Animal Testing - Right or Wrong?

[Sayonara]

If you take a cow, and try to push it off a cliff, it doesnt want to go. It shows physical distress, and anxiety which can be measured by an EEG or similar machine. (Assuming cows can judge depth, of course.)

EEG evidence only tells you that the cow's brain is responding to stimuli. To interpret those results by imposing an interpretation that relates to human psychological conditions is to anthropomorphise the results themselves.

 

 

The cow can deduce the consequences of future events, its mental states will be affected and its interests will be modeled with respect to those consequences. In this case, the mental states (distress and anxiety) are evidence that the cow has a sense of self, and an interest to continue its existence.

This is not evidence of any such thing. It shows that the cow will behave in a particular fashion under a specific set of circumstances, but it does not tell you why.

 

An interesting fact about cows is that they cannot be led down stairs (don't ask me under which conditions that was discovered; I honestly don't know and I'm not sure I want to. Cue farmer Giles jokes.) This is because their legs simply don't work that way.

Now, as a biologist I really, really do not want to detract from the wonder of the immense variety and range of animal behaviours, but you have to understand that - with very few exceptions - the overwhelmingly vast majority of them are programmatically derived, and executed either inately or instinctively.

How does this relate to our cow? Well, cows that are inclined (another pun) to toddle off the edge of a cliff, or attempt to navigate down a slope that is too steep without tacking, tend to end up dead or with four broken legs. They don't do so well at reproduction after that. The genetic basis for the population's behaviour is therefore selectively moved towards the non-suicidal.

 

Assuming other non-quantifiable mechanisms are at work without any cause to do so is precluded by Occam's Razor, and every principle of reductionism. There may be more to it than we can see under the experimental conditions we have used, but if we don't know then we don't proclaim.

 

 

Sayonara: How do you mean?

In My Memory: Because they value the continuation of their own existence.

Sayonara: Prove it.

In My Memory: I'm not an expert, but I'll see what I can come up with.

Sayonara: Thank you, I appreciate it.

What field do you have expertise in?

 

 

Scattered all throughout my posts are phrases like "seems to", "perhaps", "possibly", "can be described" etc. Its just my very cautious way of writing posts. (Besides, it would be inappropriate for me to use absolutist buzzwords like "without a shadow of a doubt", "irrefutably", or "definitely".)

If you acknowledge such a significant doubt margin I am surprised we are not agreeing on more points

Regardless, I'm glad you recognise that asynchronous communication allows us more room for liberal interpretation of stances, coupled with implicit requests for clarification. This pretty much guarantees that the discussion will not degenerate, as they so often do.

 

 

You've redefined my typically cautious way of writing things to be a subjective unjustified personal reaction - it isnt.

I wouldn't really say I have 'redefined' it - I can only respond to what I am given. The last thing I am going to do is intentionally strawman you or misrepresent your opinions, given my distaste for the practices.

 

 

Everything I've said is valid inference and scientifically meritable, and to the best of my ability is completely objective. I dont expect for you to read my mind and guess my intentions, but please dont dismiss what I have to say based on my cautious use of language.

By the same stroke of the brush I would prefer it if you saw my enquiries as a[n implied] request for further clarification, rather than dismissiveness.

 

It is true that a little inference can go a long way in arguments such as these, but I would dispute that it is objective for anyone to call such inference scientifically meritable when it is skirting so close to the realm of speculation.

 

 

"You seem to believe..."

Yes. I also acknowledge a margin for error in interpretation. That was me giving you the opportunity to correct me if I was wrong on that point.

 

 

Actually, recognition of other mental states is an enormously relevant concept. It shows that some animals have a theory of mind, and they have the ability to discern "those parts belong to that animal, these parts belong to me" (that is the literal definition of self-awareness).

I take issue with this because what you see as "recognition of other mental states", I see as consistent sources of stimulus.

A stumbling block here is the word 'recognition' itself. In your argument it represents the processes underlying "ah, I know you - you're Harry the cow", where I and You are of course critical elements. In my argument recognition is simply a process whereby a learned response (which is something we know to be simple) is associated with a particular set of information.

 

A cow, for instance, does not need to be able to identify a tractor, have a good think about what such a machine might do to it in a collision, experience anxiety at the prospect of never entering the cow olympics, and run away with a steely determination to survive the experience and practice its long jump (excuse the dramatic scenario - sleep deprivation=weirdness.)

All it needs is to associate the noise of the machine with the action of moving away and mooing, what with most previous experience of loud and strange noises having a tendency to lead to un-cowlike happenings.

