X is a member of my own group". The distinctions are fundamentally connected with the capacities of the beings, and you could make those moral decisions without even having to ask about race or sex at all. Sure, knowing the race or sex of beings tells you characteristics which correlate with race or sex, but your only interests are the characteristics along, and your not essentially making a moral distinction based on membership to a particular sex or race.

 

Not actually; species membership *determines* various other capacities (senses' date=' complexity of nervous system, etc) in a way that race or sex do not. While the *actual* moral difference may be something such as the ability to see UV light (to use a random variable), *species* becomes an effective proxy, and a useful one. If we know that members of species X can see UV, while members of Y cannot, we don't need to concern ourselves with testing an individual's UV sensation when we can easily determine it from species.

 

Species (or other taxonomic levels) *is* morally relevant, not on it's own, but because it correlates so highly with numerous relevant traits.

 

To switch tracks, if species is irrelevant, so are all other taxonomic levels, including Kingdom. Do you run comprehensive checks to make sure *every* plant you eat doesn't have a nervous system? No, of course not, you know they don't because they're plants. Same thing with species: if we know what species has what traits, we can use species as a quick and easy proxy for the presence or absence of traits.

 

[snip']

 

Easy. Is it better to kill and oodle or a luddle? If we know that oodles are substantially more intellectually advanced (and that's our criteria), then we kill the luddle.

 

The fallacy is that you're ignoring all the correlates of species. Yes, breeding group alone means nothing, but in reality, breeding group can indicate different traits, and thus you can use it as a proxy.

 

Think of it like evolutionary field studies. Fitness is *damn* hard to measure, but if we can ascertain that it correlates to fat reserves, we can evaluate that instead and have a much easier time of it. Species is a useful correlate/proxy for the traits of interest.

I think the above portions are the most important part of your post, because they are entirely correct. I'm not ignoring the correlates with species, in fact I explicitly stated how those correlates are relevant in a comment to Severian:

Why is this [knowing a creatures DNA and breeding group'] insuficient information for you to make moral decisions?

 

Because it doesnt tell me anything about the creatures actual capacities.

But now you have to understand the implications of this: when we dont talk about a creatures breeding group as a moral characteristic' date=' and instead focus on its actual capacities and characterstics, then we are talking [i']only[/i] about those characteristics and not the creatures breeding group.

 

This way of thinking changes many moral decisions, because now we cant say that there is any concievable moral difference between electrocuting an animal and electrocuting a mentally similar human; its not coherent anymore to argue that one is justified because it causes an animal pain, and one is unjustified because it causes a human suffering, because "animal" and "human" tell me only a beings breeding group without adding anything to the moral equation. Both electrocuted beings are harmed to a same extent because they're rights are violated to the same extent, and they experience the same amount of suffering; the fact that one creature belongs to one breeding group and another creature belongs to some other breeding group is happenstance, but irrelevant.

 

Because you and I are now on the same page (we both understand that breeding groups dont matter and actual capacities do), you and I should agree that if two creatures who share many of the same morally relevant capacities, then they have a similar claim to moral value no matter what breeding group they are. And I'm sure you'll agree that the fact one creature belongs to one breeding group as opposed to another does not justify neglecting one or all of its morally relevant characteristics. It follows from this kind of moral thinking that all moral boundaries between breeding groups (because many of the same characteristics are common in many species), leading to a rejection of the belief that humans are intrinsically more important or morally superior to all other creatures for the sake of being human. With this rejection of species as a moral boundary, veganism and animal rights philosophies almost build themselves.

 

You have to realize that morally relevant characteristics are almost always connected with a beings feeling and mental capacities (notice how many moral characteristics, like the capacity to suffer, be rational, practice moral reciprocity, make choices, etc. are all direct statements about a creatures feeling and mental capacities), and that almost all animals have equal or greater mental and feeling capacities to human infants. All of the same moral characteristics that make infants valuable apply to mentally similar animals. It follows that breeding livestock and cutting them up for human food is fundamentally no different than breeding infants and cutting them up to feed animals; it is fundamentally no different to hunt rabbits for sport as it would be to hunt infants for sport; it is fundamentally no different to plunge a knife into a deer's belly as it would be to plunge a knife into an intant's belly. Does it make sense why a person would become a vegan and an animal rights activist when the moral wrongness of taking animals' lives is just as profoundly disturbing and vile as taking infants' lives?

