Things not working out in Iraq? SEND MORE TROOPS!!!

[blackhole123]

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/10/iraq.bush/index.html

 

This kind of reminds me of another war that wasn't solved by sending more troops....Viet...something...

[Baz McFly]

You never know, sending in 20 thousand more squaddies, they might just find them WMD's

[ecoli]

I wonder how many Americans would not support this initiative. We need major tactical change, not more man power. What's the point of sending in more soldiers that aren't allowed to do their job properly? We should focus more on our superior technology, air support and the like, rather than try and fight a guerilla war we can't win.

[Baz McFly]

Bigger guns and superior air power will do no good in Iraq. What is needed is Kendle mint cake and love.

[ecoli]

Bigger guns and superior air power will do no good in Iraq. What is needed is Kendle mint cake and love.

 

except that the religious extremists won't don't want the people to be associated with western comforts, as that isn't "Allah's will."

[Ndi]

It worked for Stalin. True, he sent 20 million not 20 thousand, but hey.

[bascule]

While I'm glad he admitted mistakes, and did something, however this was the wrong thing. Still, "do something" is better than "sit on your hands going dum de dum de dum" while we having our soldiers killed and maimed and squander billions of dollars and the entire region degrades into civil war.

 

In a totally unrelated matter:

 

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/01/08/iraq-oil.html

 

The Iraqi parliment is about to pass production a US drafted bill almost verbatim which would effectively give control of their oil wells to western companies through production sharing agreements. Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world.

[Amos Schuman]

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/10/iraq.bush/index.html

 

This kind of reminds me of another war that wasn't solved by sending more troops....Viet...something...

 

What about that other war that was solved by sending more troops? WW...something.

[blackhole123]

What about that other war that was solved by sending more troops? WW...something.

 

This is different than that. They needed more troops to actually take control of Europe, the reason he is sending more troops is because we already took it over and there are extremists in the country.

[Bluenoise]

Why send more troops?

Give him a gun and send Bush instead. If he's so big on this war why not let him fight it instead.

 

I gaurentee you this solution will probably end about 50% of american problems.

[Amos Schuman]

This is different than that. They needed more troops to actually take control of Europe, the reason he is sending more troops is because we already took it over and there are extremists in the country.

 

So the difference is the location and size of the operational area?

[Sisyphus]

So the difference is the location and size of the operational area?

 

No. World War 2 was about subduing an enemy military in basically symmetrical warfare. In Iraq, that part was accomplished in a few days. Instead, the difficulties are far more complex than simply defeating an openly declared enemy.

 

For example, it is motivated by religion as much as anything, which means a) there will be no surrender, since the enemy fears impiety much more than death, b) there's no central authority to do the surrendering, anyway, c) there will be no end to their reinforcements, since it is impossible to irradicate a religion by force, and d) cross-sectarian hatred outweighs anti-American hatred for most, meaning, for the worst violence, American strength is largely irrelevant, since it's not directed towards Americans, anyway.

[Amos Schuman]

No. World War 2 was about subduing an enemy military in basically symmetrical warfare. In Iraq, that part was accomplished in a few days. Instead, the difficulties are far more complex than simply defeating an openly declared enemy.

 

In that we agree, and I'm glad to see this conversation's moving beyond the flippant comparison in the first post.

 

For example, it is motivated by religion as much as anything, which means a) there will be no surrender, since the enemy fears impiety much more than death, b) there's no central authority to do the surrendering, anyway, c) there will be no end to their reinforcements, since it is impossible to irradicate a religion by force, and d) cross-sectarian hatred outweighs anti-American hatred for most, meaning, for the worst violence, American strength is largely irrelevant, since it's not directed towards Americans, anyway.

 

The religious dimension of the conflict, while pervasive, is not all encompassing. It does mean that there is a component of the enemy that will not surrender or otherwise cease hostilities, but for the bulk of the Sunni and Shia insurgency this doesn't really hold. For one, the bulk of the total violence in Iraq is committed in highly coupled mixed communities of Shiis, Kurds and Sunnis; areas with historically high intermarriage rates. Two, Shia on Shia violence rivals and in certain areas in Baghdad and throughout the South outpaces violence between Shias and Sunnis. Third, the crux of the conflict is principally regional rather than religious. You'll find the greatest intersection of sectarian forces in areas where Sadrites are predominant; SCIRI and most of al Dawa--with broad middle class support--are far less visible on this front. Fourth, the core and bulk of the Sunni insurgency are Saddamists and their tribal supporters in Baghdad, Mosul, and Anbar. There are dead enders in all the groups, but the single organized entity that has shown no willingness to negotiate are the foreign fighters. The enemy in Iraq is highly fractured, participating in fighting to secure numerous interests, and not easily divisible into sectarian camps.