 

The fact that this response can be undone in a Pavlovian fashion is good evidence that it was only a Pavlovian response to begin with, since a cow that is given a stimulus to come near something that causes it anxiety - in an assumed case where the cow has notions of self and mortality - would have no reason to dismiss the perceived threat.

 

 

Taking in the behavior of other animals is very common behavior of social awareness. We usually think of monkeys as a prime example of social animals, but cows are surprisingly social animals, they will form life-long friendships, they have preferences, they can be vain. Social interactions like these tell you what an animal thinks about other animals and their intentions (this is literally "thinking about thought"), they tell you that animals have some capacity to engage in ritualization and determination that is inadequately explained conditioning or instinct, its one of the best indicators of non-human awareness available.

When biologists talk about social animals, they don't mean that they are social in the same way we are. The term refers to the fact that they have a communal structure; not to the fact that they recognise (in the political sense) the other elements in the society as being sovereign.

 

Animals acting in a group do display some amazing behaviours, not least of which would be altruism - a truly intriguing effect of social interaction. However the basis for these behaviours is evolutionary processes, working on the population at both the biological and social levels. Animals working in groups are just as much a slave to memetic patterns (which is probably outside the scope of this discussion, but what the hey) as are individuals.

 

It's not a great text by post-grad standards, but one book that gives a good general overview of how individual and group behaviours relate is "From Individual Behaviour to Population Ecology". by William J. Sutherland - ISBN 0-19-854910-5.

 

Not really to do with behaviour as such, but you might get something out of Hastings' "Population Biology: Concepts and Models" - ISBN 0-387-94853-8. This explains in painful detail the processes that drive the emergence of various behaviours, without getting bogged down in the behaviours themselves. It's useful in that it points a big finger at the energy flow control underlying all life processes, and then screams "LOOOOOOK!"

 

 

Note that where you have pinpointed "inadequately explained conditioning" above, this is not really the case at all. Conditioning occurs in an individual over a period of time. That is not how pan-population behaviours emerge, and it certainly isn't why they change with time.

 

I would agree that some elaborate behaviours may well indicate a non-human mode of awareness, in that an abstract form of processing may be taking place. As you have mentioned this is somewhat evident in several species, especially dolphins and chimpanzees. however this does not mean that we can, by extension, infer the same kind of processing in other animals. We've barely scratched the surface in the species about which we have our suspicions.

 

 

Based on the behavior, of course.

I realise your interpretation of the behaviour is an interpretation of the behaviour; what I'm asking is why you chose that particular take on affairs. What, in your view, is the perceivable mechanism?

 

 

The bonds mother cows form with their calfs is on a non-mechanical and personal level. We know this because the behavior of the cow becomes less vigorous when the calf dies or is removed. The same kind of behavior is sometimes seen in monkeys who lose their young, or elephants who mourn over bones. An excerpt from The Secret Life of Cows shows the real complexity behind cow/calf bonding:

The same behaviour in other animals is simply similar effects; it does not necessitate similar causes.

 

A personal bond is something of an elaboration here. The behaviour of the cow may simply become less vigorous because it is not biologically efficient to do otherwise. Virtually all known behaviour is a product of energy cost needing to be less than energy gains, the consequences of which can play out across an individual's day, or multiple generations (which, in many cases, can make for an awkward situation to study.)

 

 

Cows have the faculties in the brain that allow them to "feel" (a limbic system in particular), and there are some situations where they show physical signs in internal sensations. In the evolutionary sense, this would be valuable, because consciousness has a lot of "stay-alive" benefit in an unpredictable environment for animals with long life spans and reproduction cycles.

Consciousness is indeed a good "stay alive" strategy. But we shouldn't therefore conclude that cows are conscious because they are sometimes alive.

 

 

 

If you want a superior way to define "ethical", I would suggest something along the lines of "in accordance to the conclusions derived from ethics; whereas ethics is the investigation into the content of moral principles and virtues, and their justification".

Then this becomes a discussion as to why it is immoral to kill a cow, surely?

 

To be honest it would probably be less tiring for us both to argue over the ethics of it without a common definition.

 

 

Which I provided.

Not really. Unless I spectacularly missed out on something, you appeared to say that killing a cow is unethical because it is unethical.

 

 

However, you wanted to know how we can even assume cows are self-aware in the first place. Its not the same question as "how is it unethical to kill a cow", and usually I would consider it red herring - however I figured that you might be genuinely interested in hearing what I have to say, because you've noticed that the moral status of a cow is dependent on certain properties like consciousness and self-awareness.

