Voting security

[ecoli]

http://redtape.msnbc.com/2006/11/post.html#posts

 

This is an interesting article about how integrating new technology in the voting process maybe introducing a whole lot of security problems, and nobody who's making these programs nor the politicians want to talk about it, because it's too expensive.

 

I'm curious to how likely it would be that somebody hacks into the system to change election results. Obviously we won't know for sure until it happens, but is it worth it to wait and see?

[Sequence]

I don't see whats wrong with paper ballots for now. UNtil we know we have a secure system, I don't think we should leave the possibiliy of a hacker breaking in with somthing as important as our election.

[Pangloss]

There are many things wrong with paper ballots, including (especially) the IQ levels of many voters. Remember, it was problems with paper ballots that lead to this wave of electronic voting.

 

The problems just need to be solved, end of story. The systems may never be 100% secure, but a combination of reasonable security and a paper trail should be sufficient to allay most of the concerns (reasonable and otherwise).

[Pangloss]

And by the way, if you live in the United States, for goodness sake, get out there and vote today, you lazy bums!

[Dak]

There are many things wrong with paper ballots, including (especially) the IQ levels of many voters.

 

actually, i'd consider that a benifit of paper ballots.

 

take the pencil; find the name of the person who you're voting for; put an X next to his name

 

if you can't manage that -- if you can't spell 'x' or something -- then you dont deserve to vote.

 

there have been so many potential exploits reported for the voting machines, im really surprised you're still using them...

[JesuBungle]

But if there's a dot next to their name, do you write their name in the dot? If so, it seems kinda small. Maybe just their initials lol.

[Sisyphus]

I just want to never have to see a newspaper graphic on "hanging chads" again.

[Pangloss]

actually, i'd consider that a benifit of paper ballots.

 

take the pencil; find the name of the person who you're voting for; put an X next to his name

 

if you can't manage that -- if you can't spell 'x' or something -- then you dont deserve to vote.

 

there have been so many potential exploits reported for the voting machines, im really surprised you're still using them...

 

Sure, but this is all beside the point. It's not about whether voting is secure, it's about what kind of material the demogogues and the mass media have available to chew on.

 

The issue has never actually been disenfranchisement. Oh sure, there are always a few cases of mixups or errors. As I said above, those actually happened far more under paper ballots than electronic systems. But almost without exception, both before and after the change from paper to electronic, people (a) are able to vote, and (b) have their votes counted.

 

Case in point -- my ballot box was lost in a warehouse for four hours in 2000 just because a delivery truck went to the wrong location. You should have seen the hoopla -- media everywhere, helicopters flying around overhead, the whole nine yards. But they turned up just fine, seals unbroken, move along folks, nothing to see here. Oh but wait, one party said, maybe the ballots were tampered with! Oh you mean our party carried the district? NEVER MIND!

 

In short, there IS no STANDING voting problem -- it exists ONLY in the media. That's not to say that there aren't valid concerns about electronic balloting. It's just that nobody has any intention of doing anything about that, anywhere. The entire focus is on a problem that is both entirely believed to exist, and which absolutely does not.

[bascule]

As I said above, those actually happened far more under paper ballots than electronic systems.

 

How can you know that without a paper trail?

[Dak]

In short, there IS no STANDING voting problem -- it exists ONLY in the media. That's not to say that there aren't valid concerns about electronic balloting. It's just that nobody has any intention of doing anything about that, anywhere. The entire focus is on a problem that is both entirely believed to exist, and which absolutely does not.

 

for us non-yanks, what's the us media's take on this? i presume they're not focusing on the security problems?

 

Bascule: dont the machines print out paper recipts, creating a paper trail for checking purposes?

[ecoli]

Big surprize, electronic voting machines already causing problems, thought not really due to security issues.

 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15590530/?GT1=8717

[bascule]

Bascule: dont the machines print out paper recipts, creating a paper trail for checking purposes?

 

Some of them do. The ones in Nevada, made by casino equipment manufacturers, let you see a paper printout of your vote behind bulletproof glass, so you can confirm your vote was recorded properly but you cannot tamper with them.

 

Unfortunately, most e-voting machines (i.e. Diebold, Sequoia) have no paper trails.

[Pangloss]

How can you know that without a paper trail?

 

Here's a better question: How can you know that WITH a paper trail?

[Phi for All]

Personally I don't care much about which had more problems in the past. I don't want to have to worry about vote tampering and I do worry about it with a totally electronic system (Diebold's software is available on the net ffs!).

 

I liked the versions that printed what you had just punched in, let you double check it, then hit "VOTE" and have the paper drop into a secured box. Both the electronic and the paper ballots are counted (no extra time since the electronic is almost instantaneous) and any discrepancies are investigated.

 

Viola, peace of mind!

