What is a person?

[Sisyphus]

I don't really think a concise definition is possible, but I'd like to hear some ideas. I say this because I believe the most profound ethical dillemas of this century will revolve about this question. When it comes up:

 

Slavery/racism: One of the questions surrounding the ethics of slavery was about whether blacks and whites were fundamentally different and fit for different roles.

 

Abortion: This debate is all about basic disagreements over when is the beginning of a human being with the rights guaranteed thereof. Scientifically, it's an arbitrary distinction. Ethically, it makes all the difference in the world.

 

Animal rights: What about being human makes humans "people," and can those criteria be applied to other organisms, and to what degree?

 

Genetic engineering: Even if humans are people and no other natural animals are, what about human/animal hybrids? What degree of modification from human makes the organism no longer a "person?" Could other animals not even related to humans make the jump to personhood through engineering?

 

Artificial intelligence: What about completely non-organic intelligence? How can intelligence, self-awareness, consciousness be evaluated in such an alien form, and what rights would such an intelligence have?

 

Extraterrestrial life: Similar to other questions, if such life developed along utterly different lines so that normal person/animal distinctions don't apply, how do decide our ethical and moral obligations towards such life?

[YT2095]

a "person" is that which posses a "Persona".

 

 

(I think)

[Sisyphus]

Oh, well I guess it's settled then.....

[Phi for All]

Slavery/racism: Wrong in every aspect. However, if you pay them an acceptable wage (as determined by the payee) and allow them to do as they please when their work is done for the day, you move from slavery to employment. God help you then.

 

Abortion: I love children but I personally think the host should have superior rights until birth. A time must be set for legal purposes and I think the first trimester should be allowed for "mistakes", the second trimester for severe health reasons and any later only for life and death situations. Potential can't be considered imo because it is too vague.

 

Animal rights: I think we are progressing to the point where we will not need to feed upon animals but until that time comes we need to avoid cruelty wherever possible. If it costs more to be humane then that will force the market to consider alternatives. We need to stop putting so much emphasis on convenience and expediency and start thinking more long-range about EVERYTHING.

 

Genetic engineering: One of the toughest questions for me. The implications are very severe and there are many gray areas. Fallacious logic abounds ("it works great on *this* so it should work great on *that*") and we need to constantly ask ourselves whether we should do something just because we can.

 

Artificial intelligence: We have to remember that we think of ourselves and our intelligence from one frame of reference. It is delusional to assume we are the ultimate in intelligence. We had better have a comprehensive framework in place to determine what "artificial" is before we make something that has the potential to be smarter than we are.

 

Extraterrestrial life: While I don't think we are alone, I think the possibility of contact in the next century is remote (we seem to be having some difficulties right here at home). If we find life off-planet it probably won't be as complex as our own. If ETs find us they will most likely be more complex. Again, we should have a pretty clear framework in place to determine how we might gauge the complexity of alien lifeforms and our response to them.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

Here's the easiest definition of "person" I can think of:

 

Person: Anything capable of independently making a convincing argument that it is a person.

 

You'd have to apply it species/group/whatever-wide, as some members of the species/group may not be capable (mental problems, whatever).

[Royston]

Person: Anything capable of independently making a convincing argument that it is a person.

 

You'd have to apply it species/group/whatever-wide, as some members of the species/group may not be capable (mental problems, whatever).

 

But, if it's hard to define person, how can somebody give a convincing argument that 'is' what they are...and I mean convincing, I've met people that would say, 'well, I'm a person, it's obvious ain't it', I wouldn't class that as convincing, and they certainly wouldn't be classed as having mental problems per se, maybe intellectually challenged.

 

Not meaning to nit-pick. Just about to leave work, I'll try and think of something, but it's got to be pretty impossible to define, unless you have some degrees of freedom to the definition e.g mentally disabled person et.c

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

The argument would only have to be, "I'm arguing about this, thus, I am a person."

 

That's close enough for me. They're arguing that they are a person, and the definition states that they must make an argument that they are a person, so that's all that must be done. If they can recognize that much, I'd call it good.

[YT2095]

computer programs geared with Key words and sentence structure can do a wholely remarkable job of this already (I`m not talking about passing a Turing test), but they could argue within the parameters you set

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

That wouldn't be sufficiently independent, unless they use machine learning to determine what the words mean and what the appropriate words for the response mean. It can't be pre-programmed with its response.

[Dak]

[cynisism]

 

I think what it comes down to most of the time is this:

 

the only thing special about people is that i'm one

 

people (read: I), therefore, shouldn't be mistreated.