I really don't see how you can claim it is a red herring, when the discussion has its roots in your original response to my question.

You said, in DIRECT response to "why is it unethical to kill a cow":

For a lot of the same reasons it is unethical to kill a human: they suffer, and they probably dont want to die

I ruled out sufferance by pointing out it wasn't a provision. Therefore this has become a discussion as to whether or not cows can "want not to die", which is inherently related to consciousness and self-awareness, with the validity of your answer to my question being the stakes of the debate.

 

 

Thank you, I had misunderstood you. I read your post as originally declaring ethical judgements as necessarily subjective.

I do have an unfortunate tendency to elaborate the wrong bits.

 

 

There certainly are. Their capacity to suffer and hold interests is the objective fact which defines their moral worth - however you've no longer been concerened with the moral implications of awareness, you are focused on whether cows possess some kind of sense of self-awareness.

That doesn't mean anything to the premise you started out on. If you are intending to redefine the terms of your response, then you should say so.

 

 

Somehow, murder just doesnt seem like the fundamental moral axiom I can think of - for instance, does murdering a blade of grass carry the same moral consequences and murdering a person in their sleep?

I did actually mean the murder of people. I use the term in its legal sense, wherein a non-human victim would be said to have been "killed".

[jdurg]

I will apologize in advance for how my post may seem kind of 'out of the loop', but this thread has grown quite long and would take an ample amount of time to read all the way through. With that said, I will now state my opinion on the initial question.

 

I have no problems with animal testing. As a human being who enjoys being alive, I would rather have these new medicines and techniques tested on an array of animal subjects first before they are tried out on human beings. Why do I feel this way? Well as a human being I believe that our species is more important than the animal species. There's a reason why we have advanced further along than other species of animals. If the roles were reversed I'm sure that they would do the same thing. If that makes me a bad person in the eyes of some people, then so be it.

[Sayonara]

Animal testing for me falls into the "needless" category.

 

We already have literally millions of people who are paid quite well to perform dangerous roles which they know will most likely shorten their life spans.

 

Some examples would be police, fire fighters, any kind of miner, soldiers, people working in chemo- or bio-hazardous environments, and people working with radioactive materials.

 

If people can accept those risks with the proper compensation, why not allow human testing at a professional and regulated level?

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

According to New Scientist (or one magazine like that) to replace all of the animal testing in Britain for a year would require a million human volunteers.

 

So you'd need plenty of people willing to suffer.

[Sayonara]

I'm sure there are more than 1/60 of us suffering already, but on crappy pay.

[Cap'n Refsmmat]

Scientists don't have to pay animals for their services (food and whatever only) but they'd have to pay us quite a lot to do tests on us.

[Sayonara]

Well, that depends on to what degree such trialing would be subsidised by the government, and matters only if the companies and institutes in question are more interested in profit.

 

Check out these guys - they do it already, as do many others: http://www.covance.com/

[jdurg]

Covance is one of my competing companies. I work for Kendle International and we pretty much do the same thing. Before the drugs even come close to the human testing, they must pass through animal testing and be deemed 'safe' for human trials through a VERY strict set of guidelines. The pharmaceutical companies don't just come up with a random mix of chemicals and then start injecting them into humans. That would be illegal. Instead their chemistry is first investigated to see if it it similar to any other chemicals already known. Then it is moved onto animal testing to see the lethality, if any, of it. Only after it has successfully passed animal testing is it even allowed to be tested on humans.

[Sayonara]

Do the human trials in any way reduce the intensity of the animal trialing, or is it an extra step?

[Mokele]

Ok, I figure it's time to put a new twist on this, especially since it's applicable to my research.

 

What about terminal animal experiments that aren't of medical use? Ones where the goal is simply to find out how the animal itself works; knowledge for the sake of knowledge. What would various people consider justifed?

 

And, of course, there's the complicating factor that such pure knowledge might lead to beneficial applications, or it might not, and whether it will or not cannot be predicted from the intial experiments.

 

How much sacrifce is pure knowledge worth?

 

Mokele

[jdurg]

Do the human trials in any way reduce the intensity of the animal trialing, or is it an extra step?

 

Really, the two trials are independent of each other. There is a set procedure for the approval of drugs by the FDA which is generally practiced all around the world. The first step is the chemical design of the new drug. The drug is 'designed' and the company decides if it's feasible to produce. Once the production is done, a chemical analysis is performed on the drug to figure out its structure and similarities to any other compounds currently in existance. If they find that the the drug is too similar to a compound that kills people or causes other horrendous things, they may decide to rework it or kill it altogether.