[CPL.Luke]

personally I don' trust a proprietary electronic voting system, esecially not in the current political atmosphere. Only one of the electronic voting systems has ever been investigated (diebold) and princeton was able to hack into it within 1 minute.

 

The software for these things should be all over the place allowing anybody to look in and find errors and correct them. Then a a couple months before the election they could have a panel choose a final version of the software that goes out to the voting machines. NONE of these companies has reason to make a good voting machine, becaue if the election is rigged the guy who gets elected has no reason to investigate the election. And these companies could even rig the election beforehand and send the voting machines out pre-hacked.

 

granted the latter scenario is a bi extreme, but the point is we would never know whether that happened or not without a paper trail. and we don't know what goes on inside of those machines.

[Pangloss]

I agree. In fact not only is that a great example of where open source would be beneficial, it's also a great example of a place where open source would be educational. The lay citizenry does not understand how you can have something be completely open like that and still be secure -- there is a major disconnect in comprehension there, and that would be a great thing to straighten out in people's minds.

[Dak]

Some of them do. The ones in Nevada, made by casino equipment manufacturers, let you see a paper printout of your vote behind bulletproof glass, so you can confirm your vote was recorded properly but you cannot tamper with them.

 

Unfortunately, most e-voting machines (i.e. Diebold, Sequoia) have no paper trails.

 

the diebold systems print out paper totals of the votes they have registered, which are stored for 22months.

 

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-7236791207107726851&sourceid=docidfeed&hl=en-CA%20flashvars=

 

^ 1hr20min documentary on voting machines. it's a bit long, but theres a hack towards the end, where the votes are rigged (both on the paper recipt and on the card) by inserting a malitious card.

 

also... why are the machines that tally the results running windows? windows-bashing aside, surely, for security reasons, if they're going to be all secretive, then the OS should be bespoke? if the OS is known, then can't someone sneak a windows virus on via a malitious card?

 

buisnesses buy bespoke os's for this reason... is an election not inportant enough?

 

one thing i'll say about the electronic voting machines... if the problem is too great, i'd expect, sooner or later, a grey-hat to hack the results in an obvious way.

 

eg, 50,000,000 people voting for someone in a state with a population of 1,000,000, or 0 votes for anyone.

 

or everyone getting 21,188,124 votes.

[bascule]

the diebold systems print out paper totals of the votes they have registered, which are stored for 22months.

 

Are you unfamiliar with the concept of GIGO?

[bascule]

Here's a better question: How can you know that WITH a paper trail?

 

Isn't shifting the burden of proof fun...

[Dak]

its hardly shifting the burden of proof.

 

for the fact that the e-system lacks a paper trail to be significant, it has to be established that the paper trail was significant in the first place (i think it's pretty obvious, but suspect that pangloss has a point up his sleeve).

 

yeah, i guess that, if we're talking vote-machine-level fraud, then the tally printout isn't much use. it makes it a bit harder to fix, but isn't exactly infallable.

[SmallIsPower]

There certainly is motive to steal an election, a multi-trillion dollar federal budget, a hit man will kill for much, much less. Senator Chuck Hagel also has the means an opportunity, he was CEO and part owner of a company that counted his election results. and recieved 84% of the vote!

[Pangloss]

It's almost as much fun as two wrongs making a right, Bascule.

 

You aren't supporting systems that offer a paper trail. You're supporting systems that give receipts to voters. You're intelligent enough to know the difference, and we're intelligent enough want something a bit more substantive than Democrat voter complaints = truth and Republican voter complaints = lies.

[bascule]

It's almost as much fun as two wrongs making a right, Bascule.

 

You aren't supporting systems that offer a paper trail. You're supporting systems that give receipts to voters. You're intelligent enough to know the difference, and we're intelligent enough want something a bit more substantive than Democrat voter complaints = truth and Republican voter complaints = lies.

 

*boggle*

 

What?

 

Let's review:

 

The ones in Nevada, made by casino equipment manufacturers, let you see a paper printout of your vote behind bulletproof glass, so you can confirm your vote was recorded properly but you cannot tamper with them.

 

In case I didn't make it clear: I really like that system.

[Pangloss]

Well ok, pardon me, you are supporting systems that haven't received much attention yet but that would perhaps provide a "paper trail".

 

But those systems still have to be monitored and measured by somebody. And that somebody is going to be either a Democrat or a Republican. The criticism aimed at Jeb Bush and Katherine Harris during the 2000 election was entirely baseless. In fact, notice how those criticisms are currently non-existent in Virginia, which is about to go through the exact same kind of nation-controlling recount, but whose governor is a Democrat, which apparently automatically exempts him from corruption (?!).

 

We're going to need to mature beyond that sort of thing, regardless of what voting system we actually end up using.

[GutZ]

Why don't they just add biometric fingerprint scanners plus codes (changed every hour!..ok no) to the memory card storage comparment. That shouldn't be too techy for anyone to run.