 

anyone who qualifies as a person (read: similar to me) shouldn't be mistreated, because it's wrong to mistreat people (read: me).

 

iow, theres no qualities that make you a person, and thus worthy of basic rights; rather, everyone realises that if everyone else agrees not to hurt one-another, we'll live in a happyer place; specifically, by ganging up with other 'people' (read: everyone) it's easyer to secure basic rights for 'people' (read: me)

 

soooooooo... from a practicle pov, i think that 'people' is best defined as 'those who can benifit us', and 'those who could harm us, but agree to refrain' ('us' means 'me', btw), and who we, in return, refrain from harming, and aid if they ever need it. cos then they're people, and people help other people (read: 'me' on that latter one), and definately dont hurt people (me).

 

from an ethical pov, it could be 'anything capable of feeling pain', for example, but -- still with my cynical hat on -- only if they can reciprocate and grant basic rights to other people, including humans, and esecially including me, else only really to cement the idea that people (read: you) dont hurt things capable of feeling pain (read: me).

 

so: 'person' means 'us', basically.

 

[/cynacism]

[Phi for All]

Here's the easiest definition of "person" I can think of:

 

Person: Anything capable of independently making a convincing argument that it is a person.

 

You'd have to apply it species/group/whatever-wide, as some members of the species/group may not be capable (mental problems, whatever).

This would seem to cover a human in a coma but what about that individual? Is this a person or just a human? Are we making a distinction between the two? What about someone who has no brain function and is being kept alive artificially? Are they still a person or are they just human?

 

For that matter what if you had just a human brain that was hooked up to support systems and a speech synthesizer so its thoughts could be heard? It could argue that it is a person so is it by Cap'n's definition?

[lucaspa]

I don't really think a concise definition is possible, but I'd like to hear some ideas. I say this because I believe the most profound ethical dillemas of this century will revolve about this question.

 

You put your finger on the problem when you said "the most profound ethical dilemmas"

 

You are not asking "what is a person" from a scientific standpoint. What matters is what constitutes a "person" from a LEGAL and ETHICAL standpoint.

 

All your examples revolve around when an entity is LEGALLY and ethically a person, and thus able to appeal to laws humans have set up to regulate behavior between humans.

 

Slavery/racism:

The issue was whether blacks were "people" and thus entitled to protection under the Constitution or whether they were animals and could be owned as property.

 

Abortion: This debate is all about basic disagreements over when is the beginning of a human being with the rights guaranteed thereof.

 

There you go. As you noted "Scientifically, it's an arbitrary distinction."

 

So why is this in the Science Forums? To show the interface between science and ethics?

 

Animal rights:

Again, the debate is about whether to extend the rights you talked about above to other species. To redefine "human" such that it includes other species. Same for artificial intelligence and extraterrestrial intelligence.

 

Genetic engineering: Even if humans are people and no other natural animals are, what about human/animal hybrids?

 

You also mean "chimeras" here. And that's a good question. There are several sci-fi books and movies discussing that topic: how many animal genes would it take to decide the individual wasn't "human"?

 

As I said, here you are out of science. You need to look to sources of ethics/morality to decide. As a possible guideline, you might want "do unto others as you would have them do unto you"

[Dak]

You also mean "chimeras" here. And that's a good question. There are several sci-fi books and movies discussing that topic: how many animal genes would it take to decide the individual wasn't "human"?

 

speaking of chimeras, the fact that human/pig (etc) chimeras exist in people who have undergone organ transplants, and who are still concidered a 100% person, kinda proves that people will concider at least partially histologically chimeric individuals as people.

 

i suspect if the chimerisism affected the brain it'd be different, tho.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

This would seem to cover a human in a coma but what about that individual? Is this a person or just a human? Are we making a distinction between the two? What about someone who has no brain function and is being kept alive artificially? Are they still a person or are they just human?

Tough one, but the best answer would be treat them as though they are a person. It's not fair to make a distinction between various people of the same potential just because one is temporarily incapacitated. Brains in jars have feelings too!

 

For that matter what if you had just a human brain that was hooked up to support systems and a speech synthesizer so its thoughts could be heard? It could argue that it is a person so is it by Cap'n's definition?

I would argue that it is. People get upset over unplugging a person in a vegetative state, and the brain is probably doing more thinking than the person in the coma.

[Sisyphus]

You put your finger on the problem when you said "the most profound ethical dilemmas"

 

You are not asking "what is a person" from a scientific standpoint. What matters is what constitutes a "person" from a LEGAL and ETHICAL standpoint.