 

Once they've gotten all of the paperwork done and have decided that the drug will possibly be useful and is cost-effective, they submit an application to the FDA to begin animal trials. These trials are designed to see what the lethal dosage is of the drug in comparison to its possible therapeutic dose. (If they see that the lethal and therapeutic doses will be too close together, the drug is scrapped). With the animal trials they are also able to see if there is something intensely wrong with the drug that would make it 100% unsafe for human usage. If the data from the animal testing isn't good, the FDA will not approve the drug for clinical trials and the whole process stops right there.

 

If the drug passes the animal testing stage the FDA will then give the approval for the "Phase I" clinical trials. In these trials they want to investigate the short term effects of the drug on human subjects. The subjects are generally paid volunteers, or patients for which the risk/reward ratio is worth the testing. (Like for terminally ill AIDS patients testing AIDS drugs). The studies are performed over a relatively short period of time and data is collected to see what Adverse Events, if any, occur. If there are too many Adverse Events and not enough efficacy, the trial will be stopped and FDA approval will not be granted. If there are positive signs, the drug then goes into the Phase II stage.

 

In the Phase II trials, a wider array of patients are given the drug; both large numbers of healthy and ill patients. While Phase I trials are usually a very small handful of patients, Phase II trials can be in the hundreds. In Phase II the clinical trial is attempting to see the widespread short term and mid-range term effects of the drug. They want to know what the majority of people will experience when they take the drug on a routine basis. This is the most important stage of the clinical trials because the most data is obtained here. After Phase II, the drug is many times submitted for approval to the FDA. If the FDA approves, the drug can be mass produced and sold to the public. If it's not approved, then either further testing will be done or adjustments to the drug will be made and a new set of trials will begin.

 

Even after a drug is released on the market, it will still undergo the Phase III trials which are the long term trials. These attempt to see what the drug does over the long haul of five to six years. A lot of the Vioxx/Celebrex Adverse Events were most likely discovered during Phase III trials.

 

By having the animal testing, the number of patients put at risk for trying an untested drug is greatly reduced. It also allows more patients to try these Phase I drugs and perhaps discover a new benefit. Viagara started out as a heart medication, but during the clinical trials they saw that everyone taking it was no longer impotent. Who knows what other 'benefits' we might find in a drug on trial simply due to the umber of people out there taking it. If there are no animal trials beforehand, far fewer people would probably want to take the risk of trying an untested chemical, and we wouldn't see as much exposure anymore. Less exposure means a lower chance of finding an unintended benefit.

 

Here's another way to look at it. If you went into an organic chemistry lab and threw some things together, would you be willing to put whatever you created right into your mouth? In a sense, by removing animal testing that is exactly what you'd be doing with any new 'drug'. (Sorry for the rambling here at the end. I just got really tired and my brain suddenly died.)

[Hellbender]

Well as a human being I believe that our species is more important than the animal species. There's a reason why we have advanced further along than other species of animals.

 

of course being a member of a social species such as ours you would feel that way. But what is this "reason" we have advanced further along than any other species?

[jdurg]

of course being a member of a social species such as ours you would feel that way. But what is this "reason" we have advanced further along than any other species?

 

Perhaps our ability to survive tough conditions and know how to make use of our surroundings to not only lengthen our lives, but make the quality of our lives better? Using animals to test things out on before applying them to ourselves is just another example of using our surroundings to our advantage. In this case, those 'surroundings' are the other animal species.

 

For me it gets into a gray area depending on what is being tested. If you're testing out a new makeup, I have trouble agreeing with the whole thing. In that instance, the makeup isn't something that will help extend our lives. It's only something designed to increase one's vanity and their concept of themselves. (Then again, you could also say that the makeup could make them more likely to reproduce, thus extending our species, but then you're REALLY stretching the argument ). For things like medicines and drugs which allow people to live normal, happy lives, I'm all for the testing.

[Hellbender]

okay good point. I was just wondering if you meant reasons as in human attributes, or some wierd cosmic reason. Thanks for clearing that up.

[In My Memory]

Sayonara

 

Thank you for your reply, it has been very helpful.

 

EEG evidence only tells you that the cow's brain is responding to stimuli. To interpret those results by imposing an interpretation that relates to human psychological conditions is to anthropomorphise the results themselves.

 

This is not evidence of any such thing. It shows that the cow will behave in a particular fashion under a specific set of circumstances' date=' but it does [u']not[/u] tell you why.