 

 

 

Severian,

Of course it is factual. That is the point. Your moral distinction between creatures is also factual. And you also do not have an 'explanation' of why your distinctions have any moral standing. You just claim that they do. For example, you would say that a cow has fewer 'interests' than a human and therefore is worth less than a human, but you have not justified why 'interests' constitute a viable metric of worth. You haven't even properly defined 'interests' - for example, it seems that you would not count a plant's interest in photosynthesis as an interest of moral significance.

Factual and moral judgments report facts: factual judgements refer to true or false claims about nature, and moral judgements refer to true or false claims about the ways to behave. Moral judgements are intelligible in the world of moral language, and they report facts using moral language. Moral judgments always reduce down to a set of intrinsic values (things valuable in themselves); claims of intrinsic value always begin in metaethics, and always begin with asking "is it true that X is intrinsically valuable", where an intrinsic value is understood as something worth pursuing in itself without reference to other entities.

 

Many moral theories provide different reasons for why some characteristics are intrinsically valuable, but they all have in common a way of showing that the question "is it true that X is intrinsically valuable" is answered with a "yes" or a "no" when X is replaced with some characteristics. At this point, the philosophy of language can show that some X's affirm the statement, but that gets incredibly technical and cumbersome to read; hopefully, the demonstration with lundles and oogles shows that X is not affirmed for the characteristic "breeding group", so breeding groups arent a measure of intrinsic value; and hopefully if you remember some of my other posts, you understand that it really is true that people persue happy experiences for the sake of those experiences without reference to other entities, so happiness is at least one intrinsic value. Preference satisfaction is intrinsically valuable for identical reasons, because the satisfaction of preference is pursuable for the sake of satisfying those preferences alone (note that it isnt important what the content of those preferences are, just that they are satisfied).

 

I think some of my comments in previous posts on "interests" are too technical, and I recommend reading Peter Singer's book "Practical Ethics" to get a handle on it. But basically, "interests" refer collectively to a creatures morally relevant characteristics, so that promoting happiness and satisfying a beings preferences both fall under the umbrella phrase "satisfying interests". Because interests are connected to a beings morally relevant characteristics, and morally relevant characteristics almost always refer directly to a beings mental and feeling capacities, then its understood that (minimally) a capacity to feel pain is prerequisite to holding any interests at all. Plants dont have brains, they dont suffer, they dont have mental lives, so they dont have any interests to take in consideration.

 

In fact, I find your position against arbitrariness rather amusing, because it has logical consequences which I imagine you would be dead against. The only way one can come up with a non-arbitrary moral code is to derive it from physical law. So, if for example, a law of physics logically led to a moral conclusion, then it would not be arbitrary. I imagine you would not be happy defining this as morality though.

I dont see why we have to presume that moral rules and physical rules have to be necessarily the same thing or follow from one another, because moral rules are not objects or substances found anywhere in the universe.

 

We can take from the tradition of the rationalists and state that a non-arbitrary moral code can be known from reason alone where moral rules follow directly from logical rules, or we can take from the tradition of the empiricists and say that moral rules follow directly from the interactions between rational and feeling beings (both approaches are compliant with naturalism, because the moral rules would refer to facts about the natural world).

 

Alternatively, a non-arbitrary moral code could derive from a divine entity, ie. God. Although people may disagree what God's decree on morality was, the actual morality handed down from God would be fixed and therefore not arbitrary.

Fair enough, should I choose to write down all of my moral prescriptions before I die, they will be fixed and hopefully passed down to my children and all of their children. As my said morals are fixed too, and therefore not arbitrary.

 

One could then of course argue whether one wishes to define this decree as 'morality', and I suppose the supposition that it is is just as arbitrary in itself.