 

So a more serious question asks how this Maliki-Petreus operational adjustment will bring the post-Samarra expansion of the conflict under control such that the political process can move forward.

[-Demosthenes-]

It's not that much more complex, merely a limited war. A limited war is one where you limited (), such as in Vietnam where they couldn't use so much power as to threaten other communist powers. Here we can't use so much power as to frighten Middle Eastern countries. It's a bad idea to get into one of these wars, if you win you have to barely win, or the surrounding countries will get spooked and attack. It's a horrible situation, and sending more troops is mostly a morale booster, it's only a 15% increase -- over time.

 

In WWII the whole world was already at war, you didn't have to worry about other countries joining. War isn't like that anymore. Most future wars will be similar (limited), what can you do?

[bascule]

So the difference is the location and size of the operational area?

 

Umm, we were fighting the Axis Powers during World War II... a league of soverign nations. There's a vast difference between fighting the combined military forces of multiple soverign nations with an alliance spanning the globe vs. fighting paramilitary groups who aren't even powerful enough to overtake Iraq, much less conquer several surrounding nations.

[Pangloss]

I'm more or less convinced that the "surge" is moot, and the war is already over. Neither party wants troops in Iraq during the 2008 presidential run. They'll be either home or on their way home by the end of this year.

 

But then I thought we'd never see another shuttle launch, so what do I know.

[Amos Schuman]

Umm, we were fighting the Axis Powers during World War II... a league of soverign nations. There's a vast difference between fighting the combined military forces of multiple soverign nations with an alliance spanning the globe vs. fighting paramilitary groups who aren't even powerful enough to overtake Iraq, much less conquer several surrounding nations.

 

So tag on the scale of operations and the enemy's combat power relative to the good guys as a difference as well. What's your point?

 

I'm more or less convinced that the "surge" is moot, and the war is already over. Neither party wants troops in Iraq during the 2008 presidential run. They'll be either home or on their way home by the end of this year.

 

The war's obviously not over. There's a unity government in Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan is fairly secure and growing. The Sadrites are still fighting SCIRI--and not terribly well--for control over both Shi'a neighborhoods in Baghdad and the South. The Sunni insurgency is now contending with both American and Shi'a opposition on the battlefield. The Iraqi security service is growing in numbers, quality and reliability. That leaves the Bush administration as one of the few remaining unknown variables in terms of gauging future American commitment, and this President hasn't exactly demonstrated a lack of resolve in international affairs even in the face of domestic defeat at home. The other unknowns include the potential regional and largely independent responses from the Israelis, Saudis, Syrians and Iranians--these will weigh more heavily, I imagine, in President Bush's calculus than the lack of backbone in Congress--and of course Congress' political willingness to cut off funding to a President who goes ahead and deploys forces into theater anyway.

 

Anyone who says they know where the next six months are going is either selling something or smoking it.

[Pangloss]

Anyone who says they know where the next six months are going is either selling something or smoking it.

 

Ahem. Did you miss my caveat? I don't think I deserved that personal attack, and posting like that certainly makes you look like you're the one who has something to sell.

 

There's a unity government in Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan is fairly secure and growing. The Sadrites are still fighting SCIRI--and not terribly well--for control over both Shi'a neighborhoods in Baghdad and the South. The Sunni insurgency is now contending with both American and Shi'a opposition on the battlefield. The Iraqi security service is growing in numbers, quality and reliability. That leaves the Bush administration as one of the few remaining unknown variables in terms of gauging future American commitment, and this President hasn't exactly demonstrated a lack of resolve in international affairs even in the face of domestic defeat at home. The other unknowns include the potential regional and largely independent responses from the Israelis, Saudis, Syrians and Iranians--these will weigh more heavily, I imagine, in President Bush's calculus than the lack of backbone in Congress--and of course Congress' political willingness to cut off funding to a President who goes ahead and deploys forces into theater anyway.

 

That's one way to look at it, and I respect your opinion on it. Frankly I hope you're right. But there's a general consensus that your "unity government" is little more than a Shi'a junta. The Iraqi security forces are infiltrated with terrorists and their sympathizers, and even those who don't take sides are barely able to cope, much less act.

 

I was encouraged by the president's appearance on 60 Minutes last night. I am often encouraged by particular details of what's happening over there.

 

But the quote you referenced (and the opinion it reflects) is based entirely on the American political realities. I simply don't believe the surge is going to do anything, and I don't think the situation is going to improve enough in 2007 such that it will be politically viable to maintain a force there during the entire 2008 election cycle. It just is not a realistic belief.

 

But as I said above:

 

But then I thought we'd never see another shuttle launch, so what do I know.

 

Just my two bits, for what it's worth. Doesn't mean I'm "selling something or smoking it".