 

An interesting fact about cows is that they cannot be led down stairs (don't ask me under which conditions that was discovered; I honestly don't know and I'm not sure I want to. Cue farmer Giles jokes.) This is because their legs simply don't work that way.

Now, as a biologist I really, really do not want to detract from the wonder of the immense variety and range of animal behaviours, but you have to understand that - with very few exceptions - the overwhelmingly vast majority of them are programmatically derived, and executed either inately or instinctively.

How does this relate to our cow? Well, cows that are inclined (another pun) to toddle off the edge of a cliff, or attempt to navigate down a slope that is too steep without tacking, tend to end up dead or with four broken legs. They don't do so well at reproduction after that. The genetic basis for the population's behaviour is therefore selectively moved towards the non-suicidal.

 

Assuming other non-quantifiable mechanisms are at work without any cause to do so is precluded by Occam's Razor, and every principle of reductionism. There may be more to it than we can see under the experimental conditions we have used, but if we don't know then we don't proclaim.

I wouldnt say non-quantifyable, I would probably say something along the lines of "indirect" (possibly in the same way as evidence for neutrinos). That is where any EEG evidence has its relevance - unless there have been advances into measuring private experiences of others that I'm not aware of. Analogously, I would amount this indirect evidence to be similar to the machines that monitor whether a patient is drifting in or out of states of arousal while under anesthetic.

 

Cows, to me, dont seem like stimulus-response machines. Some of their behavior seems to be better explained as necessitating abilities for mental representation or internal processing. Certain behaviors imply self-awareness, such as distress accompanied by self-preservation - although avoiding suicidal tendencies is pre-programmed into animals, the survival tendency in cows (or even humans) isnt an unconscious or involuntary behavior, the distress is a measurable mental state that is essentially feedback between the cows deduced consequences of its circumstances and awareness of itself (it is also noted the distress is not a conditioned reaction). The cow could never experience distress if it did not possess both characteristics of being aware of its environment and being aware of itself, which is one of the quintessential differences between an insect preserving its own existence and a cow preserving its own existence. (That is probably the most grammatically complicated paragraphs I've written in a very long time, please let me know if I need to clarify.)

 

To the best of my knowledge, that description avoids anthropomorphism, or at worst its a very very weak form of anthropomorphism that has its roots in functionalism. This type of functionalism is compatible with Occams Razor in the same way that we use animal brains to make more sense of human brains (such as how brains store memory), not at all comparable to the type of anthropomorphism that lurks behind the statement "my cows dont like Rush Limbaugh".

 

What field do[/u'] you have expertise in?

The things the non-tech people called "computer stuff", philosophy of nature and mind, and biblical exegesis - not very physical career choices, but very mentally demanding on my part.

 

I have no expertise in anything that would be relevant to this thread (unless the thread suddenly devolved into a discussion of computer science and bible exegesis). Despite my academically unremarkable resume, I like to become engaged in threads like these because they are interesting and they are always a learning experience. I do have a little armchair experience with ethology, a little more than an "intro to psychology 101" in the study of human behavior, and lots of experience into the philosophical implications of animal sentience if that means anything.

 

Because I am in a tough spot with my current employment (very competitive, pay is less than ideal, and too little contact with people), I am currently in the process of trying to earn a degree in what I generalize as "a more 'serious' scientific endeavor" - perhaps I'll dedicate myself to the study of animal awareness. But enough about me...

 

If you acknowledge such a significant doubt margin I am surprised we are not agreeing on more points

Stubborness I suppose

 

I wouldn't really say I have 'redefined' it - I can only respond to what I am given. The last thing I am going to do is intentionally strawman you or misrepresent your opinions, given my distaste for the practices.

That is very honorable, and I appreciate it

 

By the same stroke of the brush I would prefer it if you saw my enquiries as a[n implied] request for further clarification' date=' rather than dismissiveness.

 

It is true that a little inference can go a long way in arguments such as these, but I would dispute that it is objective for anyone to call such inference scientifically meritable when it is skirting so close to the realm of speculation.[/quote']

Ah, I see. Sometimes I have the problem of not being the most perceptive to others requests (and to a much greater extent being unable to explain things in a most coherent way and succinct way possible), so I understand exactly what you mean. However, in the interest of keeping the flow of thought moving in a forward direction, I will try not to resurrect week-old comments - I'm sure you can sympathize.

 

I take issue with this because what you see as "recognition of other mental states"' date=' I see as consistent sources of stimulus.

A stumbling block here is the word 'recognition' itself. In your argument it represents the processes underlying "ah, I know you - you're Harry the cow", where I and You are of course critical elements. In my argument recognition is simply a process whereby a learned response (which is something we know to be simple) is associated with a particular set of information.