One could also argue that:

- Gods commands have no prescriptive weight

- that God's commands are arbitrary

- that God's commands are subjective

- that God's commands are fundamentally unknowable

- that God's commands are fundamentally irresolvable, because many people have different ideas of what God has willed, but because God's commands cant be scrutinized by the rules of logical inference, there is no way to determine which ideas of God really belong to God

- that God's commands dont single out human beings for a special place in the universe

- that the commands ascribed to God are false

- or that God doesnt exist.

 

If I were a theist, I could never believe in the anthropocentric Gods of religion, because those gods are so morally short-sighted and the moral rules so evidently reflect the customs of the time that the moral prescriptions of religion cannot possibly come from an infinitely wise being. My theism would probably look like deism, a god who neither knows nor cares about human affairs, or it would be a personal God who reflects no anthropocentric tendencies (of course, if I went around saying "dont kill animals because it upsets the divine goddess", you would probably think I was schizophrenic).

[the tree]

Its kinda hard to imagine that creatures with sense organs dont actually use them to sense, so I dont think its unreasonable to believe that non-vertebrate animals have similar pain experiences as people.

Sense and pain are different ideas, obviously.

 

To horribly simplify it, one could call pain any feeling that an animal would chose to avoid. But you and I both know that pain is something entirely different and I don't think you can call something pain unless the creature feeling it gives a damn that it is there.

 

Since I'm not an octopus, I don't know that having an tentacle chopped off wouldn't induce any emotion apart from irritation at not being able to pick up a rock or whatever octopi do.

 

edit Mokele made an interesting post on exactly that point here: here

[Pleiades]

I don't see the point in this. Our meat is already grown.... in green fields wlaking on four legs. The traditional method of growing meat seems much more efficient to me.

The meat most people eat comes from animals that have never seen sunlight, let along green fields, they are also kept in pens so small they can’t turn around, so I don’t expect they do much walking either.

 

As to growing meat in a lab, I think it’s a waste of time. Growing meat is inherently less energy efficient that growing plants. That isn’t to say that meat doesn’t have its place, for example, there are some places in developing countries where there is little arable land, but the land is still suitable for grazing animals (hilly areas for example), in this case using animals for food makes sense. But here in the developed word, meat has little practical function; it's a want, not a need.

 

Vegetarian since I was 6.

[Mokele]

but I think we are reasonably intelligent enough to understand that creatures need to take in sense data of their environment, and they need to know when they've been injured (it has a tremendous survival advantage). We can also observe their behavior where they appear to be stressed by "painful" stimuli, they have certain behaviors that indicate distress, and they respond to pain killers. Its kinda hard to imagine that creatures with sense organs dont actually use them to sense, so I dont think its unreasonable to believe that non-vertebrate animals have similar pain experiences as people.

 

First, nociception isn't pain. If you expose a bacteria to a chemical that's toxic to it, it will display aversive behaviors and stress responses. However, one cannot claim a bacteria feels pain; it's a single-celled organism, governed solely by chemical processes to the level that it's essentially an automaton.

 

Additionally, experiments various painkillers at various dosages have shown that detection of harmful stimuli (nociception) does not correspond to 'pain' (this is both inferred from animal studies and directly reported from human studies). Based on further experimental evidence, we know that nociception is possible without the brain (if the spine-brain connection is severed), but not pain. It's also possible, of course, to feel pain without nociception (phantom pain in amputees).

 

As for animal response to painkillers, what level are these painkillers working at, and can we be sure they're working in the same way? Are they interfering with pain, or just nociception?

 

I'm not saying you're wrong; I intuitively think there's something very close to pain in most multicellular organisms. However, inutition and guesswork is not good enough, and I'm pointing out some of the very real and important issues that must be addressed before we have actual knowledge to work from.

 

I cant tell whether your statement, "Is their pain homologous, or even analagous, to ours", is just a quirk of language or something else. At first sight, I thought you were implying that pain experiences only matter so long as they are sufficiently human enough (note that I reject anthropocentric presumptions, and I dont think pain matters anymore for it being the pain of particular species or not).