 

All your examples revolve around when an entity is LEGALLY and ethically a person, and thus able to appeal to laws humans have set up to regulate behavior between humans.

 

Yes, that's exactly correct. "Person," from a scientific perspective, is necessarily going to be a term defined with arbitrary cutoff points. I revert to Freeman Dyson's wisdom: "Defining life is a question for lawyers, not scientists."

 

I do not, however, necessarily agree with the absolute emphasis on legality. I don't believe that ethics=laws. We should try to base our laws on our ethics.

 

So why is this in the Science Forums? To show the interface between science and ethics?

 

Yes. Science can't make these decisions for us, but, as I see it, it is highly relevant in two ways.

 

First, it can give us more data on which to base our decisions. When the consensus was that black people were something like halfway between a white person and a gorilla, the question of how they should be dealt with was trickier. When it became clear that the differences were far more subtle and mostly cosmetic, it became a moot point.

 

Secondly (and more importantly) it can create, via technology, new situations that render previously adequate frameworks obsolete. Right now, person is only vaguely defined: "like us," as Dak says, or "equivalent to homo sapiens." This vagueness causes problems with questions like abortion and terminating life-support for the braindead. However, those debates are nothing compared to the potential debates over things like designer organisms (when even "homo sapiens" becomes a more and more arbitrary category) or AI, and we should be aware of those difficulties before we push technology in those directions.

[lucaspa]

speaking of chimeras, the fact that human/pig (etc) chimeras exist in people who have undergone organ transplants, and who are still concidered a 100% person, kinda proves that people will concider at least partially histologically chimeric individuals as people.

 

i suspect if the chimerisism affected the brain it'd be different, tho.

 

This, technically, isn't chimerism, Dak. It's humans with xenogenic transplants. Chimeras are the result of introducing genes from another species into the genome. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/01/0125_050125_chimeras.html

 

ROSA mice are also chimeras -- they have bacterial genes inserted into the mouse genome. Note that, in this case, the species is still regarded as mouse.

[lucaspa]

Yes, that's exactly correct. "Person," from a scientific perspective, is necessarily going to be a term defined with arbitrary cutoff points. I revert to Freeman Dyson's wisdom: "Defining life is a question for lawyers, not scientists."

 

So is this appropriate in Science Forums? I notice several threads on the same basic question: when does "human" life begin.

 

You allude to this later in the post:

 

Yes. Science can't make these decisions for us, but, as I see it, it is highly relevant in two ways.

 

First, it can give us more data on which to base our decisions.

 

Secondly (and more importantly) it can create, via technology, new situations that render previously adequate frameworks obsolete. Right now, person is only vaguely defined: "like us," as Dak says, or "equivalent to homo sapiens."

 

Yes, science can provide data, but that doesn't make decisions. Ultimately, those decisions are decided due to ethics. The data has to be evaluated within ethical theories. So what you need for this discussion are people trained in ethics. Such do exist.

 

Now, science doesn't always do the informing. In the case of the "blacks are not human" debate, it was decided that people of African ancestry were fully human long before the genetic data became available. Remember, the Civil War was fought 1861-1864.

 

I do not, however, necessarily agree with the absolute emphasis on legality. I don't believe that ethics=laws. We should try to base our laws on our ethics.

 

I tried to separate legal and ethical and always said "legal and ethical". That "and" is not the same as "=". I agree that, ideally, laws correspond to ethics. As you noted, sometimes they don't. When they don't, conflict eventually results -- as in the Civil War and the Civil Rights struggle -- as the two are brought into congruence.

 

Right now, person is only vaguely defined: "like us," as Dak says, or "equivalent to homo sapiens."

 

Right now, "person" is defined as "a member of homo sapiens". Dak is being optimistic that "person" has been extended to other species or entities. It is what several people are trying to do, but it hasn't been done yet.

 

This vagueness causes problems with questions like abortion and terminating life-support for the braindead.

 

Right. But why? Because the debate is whether the entity is a member of homo sapiens. In the case of abortion, is the embryo-fetus a member of homo sapiens? In the case of the braindead, has the individual stopped being a member of homo sapiens? (BTW, notice that in the case of capital punishment, there is an implicit argument that the criminal has forfeited his membership in homo sapiens.)

 

However, those debates are nothing compared to the potential debates over things like designer organisms (when even "homo sapiens" becomes a more and more arbitrary category) or AI, and we should be aware of those difficulties before we push technology in those directions.