 

A cow, for instance, does not need to be able to identify a tractor, have a good think about what such a machine might do to it in a collision, experience anxiety at the prospect of never entering the cow olympics, and run away with a steely determination to survive the experience and practice its long jump (excuse the dramatic scenario - sleep deprivation=weirdness.)

All it needs is to associate the noise of the machine with the action of moving away and mooing, what with most previous experience of loud and strange noises having a tendency to lead to un-cowlike happenings.

 

The fact that this response can be undone in a Pavlovian fashion is good evidence that it was only a Pavlovian response to begin with, since a cow that is given a stimulus to come near something that causes it anxiety - in an assumed case where the cow has notions of self and mortality - would have [u']no reason to dismiss the perceived threat.

I think largely, the argument against pushing the behavior of animals against the behavioristic fence is based on versatile behavior - I dont know what the word is supposed to be (some variation of operant conditioning, I think), but its basically the phenomenon that explains how children acquire language on basic stimulus-response-reinforcement principles, but then break through the boundaries of stimulus-response-reinforcement by stringing together complicated and coherent sentences that they've never heard before according to specific grammatical rules. In animals, versatile behavior comes in the form of lion prides sending off a hidden lion to ambush an animal as the others chase the prey in the hidden lions direction.

 

You can rearrange that scenario with the the hypothetical cow and hypothetical tractor to show the cow is engaging in mental activity that involves acquiring and organizing information about its surroundings, and to act upon that information according. If you postulate the cow has a choice between running off a cliff or running into a clear pasture, the cow will run to the pasture everytime (and this is regardless of whether its the first time or 100th time). The indication being, even if most behavior is unconscious, the cow engages in some level of decision making (perhaps this means it is being driven motivated to run away from its stimulus also has a sense of its own mortality) and therefore avoids the cliff. There is at least some indication that there is some sifting through the outcomes of certain situations and internal processing rather than being the mindless repition of a certain set of reactions.

 

Its not the most sophisticated example imaginable, but it gets the job done until I'm more awake to think of a better one.

 

Note that where you have pinpointed "inadequately explained conditioning" above' date=' this is not really the case at all. Conditioning occurs in an individual over a period of time. That is not how pan-population behaviours emerge, and it certainly isn't why they change with time.

 

I would agree that some elaborate behaviours may well indicate a non-human mode of awareness, in that an abstract form of processing may be taking place. As you have mentioned this is somewhat evident in several species, especially dolphins and chimpanzees. however this does not mean that we can, by extension, infer the same kind of processing in other animals. We've barely scratched the surface in the species about which we have our suspicions.

 

I realise your interpretation of the behaviour is an interpretation of the behaviour; what I'm asking is why you chose that particular take on affairs. What, in your view, is the perceivable mechanism?[/quote']

This is probably a bad way to construct a percievable mechanism, but basically whatever behavior that non-conditioned, not hardwired into genes, and not reflexive is usually indicative of behavior that is "reasoned" or requires some kind of processing. I dont know if nonconditioned-nonhardwired-nonreflexive behaviors have a name (maybe they are just called "voluntary" behaviors for short?), its much easier to explain what they arent than what they are. Here is a list of various things I can think of that might be evident of some level of mental processing:

 

* For the most part, any kind of ingenious problem-solving ability would a good indication of animal awareness. Use of tools come to mind, such as a monkeys use of a stick to dig ants out of a hole, animals that use rocks to break open ostrich eggs, or a herons use of twigs to attract minnoes to the surface of water seem to indicate that it has some ability to deduce the consequences of its actions.

 

* Solving problems that have been unprepared for as a matter of any kind of previous conditioning or genetic predisposition indicate some level of awareness, as awareness is the most efficient way to solve these problems.

 

* I would also amount non-reinforced learning to some indication of internal processing, such as learning a dance routine by watching others, or a cow who discovers a source of water from watching other cows, or birds who learn to fly by watching others.

 

* To some extent, goal-oriented behavior and self-monitoring are good indicators of some type of awareness about the environment. Birds who learn to fly are goal-oriented in their deliberate efforts to perfect their ability to fly on their first few failed attempts.

 

* Coordinated behavior that is invested in the protection of the animal (such as an animal guarding itself because it is in pain) is an indicator of self-awareness, because the behaviors necessitate mental experiences that are more than simply reflexes.

 

* Comparitive behavior, such as an animal comparing its own size to that of another animal to determine whether it should fight it, is an indication of self-awareness in the most literal sense of the word (if at least they have a sense of how big they are).