 

Sorry for the confusion. I was attempting to use morphological terms to illustrate my point. Homologous portions of anatomy as related by evolutionary origin and embryonic development (the fin of whale and the hand of a human are homologous, as they arrise from the same structure even if they look different), while analagous portions look similar but evolved and develop independently (the wing of a bird vs the wing of an insect).

 

Applied to pain, we can be reasonably sure a chimp's pain in homologous to ours; we're closely related, have all the same structures, and so we can presume their perception of pain is close to ours. Now, as I learned in a prior debate with Glider, mammal pain is handled by the limbic system, which is unique to mammals. However, reptiles, which lack the limbic system, appear to feel pain (appropriate behavior responses and such), meaning they must do it with a different portion of their brain. Since a different portion of the brain is being used, can we effectively compare mammal pain to reptile pain, even if they have similar outputs? Think of a bird and insect wing; both have the same function and gross output (flight), but the underlying mechanisms are quite different, and result in different aerodynamic capabilities and limitations and different modes of flight. How much of what we're concerned with in terms of pain is output versus internal mechanisms? How do we *know* the experience of an animal with a different internal mechanism is like ours? What if they feel pain the same way we feel hunger or pressure in our bladder, as a phsiological need with associated compulsions but not strictly painful?

 

Again, I'm not saying this *is* the case, only that you seem to have made the assumption that pain is pain across all taxa. Since pain is processed by the brain, and animal brains can be *amazingly* different (compare our brain to the circumesophogeal brain of an octopus), this isn't an assumption you can get away with making.

 

Trouble is, I don't have the foggiest idea of how to actually *determine* if the experiential aspect of pain is similar across taxa....

 

you and I should agree that if two creatures who share many of the same morally relevant capacities, then they have a similar claim to moral value no matter what breeding group they are. And I'm sure you'll agree that the fact one creature belongs to one breeding group as opposed to another does not justify neglecting one or all of its morally relevant characteristics.

 

Within the confine of a logical ethical system, yes, though I still have doubts about the necessity of a logical system.

 

You have to realize that morally relevant characteristics are almost always connected with a beings feeling and mental capacities (notice how many moral characteristics, like the capacity to suffer, be rational, practice moral reciprocity, make choices, etc. are all direct statements about a creatures feeling and mental capacities), and that almost all animals have equal or greater mental and feeling capacities to human infants.

 

Very wrong, but for a nit-picky reason: the vast majority of animals have so little brain function that if you cut their heads off, they only die from hunger or thirst or suchlike. Remember, beetles alone are over 50% of all species, and arthropods as a whole are over 70%. In terms of numbers, just about everything is bugs and worms.

 

However, yes, there are a wide array of species with superior mental capacity to infants. (Cynicism: there's a wide array of species with superior mental capacity to most adults, too.)

 

All of the same moral characteristics that make infants valuable apply to mentally similar animals. It follows that breeding livestock and cutting them up for human food is fundamentally no different than breeding infants and cutting them up to feed animals; it is fundamentally no different to hunt rabbits for sport as it would be to hunt infants for sport; it is fundamentally no different to plunge a knife into a deer's belly as it would be to plunge a knife into an intant's belly. Does it make sense why a person would become a vegan and an animal rights activist when the moral wrongness of taking animals' lives is just as profoundly disturbing and vile as taking infants' lives?

 

But that's based on emotive reasoning; we recoil at those analogies not because there's anything wrong with killing babies (Try New Soylent Veal!!), but because we're programmed to be revulsed at killing babies.

 

Is killing babies really inherently wrong? What's wrong with the way the ancients did it, leaving unwanted or unviable kids for the wolves, other than our instinctual response against it?

 

This is what I mean by our morality arising from our evolution; your arguement is convincing to a human, but if you told it to a sentient monitor lizard, it'd laugh (and probably eat a baby lizard for lunch).

 

So, weird as it sounds, what's wrong with killing babies?

 

Mokele