 

You are making an argument for ethicists or moralists, not scientists, to discuss the situation. Now, in an ideal world, yes, we would consider the ethical issues before we do the technology. In practice, humans have never done that. Technology first, ethics second. However, the recent bans on human cloning indicate the humans may be learning to consider ethics before the situation is forced on them by the technology.

 

But the website I posted to Dak -- http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/01/0125_050125_chimeras.html -- argues against it.

 

I suspect we are going to have several wars -- analogous to the Civil War -- to establish the rights (as humans) of chimeras and artificial intelligences.

[lucaspa]

Tough one, but the best answer would be treat them as though they are a person.

 

WHY is that the "best answer"? You asserted that as fact, but it's not. It's your opinion. I may agree or disagree, but in either situation you need to explain your reasoning.

 

Brains in jars have feelings too!

 

How do you know? If the jar does not have a complex nutrient and oxygenation system, obviously the brain does not -- because the cells are dead!

 

People get upset over unplugging a person in a vegetative state, and the brain is probably doing more thinking than the person in the coma.

 

Here the data is against you. When the autopsy of Terri Schiavo was done, it was found there was NO thinking going on, because the structure to do so (the cortex) no longer existed. She was running on the cerebellum's autonomic systems.

 

All those shouting so loudly for Schiavo either got suddenly silent or tried to pretend the autopsy did not exist.

[Dak]

^ re-read cap'n's post, and the quote it was in responce to. the brain in the jar has communicative abilitys, there was a 'temporary' in the original comment about comatose people and unfairness, and no implication that Terry could think.

 

This, technically, isn't chimerism, Dak. It's humans with xenogenic transplants. Chimeras are the result of introducing genes from another species into the genome. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/01/0125_050125_chimeras.html

 

ROSA mice are also chimeras -- they have bacterial genes inserted into the mouse genome. Note that, in this case, the species is still regarded as mouse.

 

[OT]

 

chimerisism is a term that can mean several things, depending upon which field you're in.

 

eg, histologically, my example is a chimera as it contains tissues from two distinct organisms, although it's genetically achimeric as no cells contain genomes of mixed origin (see: individuals who are naturally chimeric, i.e. two zygotes fused into one: genetically achimeric, as each genome is from one individual, but histologically chimeric, as some tissue is of one origin, and other tissue of another origin).

 

What you describe are genetically chimeric, but a histologist would call them achimeric, as all the tissue is from one individual and is genetically identical (albeit a genetically chimeric individual)...

 

women with phenotypic differences due to genes on the x-chromosome that manifest in 'patches' due to bar-body formation (like tortoise-shell cats) are also said to be chimeric.

 

[/OT]

 

So is this appropriate in Science Forums? I notice several threads on the same basic question: when does "human" life begin.

 

this is biomedics, so yeah, as i'd argue that biomedics is a marriage between science and ethics.

 

Dak is being optimistic that "person" has been extended to other species or entities

 

I'm somewhat appauled that my attempts to be pessimistic and cynical can be mistaken for optimism when compared to actual reality...

 

-----------------------------

 

This may be a revealing thought-experiment about what criteria we use to judge personhood, or it might just be bizzare, but: if elves, dwarfs, hobbits etc -- basically, everything from middle-earth/lord of the rings -- existed, would they be people? what about bugs bunny? chitty-chitty-bang-bang? stitch from lilo and stitch? etc?

 

they're somewhat similar to us, but are they similar enough? and why?

[lucaspa]

chimerisism is a term that can mean several things, depending upon which field you're in.

 

OK, fair enough. The way it was being used was what you are calling "genetic chimerism".

 

If you mean xenogenic organs, then the developing consensus seems to be: if the CNS is human, then the organism is human. I say this because notice people that have artificial implants, such as total hips and knees. Also notice people that have prosthetics for amputated limbs. Technically, these are "cyborgs" because they are part human, part machine. BUT, as long as the brain and spinal cord is original, no one is raising a question.

 

But please note the recent furor over the "face transplant" in France. A large part of that furor was that the host would have the donor's "face" and thus, somewhat the donor's "identitity". Apparently we associate our "personhood" partly in our unique face.

 

Now, what happens when the genome is partly from H. sapiens and partly from other species? Instead of individual organs, you are talking about the entire organism. What is it? Is it H. sapiens or something else?

 

Fused human genomes or extra genes on a chromosome don't present an ethical problem. After all, all the genes are from H. sapiens. And we can see that we have a single "organism" or "person".