[TriggerGrinn]

I wonder how many Americans would not support this initiative. We need major tactical change, not more man power. What's the point of sending in more soldiers that aren't allowed to do their job properly? We should focus more on our superior technology, air support and the like, rather than try and fight a guerilla war we can't win.

 

No offense, but I just mean to mention the use of the word 'we' is really kind of arrogent and the like considering your comfy warm computer chair and bullet free enviroment.

 

General public simply does not measure up to a soldier in respect certain aspects.

 

I side with the fact it sucks but by no means do I know what the real story is.. I know there is less crazed suicide bombers... but essentially no one really wins in war, it just comes to a hault when theirs no 'fuel' left.. in the fueds..

[Amos Schuman]

Ahem. Did you miss my caveat? I don't think I deserved that personal attack, and posting like that certainly makes you look like you're the one who has something to sell.

 

Wow, testy. I'm curious as to how you mined a personal attack out of that sentence, especially since you made no prediction regarding the course of events in Iraq over the next six months.

 

That's one way to look at it, and I respect your opinion on it. Frankly I hope you're right. But there's a general consensus that your "unity government" is little more than a Shi'a junta.

 

There's no such consensus. At the most there's a consensus that Shi'is and Kurds are working together to push through policy Sunnis cannot suffer. I can't even find a mainstream editorial that describes Maliki's government as a junta.

 

The Iraqi security forces are infiltrated with terrorists and their sympathizers, and even those who don't take sides are barely able to cope, much less act.

 

Broad statements like that aren't terribly useful, and they do great malpractice to the reality on the ground. There are over 130,000 Iraqis in uniform, and an additional 25,000 in service of the the most problematic national police. Estimates range from 5 to 20 percent rates of infiltration by not just insurgents, but al Dawa partisans, Sadrists and other unreliable elements in units raised in the Baghdad and neighboring governate, they dip to 1 percent outside of the capital area. The infiltration hinders Iraqi capacity to manage political violence in Baghdad particular, but over 20,000 Iraq policemen of all stripes--not just the National Police--have died in the line of duty the past two years.

 

It's one thing to say the Iraqi police has been unable to provide a level of security necessary to mollify the need for American forces, reverse an increased trend in insurgent and sectarian violence, and set the conditions for economic revival in Baghdad. It's quite another thing to say that the entire system is rotten the core and consequently unworkable without any appeal to the actual numbers.

 

I was encouraged by the president's appearance on 60 Minutes last night. I am often encouraged by particular details of what's happening over there.

 

No argument here. I also think we should find some comfort in the fact that America's allies have largely wrapped up their missions in Southern Iraq and are largely redeploying out. We know that at least under the best circumstances that Iraqi security services can stand up as Coalition forces stand down. The question is what it would take to repeat this trend in the three most critical governates. I think a great deal more Americans would at least be more circumspect in their criticism if they knew more about the operational character of what the Americans and Iraqis are doing rather than just the presence of violence.

 

But the quote you referenced (and the opinion it reflects) is based entirely on the American political realities.

 

I didn't quote anyone, so I'm not entirely sure what you're talking about.

 

I simply don't believe the surge is going to do anything, and I don't think the situation is going to improve enough in 2007 such that it will be politically viable to maintain a force there during the entire 2008 election cycle. It just is not a realistic belief.

 

Here we'll have to disagree. I think you might misunderstand exactly what the augmentation is and aims to accomplish. Instead of thinking of it as 20,000 American troops, think of it as nine to twelve brigades, two-thirds Iraqi, one-third American, entering into Baghdad with the specific responsibility of capturing or killing insurgents, militiamen, and other threats to peace. Also consider that operations will begin in disparate parts of the greater metropolitan area and will grow as concentric circles over the next few months. Iraqis will have the first opportunity to act on intelligence regarding enemy locations and respond to attacks en force in the nation's capital. The three or four American brigades will principally support Iraqi units with logistics and intelligence, relieving the front where special expertise is required. For this to go totally wrong (and it can, and that means for the surge to provide not even an increase in American combat power), more than half of the Iraqi contribution to the augmented force will have to be ineffective and replaced with American troops in theater. If we get to that point, you can say that this particular thrust has failed. This is where the Administration's pressure on Maliki is entirely crucial. It's going to be his responsibility to perform at least as well as he has since October for the military component of this new operation to succeed.

[john5746]

It's going to be his responsibility to perform at least as well as he has since October for the military component of this new operation to succeed.

 

The military component will win, and?

[Pangloss]

I didn't quote anyone, so I'm not entirely sure what you're talking about.

 

You quoted me. That's what I was referring to.

 

If that snipe wasn't aimed at me then that's fine. Given that it came right after you quoted me, it sure looked like it was. If I was wrong, I apologize.