 

* Sensations or emotions are a precursor to an animal developing interests or thoughts about itself at all. Without going into detail, certain kinds of behaviors with consideration to environmental circumstances (such as an animal who hurts itself and begins to writh in pain), especially when the behavior is remedied at the application of anethetics, are indicative that an animal is experience some kind of mental state rather than reacting reflexily. Singer would argue that ability to feel pain or pleasure is basically the same thing as being sentient. This much alone is all that is necessary for me to conclude that certain animals, including cows, are self-aware.

 

* Complex social interaction indicates that animals have the ability to discriminate the difference of which parts belong to which animals.

 

* Awareness of a "pecking order", or other kind of social hierarchy indicates an animals ability to say "I belong here in relation to them", which is a strong indication of self-awareness.

 

* Animals capable of experiencing frustration are an indication that they possess not only awareness, but intentions and expectations. For instance, birds prevented from performing their natural behavior of building nests experience hormonal changes that are damaging to their health - without anthropomorphosizing, this effect can be reasonably be called anxiety or stress.

 

* Companionship is an indication of awareness of a conscious bond between two animals. My cat has a habit of laying on my lap as I work on things at the computer, he prefers me above any other people who might come to visit - there isnt any obvious gain or detriment to bugging me at the computer all day than sleeping on a vent or in the sunlight. He seems to behave in a way that acknowledges my existence as a seperate mind from itself (it actually brings me dead mice *shudder*) rather than something that moves around and pours food into his bowl. Cows exibit similar behaviors. This is a very strong indication that my cat, among other animals, have a "theory of mind", which highly relevant to assessing whether animals are self-aware at all.

 

A personal bond is something of an elaboration here. The behaviour of the cow may simply become less vigorous because it is not biologically efficient to do otherwise. Virtually all known behaviour is a product of energy cost needing to be less than energy gains, the consequences of which can play out across an individual's day, or multiple generations (which, in many cases, can make for an awkward situation to study.)

I can think of certain situations that seem to be an irrational waste of energy - playfulness being the most immediate example.

 

Where animals engaging in play wastes enormous amounts energy, the animals usually dont need much improvement for muscular and physical functions. It has a more beneficial purpose of developing an animal mentally by increasing its adaptibility, inventiveness, versatility, flexibility, etc. Lots of studies on rats show that keeping a rat physically stimulated (by giving it something new to play with everyday) has obvious mental benefits like improved memory.

 

At least in that sense, thinking about animal behavior isnt so pressed against the behavioristic fence.

 

Consciousness is indeed a good "stay alive" strategy. But we shouldn't therefore conclude that cows are conscious because they are sometimes alive.

I would consider sleeping to be one of the most irrational "stay alive" behaviors for an animal to engage in, in fact shutting off most of your awareness to your surroundings for several hours at a time (as opposed to merely laying about) is probably a very good way to get eaten. Sleeping doesnt seem to have any adaptive advantage at all - except for things which are conscious throughout the day, in which sleeping is a necessary behavior to maintain some level of conscious awareness about the world without going crazy. Short bursts of brain activity in the visual and auditory regions of the brain indicate that cows and most mammals can even dream while asleep.

 

If the animal werent conscious, then sleep behavior would be unnecessary (and even detrimental) - I assume the cost/benefit of consciousness (sleeping vs. energy conservation vs. some level of awareness and reacting to environment) all compete with one another, with consciousness having the most beneficial selective advantage above non-conscious alternatives.

 

Then this becomes a discussion as to why it is immoral to kill a cow' date=' surely?

 

To be honest it would probably be less tiring for us both to argue over the ethics of it without a common definition.[/quote']

Very much, yes.

 

Not really. Unless I spectacularly missed out on something' date=' you appeared to say that killing a cow is unethical because it is unethical.

 

I really don't see how you can claim it is a red herring, when the discussion has its roots in your original response to my question.

You said, in DIRECT response to "why is it unethical to kill a cow":

 

I ruled out sufferance by pointing out it wasn't a provision. Therefore this has become a discussion as to whether or not cows can "want not to die", which is inherently related to consciousness and self-awareness, with the validity of your answer to my question being the stakes of the debate.[/quote']

Do you think the interests of beings is of any moral relevance at all?

 

I think interests are very relevant to morality - this type of ethics is a form of utilitarianism. In this sense, it is ethical to maximize the interests of things, unethical to do things contrary to the interests of things - I'm sure it really isnt necessary for me to explain that not all interests carry the same moral weight (i.e. throwing spitballs at a person against their interests is much less unethical than torturing that person), and that sometimes conflicts in interests require weighting consequences of the actions.