 

Now that I think of it, what about multiple personalities? The current treatment has been to "integrate" them all back into a single personality. But in the process some of the personalities are "killed". I remember reading about at least one case where the personality involved looked at it that way.

 

this is biomedics, so yeah, as i'd argue that biomedics is a marriage between science and ethics.

 

Actually, the title of the board is "biomedical ethics". However, this discussion isn't in the area traditionally encompassed by biomedical ethics. Biomedical ethics are concerned about such things as: protection of rights for human research subjects, medical malpractice and incompetence, patient rights, etc. Biomedical ethics involves the ethics of treatment of persons by the medical and biological professions. It traditionally doesn't define "person".

 

Even so, discussion of biomedical ethics, by its very nature, should involve ethicists. It is not pure science.

 

 

This may be a revealing thought-experiment about what criteria we use to judge personhood, or it might just be bizzare, but: if elves, dwarfs, hobbits etc -- basically, everything from middle-earth/lord of the rings -- existed, would they be people? what about bugs bunny? chitty-chitty-bang-bang? stitch from lilo and stitch? etc?

 

This is the same issue as extraterrestrials or artificial intelligence. Just under a different name. The issue is the same: a sentient and technologically capable species that is not H. sapiens. Or a machine (the car in chitty-chitty-bang-bang or Herbie or Data) that is self aware and possesses an intelligence similar to humans. Do we extend "rights" to them and have the obligations toward them that we do to members of H. sapiens?

[Sisyphus]

This may be a revealing thought-experiment about what criteria we use to judge personhood, or it might just be bizzare, but: if elves, dwarfs, hobbits etc -- basically, everything from middle-earth/lord of the rings -- existed, would they be people? what about bugs bunny? chitty-chitty-bang-bang? stitch from lilo and stitch? etc?

 

 

More importantly, what about orcs? Or a balrog?

[ydoaPs]

I think the concept of personhood is well indicated by the following passages from Rethinking Life and Death by Peter Singer.

An Unusual Institution

In the Netherlands' date=' a few years ago, an observer reported on the lives of some people confined in a new kind of institution. These people had a special condition that did not handicap them at all physically, but intellectually they were well below the normal human level; they could not speak, although they made noises and gestures. In the institutions in which such people were usually kept, they tended to spend much of their time making repetitive movements, and rocking their bodies to and fro. This institution was an unusual one, in that its policy was to allow the inmates the maximum possible freedom to live their own lives and form their own community. This freedom extended even to sexual relationships, which led to pregnancy, birth and child-rearing. The observer was interested in finding out how people without language would behave under these conditions.

 

The behaviour of the inmates was far more varied than in the more conventional institutional settings. They rarely spent time alone, and they appeared to have no difficulty in understanding each other's gestures and vocalisations. They were physically active, spending a lot of time outside, where they had access to about two acres of relatively natural forest, surrounded by a wall. They co-operated in many activities, including on one occasion-to the consternation of the supervisors-an attempt to escape that involved carrying a large fallen branch to the wall, and propping it up as a kind of ladder that made it possible to climb to the other side.

 

The observer was particularly impressed by what he called the 'politics' of the community. A defined leader soon emerged. His leadership-and it was always a 'he'-depended, however, on the support of other members of the group. The leader had privileges, but also, it seemed, obligations. He had to cultivate the favour of others by sharing food and other treats. Fights would develop from time to time, but they would usually be followed by some conciliatory gestures, so that the loser could be readmitted into the society of the leader. If the leader became isolated, and allowed the others to form a coalition against him, his days at the op were numbered.

 

A simple ethical code could also be detected within the community. Its two basic rules, the observer commented, could be summed up as 'one good turn deserves another', and 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. The breach of the first of these rules apparently led to a sense of being wronged. On one occasion Henk was fighting with Jan, and Gert came to Jan's assistance. Later, Henk attacked Gert, who gestured to Jan for help, but Jan did nothing. After the fight between Gert and Henk was over, Gert furiously attacked Jan.

 

The mothers were with one exception competent at nursing and rearing their children. Then mother-child relationships were close, and lasted many years. The death of a baby led to prolonged grieving. Because sexual relationships were not monogamous, it was not always possible to tell who the father of the child was, and fathers did not play a significant role in the rearing of the children.

 

In view of the very limited mental capacities that these inmates had been credited with, the observer was impressed by instances of behaviour that clearly showed intelligent planning. In one example, two young mothers were having difficulty stopping their small children from fighting. An older mother, a considerable authority figure in the community, as dozing nearby. One of the younger mothers woke her, and pointed to the squabbling children. The older mother made the appropriate noises and gestures, and the children, suitably intimidated, stopped fighting. The older mother then went back to her nap.