 

Nice chatting with you, as always, RP.

[Amos Schuman]

You quoted me. That's what I was referring to.

 

Oh, in that case I'd definitely have to disagree that your opinion reflects "political realities." It likely reflects a gut feeling resulting from an imperfect digest of the events, but in the end its still a broad based, loaded point of view based on a vague representation of the facts. There's plenty of room for criticism and hyperbole, but I think it serves the stated purpose of these forums to frame criticism in a rigorous, precise way.

 

If that snipe wasn't aimed at me then that's fine. Given that it came right after you quoted me, it sure looked like it was. If I was wrong, I apologize.

 

I apologize for not being clear before. On the other hand, it seems like a waste of time to go back and forth about form. I took issue with a number of other points you've laid out. Do you have anything to add?

[Pangloss]

No, and I thought your points were interesting. You're certainly correct in pointing out that I have an imperfect digest of events and am simply expressing my opinion. I never intended otherwise, and I don't have any problem with disagreement on that basis.

 

Well I can add something in terms of furthering the discussion, perhaps. ABC News ran an interesting piece last night about the pressure the Malaki government appears to be putting on al-Sadr and his army. He's apparently been pushed to the point where he (al-Sadr) is acknowledging the pressure and vowing that his army will go on even if he's killed (sounds like a step forward to me). There's also a story running around today that his top aide has been arrested.

 

It's notable that these things are happening *before* any kind of surge is actually taking place (I don't think that's actually slated to happen until late summer or early fall, if memory serves). Perhaps the threat of a ramping up was enough to cause something significant to happen within the Malaki government.

 

Obviously I'm still heavily skeptical about how all this is going to turn out.

[Amos Schuman]

It's notable that these things are happening *before* any kind of surge is actually taking place (I don't think that's actually slated to happen until late summer or early fall, if memory serves). Perhaps the threat of a ramping up was enough to cause something significant to happen within the Malaki government.

 

We should examine the timeline to see if the American news narrative holds water. Late 2005 and early 2006 passed with Maliki's embrace of the Sadrists blessed by most all parties in Iraq (with the Sunnis as exception) and outside--there was strong bipartisan willingness in the United States as well as an agreement in Europe that the best way to deal with Sadr's wing of al Dawa was through engagement and enlargement of the political process. Arguably al Qaeda's attack on the Shi'a mosque in Samarra in February 2006 change the game significantly. The single security ministry where Sadrites held influence, the Interior Ministry, acted surreptitiously to support Sadrite militias and even leant weapons and men in attacks against Sunni civilians. Maliki's government has been reeling from this scandal since early last year (if you need a comparison, consider how long the Clinton impeachment or the Plame affair drug out). It also took several months for Maliki and the rest of al Dawa and SCIRI to work out their approach to Sadr as well as get the Americans onboard (apparently, the Europeans have forfeited any stake in this argument). Throughout the summer we saw entire units of the national police--including more than a few whole battalions--stricken from operations by a still reforming Interior Ministry and the Iraqi Army taking on the daunting task of policing Baghdad. By October, we were already seeing the central government attacking and detaining scores of Sadr militiamen as well as Sunni insurgents. By the way, with the exception of Operation Together Forward we should note that the Americans attention was principally in dismantling al Qaeda, former regime fighters, and other Sunni Islamists Anbar and Ninawa.

 

The point is that Maliki's response, indeed the American's response, to various threat, while properly criticized, should not be viewed as simply being recent or long delayed or whatever. I think that impression carries through the media due to a lack of geographical and temporal context to actions taken by the Coalition, the Iraqi government and the various fighting organizations in theater. This crude simplification leaves the impression that violence in Iraq (actually the insecure governates, though these are arguably all that matter in Iraq) is isotropic and damn near without purpose.

 

EDIT: Just something else that annoys me. Anybody notice that news media treats Iraqi insurgent groups as shadowy, elusive organizations that seem to lack any sort of sustainable structure or leadership? We've seen this happen before. Journalists in World War II took time to tell the Allied publics about Hideki Tojo, Admirals Yamamato and Nagumo, the Black Dragons, the Nazis, Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Hitler, Erwin Rommel. But by the time Korea rolled around most Americans couldn't name the commander of Chinese forces in theater. Vietnam, you might've heard of Ho Chi Minh but General Giap wasn't a household name. The Battle for Iraq has gone on for at least as long as it took to see Victory in Europe, but most people don't know names like al Douri or the Fedayeen Saddam or the Party of the Protectors of the Faithful. Muqtada Sadr is finally gaining traction in the American news, but he's been talked up almost as much as Sistani for even longer than he's been a threat.

 

Why do you guys think this is?