 

Right now, I am slightly fatigued at the moment, and will be going to bed, so I wont be terribly winded about it, but an "interest" is exactly what it sounds like - a basic desire or something sought to avoid.

 

Not to say cows need to be taught to have an interest in their own life, but I can expose a cow to certain situations which demonstrates its existent interest in the continuation of its own life (or, if an interest in its own life isnt obvious, perhaps other interests that, in order to be respected, require the continuation of its own life). These are morally relevant characteristics, and hence to kill a cow is unethical).

 

I can very easily see where you might read this part of my post as being nothing more than a shifting of semantics to get out of hole, but that isnt the case - "interests in preservation of ones own life" are related to "not wanting to die" (they are the same thing to me), if you read through any of my other posts with the keyword "interests" you'll see that I've argued this position consistently from the beginning.

 

In a basic ethical sense, I would argue that it is profoundly unethical to kill a cow (or a human) that requires them to experience extreme pain. All things being equal, it is less unethical to kill a cow (or a human) painlessly, such as with anesthetic. All things being equal, it is less unethical to kill a cow (or a human) without their suffering or knowledge that they will die (such as in their sleep). All things being equal, it is ethical to respect the interests in continuation of life and in not wanting to be tortured of both cows and humans.

 

Hopefully I've made sense of where I'm coming from.

 

That doesn't mean anything to the premise you started out on. If you are intending to redefine the terms of your response, then you should say so.

I dont think I am. At least not intentionally.

 

I did actually mean the murder of people. I use the term in its legal sense, wherein a non-human victim would be said to have been "killed".

Ah, well the refraining from murder of humans has a lot of different interpretations.

 

I can think of lots of justications for not taking human lives, including contractarian interpretations (sophisticated, but not credible in the philosophical sense), sacred life justifications (these usually involve double-talk, and arent worth much), divine command (the first problem being the questionable axiom of some type of deity existing in the first place, the second problem being an application of Euthrypo's dilemma, the third problem being that divine command carry no more prescriptive force than my own commands), etc. I still prefer the interests/suffering point of view.

 

 

By the way, Sayonara, your posts have been lovely, and very intellectually stimulating But having exhausted basically everything that I know about animals, and being very tired, I must be getting my sleep now.

 

All the best,

In My Memory

[Sayonara]

By the way, Sayonara, your posts have been lovely, and very intellectually stimulating But having exhausted basically everything that I know about animals, and being very tired, I must be getting my sleep now.

Agreed - it's nice to have a proper debate once in a while

 

Like you I'm up to my tired eyes in stuff, so I'll reply just as soon as I can!

[Guest rizzlmeshizz]

if animal testing is right y do ppl say it wrong?

[Sayonara]

If I say it's a banana, does that make it a banana?

[ed84c]

animal Testing Wrong.

 

Humans by definition are arseholes, why should animals suffer to save us?

 

Well sorry thats a bit blunt, but you know what i mean, when do animals purpousely try to upset you? when do they talk behind your back? When do they take the pis*?

[Sayonara]

"I'm going to totally ignore the progressive discussion and make useless comparisons."

[ed84c]

no my point was, that genrally speaking it seems that animals will upset me far less that humans, and as such i would be more concerned about their welfare than that of humans.

 

I was just putting my view into the discussion although against the flow, it was the purpous of the thread.

[Aardvark]

no my point was' date=' that genrally speaking it seems that animals will upset me far less that humans, and as such i would be more concerned about their welfare than that of humans.

 

I was just putting my view into the discussion although against the flow, it was the purpous of the thread.[/quote']

 

If you are going to argue that animals are in some way inately superior to humans and thus deserve greater consideration and rights there are probably better ways to express yourself than simply calling humans a*******s.

 

If you seriously want to argue that point of view i would be most interested in how you arrive at and support it.

[Hellbender]

If you are going to argue that animals are in some way inately superior to humans and thus deserve greater consideration and rights there are probably better ways to express yourself than simply calling humans a*******s.

 

If you seriously want to argue that point of view i would be most interested in how you arrive at and support it.

 

although I agree that this opinion needs further explanation if he wants to pursue it further, there is no need to explain one's opinion.

[Lance]

although I agree that this opinion needs further explanation if he wants to pursue it further, there is no need to explain one's opinion.

 

There is if he wants it to hold any weight on a science forum.

[Hellbender]

There is if he wants it to hold any weight on a science forum.

 

true