 

In order to see just how far ahead these people could think, the observer devised an ingenious test of problem-solving ability. One inmate was presented with two series of five locked boxes made of clear plastic, each of which opened with a different, but readily identifiable, key. The keys were visible in the boxes One series of five boxes led to a food treat, whereas the other series led to an empty box. The key to the first box in each series lay beside it. It was necessary to begin by choosing one of these two initial boxes; and to end up with the treat, one had mentally to work through the five boxes to see which choice would lead to the box with the treat. The inmate was able to succeed in this complex task.

 

The inmates' own awareness of what they were doing was well shown by their extensive practice of deceit. On one occasion, after a fight, it was noticeable that the loser limped badly when in the presence of the victor, but not when alone. Presumably, by pretending to be more seriously hurt than he really was, he hoped for some kind of sympathy, or at least mercy, from his conqueror. But the most elaborate forms of deceit were concerned with-no surprise here for any observer of human behaviour-sexual relationships. Although monogamy was not practised, the leader tried to prevent others having sex with his favourites. To get around this, flirtations leading up to sexual intercourse were conducted with a good deal of discretion, so as not to attract the leader's attention.

 

I have described this community in some detail because I want to raise an ethical question about the way in which people with this condition were regarded by those who looked after them. In the eyes of their supervisors the inmates did not have the same kind of right to life as normal human beings. Though treated with care and consideration for their welfare, they were seen as clearly inferior, and their lives were accorded much less value than the lives of normal human beings. When one of them was killed, in the course of a dispute over who should be leader, the killing was not considered equivalent to the killing of a normal human being. Nor were they eligible for the same kind of medical attention that, throughout the Netherlands, was available for normal human beings. Moreover in the other institutions-not the one I have just described-people with this condition are deliberately infected with diseases such as hepatitis, in order to test the efficacy of experimental drugs or vaccines. In some cases they die as a result of the experiment.

 

How should we regard this situation? Is it moral outrage? Or is it ethically defensible, given the more limited intellectual capacities of these people?

 

Your answer to this question may vary according to the mental image you formed of the inmates of the community I have described. I referred to them as 'people'. In doing so I was using 'people' as the colloquial plural of 'person' and for that term I had in mind the definition offered by the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke: 'A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places'. But because the term 'person', like 'people', is commonly used only of members of the species [i']Homo sapiens[/i], my use of the term may have led you to think the community I was describing was made up of intellectually disabled human beings. My use of Dutch names probably reinforced that assumption. In that case, you probably also thought it very wrong that the lives of these people were accorded less value than those of normal human beings; and the mention of their use as experimental subjects very likely caused shock and a sense of outrage.

 

Perhaps some readers, however, were able to guess that I was not describing human beings at all. The 'special condition' that these people have is their membership of the species Pan troglodytes. They are a community of chimpanzees, living in Arnhem Zoo, not far from Amsterdam. If you guessed this, you may not have been so shocked that the supervisors thought the value of the lives of the inmates was markedly less than that of normal humans; perhaps you were not even disturbed by the use of the inmates in lethal experiments.

 

In all the cases I have discussed so far, the human nature of the life in question has set the whole framework of the ethical discussion. I began this chapter with a subterfuge to make each reader aware of the extent to which his or her attitudes vary according to whether it is a human or nonhuman being who is killed-even when the actual capacities of the being are known, though its species is not. Becoming aware of this is a first step towards a critical examination of another part of the foundations of our ethical attitudes to life and death. I have already noted the curious fact that the term 'pro-life' is used to describe people who oppose killing human fetuses but are quite happy to support the killing of calves, pigs and chickens. This is in itself powerful testimony to the extent to which the killing of any human beings, even fetal human beings, seems to us an overwhelmingly more important issue than the killing of nonhuman animals. But here, too, we shall find that the traditional ethic now looks decidedly shaky.

 

Who is a Person?

This chapter began with a description of the life of a community, the nonhuman nature of which was concealed by my use of the term 'person'. We often use 'person' as if it meant the same as 'human being'. In recent discussions in bioethics, however, 'person' is now often used to mean a being with certain characteristics such as rationality and self-awareness. There is a solid historical basis for this use. It is, as we saw, consistent with the definition given by John Locke in the seventeenth century. 'Person' comes from Latin 'persona', which initially meant a mask worn by an actor in a play, and later came to refer to the character the actor played. The word was introduced into philosophical discourse by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who used it to mean the role one is called to play in life. It was then taken up by early Christian thinkers grappling with the problem of understanding the doctrine of the trinity-what was the relationship between God the Father, God the Son, and the Holy Ghost? In 325 the Council of Nicea settled the issue by saying that the trinity is one substance and three persons. But what was a person? Since neither God the Father nor the Holy Ghost were human beings, it was evident that a person did not have to be a human being. In the sixth century the philosopher Boethius confirmed this by defining 'person' as 'an individual substance of rational nature', a definition subsequently used by Aquinas and other writers and supplemented by Locke with the element of awareness of one's own existence at different times and places.

 

So a person is not by definition a human being. But the only nonhuman persons Boethius and Aquinas contemplated were spiritual beings like God and the Holy Ghost. Are there other, more tangible persons who are not human? Is the following a description of a person?

She communicates in sign language, using a vocabulary of over 1000 words. She also understands spoken English, and often carries on 'bilingual' conversations, responding in sign to questions asked in English. She is learning the letters of the alphabet, and can read some printed words, including her own name. She has achieved scores between 85 and 95 on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test.

 

She demonstrates a clear self-awareness by engaging in self-directed behaviours in front of a mirror, such as making faces or examining her teeth, and by her appropriate use of self-descriptive language. She lies to avoid the consequences of her own misbehaviour, and anticipates others' responses to her actions. She engages in imaginary play, both alone and with others. She has produced paintings and drawings which are representational. She remembers and can talk about past events in her life. She understands and has used appropriately time-related words like 'before', 'after', 'later', and 'yesterday'.

 

She laughs at her own jokes and those of others. She cries when hurt or left alone, screams when frightened or angered. She talks about her feelings, using words like 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', 'enjoy', 'eager', 'frustrate', 'made', and, quite frequently, 'love'. She grieves for those she has lost-a favourite cat who has died, a friend who has gone away. She can talk about what happens when one dies, but she becomes fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death or the death of her companions. She displays a wonderful gentleness with kittens and other small animals. She has even expressed empathy for others seen only in pictures.

 

Many people react with scepticism to such descriptions of a nonhuman animal, but the abilities of the gorilla Koko described here are broadly similar to those reported quite independently by observers of other great apes, including chimpanzees and orang-utans. On the evidence presented, there seems little doubt that Koko is 'a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places'. So, it would seem, are many other great apes, and not only those who have learnt a human language. After spending most of ther life observing free-living chimpanzees in the Gombe region of Tanzania, Jane Goodall wrote:

Certainly all of us who have worked closely with chimpanzees over extended periods of time have no hesitation in asserting that chimpanzees, like humans, show emotions similar to-and sometimes probably identical to-those which we label joy, sadness, fear, despair and so on...They can plan for the immediate future...and they clearly have some kind of self-concept.

 

There are other persons on this planet. The evidence for personhood is at present most conclusive for the great apes, but whales, dolphins, elephants, monkeys, dogs, pigs, and other animals may eventually also be shown to be aware of their own existence over time and capable of reasoning. Then they too will have to be considered as persons. But what difference does it make, whether a nonhuman animal is a person or not? In one respect, it makes little difference,. Whether or not dogs and pigs are persons, they can certainly feel pain and suffer in a variety of ways, and our concern for their suffering should not depend on how rational and self-aware they might be. All the same, the term 'person' is no mere descriptive label. It carries with it a certain moral standing. Just as, in law, the fact that a corporation can be a person means that a corporation can sue and be sued, so too, once we recognise a nonhuman animal as a person, we will soon begin to to attribute basic rights to that animal.

 

Our isolation is over. Science has helped us to understand our evolutionary history, as well as our own nature and the nature of other animals. Freed from the constraints of religious conformity, we now have a new vision of who we are, to whom we are related, the limited nature of the differences between us and other species, and the more or less accidental manner in which the boundary between 'us' and 'them' has been formed. Adopting this new vision will change forever the way in which we make ethical decisions about beings who are alive and belong to our species, but lack the capacities that some members of other species possess. Why should we treat the life of an anecephalic human child as sacrosanct, and feel free to kill healthy baboons in order to take their organs? Why should we lock chimpanzees in laboratory cages and infect then with fatal human diseases, if we abhor the idea of experiments conducted with intellectually disabled human beings whose mental level is similar to that of the cimpanzees?

 

The new vision leaves no room for the traditional answer to these questions, that we human beings are special creation, infinitely more precious, in virtue of our humanity alone, than all other living things. In the light of our new understanding of our place in the universe, we shall have to abandon that traditional answer, and revise the boundaries of our ethics. One casualty of that revision will be any ethic based on the idea that what really matters about beings is whether they are human. This will have dramatic effects, not only on our relations with nonhuman animals, but on the entire traditional sanctity of life ethic. For once we remove the assumption that an animal must be human in order to have some kind of right to life, then we will have to start looking at the characteristics and capacities that an animal must possess in order to have that right. When we do that, however, we will not be able to avoid noticing that, if we set the standard anywhere above the bare possession of life itself, some human beings will fail to meet it. Then it will become very difficult to continue to maintain that these humans have a right to life, while simultaneously denying the same right to animals with equal or superior characteristics and capacities.

[FreeThinker]

There is a difference between being a member of the species Homo sapiens and being a person. If we think of a person as a member of Homo sapiens, what does that actually mean? Is it the number of chromosomes? In that case anyone of my cells can be considered a person. Is it intelligence? What about people who are mentally handicapped? Or people with lower IQ, are they less of a person than someone with a higher IQ? I like John Locke’s definition of a person “A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as self, the same thinking thing, in different times and places”. Taking this definition into consideration, I will try and address your categories.

 

Slavery/racism: Clearly any human being with the ability to have future plans and can consider itself as self would be defined as a person. This goes for black, whites or any other race.

 

Abortion: I would not consider a fetus as a ‘person’. It is simply a collection of cells. Until the neurological pathways have been developed , it is nothing but a collection of cells.

 

Animal rights: This is difficult. How can we truly know what sort of an existence a dog experiences ( with its numerous smell detectors) or a bat (with its sonar)? Maybe they experience self in a similar way we do?

 

Genetic engineering: Interesting. Would a chimp/human hybrid be considered a person? Would it have dreams? Do chimps experience some level of consciousness? It is a difficult question.

 

Artificial intelligence: I would say that if A.I was to reach the level of consciousness , it should be considered as a ‘person’. Why should the fact that we contain more carbon (compared to silicon) have anything to do with ethics?

 

Extraterrestrial life: Once again , we can not judge that which we don’t understand. If these beings experienced some level of self awareness, they should be treated just as you and I.

[lucaspa]

More importantly, what about orcs? Or a balrog?

 

Is that any different than Hitler, Stalin, or serial killers?

 

It's still the same question, Sisyphus: when do we decide that another species qualifies as being sentient, technological, and having the same rights and obligations we humans have toward each other? Sentience and technological does not = peaceful among individual humans.

 

Self-defense against fellow humans is accepted as ethical. Therefore why would not self-defense against orcs or balrogs be accepted as ethical if we extend "personhood" to cover them?

[lucaspa]

There is a difference between being a member of the species Homo sapiens and being a person. If we think of a person as a member of Homo sapiens, what does that actually mean? Is it the number of chromosomes? In that case anyone of my cells can be considered a person. Is it intelligence? What about people who are mentally handicapped? Or people with lower IQ, are they less of a person than someone with a higher IQ? I like John Locke’s definition of a person “A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as self, the same thinking thing, in different times and places”. Taking this definition into consideration, I will try and address your categories.

 

You forgot to mention the most important one: if you really use Locke's definition, then you exclude quite a few members of H. sapiens: mentally retarded, babies less than 6 months old (who live only in the present and can't think of themselves in different times and places), those suffering from traumatic brain injury, those in a coma, etc.

 

I think what you need to do is look at the group, not individuals. Because humans as a species demonstrate Locke's criteria, Locke considers all humans to be "people", whether specific individuals meet the criteria or not -- they are included as "people" because the group qualifies.

 

And you do the same thing -- look at the group. As we said, not every white, black, etc. can meet Locke's criteria, but the overwhelming majority can, so you take the group -- race -- as being people.

 

For abortion, you are saying that none of the group -- fetuses before 3 months -- meet the criteria.

 

A problem comes when we get to AI. Here there isn't going to be a "group", at least initially. It will be one computer. When we get to a group -- a production run of AIs, then we would have a group. But is the first AI going to be considered a person? Or are we going to have to wait for thousands of AIs?

 

Extraterrestrial life: Once again , we can not judge that which we don’t understand. If these beings experienced some level of self awareness, they should be treated just as you and I.

 

When thinking of ETs, we are thinking of either those that visit us by spaceship or that have a technological civilization. However, what about the Borg? The collective has self-awareness, but the "being" as in individual Borg?